PLATO

PHAEDRUS

EDITED BY

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To Frédérique

κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν, ὥστ' ἐκφανέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον

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PREFACE

Like other great works of Greek literature, the *Phaedrus* comes to us laden with established views and previous interpretations. The dialogue has acquired the additional burden of being considered important, and interpreted accordingly, in accounts of Plato's thought, of the intellectual debates of fourth-century Greece, and of the development of Greek culture and Western metaphysics. There is no better remedy, it seems to me, than an encounter with the dialogue itself. I have attempted to loosen up a bit the constraints of received wisdom and to take a fresh look at what Plato says in this dialogue to his contemporary audience and how he chooses to say it. Furthermore, in the ongoing process of reading and interpreting the *Phaedrus*, an approach that returns to the dialogue itself would make a timely contribution.

Of the vast secondary literature on the *Phaedrus*, I cite only those items that seem most useful for understanding whatever point is at issue; this is an economy that should benefit readers of this edition. For questions of syntax, I refer to Guy Cooper's *Attic Greek prose syntax* (*AGPS*) because it contains a wealth of informative examples and recognizes significant subtleties that go unremarked in other reference grammars. A new edition of Hermias' commentary on the *Phaedrus* by C. Lucarini and C. Moreschini (De Gruyter) is still forthcoming as of this writing, and thus could not be used in this edition.

Doing this work, I have benefited from a great deal of criticism, learning, advice, and assistance generously bestowed. My debt to Pat Easterling and Richard Hunter is enormous, and surpassed only by the pleasure I have been afforded in working with them. I am deeply indebted to Jefferds Huyck, whose critical reading of various drafts has been instrumental. I am grateful to Christian Brockmann, Frédérique Woerther, and Paul Cartledge for criticism and advice on particular questions; to Helen Van Noorden and Jenny Bryan for including me in their April 2009 colloquium on the *Phaedrus*; to the students of Hunter Rawlings at Cornell University for feedback on a draft of the commentary; to Michael Sharp, Elizabeth Hanlon, and Elizabeth Davey for their work at the press; and to Iveta Adams for excellent copy-editing. Finally, it gives me great pleasure to acknowledge friends and colleagues, old and new, of Jesus College and the Faculty of Classics of Cambridge University, who made an old student feel at home and contributed materially to the progress of this project.

Houston, Texas H. Y.
31 July 2010

ABBREVIATIONS

DIALOGUES OF PLATO CITED IN THE INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY


Alc.	*Alcibiades*
Ap.	*Apology*
Chrm.	*Charmides*
Cra.	*Cratylus*
Cri.	*Crito*
Epist.	*Epistles*
Euthd.	*Euthydemus*
Euthphr.	*Euthyphro*
Grg.	*Gorgias*
Hp. mi.	*Hippias minor*
Ion	
Lach.	*Laches*
Laws	
Lys.	*Lysis*
Menex.	*Menexenus*
Meno	
Phd.	*Phaedo*
Phdr.	*Phaedrus*
Phlb.	*Philebus*
Plt.	*Politicus* (*Statesman*)
Prm.	*Parmenides*
Prt.	*Protagoras*
Rep.	*Republic*
Smp.	*Symposium*
Sph.	*Sophist*
Tht.	*Theaetetus*
Ti.	*Timaeus*

OTHER ABBREVIATIONS


AGPS	G. L. Cooper, III, after K. W. Krüger, *Attic Greek prose syntax*, 2 vols. (Ann Arbor 1998). Cited by paragraph number.
Alcid.	Alcidamas
AS	L. Radermacher, ed. *Artium scriptores (Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik)* (Vienna 1951). Cited by author number and paragraph number.

CPF	F. Adorno *et al.*, eds. *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini* (Florence 1989–). Cited by author number and papyrus number.
DK	H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th edn. (Berlin 1952). Cited by author number and fragment number.
FGE	D. L. Page, ed. *Further Greek epigrams* (Cambridge 1981).
GP	J. D. Denniston, *The Greek particles*, 2nd edn. (Oxford 1954).
Hermias	Commentary by Hermias of Alexandria (cf. Introd. note 69). Cited by page and line number from P. Couvreur, ed. *Hermiae Alexandrini in Platonis Phaedrum scholia* (Paris 1901; reprinted Hildesheim 1971).
LSJ	H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. Stuart Jones, *A Greek-English lexicon*, 9th edn. (Oxford 1940), with revised supplement (Oxford 1996).
PCG	R. Kassel and C. Austin, eds. *Poetae comici Graeci* (Berlin 1983–). Cited by author name and fragment number.
Ph.	Phaedrus
PMG	D. L. Page, ed. *Poetae melici Graeci* (Oxford 1962). Cited by author name and fragment number.
PMGF	M. Davies, ed. *Poetarum melicorum Graecorum fragmenta* (Oxford 1991). Cited by author name and fragment number.
S.	Socrates
Σ	Scholion. Scholia to the *Phaedrus* cited from D. Cufalo, ed. *Scholia Graeca in Platonem*, vol. I. *Scholia ad dialogos tetralogiarum I–VII continens* (Rome 2007).
SSR	G. Giannantoni, ed. *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae* (Naples 1990). Cited by author name and fragment number.
TrGF	B. Snell, R. Kannicht, and S. Radt, eds. *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta* (Göttingen 1971–2004). Cited by author name and fragment number.

Abbreviations of authors, texts, and reference works not listed above follow the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd edn. For works of modern scholarship cited by author's name and date of publication, full references are given in the bibliography.



Map 1 Approximate route of Socrates and Phaedrus



Map 2 Athens

INTRODUCTION

1. APPROACHING THE *PHAEDRUS*

Plato's dialogues are masterpieces of the literary representation of philosophical conversations. Yet the *Phaedrus* stands out even in Plato's corpus. The dialogue's formal structure makes evident the main topics.[1] After the opening scene establishes Ph.'s enthusiasm for Lysias' rhetorical art and S.'s intention to examine it, Ph. reads Lysias' speech on *erōs* aloud to his companion, whereupon S. delivers extempore two speeches on *erōs* of his own. Then, just past the halfway point, the dialogue undergoes its most overt change in style and substance as S. shifts from the rhetorical presentations on *erōs* to a dialectical inquiry into the nature of good discourse. The inquiry is concerned mostly with the art of rhetoric, but concludes with a consideration of written texts and dialectic. Beyond the topics that are given formal prominence – *erōs*, rhetoric, dialectic, written texts – other important themes that arise in the conversation include philosophy, beauty, play, the soul, the gods, the sophists, and the nature of *technē*.

Beyond the forms of discourse that structure the dialogue – the rhetorical speeches of the first half, the dialectical inquiry of the second half – S. addresses Ph. in friendly and ironic conversation, in allegories and myths, in didactic argument, in studied artificial language. S. prays; he quotes and invents verse; he mocks sophistic pretenders to rhetorical art. S.'s second speech on *erōs*, his "palinode" as he calls it in imitation of Stesichorus' poem of that name (243a2–b6, 257a3), is so imaginative and large that it threatens to dominate the dialogue as a whole. But it is prevented from dominating because in the following dialectical inquiry, as an example of rhetorical discourse, it is relegated to a status that is secondary to and less serious than dialectic (265c8–d2n.). To present this complex web of topics and forms of discourse, Plato adopts the simplest dialogue form, direct speech between S. and a single interlocutor.[2] The conversation begins, proceeds, and ends with captivating, unbroken naturalness, as if the whole thing were no more than a simple conversation between friends.

Since antiquity readers have sought to articulate what the dialogue as a whole is about.[3] Beyond the intriguing nature of the problem, they have felt encouraged, or perhaps provoked, to make the attempt by S.'s comment on the need for design in artistic discourse, which he calls "logographic necessity" (ἀνάγκην λογογραφικήν, lit. "necessity in the composition of discourse," 264b7).

[1] The synopsis in the appendix displays the contents of the dialogue.

[2] McCabe 2006 on the dialogue forms used by Plato.

[3] The earliest extant commentary on the *Phaedrus*, by the Neoplatonist Hermias of Alexandria (fifth century CE), opens with a discussion of the dialogue's σκόπος, "aim," which is a way of formulating the question of unity (Hermias 8.15–12.25). On Hermias, see note 69 below.

S. makes the comment while criticizing Lysias' speech in the dialogue, but it is clearly implied that S.'s point applies to all artistic discourse (264b6–8n.), which surely includes the *Phaedrus*. So Plato suggests that the *Phaedrus* too has design even though the dialogue is so rich and multifaceted that an account of its thematic unity continues to be elusive.[4] Nevertheless, the very act of reading forces us to believe in, and seek for, some structuring design.[5] One approach is to consider what S. means by "logographic necessity" and how it characterizes the dialogue's plot. As it unfolds, the plot shows how Ph., under S.'s influence, moves away from Lysias and towards S., away from sophistic rhetoric and towards philosophy.[6]

2. DESIGN, COMPLEXITY, AND THE PLOT

S. employs the term "logographic necessity" (the only instance in Plato's corpus) while he is considering how persuasion can be produced by art (πείθειν τέχνῃ, 260d8; 261c9–d1n.). Only a speaker who has knowledge of the subject matter of his discourse is in a position to persuade by art; such a speaker persuades by moving the auditor step by step from the view which he or she holds at the outset to the view which the speaker wants the auditor to hold at the conclusion (261e5–262c3). In a discourse that produces this effect by art, the author will have composed the parts of the discourse and placed them in a particular order so that as a whole the discourse produces the desired effect on the auditor (264c3–6n.). By "parts of the discourse" (τὰ τοῦ λόγου, 264b3) S. means not formal elements such as introduction, narrative, and conclusion, which he disparages (266d7–e4, 267d2–4), but the steps of the argument that move the auditor from his or her initial view to the view which the speaker wants the auditor to hold at the end (262a2–3n., 262b6–8).

In denying that Lysias' speech possesses design, S. points out that the speech seems to begin at the end and to have been thrown together at random, and that there is no reason why any of the parts of the speech should occupy the place it has rather than any other place (264a5–b8). S. also compares a grave epigram composed for Midas, in which the four lines that constitute the epigram can stand in any order, and it makes no difference to the effect of the whole (264c8–e2). Hence in speeches that possess design there is a compelling reason, related to the persuasive goal of the speech, for the elements of the discourse to be what they are and be set out in a particular order. There is also a compelling

4 Werner 2007 is a comprehensive review. It is anachronistic to expect thematic unity, which is distinct from the question of design, in literary and dramatic works of classical Greece (Heath 1989).

5 For the basis of this natural view of reading, cf. Hirsch 1976.

6 The term "sophistic rhetoric" covers the complete range of rhetorical theories put forward by the sophists. This usage follows Plato's (260d1n., d4n.), to whom the differences among the sophists' rhetorical theories were trivial (266d5–269d1). What all forms of sophistic rhetoric have in common and what renders them all futile is the notion that a speaker can persuade by art without knowledge of the subject of his discourse (Introd. 4).

quality to the persuasion that is produced when discourses are composed with design (271b2–4n.).

Plato, who composed the speech attributed to Lysias in the dialogue (230e6–234c5n.), made its lack of design conspicuous. Not only are the parts of the speech placed in a tedious, interchangeable order (231a7n., d6n.), but as a work of epideictic rhetoric the speech is not meant to have any effect at all on the young male auditor to whom it is ostensibly addressed. The young man is addressed by an older man, who argues that the young man should grant sexual favors to him, the speaker, even though he does not love him, in preference to an older man who does love him.[7] But the deliberative framework is merely formal and functions rather as a platform for Lysias to address his audience of rhetorical enthusiasts and impress them with his cleverness and verbal skill (234e4–235a7, 257e1–258d10n.). By contrast, S. refers to both of his speeches, advising the same young man on his choice of suitor, as examples of true rhetorical art (262c4–266d4n., 262c8–d2n.). Both speeches – one condemning *erōs*, one praising – take their respective deliberative tasks seriously. Both are tightly woven compositions in which every element contributes to the persuasive goal and does so because of its position in the sequence of elements that make up the whole (237a7–241d1n., 243e7–257b6n.). S.'s speeches are epideictic only in the sense that they demonstrate what effective deliberative rhetoric consists in. They are lessons in rhetorical art (264e6–265d2), not attempts at impressing an audience that enjoys verbal games.

The compelling quality of S.'s speeches on *erōs* is apparent in their construction, but we can only guess what effect they would have on the imaginary young man to whom they are addressed. The most striking example of design in the *Phaedrus* occurs in the plot, in which we see Ph. change as a result of the discourse that S. addresses to him over the course of the dialogue. When the two encounter each other at the start, Ph. is utterly taken by the cleverness of Lysias' epideictic art (227c3–228a4, 234c6–d4), and he is on his way with text in hand to practice that art himself (228d6–e4). Ph.'s attraction to Lysias' art reflects his native passion for what is beautiful and fine (228a4n.). Hence the problem faced by S.: how can this individual, whose interest in epideictic rhetoric masks an aptitude for philosophy, be stopped from his current course and moved to adopt philosophical values and to pursue philosophy instead? By the end of the dialogue Ph. has abandoned his intention to practice epideictic rhetoric. All his prior enthusiasm for Lysias,

[7] Lysias' and S.'s speeches on *erōs* are based on Greek pederasty, the set of sexual–social customs in which an adult male (ὁ ἐραστής, "lover") courted, and when successful had sex with, an adolescent male (ὁ ἐρώμενος, "beloved," or τὰ παιδικά, "darling"). Normally the *erastēs* also offered his *erōmenos* an informal education in the ways of society and adulthood. Such relationships were a basic part of upper-class Athenian life, existed for the *erastēs* alongside marriage, were socially approved at least when they observed certain limits, and are widespread in Athenian culture and art. The best comprehensive account remains Dover 1989. See also Cantarella 2002: 17–53 for a brief account, Cohen 1991: 171–202 on social regulation, Lear and Cantarella 2008 on iconographical evidence.

the sophists, their rhetoric, and their texts has vanished. S. has kindled in Ph. a desire for the transcendent goals of philosophy (in the palinode) and introduced him to the dialectical discussion used by philosophers (in the inquiry into rhetoric). S. has shown that oral dialectic is much better at advancing knowledge and understanding than written texts (274b7–278c3). Ph. has declared (278b4n.) and confirmed (279c5n.) his intention to pursue philosophy. The dialogue ends on a positive note of joint philosophical endeavor (279c6n.). To be sure, Ph. has not yet become a philosopher; and Ph.'s aptitude for philosophy lies more in his appreciation of beauty than in his skill at dialectic. Yet S. has turned Ph. towards philosophy and brought him, so to speak, to the threshold. Having come that far, Ph. is immeasurably better off than he was at the outset; and the opportunity to progress towards serious engagement with philosophy now lies before him. Whether Ph. will, like Lysias' brother Polemarchus (257b3–4), become a serious student of philosophy is beyond Plato's concern in the dialogue.

To move Ph. away from sophistic epideictic rhetoric and towards philosophy is S.'s goal from the moment he accosts him at the outset, as Plato suggests through S.'s irony in the scenes leading up to the palinode, and as S. makes explicit in his prayer to Eros at the end of the palinode (257b4–6). Until Ph. hears S.'s prayer, Ph. is unaware that S. is seeking to have this effect on him. Hence all of S.'s utterances until the end of the palinode have a double sense. The superficial sense, addressed to Ph., is that in which S. responds to Ph.'s utterances and moves the dialogue with him forward. The underlying or ironic sense, addressed to the reader, indicates S.'s intent of moving Ph. towards philosophy and reveals how at each moment S. is leading him towards the goal. S.'s care for Ph. being evident throughout, his irony is gentle, well-intentioned, and amusing.

In the opening scene, while S. and Ph. banter and meander in the countryside, S. is maneuvering Ph. into reading him Lysias' speech in a suitable, isolated spot. S.'s purpose is to provoke a contest between Lysias and himself with Ph. as judge and thereby to gain an opportunity to change Ph.'s allegiance. Following the probing nature of S.'s question that opens the dialogue, "Ph., my friend, where to and where from?" (227a1n.), the process begins with S.'s second utterance, which puts the focus on Lysias and dismisses Ph.'s other concerns (227b2n.). As the scene progresses S. expresses interest in Lysias' speech for its novelty and cleverness, which is how Ph. understands him. But repeated irony makes it impossible for the reader to take S. at his word.[8] S. is actually interested in Lysias' speech just because of Ph.'s interest in it, which S. exploits in order to lure Ph. into reading it aloud. Ph. assents to each stage of this process because S. knows his interlocutor well enough to know just what to say in order to produce his assent (228a5n.). The two small-scale set pieces of the opening scene – S.'s rejection of rationalizing myth (229c5–230a6) and his rhetorical outburst upon arriving at the pleasant spot under the plane tree (230b2–c4) – are ironic in that their import for

[8] 227b6–7n., b9–10n., c8n., d3–5n., 229e4n., 230d7–e1n.

the educational endeavor that lies ahead for Ph. is made apparent to the reader (229c5–230a6n., 230a3–6n., 230b2–e1n.) while Ph. remains unaware (230c5–d2).

Following the reading of Lysias' speech, S. declines to share Ph.'s enthusiasm for it, which brings into the open the underlying difference between their views of what constitutes good rhetoric (234c6–235d2). S. exploits that difference in order to manipulate Ph. into urging him to deliver a speech of his own in reply (235d3–236e8). The very success of S.'s speech – the potency of its argument against *erōs* – provokes the crisis that makes it necessary for S. to deliver a second speech, his palinode, to make amends for his offense against Eros in the first speech (241d2–242b5). The seriousness of the crisis is assured by the appearance of S.'s divine voice (242b7–8n.), which prevents him from leaving the spot under the plane tree before he has delivered the palinode (243a2–b6). Ph.'s assistance as attentive auditor is required as well (243c2–3n., e6n.). S. now has Ph. in the position that he was seeking from the beginning. The palinode is S.'s best effort at presenting the case for philosophy most effectively to a soul such as Ph. (257a2–4). Ph. has been prepared, and it is up to him whether he responds positively or not. By echoing S.'s closing prayer that he give up epideictic rhetoric and devote himself to philosophy (257b7–c1), Ph. indicates that S.'s effort has not failed, which is appropriate given the brilliance of the speech that Plato composed for him.

But S.'s task is not complete. Assenting to S.'s prayer that he take up philosophy, Ph. appends a condition – "if it is better for us" (i.e. for Lysias as well as Ph., 257b7–c1) – which S. answers in the rest of the dialogue. Now openly assuming the role of Ph.'s teacher in philosophy (261a3–5), S. no longer pursues a hidden agenda for Ph. under the guise of irony. But S.'s didactic discourse is no less strategic, no less a matter of eliciting the right response in order to lead Ph. towards the goal. Out of Ph.'s chance reference to a politician who criticized Lysias for being a speechwriter (257c1–6), S. fashions the inquiry that serves as Ph.'s initiation into dialectical philosophy (257c7–258e4): what constitutes good discourse? When complete, the inquiry will enable Ph. to understand why sophistic rhetoric is fundamentally misguided, why true rhetoric requires philosophy, and why philosophy is a better, nobler pursuit than sophistic rhetoric. If Ph. acquires these convictions on the basis of reasoned argument, the attachment to philosophy that was formed in the palinode will be strengthened. Had Ph. made a different remark, S. would have been able to use that remark to fashion the same inquiry, such being the nature of his expertise in discourse (271c9–272b4n.). Before launching the inquiry, S. prepares Ph. for its rigors, to which he is unaccustomed, by the parable of the cicadas, which urges perseverance for the sake of the divine pleasure and honor that dialectical pursuits afford (258e5–259d6n.).

In a short space the inquiry covers much ground (259e2–274b6n.): S. introduces a new theory of rhetoric that includes dialectic as the means of generating arguments and psychology as the basis for style, while also demonstrating the failure of sophistic rhetoric as a whole. There is no lack of dense argument and abstruse detail. To help Ph. through this thicket, S. not only seeks and obtains

Ph.'s assent at each step, but he relieves abstract argument with examples from the speeches in the dialogue (262c4–7), digresses to answer Ph.'s particular concern (261b4–e4), chooses as exemplary experts figures whom Ph. knows and will accept (268a7–8n., 268c5n., 269a5n.), and simplifies a difficult argument on *physis* by proceeding from general to specific (269d2–272b6n.). In his interactions with Ph., S. shows himself to be a μουσικός, not a cultured gentleman (268d7n.) but an expert in face-to-face dialectical instruction (268e1–2n.) and a follower of Plato's philosophical Muses (248d3, 259d2–5).

Ph.'s success in following the arduous account of rhetoric is evident from the ease with which, no longer an utter neophyte, he follows the final stage of the inquiry devoted to writing (274b7–278e3). Formerly S. addressed Ph. in mythical discourse because it suited him (230a3–6n., 257a3–4n.); now S. rebukes Ph. for his impatience with the Egyptian myth (274c4, 275b3–c2). Ph. not only follows S.'s argument but contributes to it (276a7–8n., e1–3n.). Ph. provokes S.'s comment on Isocrates, which goes beyond what S. had intended to discuss (278e4–8). At the end, following Ph.'s confirmation of his intent to pursue philosophy (279c5), now without condition, S. and Ph. acknowledge each other as friends and partners in the pursuit of wisdom (279c5n., c6n.). Evidently S. has changed Ph. since he left the Morychian house, where he spent the morning enthralled by Lysias. To appreciate the magnitude of the event, compare the *Euthyphro* and *Ion*, dialogues in which S. also addresses a single interlocutor whose fortuitous encounter with S. is, like that of Ph., full of potential. Yet unlike S.'s discourse in the *Phaedrus*, the Socratic *elenchos* ("examination," as S.'s discourse in these dialogues is known) leads them to *aporia*, or "impasse."[9] The reader may be instructed, but the interlocutor departs utterly unchanged. Euthyphro and Ion may seem to have little aptitude for philosophy, yet S. does not adapt his discourse to their needs and aptitudes. Ph.'s initial enthusiasm for Lysias' speech hardly seems to be a good omen for philosophical endeavors, and his aptitude for philosophy becomes apparent only under S.'s tutelage.

All of S.'s utterances in their unpredictable variety of form and content belong to the artfully contrived sequence that moves Ph. forward step by step towards the goal. The design of the dialogue as a whole consists in the coherence of the sequence such that the effect – the change that S. produces in Ph. – is convincing. This does not mean that S.'s conversation with Ph. could not (conceivably) have turned out otherwise. It means that the way it does turn out makes good sense. If that is the case, then the complexity of the dialogue itself contributes to its coherence. S. suggests the reason for this convergence of complexity and meaning when he recalls the part of his rhetorical doctrine according to which the expert determines the style of his discourse in regard to the nature of the soul being addressed (271b2–4n.). The rhetorical expert "offers a variegated soul variegated and all-inclusive discourses" (ποικίλῃ μὲν ποικίλους ψυχῇ καὶ παναρμονίους

9 Vlastos 1983 on the Socratic *elenchos*.

διδοὺς λόγους, 277c2–3). The liveliness of S.'s metaphors for complexity, and the artificiality of his word order and sound play, suggest a boldness in this *rhētōr*'s art (277c2–3n.), in which form strictly follows function. Discourse should be as complex as it needs to be to persuade the soul being addressed. In Ph. S. faces a complex, "variegated soul" (e.g. 228b5–c3, 234d2–6, 242a6–b5). The "variegated, all-inclusive discourses" that S. addresses to Ph. are no more or less complex than is needed for the task at hand.

3. PHAEDRUS, LYSIAS, AND THE DRAMATIC DATE

One aspect of the plot that requires scrutiny is Ph.'s age and his status as either potential *erastēs* or potential *erōmenos*. The question matters for our understanding of what and how he learns at S.'s hands. It has been claimed that Ph. is a young man and potential *erōmenos* like the young man addressed in the speeches on *erōs*, and that, like the young Alcibiades, Charmides, and other handsome young men (παρὰ τοῖς καλοῖς, 257b1), Ph. is lured towards philosophy by erotic tension with S. as his (philosophical) *erastēs*.[10] One passage in particular might seem to support this reading. Before he begins his palinode, S. seeks the imagined young man he addressed in his first speech to make sure he hears the palinode before he acts, to his detriment, on the advice in that speech (243e4–5). Ph. responds, "here he is ever right next to you whenever you wish" (243e6), which has been taken to mean that Ph. reveals himself to be the young man and potential *erōmenos* addressed in the speeches on *erōs*.[11] It is also claimed that S. prepares Ph. for his seduction in the palinode by sexual innuendo in the opening scene and by the beauty of the isolated bower in which their conversation unfolds (230b2–c4).[12] In fact, though Ph. is younger than S. (236d1), he is not an adolescent but an adult, and far from being a potential *erōmenos* to S., Lysias, or anyone else, Ph. is a potential *erastēs*.

Ph. son of Pythocles of the deme Myrrhinus (244a1), a well-attested historical personage, was born no later than 444 and possibly as early as 450.[13] Though Plato gives no precise indication of when the dialogue may be supposed to take place (beyond the *terminus ante quem* of S.'s death in 399), he conveys a general,

[10] Asmis 1986, Nussbaum 1986: 200–33 are the most thorough formulations. The view is common but not universal (Parmentier 1926, Görgemanns 1993: 141–2). The idea of Ph. as an *erōmenos* was considered in antiquity: Maximus of Tyre, *Dialexis* 38.4, Hermias 1.10, 11.20–32.

[11] Three other passages are adduced in support of the view of Ph. as potential *erōmenos*, mistakenly. The vocatives ὦ νεανία (257c7), ὦ παῖ (267c5) with which S. addresses Ph. do not mean that he is a youth, but tease him for his inability to understand the point at issue. When S. calls Ph. καλλίπαιδα (261a3), he means not "beautiful boy" but "who has beautiful children," which refers to Ph.'s ability to elicit discourses, his "children" (261a3n.).

[12] The beauty of the isolated bower turns out to be less an incentive to seduction than a stimulus for philosophical discussion (258e5–259d6n.). The sexual innuendo is discussed below, note 20.

[13] Biographical information in Nails 2002: 232–4. Ph. died in 393.

imprecise sense of the last ten or fifteen years of the fifth century, at which time Ph. would be in his thirties or forties. There are four historical indications in the dialogue.[14] First, Lysias' brother Polemarchus is still alive (257b3–4); his death at the hands of the Thirty Tyrants in 403 was well known in the fourth century through Lysias' account of it (Lys. 12). Second, Isocrates, born in 436, is old enough to have begun his rhetorical studies (279a4–7) but "still young" (νέος ἔτι, 279a1). The reference is sufficiently vague to suit any time after roughly 418, when Isocrates would be eighteen, until perhaps 403 when he began his career as a professional prose-writer (279a1–2n., a6–7n.). Yet, thirdly, Lysias' status as the leading rhetorical writer of the day (228a2, 278c1–2) suggests a time not much, if at all, before 403. Lysias' (genuine) surviving speeches all stem from 403 and after, when Athenian democracy was restored and his career flourished.[15] Finally, a politician's supposed attack on Lysias for being a speechwriter also makes sense at the time of the democratic restoration or shortly thereafter (257c5n.).

Plato chose Lysias to represent the rhetorical culture that Ph. admires and S. opposes because Lysias was the preeminent rhetorical artist and most prolific speechwriter before Isocrates, Plato's own rival (278e4–279b3n.).[16] Lysias solidified his reputation by circulating his speeches in written form, which also anticipated Isocrates and made Lysias an appropriate target for Plato's critique of written texts. Further, Lysias was connected to S.'s circle through his brother Polemarchus and father Cephalus, both of whom have memorable roles in the *Republic* (1.327b–336a; Lysias is also present but says nothing, 1.328b). Plato was interested less in historical precision than in a scenario that from the perspective of forty or fifty years later was plausible, while allowing him to create the fictional encounter that served his philosophical purposes.[17] Plato evidently expected his readers to have no trouble imagining a conversation between S. and Ph., undisturbed by politics and war, at a time when Polemarchus had turned to philosophy, Isocrates had begun his rhetorical studies but was still young, and Lysias was at the height of his artistry and fame.[18]

Beyond the imprecise dramatic date, Ph.'s status as an adult and potential *erastēs* is evident from Plato's portrayal of him. S. regards Ph. as the most prolific

[14] In addition, the way in which S. refers to Sophocles (d. 406/405) and Euripides (d. 407/406) might suggest that they are alive at the time of the dialogue (268c5, 269a1).

[15] Todd 2007: 12–17. Ancient tradition puts Lysias' birth in 459/458, modern scholarship puts it in the mid 440s (Todd 2007: 10).

[16] Usher 1999: 54–118 on Lysias' artistry and corpus.

[17] Nails 2002: 308–29, Graham 2007 demonstrate Plato's lack of concern for historical precision even in dialogues that have specific dramatic dates.

[18] Two further issues, regarding the presence of Ph. and Lysias in Athens yet external to the dialogue, have been debated: Ph. was exiled in 415 for his role in the profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries (Andoc. 1.15, *IG* i³ 422.229, 426.102) and the date of his return to Athens, possibly not until the amnesty of 403, is unknown; Lysias spent years in Thurii, but the date of his return to Athens is disputed (412/411 according to Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 1). Cf. Dover 1968a: 32–3, 41–3, Nails 2002: 314, Todd 2007: 6–12. Plato ignored these issues; forty or fifty years later they were too vague to matter for the scenario in the dialogue.

facilitator of discourses of his day apart from Simmias of Thebes (242a6–b5), which would only be possible for an adult and which is consistent with Ph.'s easy familiarity with affairs and culture in the dialogue (e.g. 235d6–e2, 243d5–e2, 261b2–6, 273a3–b3). Ph. has a similar status in the *Symposium* (177d, 178a–180b), where, since the *Symposium* is clearly set in 416, the year of Agathon's first victory as a tragic poet (173a), he would be roughly thirty. On the other hand, in the *Protagoras* Ph. is one of the numerous young men who have gathered at Callias' house to attend the sophists (315c). The status of these young men as potential *erōmenoi* is emphasized by remarks on the beauty of Alcibiades and Agathon (309a–b, 315e). The *Protagoras* is set distinctly earlier in the Athenian past than the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*,[19] which accords with the adolescent age of all the noteworthy young men who are named, Ph. included.

Ph.'s status in the *Phaedrus* as a potential *erastēs* is emphasized by the three passages where S. speaks of Ph. as Lysias' *erastēs* (236b5, 257b4–5, 279b3). S. is speaking metaphorically, referring to the intensity of Ph.'s enthusiasm for Lysias' rhetorical skill (236b5n.).[20] Yet by means of the *erastēs* metaphor S. encourages Ph. to consider his actions and obligations as a potential *erastēs*. Before the palinode S. casts mutual shame on himself and Ph. for endorsing the crude and selfish *erastai* of the first two speeches (243c1–d1). The restrained and caring *erastēs* of the palinode is the proper model. At the end of the dialogue, having informed themselves about what good discourse consists in and how it can be learned, S. and Ph. agree that they must now convey these insights to their respective (figurative) *erōmenoi*, Isocrates and Lysias, so that they too might progress towards philosophy (278e3–8, 279b2–4). Hence, when S. competes with Lysias for Ph.'s allegiance at the beginning of the dialogue, S. is competing not for a young man and potential *erōmenos*, but for an adult disciple of his art of discourse-composition. S.'s lessons in rhetorical art – with regard to the method of effective persuasion, the concern for the auditor's interests, and the orientation towards philosophy – will allow Ph. to take on the role of *erastēs* properly.[21]

It remains to consider 243e6, Ph.'s response to S.'s request for the imagined young man who is to listen to the palinode (243e4–5). S.'s task in the palinode is not merely to advance Ph.'s rhetorical education. He also wants to move Ph. towards philosophy by engaging him personally in the compelling vision of philosophy's transcendent quest (Introd. 2). To that end, whereas Ph. was a detached spectator of epideictic when listening to Lysias' speech (227c6n., 234c6–235b4) and S.'s first speech (235e3–236b4, 242c7–d1n.), S. seeks to provoke Ph. into listening to the

[19] Before or towards the beginning of the Peloponnesian War; cf. Nails 2002: 310.

[20] The sexual innuendo in the opening scene has a similar import: Ph.'s enthusiasm for Lysias' art is so intense that it seems like sexual infatuation (228b6n., c2n., c2–3n., 229b4–5n.; also 234d3–4). Hence these passages too suggest Ph.'s status as potential *erastēs*.

[21] In the *Lysis* S. gives Hippothales a demonstration in how an *erastēs* should address an *erōmenos* (204b–210e). Hippothales, having recently attained the age of adulthood and taking his first, uncertain steps as an *erastēs*, is much younger than Ph. in the *Phaedrus*.

palinode as an engaged participant (243c2–3n.). Immediately prior to requesting the boy, S. recalls Ph.'s aptitude for facilitating speeches (243e2n.), which is the prominent feature of Ph.'s character (242a6–b5, 261a3n.) and which S. also exploited in regard to his first speech (236b8–237a1). When Ph. responds, "here he is ever right next to you whenever you wish" (243e6), he obliges S. and facilitates the palinode by taking on the role of the imagined young man. Yet the role is no mere role, as S. surely intends, because, like the imagined young man, Ph. faces a choice regarding the direction and thus the welfare of his soul, and the speech addresses that choice for both of them. S. does not lose sight of the young male auditor as he delivers the palinode (249e2n., 252b1n.), but he focuses more on the *erastēs*' experience of *erōs* and the value of philosophical *erōs* to him (249d4–254e9) than on the benefit to the young man (255a1–257a1). He thereby ensures that Ph., the potential *erastēs* right there before him, reaps the full benefit of his eloquence.

4. THE ART OF PSYCHAGOGIC RHETORIC

Plato is commonly regarded as the inveterate opponent of rhetoric in the foundational dispute between philosophy and rhetoric. The common view is crude because it omits Plato's own distinction between sophistic rhetoric, which he disparages in the *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*, and the true art of rhetoric, which he broaches in the *Gorgias* (260d1n.) and elucidates in the *Phaedrus*.[22] The common view is misleading because it obscures the nature of Plato's interest in rhetoric as a bridge between philosophy and the rest of the world. Philosophy, understood as the pursuit of wisdom and the realization of that pursuit to the maximum extent possible, is the natural and proper source of guidance for human thought and action in both individuals and communities (*Rep.* 5.473c–d). For philosophy to influence non-philosophers and thereby to benefit them, philosophers must persuade non-philosophers to accept philosophical guidance and must instill in them philosophical values and understanding to the maximum extent possible. That task falls to rhetoric, as evidenced in S.'s encounter with Ph. and elsewhere in Plato's work.[23]

In the inquiry into good discourse conducted by S. and Ph. (259e2–274b6) Plato sets forth how rhetoric can be constituted as a *technē* and how sophistic rhetoric fails as a *technē*. He also indicates how the argument on rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* differs from and complements that in the *Gorgias*.[24]

[22] On the consistency of Plato's view of rhetoric in the *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*, see Black 1958.

[23] "It is a characteristic Platonic mode of thought to locate the true purpose of some item not in its most basic daily use, but in the highest good that it can help realise" (Sedley 2003: 62 in regard to Platonic etymologizing). Thus Plato intends rhetorical art not for mundane uses such as the lawcourt and assembly, but for the aid it can render philosophy. On Plato's use of rhetoric for educational purposes in the *Republic* and *Laws*, see Yunis 2007a, 2007b.

[24] For a full account of the argument summarized in this section, see Yunis 2009.

To launch the inquiry, S. and Ph. distinguish between two meanings of good discourse and settle on one as the basis for the inquiry that follows (259e2–261a2). The sense on which they settle – discourse that persuades – is the reason why S. presents an account of rhetoric as the answer to the question about good discourse. S. begins by claiming that "good discourse requires the speaker to know the truth about the subject of his discourse" (259e5–6). Ph. counters that good discourse depends not on knowledge of what is true but on knowledge of what the audience at hand believes to be true, for "persuasion (τὸ πείθειν) depends on the latter and not on the truth" (260a3–4). S. responds with a vignette intended to demonstrate that good discourse depends on the speaker's having knowledge of the subject of his discourse (260b1–d1). Suppose a speaker tries to persuade an audience to acquire horses for military purposes; suppose further that both speaker and audience are ignorant of what horses are, but the speaker knows that the audience believes a horse to be the tame animal with the largest ears. Praising such animals for their military usefulness, the speaker persuades the audience to acquire what are in fact donkeys. "When a skilled speaker, who is ignorant of good and bad, persuades a city as ignorant as himself," the consequences can clearly be disastrous (260c7–d1).

The argument based on the confusion of horses and donkeys recalls the argument against sophistic rhetoric in the *Gorgias*. There S. argues that Callicles as well as all Athenian politicians is unfit to hold the political power he seeks because he is ignorant of what is good for the polis. The Athenian political audience (i.e. the *dēmos*) is also ignorant of what is good for them, which makes them parallel to the ignorant audience in the *Phaedrus*' horse-and-donkey example. The model of discourse underlying both the account of sophistic rhetoric in the *Gorgias* and the horse-and-donkey vignette in the *Phaedrus* is that of advising. Where advice is wanted, the adviser must know whereof he speaks in order for his advice to be any good and do any good. Good discourse in this sense supplies the knowledge which the recipient of the discourse needs for his welfare but otherwise lacks. The sophists' pseudo-art of rhetoric, used by politicians to achieve victory in Athens' mass democratic institutions, is a form of flattery. In democratic conditions, i.e. where speakers compete in flattering the decision-making audience, the philosopher, physician, or other expert is unable to transmit his expertise. Thus he withdraws and his expertise becomes unavailable to those who need it.[25]

In the *Phaedrus* S. turns to the alternative suggested by Ph. (260a3–4). Speaking for the moment on behalf of the sophists' art of rhetoric, S. imagines it might object to his horse-and-donkey argument thus: "Why do you wonderful people speak so foolishly? I don't require a person to be ignorant of the truth if he is to learn to speak. Rather, if my advice counts for anything, I insist that a person first acquire the truth before he comes to me. In any case my boast is that without

[25] Yunis 1996: 117–71 on the argument against sophistic rhetoric in the *Gorgias*.

me a man who knows the truth will not be any closer to persuading by art" (260d4–8). Although it is uttered on behalf of sophistic rhetoric, this passage also responds to philosophy's need for an art of persuasive discourse if it is to influence non-philosophers (260d4–8n.). Yet instead of repudiating persuasion for the reasons laid out in the *Gorgias* (260c4n.), S. embraces the challenge posed by sophistic rhetoric, and he and Ph. undertake to investigate how persuasion can be implemented by art. Maintaining his claim that knowledge is necessary for good discourse, S. argues not that a speaker must have knowledge of his subject in order to deliver good advice (which was his brief in the *Gorgias*), but that a speaker will be most effective at persuading his audience if and only if he has knowledge of the subject of the discourse (260e4–261a5).

Plato's account of rhetoric follows from the kind of persuasion he wants rhetoric to accomplish. S. defines rhetoric as ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων (261a7–8). The art of "leading the soul through speeches" is the ability to use discourse to influence human beings to go in a particular direction (261a7n.). If sophists such as Gorgias, democratic politicians such as Callicles, and speech-writers such as Lysias want to secure the approval of large audiences, particularly when competing with others seeking the same, Plato wants to persuade individual human beings, or in his parlance "souls," to make certain choices and to pursue certain ends, or, in the sense of *psychagōgia*, to go in one direction rather than another. Plato also shifts the focus of the art away from the approval of (irrational) mass audiences to the form and content of discourse and the receptive properties of souls, factors that can provide a systematic basis for artistic choices (261e1n.).

S. begins the account of psychagogic rhetoric with a dense, abstract argument that makes good on his claim that persuasion by art requires knowledge of the subject of the discourse (261e5–262c3n.). How then is such knowledge to be acquired and made suitable for rhetorical purposes? S. introduces two disciplines – dialectic and psychology – that enable rhetoric to be constituted as a proper *technē*. Dialectic provides the rhetorical speaker with the requisite knowledge of his subject matter, which in turn enables the speaker to create the arguments that constitute the content of his discourse (235a1n., 262c4–266d4n., 265d4–266b2n.). Psychagogic rhetoric requires psychology – the knowledge of the nature and types of human soul (269d2–272b6) – because persuasion takes place in the soul (270b6–7). Psychology enables the rhetorical speaker to cast the content of his discourse in the particular form that will persuade a particular soul (271b2–4n.), which is useful for face-to-face encounters like that between S. and Ph. The *Phaedrus* contains merely a suggestion of the possible political use of proper rhetorical *technē* (257e1–258d10). Since Plato's expert *rhētōr* either controls the conditions in which he issues his discourse or does not speak (272a3–4n.), it is difficult to envision such rhetoric in democratic political conditions.

Plato was innovating when he based the art of rhetoric on dialectic and psychology. Each of the two disciplines responds to a signal failure in the persuasive capabilities of sophistic rhetoric. A sophistic speaker, ignorant of the subject of

his discourse but schooled in his auditor's beliefs about the subject, can do no more than persuade the auditor to accept something that, by virtue of his existing beliefs, he is already inclined to accept from the start (as in the horse-and-donkey vignette). *Psychagōgia* is a more demanding persuasive task. It requires the speaker to be able to replace the auditor's current beliefs, which are likely to be conventional, with entirely new ones, for example, beliefs that could be sufficiently transformative to make possible an attachment to philosophy. Dialectic provides the speaker with the knowledge to produce arguments with that psychagogic power, as S. illustrates in his analysis of the argument in the palinode (265b2–c3, 265e1–266b2). Further, the techniques and formulae that fill the sophists' rhetoric books – emotional appeals, probability arguments, imagistic diction, etc. (266d7–267d9) – are mere stimuli that sophists deploy ad hoc to produce given responses (268a1–269d1). Rhetorical psychology allows all formal elements, including the sophists' linguistic and argumentative techniques, to be organized to produce a given persuasive outcome in the auditor's soul (272a4–5n.). Since the art of psychagogic rhetoric entails the mastery of dialectic and psychology in addition to expertise in language and discourse, it is an immense, daunting undertaking. But there is no short cut to the art (272a6–273e3).

As the primary method for the pursuit of knowledge, dialectic is so closely associated with philosophy in Plato as to be almost identical to it (265d4–266b2n., 276e5n.). Yet dialectic is introduced into rhetoric for the purely instrumental reason that it is necessary for persuasion (261a4–5n.). Far from merging rhetoric and philosophy, the role of dialectic in rhetoric defines rhetoric and philosophy more clearly and makes evident the differences between them.[26]

The rhetorical speaker uses dialectic for his material (265d4–266b2) and casts that material in a suitable form (265c8–d2n.); rhetorical discourse is not the straightforward presentation of raw dialectical argument (265b2–c3). The *psychagōgia* produced by rhetoric treats the auditor's soul as a passive thing and sends it in a direction of the speaker's choosing. This movement may be beneficial to the auditor, it may lead to engagement with philosophy, but it is at best preparatory to philosophy and is not in itself philosophy. Dialectic, on the other hand, the proper discourse of philosophy, is a collaborative process in which both parties are actively engaged (276e4–277a4, 278a1–b2). Rhetoric does not entail the erotically charged pursuit of knowledge as does dialectic (266b4–c1). Dialectic is the appropriate medium for transmitting knowledge, whereas rhetoric, like written discourse, is not (277e6–278a1n.). Dialectic produces clear and stable ideas (275c6n., 277d6–7n.). Rhetoric is a kind of deception (ἀπάτη, 261e6; 261e5–262c3n.), and because rhetoric can argue opposing sides of any case (ἀντιλογική, 261d10) and make a persuasive case for virtually any proposition

[26] Plato's views on the relationship of philosophy, dialectic, and rhetoric were eclipsed by Aristotle's, which differed greatly from Plato's and dominated the rest of antiquity (Hadot 1980).

(261e2–3n.), it can produce unstable ideas about good and bad and right and wrong.[27]

By considering rhetoric without regard for any end other than that of the art itself, viz. persuasion, Plato strengthens his account of the *technē* but also raises the problem of the ends to which rhetoric should be used. Yet Plato refrains from making an explicit argument or statement to the effect that rhetoric requires philosophical guidance for its proper use.[28] Nor can one assume that because the artistic *rhētōr* acquires dialectical knowledge for use in rhetoric, dialectic will somehow confer on him philosophical values.[29] Rather, Plato conveys his view indirectly. First, to justify the immensity of the effort that would be expended in acquiring the art of psychagogic rhetoric, S. pointedly states the necessity of pleasing the gods and spurns the sophists' pursuit of self-interest (273e3–274a5). Second, the aesthetic preeminence of the palinode is itself an argument – a rhetorical one – for the priority of philosophy. Plato made a strategic decision to structure the *Phaedrus* in such a way that he offers not a philosophical or dialectical defense of the priority of philosophy but merely a rhetorical one. This strategy, which is unique in the Platonic corpus, may have been occasioned by Plato's desire in this dialogue to put the case for philosophy's priority above all to a class of readers who, like Ph., were more inclined to rhetoric than to philosophy.[30]

5. *ERŌS*

The conventional *erastēs* of Lysias' speech and S.'s first speech suffers from a disturbance that destroys his normal mental processes. It comes upon him from outside himself and sets him into motion – towards the *erōmenos* and towards sexual relations with the *erōmenos* – that he cannot control. Such a situation is full of hazards for both parties, those which affect the *erōmenos* offering the material for any author who composes a speech on Lysias' theme (235e3–236a3). The disturbance is called *erōs*, and it has always been understood to come from the god Eros. After his first speech S. denies none of the bad things that arise from the disturbance of the conventional *erastēs* and make him dangerous for his *erōmenos*. S. denies only that the disturbance comes from Eros (266a2–5). No god can be the cause of bad things (242e1–4, 246e1n.). The disturbance that is the subject of the palinode, also called *erōs*, is a different, unconventional phenomenon. It is

[27] Thus S.'s first speech on *erōs*; also Callicles' diatribe against philosophy (*Grg.* 482c–486c), Protagoras' oration on virtue (*Prt.* 320c–328c), and the speeches of Glaucon and Adimantus on the futility of justice (*Rep* 2.358e–367e).

[28] Elsewhere Plato argues or states explicitly that rhetoric must be guided by philosophy (*Ap.* 17a–18a, *Grg.* 464b–465e, *Plt.* 303e–304e).

[29] The complex soul of the palinode (as in the *Republic*) allows for the conflict between knowing right and doing right (253c7–254e9).

[30] Yunis 2005: 103–6. Cf. Ferrari 1987: 54–5: no argument for establishing philosophy's priority is possible because a condition for such an argument (in this case) is the previous establishment of philosophy's priority.

beneficial to both *erastēs* and *erōmenos* and is the *erōs* that actually comes from Eros (266a5–b2).

The palinode is a hymn that celebrates Eros in mythical and poetic language (257a3–4n.). But the form in which the palinode is cast should not mislead. Its serious purpose (245b6–c2, 257a2–b6) guarantees that, as far as S. is concerned, it is true (265b6–c1n.). After demonstrating that souls are immortal (245c5–246a2), S. explains the nature of the soul and the greater natural order in which souls exist before and after their embodied life on earth. Souls have their sustenance in contemplating Being and the Forms (248b5–c2), which they innately desire (247c4–248c2, 250d5–6).[31] Souls are imagined as winged chariots, each with driver and team of two horses – two good, obedient horses for divine souls, one good, obedient horse and one bad, disobedient one for human souls (246a3–b4). Soul-chariots ascend the inside of the vault of heaven towards the pinnacle, from which point they peer out to the super-heavenly realm beyond where lie Being and the Forms (246e4–247c3). Divine souls make the ascent easily, human souls do it with difficulty and barely succeed in glimpsing, to a greater or lesser extent, the super-heavenly realm (247c4–248c2). But making the ascent in order to contemplate Being and the Forms is the essential task of all souls. If, in the case of human souls, feathers and wings are lost and the bad horse disrupts the chariot's progress, the soul is dragged downwards. If feathers and wings grow and the driver controls his team, the soul moves upwards.

When a soul is born into a life on earth, mere corporeality weighs it down and drags it away from its goal (248c7–d1). But regrowing wings and moving upwards towards the goal can also take place in corporeal life. When a human being on earth acquires knowledge of reality – particularly in the case of dialectical learning that in its higher stages confers knowledge of the Forms of justice, moderation, and the other virtues – the soul begins to perceive the Forms, if not with the directness and clarity that occur in the pure psychic state before birth and after death. But because all human souls had a direct glimpse, to some extent, of Being and the Forms before birth (249b5–6), when human beings gain knowledge of Forms during their earthly existence they are recollecting the Forms which they saw directly when they were pure souls before their corporeal life (249b6–c1n., c1–2n.). Recollecting Forms hastens the growth of the soul's wings and its progress towards regaining direct contemplation of the Forms.

Among all Forms only the Form of beauty can be recollected on earth without dialectic and merely by means of visual perception. Only the Form of beauty has a radiance (φέγγος, 250b2) that gives it the capacity to show forth what it is (i.e. to make its essence apparent) in a corporeal likeness of the Form, that

[31] Being and the Forms, the essential elements of Platonic metaphysics, are not mere concepts that explain reality, but are the only fully real things and are responsible for the reality of the perceptual world. The theory of Forms as used in the *Phaedrus* is set out in the *Republic*, *Phaedo*, and *Symposium*. On Being, the Forms, and reality in Plato, see Harte 2008.

is, in a boy who by virtue of his beauty is a likeness of the Form of beauty (250a5n., 250b1–d7, 251a3–4). Divine *erōs* occurs when a man sees a beautiful boy, simultaneously begins to see the Form of beauty showing itself forth through him, and begins thereby to recollect the Form of beauty. Recollecting the Form distinguishes divine *erōs* from its non-divine namesake. Yet recollecting the Form at the sight of a beautiful *erōmenos* can occur only to a person whose soul had a sufficiently extensive glimpse of the Form during its prenatal period (250a1–7, 250e1–251a3). This extensive prenatal glimpse of the Form is also what makes a soul philosophical (248d2–3). Only philosophers or persons with philosophical potential experience divine *erōs* (249c5–d3).

Divine *erōs* is a kind of madness because it brings the *erastēs* the same mental disturbance, physical distress, and extreme sexual desire that accompany conventional *erōs* (251a4–b2n.). But in addition it regrows the wings of his soul, which only increases the intensity of his manic state (251b2–d7n.). As *erōs* drives the *erastēs* towards his *erōmenos* a crisis erupts. The bad horse wants sex with the *erōmenos*, but the charioteer recalls the Form of beauty alongside moderation in the superheavenly realm and desires only a chaste proximity to the beauty of the *erōmenos* (254b5–7, e8–9). As the *erōmenos* receives the image of his own beauty reflected back to him from the *erastēs*, he too experiences divine *erōs* and recollects the Form of beauty (255c1–d5); his wings too begin to grow. The charioteers in both their souls, with the support of their good horses, suppress the bad horses and take control of their teams. They abstain from sex, and *erōs* is fulfilled through proximity and conversation. The *erastēs* introduces his *erōmenos* to philosophy, and they live oriented towards the gods (252d2–253a7). Both the *erastēs* and the *erōmenos* have taken a huge leap forward in their souls' journey towards lasting contemplation of the Forms (256a6–b7), the natural goal of their existence.

The palinode shows that philosophy combines reason and divine madness.[32] Far from constituting a contradiction, the combination makes philosophy a more potent and coherent activity than it would be if either element were lacking. Dialectic and divine *erōs* are both means of recollecting Forms, hence both do philosophical tasks. But *erōs* recollects only the Form of beauty, which dialectic cannot easily do. The presence of beauty among the Forms, indeed among the essential ones such as justice, moderation, and wisdom (250b1–4, d1–7, 254b6–7), makes the aesthetic and affective aspects of life as essential as knowledge and ethics. The account of divine *erōs* recognizes that beauty is understood for what it is merely by being perceived, that it provokes a (potentially strong) response in the perceiving person, that the philosophically inclined soul will find meaning in it beyond the immediate encounter, and that the affective element that is roused by beauty is not merely the appetite for sex. The divine aspect of divine *erōs* does not mean that it befalls one by the unpredictable favor of a god. It means, rather,

[32] Burnyeat 2011 on reason and madness in the *Phaedrus*.

that the irrational but beneficial response to beauty is part of human nature in a world that is divinely ordered to support human well-being (246e1n.).

After the manic encounter subsides, divine *erōs* leads *erastēs* and *erōmenos* to become friends (φίλοι, 255a1–b6) and to pursue philosophy together (249a2, 252e1–253a7, 256a6–b7). Divine *erōs* improves their philosophical discourse by injecting a personal element that is lacking, for example, when dialectic is used in a purely analytical way to supply the material for rhetorical arguments. Dialectic is both a mode of reasoning and a form of dialogue (276e5n.), the latter requiring the participants to care about their common activity. Thus S. describes himself as "an *erastēs* of divisions and collections" (i.e. the constituent procedures of dialectic) who pursues a potential partner in dialectic as if he were a god (266b4–c1). Beyond demonstrating his care in the dialectical inquiry with Ph., S. emphasizes the human element in dialectic generally (276e5–277a4): "having come upon a suitable soul, the dialectician plants and sows [in that soul] discourse that is based on knowledge and that can defend itself and him who planted it, discourse that is not barren but has a seed . . . and that makes the possessor of the seed flourish as much as possible for a human being."

Divine *erōs* explains how an individual forms a commitment to philosophy and acquires the motivation to pursue it. Neither *erastēs* nor *erōmenos* weighs options and decides on philosophy as the most expedient choice, as, for example, the young male auditor in the two earlier speeches is asked to weigh his options and make the most expedient choice of suitor. Their prenatal view of the super-heavenly realm has prepared the *erastēs* and *erōmenos* to recollect the Form of beauty, but when the recollection occurs, beauty calls to them and attracts them to itself. At that point they are engaged in philosophy. Ultimately the *erōs* that attracts a soul to beauty is the same force that draws a soul to all the Forms and that motivates the individual to pursue wisdom through dialectic and any other means (250d5–6): "wisdom would arouse terrible desire (δεινοὺς ἔρωτας) if it furnished such a vivid image of itself that was visible to the eyes, and likewise the other desirable things (ἐραστά)," i.e. the other Forms, such as justice and moderation, that are "valuable to souls" (250b1). The regrowth of wings that occurs in divine *erōs* lifts the soul towards the contemplation of all the Forms.

In the palinode S. assumes the task of conveying a palpable sense of just how desirable beauty is and what the attraction of philosophy feels like (243e7–257b6n.). At one point S. recalls the moment, before his birth into this current life, when he stood as a pure soul in the divine chorus and peered directly at all the Forms, beauty conspicuous among them (250b4–c5). S. does not describe beauty but demonstrates its compelling power by the bliss that is evident in his reminiscence of it. To stress this aspect of philosophy is appropriate in the encounter with Ph., who has the capacity for being affected by aesthetic experience (228a4, 259b4) and who, like S., is keen for erotic discourse. No wonder Ph. converts so readily once S. introduces him to divine *erōs* in the palinode.

6. PLATO'S LIVELY STYLE

One of the hallmarks of his work, the liveliness of Plato's writing is essential for creating and maintaining the reader's interest. Among the elements that contribute to this effect are the stylistic and verbal devices that surprise and give pleasure upon recognition. The following paragraphs present a selection of such devices as used in the *Phaedrus* to enhance the play of form and content.

(1) *Variation*: As S. adopts different forms of discourse to advance Ph.'s progress towards philosophy (Introd. 2), Plato stylizes S.'s discourse in accord with generic expectations. For instance, S. uses studied, artificial language to describe the spot under the plane tree, creating an *ekphrasis*, a formal rhetorical display (230b2–c4n.). S. opens his first speech by mimicking the grandeur of traditional invocations of the Muses, then undercuts it with irony (237a7–8n., a8–9n.). Defining *erōs* in his first speech, S. creates a condensed dialectical argument that concludes with a display of asyndetic clauses and an etymological play on *erōs* (237d4–238c4n., 238b6–c4n., c4n.).

S.'s palinode is replete with poetic diction and usage (257a3–4n.), but it contains other styles: the proof of the soul's immortality is expressed in the gnomic, oracular style of fifth-century Ionian philosophical prose (245c5–246a2n.); S.'s account of his prenatal glimpse of the super-heavenly realm is colored by the language of ecstatic mystery cult and strives for sublimity (250b4–c5n., c1–2n.); the crisis in the *erastēs*' soul is described with a narrative that evokes the violence of racing and crashing chariots (253e5–254e9).

S. mocks craven democratic politicians with comic comparisons of emotional, self-absorbed poets and august, legendary lawgivers (257e1–258c4). S. mocks the sophists' rhetoric books with a heavily ironic survey of their achievements (266d5–267d9). To help Ph. through the difficulties of the dialectical inquiry into rhetoric, S. uses a gentle didactic style that quotes the (fictive) advice of reputable experts for Ph.'s benefit (268a1–269d1n.). The densest technical passages of the inquiry (270d1–7, 271c9–272b1) are delivered by S. uninterrupted in a dry style that uses parallel clauses and pronouns that refer to abstract categories (e.g. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοίδε ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε λόγων διὰ τήνδε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐς τὰ τοιάδε εὐπειθεῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε διὰ τάδε δυσπειθεῖς, 271d4–6). Since both the cicada myth and the Egyptian myth impart timely lessons for Ph., S. tells them with narrative economy and explicit, didactic conclusions (258e5–259d6n., 274c5–275b2n.). S.'s concluding prayer recalls traditional pious language while including a riddle based on S.'s particular form of piety (279b8–c3).

Beyond the stylistic variety of S.'s utterances, Plato mimics Lysias' style so well in the speech attributed to him in the dialogue that scholars have considered whether Plato may have inserted a genuine Lysianic composition (230e6–234c5n.). The repartee in which S. and Ph. engage, especially in the opening scene (227a1–230e5) and the first interlude (234c6–237a6), is swift, lively, and entertaining while moving S.'s philosophical agenda forward.

(2) *Verse*: In the opening exchange, responding to Ph.'s request for leisure (σχολή, 227b8) to discuss Lysias' speech, S. says: "Do you not believe that I will regard listening to how you and Lysias spent the time as an affair, in Pindar's words, 'above even business' (καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον)?" (227b9–10). The quotation along with the mention of the poet creates mock grandeur, which suggests irony in S.'s claim about leisure. When the suggestion is soon confirmed (229e4n.), the reader begins to understand S.'s educational agenda for Ph. (Introd. 2) and S.'s view of how leisure is best spent (229c5–230a6, 258e5n.).

S. refers to Sappho and Anacreon as authorities on *erōs* (235c3). He quotes Ibycus (242c7–d1) and Stesichorus (243a2–b6) to explain his need to deliver the palinode. In the palinode he alludes to Sappho's poem φαίνεταί μοι (frag. 31 Voigt, 251a4–b2n.). The reference, quotations, and allusion palpably connect S.'s philosophical *erōs* with the divine, mad *erōs* of the archaic poets, and thus suggest that philosophical *erōs* is not a Platonic invention but an inherited feature of Greek experience and self-understanding.

S. interjects bits of Homeric verse, verse that sounds Homeric, and prose formulations of Homeric phrasing: the charioteer "gives [the bad horse] over to pains" (ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν), which at sentence-end mimics Homer's ὀδύνῃσιν ἔδωκεν at verse-end and concludes the bad horse's rebellion against the charioteer (254e5n.); when S. declares that he "follows in the footsteps [of a partner in dialectic] as if he were a god" (κατόπισθε μετ' ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο, 266b7), the Homeric-sounding partial hexameter verse draws attention to a rare self-revelation on S.'s part; S. mocks Thrasymachus by referring to him with the Homeric construction "the might of the Chalcedonian" (τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, 267c7).

S. introduces verse to combine serious points with parody: the hexameter verse that ends his first speech (ὡς λύκοι ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ', ὣς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί, 241d1) indicates the onset of nympholepsy that S. feared (238d1n.) and completes his stratagem to limit his speech to part of Lysias' plea (237a7–241d1n.); S.'s unmetrical, hitherto unknown, Homeric verses, which are patently Plato's invention, poke fun at his own argument about *erōs*' capacity for growing the soul's wings (252b1–c3); the verse epigram for Midas makes the tediousness of Lysias' speech comically, painfully evident (264e1n.).

(3) *Word order*: Plato departs from normal word order for effect: anacoluthon betrays S.'s excitement as he is about to describe divine *erōs* in the palinode (249d4–e1n.); hyperbaton stresses the word or words that are out of place (ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων [*sc.* ποιήσεως] ἡ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἠφανίσθη, 245a6–7; οὐκ ἀπολείπεται οὐδέ τινα τοῦ καλοῦ περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖται, 252a1–2; ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα εἴδη ἔχει, 271d1); word order with ambiguous meaning gains clarity from the context (252d6–8n., 266c1–2n.).

Ostentatiously artificial word order is rare and conspicuous when it occurs: a hyper-chiasmus (ABC–CBA) presents the psychic dichotomy of wild–gentle, disordered–orderly, monstrous–divine (230a3–6n.); antithetical chiasmus with

anaphora (οὔτε σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη οὔτε θεία μανία) announces the conclusive point of the palinode (256b5–7n.); an intricate combination of interlacing, *polyptōton*, and *homoioptōton* along with sound play (ποικίλῃ μὲν ποικίλους ψυχῇ καὶ παναρμονίους διδοὺς λόγους, ἁπλοῦς δὲ ἁπλῇ) describes the manner in which the artistic *rhētōr* stylizes his discourse (277c2–3n.); a four-fold play on the root τελ- (τελέους ἀεὶ τελετὰς τελούμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται) anticipates the metaphor of ecstatic initiation for the prenatal glimpse of the Forms, while also suggesting the superiority of philosophical "initiation" to that of Eleusis (249c6–d1).

Plato uses jingling sound play for ridicule: προοίμιον μὲν οἶμαι πρῶτον mocks sophistic doctrine on the prooemium (266d7–e1); excessive repetition of ἄν (232c2–3) and showy Gorgianic phrasing (233c1–4) mock Lysias; jingles intentionally mar S.'s pseudo-Homeric verses (252b6–c1n.); markedly rhythmical prose mocks Thrasymachus (267c5–7n.).

(4) *Wordplay and metaphor.* Etymological *technē*, which uncovers the edifying information that was encoded in the Greek language in its pristine state, is a serious endeavor (244b6–d5n.), but S. uses it to create rhetorical arguments: inspired prophecy (μαντική) is a form of divine, beneficial madness (μανική), a crucial first step in the palinode (244c1–5); so too the etymologies of ἔρως (238c4n.), ἐραστής (249e3n.), ἵμερος (251c5–6n.) advance S.'s rhetorical arguments. S. demonstrates the humorous possibilities of such etymologies in the pseudo-Homeric verses that speak of Ἔρως as Πτέρως ("Wingederos," 252c1).

Plato uses ambiguity to suggest two different meanings at once: τὰ δέοντα (234e5n.), φιλοσοφία (239b4n.), ἀσήμαντοι (250c4–5n.), πεπαίσθω (278b5n.). He returns to literal meanings of key concepts to redefine them: λογογραφία (257e1–2n.), ψυχαγωγία (261a7n.). The solution to the riddle in S.'s concluding prayer lies in understanding the word χρυσοῦ figuratively as "wisdom" (279c2–3n.). S. uses a semblance of prayer diction (ὅστις δή ποτ' ὢν τυγχάνει καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος) ironically to express disdain for precise knowledge of the lineage of mistaken sophistic doctrines (273c7–d1n.). He uses Aristophanic diction (ὦ μοχθηρέ, μελαγχολᾶις) to illustrate a crude way of speaking (ἀγρίως) that should be avoided in dialectic (268e1n.). The bluntness is comic, as is the parodic usage of μουσεῖα, also borrowed from Aristophanes (267c1–3n.).

τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα, a poetic usage meaning "the delight that inspires *erōs*," refers to the beautiful young man (253e5n.). Stesichorus' *Palinode* is itself an "ancient purification" (καθαρμὸς ἀρχαῖος), which brings ritual and moral ideas of purification together and presents Stesichorus' poem in a new light (243a2–4n.). Lysias' speech is "the drug (φάρμακον) for [S.'s] going out [of the city]," to which S. compares the effect of leading around dumb animals by hanging bits of food in front of them, hence an ironic usage (230d5–e1). Theuth claims that writing is "a drug (φάρμακον) for [enhancing] memory and wisdom," which in its lack of irony suggests the speciousness of the claim, as Thamus and S. go on to demonstrate (274e4–5n.). Dialectical discourse "is written (γράφεται) along with knowledge in

the soul of the learner," in which the metaphor for dialectic – writing, in respect to its durability – is the very activity to which dialectic is opposed (276a4n.). Metaphor and simile combined: "like bacchant women they [i.e. *erastai*] pour [their divine traits] onto the soul of the beloved" (253a5–7); "every speech must be composed like a living creature... so that it is neither headless nor footless" (264c3–6); describing the dialectical process of division: "to cut up [a form] into its sub-classes at joints... and... not to shatter any part [of it] by performing like an incompetent butcher" (265e1–3).

(5) *Dramatization*: Plato turns mythical and historical characters into active participants in the conversation. Nestor, Odysseus, and Palamedes are authors of rhetorical *technai*, the first two representing unspecified sophists (261b7–c3), the third representing the philosopher Zeno of Elea ("the Eleatic Palamedes," 261d6), whose contribution helps S. define psychagogic rhetoric (261d6–e4). Pericles, the most accomplished practitioner of rhetorical *technē* (269e1–2), is cast as a proponent of psychagogic Platonic rhetoric *avant la lettre*, schooled by Anaxagoras in the scientific foundations of the discipline (270a1–6). Pericles instructs S. and Ph. on the correct method of teaching the art, and chides them for failing to understand the errors of sophistic rhetoric teachers (269b4–c4). S. addresses Tisias directly, reproaching him for failing to understand both the argument on rhetoric in the dialogue and the need to use rhetoric for divine rather than self-serving ends (273d3–274a5). As S. and Ph. first consider how to proceed in the inquiry into good discourse, Plato sharpens the sophistic challenge by having S. personify sophistic rhetoric and verbalize the stern rebuke that sophistic rhetoric would utter (260d3–8). In response, S. introduces "the Laconian," who represents unassailable wisdom (260e5n.), and calls forth the "noble creatures" (θρέμματα γενναῖα) – viz. the arguments on behalf of philosophical rhetoric – whose task it is to instruct Ph. (261a3–5).

(6) *Particles*: Plato uses particles more freely and with greater variety than any of his literary contemporaries.[33] For example, δή adds a note of insistence in the opening line (227a1). It gives S.'s insight into Ph.'s rhetorical aspirations in the opening scene a triumphant tone (228c2). It is used six times in a half page to show S.'s derisive attitude towards Tisias' probability arguments (272e4, 273b4n.).

Following the abrupt end to S.'s first speech, when S. asks Ph. ἆρ' οἶσθ' ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν... σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάσω; (241e3–4), the interrogative particle ἆρα suggests that the answer to this question, posed in answer to a preceding question, is not in doubt. When S. and Ph. reach the plane tree towards which they have been walking and S. asks ἆρ' οὐ τόδε ἦν τὸ δένδρον ἐφ' ὅπερ ἦγες ἡμᾶς; (230a6–7), ἆρ' οὐ with the imperfect indicative conveys the lively manner in which S. at once sees the tree and recalls their decision to seek it out.

In long sentences S. uses μέν/δέ in multiple iterations to differentiate syntactical elements that stand in coordination with each other, e.g. the sentence that

33. See *GP*, des Places 1929 on Plato's use of particles.

describes the differences in the extent to which different souls succeed in glimpsing the super-heavenly realm (structured at the first level by μέν . . . δέ . . . δέ): καὶ οὗτος μὲν θεῶν βίος· αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί, ἡ μὲν ἄριστα θεῶι ἑπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη ὑπερῆρεν εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἡνιόχου κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπεριηνέχθη τὴν περιφοράν . . . ἡ δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἦρεν, τοτὲ δ' ἔδυ, βιαζομένων δὲ τῶν ἵππων τὰ μὲν εἶδεν, τὰ δ' οὔ. αἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλαι γλιχόμεναι μὲν ἅπασαι τοῦ ἄνω ἕπονται, ἀδυνατοῦσαι δὲ ὑποβρύχιαι συμπεριφέρονται (248a1–6; cf. 256a6–b7, 270d1–7). μέν/δέ adds punch to short phrases (256a1, 277c2–3). In conversational passages μέν is answered by τε (266c4), μὲν δή (266c6), μήν (268e3), οὐκοῦν αὖ (278d8), καί (279c5). An unusual usage occurs when τὸ μὲν ὅλον (261a7) introduces the inquiry into rhetoric "as a whole." It hangs unanswered until the first stage of the inquiry is complete and S. opens the inquiry into written discourse in particular (τὸ δ' εὐπρεπείας δὴ γραφῆς πέρι καὶ ἀπρεπείας, 274b7–8n.). Apodotic δέ (initiating the apodosis or main clause) maintains clarity in long conditional sentences (255a5, 272a3).

Adverbial καί adds feeling: when Ph. refers to the artistry of Lysias' speech – αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ κεκόμψευται (227c6) – the καί makes evident Ph.'s delight as well as Plato's gentle mockery; when S. inquires about how the sophists have treated dialectic in their rhetorical *technai* (which they have not done) – λεκτέον δὲ τί μέντοι καὶ ἔστι τὸ λειπόμενον τῆς ῥητορικῆς (266d4) – the καί suggests a touch of exasperation on S.'s part.

S. uses οὗτοι μὲν οὖν as a forceful corrective to the sophists' failure to appreciate rhetoric's need for psychology (271b6). Plato uses the drab connective particles ἔτι δέ (231a7n.) and καὶ μὲν δή (231d6n.) several times in Lysias' speech to string points together and suggest the tediousness of the whole speech. Asyndeton is used sparingly but with effect, e.g. to convey Ph.'s disappointment when S. prevents him from delivering his own version of Lysias' speech (228e3); to suggest the *erōmenos*' rising sexual tension towards the *erastēs* (ἐπιθυμεῖ . . . ὁρᾶν, ἅπτεσθαι, φιλεῖν, συγκατακεῖσθαι, 255e2–3).

7. THE *PHAEDRUS'* DATE OF COMPOSITION AND PLACE IN THE PLATONIC CORPUS

We should presume that as a matter of decorum Plato (*c.* 425–348/347) would not have written the *Phaedrus* while Lysias was alive. The date of his death is unknown, but it is unlikely to have been long after 380.[34] By having S. criticize Isocrates (436–338) explicitly, Plato alludes to his contemporary world, not by anachronism but strategically embedding his point in the dialogue's structure (278e4–279b3n.). Beyond the criticism itself, Plato indicates that he views Isocrates as the chief contemporary proponent of the sophistic rhetorical culture to which Ph. is attached at the outset and against which S. argues over the course of

[34] The date of his last speech (Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 12; Todd 2007: 7).

the dialogue. Isocrates would only take on this role in Plato's eyes and become worthy of an explicit (though decorously phrased) critique when his career and especially his writings had made him sufficiently well known. One could only guess when Isocrates first reached that point. But he had clearly done so by the 360s (279a6–7n.), which makes that decade or the following one the likeliest for the composition of the dialogue.

This meager evidence for dating the *Phaedrus* is greater than exists for most other Platonic dialogues, which generally do not make even vaguely datable references to the contemporary world.[35] Allusions from one dialogue to another can help establish a relative chronology, but such allusions are few and often subjective. Beyond these bare facts the evidence does not exist to place the dialogues in the order of their composition or to fix the date of composition of any of them. In the face of this situation scholars have sought to discover the dialogues' order of composition by examining certain similarities and differences among them and thereby also to estimate dates of composition. Since the nineteenth century a large body of scholarship has refined a hypothesis that explains Plato's development as writer and thinker by assigning the dialogues to early, middle, and late periods.[36] On the basis of this hypothesis there is a consensus that the *Phaedrus* was composed late in Plato's middle period, that is, in the mid 360s.[37] The developmental hypothesis is nowadays so widespread as to be invoked without argument, but it is also controversial and warrants consideration.

The developmental hypothesis classifies the dialogues according to their resemblance to each other in respect to length, style of dramatization and argument, establishment of positive claims, and the treatment of the theory of Forms. Plato is thereby held to have progressed over his career from writing one kind of dialogue ("early" or "Socratic") to the second kind ("middle") and thence to the third kind ("late").[38] The developmental hypothesis finds support in stylometric studies of Plato's corpus that also establish three groups of dialogues – also called early, middle, late – that share stylistic traits whose incidence can be counted (e.g. particular diction and particle combinations, avoidance of hiatus). The statistical evidence that divides the dialogues into three groups based on measurable stylistic affinities is striking, but only the late stylometric group matches the late developmental group closely while there is a much looser correspondence between the early and middle stylometric and developmental groups.[39] Further, the arguments that would link the three stylometric groups to chronologically

[35] Except by occasional anachronism: e.g. *Menex.* 245e establishes a *terminus post quem* of 386; *Smp.* 193a establishes a *terminus post quem* of 385.

[36] Taylor 2002 on the origins of the developmental hypothesis.

[37] De Vries 1969: 7–11, Heitsch 1993a: 232–3.

[38] Irwin 2008: 77–84 explains and defends the developmental hypothesis and lists the dialogues that belong to each of the periods. The developmental hypothesis integrates the small amount of external evidence that exists for the dialogues' composition.

[39] Kahn 2002: 96–7. Kahn 2002 reviews the stylometric studies and makes a case for Platonic chronology based on stylometry.

ordered periods of composition are extremely weak. It remains as likely as not that the dialogues of any stylometric group were composed within a particular period and that Plato progressed chronologically from one stylometric group to the next.[40] There exists no external evidence to support the notion that the diversity evident in the corpus reflects a linear development over Plato's career. In the absence of such evidence it is just as likely that the diversity in the corpus is the result of Plato's using a variety of styles and exploring a variety of concerns, possibly aiming at different audiences, over the course of his career.[41]

Thus the developmental hypothesis does not provide a secure basis for assigning the *Phaedrus* to the mid 360s. But the reference to Isocrates, which offers a likely date of composition in the period 370–350, is sufficient for understanding and interpreting the dialogue with regard to its original context. No points of interpretation in the dialogue hinge on a date more specific than those two decades. As for the place of the *Phaedrus* in Plato's corpus, insofar as one is concerned not with Plato's overall development but just with understanding and interpreting this dialogue, it is useful to recognize where the dialogue itself invites reference to other dialogues or requires it for the sake of coherence.

The argument against sophistic rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* is formulated to complement the argument against sophistic rhetoric in the *Gorgias* (Introd. 4). Plato alerts the reader to this fact by a striking verbal allusion to the *Gorgias* just as S. begins the argument in the *Phaedrus* (260e4n.). When S. introduces an analogy between medicine and psychagogic rhetoric, Plato again alludes to the *Gorgias* in order to make clear how his current point differs from a similar one in the *Gorgias* (270b4–5n.). Clearly the *Gorgias* precedes the *Phaedrus* and belongs to the background which the reader will want to consider in reading the *Phaedrus*. It is likely that the *Republic* precedes, too. In the discussion of writing, Plato comments indirectly on his own writings (276d1–e3). Ph. gives high praise to one who, having knowledge of justice (276c3–4) and using writing properly, i.e. as play, "tells stories about justice" (δικαιοσύνης... πέρι μυθολογοῦντα, 276e2–3), which seems to allude to the *Republic* (276e1–3n.). Further, when Plato refers to his own writings, in a self-deprecating way, as reminders for the forgetfulness of old age (276d2–3n.), he seems to imply that he has already produced a large body of written work. But such an implication, even if it were certain, leaves open exactly how far along in his career Plato was when he wrote that passage. The palinode's image of the human soul as constituted by a reasoning charioteer and mixed team of good spirited horse and bad appetitive horse resembles in essentials the tripartite psychology of the *Republic*, but it does not require knowledge of the *Republic* to be understood (246b1–4n.).

[40] Griswold 2002; cf. also Denyer 2001: 17–20.

[41] Denyer 2001: 20–4. Annas 2002 rejects the developmental hypothesis and offers an alternative. Wieland 1982: 83–94 criticizes the developmental hypothesis for its philosophical inadequacy.

The myth in S.'s palinode dramatizes Plato's theory of recollection and utilizes the theory of Forms (Introd. 5). Yet S. invokes recollection and the Forms abruptly and forgoes a formal introduction or justification of them even though they are abstruse, non-intuitive ideas (249c1–2n., 250a5n.). By contrast, S. troubles to establish the immortality of the soul with a formal proof (245c5–246a2). The theory of recollection is introduced in a dialectical manner along with the theory of Forms in the *Phaedo* and without the Forms in the *Meno*. The theory of Forms is also introduced dialectically in the *Symposium* and *Republic* books 5–7. One is not forced to conclude that these dialogues precede the *Phaedrus*. But Plato's reader would be better able to understand the palinode's myth if he or she already understands recollection and the Forms or can at least find out about them in those other dialogues.

S. briefly explains dialectic with regard to its constituent procedures of collection and division because rhetoric needs dialectic to be constituted as a *technē* (Introd. 4). In an even briefer comment S. reveals his passion for collection and division with regard to philosophical pursuits (266b4–7). From the *Phaedrus* alone, one could not anticipate how collection and division are used in the *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and *Philebus*, where they are put to philosophical work and bring philosophical reasoning to a new level of clarity and power (265d4–266b2n.).

8. RECEPTION

Plato's corpus of written dialogues shaped and influenced a great number of individual philosophers and writers as well as schools and movements in many spheres of human endeavor from the fourth century BCE until today.[42] Since the *Phaedrus* was always recognized as a genuine Platonic dialogue and contains the lessons on *erōs* and the soul presented in the palinode, it attracted its share of attention within the larger schemes of Platonism and Platonic influence. The following paragraphs offer a selection of instances where writers and thinkers can be seen reacting to the *Phaedrus* in particular.

(1) *Fourth century* BCE: The *Phaedrus* fundamentally influenced Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, though Aristotle does not mention Plato in this regard.[43] First, Aristotle follows Plato in rejecting the sophistic view that persuasion itself is the focus of the art. For both Plato and Aristotle rhetorical art lies in the *rhētōr*'s choices of content and style; these factors aim at persuasion and are the only factors which the *rhētōr* can control (235b2n., 261e1n.). Second, Aristotle follows the *Phaedrus* with respect to two of his three kinds of artistic rhetorical proof (πίστις, *Rh.* 1.2.2–10). Aristotle's first rhetorical proof is argument (λόγος) and requires the speaker

[42] For an outline of this long complex story, see Horn *et al.* 2009: 387–522.

[43] *Rh.* 3.1408b20 mentions irony in the *Phaedrus* (237a7–241d1n.). *Metaph.* Λ.1072a1–3, *Top.* 6.140b4 refer to the argument on the immortality of soul (245c5–246a2).

to be knowledgeable about the topics related to the subject matter of the discourse (*Rh.* 1.4–14, 2.18–26).[44] Aristotle's second rhetorical proof, manipulating the audience's emotions (πάθος), adapts Plato's use of psychology to fashion discourse in response to the qualities of the auditor's soul (*Rh.* 2.1–17). Aristotle's third rhetorical proof, imparting the view that the speaker has a good character (ἦθος), has no parallel in Plato, for whom the speaker's authority and trustworthiness are best established outside the discourse. Aristotle was also influenced by Plato's arguments on design in discourse (Introd. 2), evident in *Rhetoric* 3.13, 17 on arrangement and in *Poetics* 23 on the organic unity of tragic action.

The *Phaedrus* has no visible influence on the *Rhetoric to Alexander* except perhaps insofar as the latter treatise approves and elaborates the probability arguments that Plato rejects.[45] The erotic speech preserved in the Demosthenic corpus ([Dem.] 61) is eclectic, but signals its indebtedness to the *Phaedrus* by the name of its addressee, Epicrates, the host of the rhetorical gathering where Ph. spent his morning listening to Lysias (227b4).[46] Two fragments of a comedy entitled *Phaedrus* by the poet Alexis (*PCG* 247–8) perhaps indicate that Plato's dialogue was popular enough in the mid to late fourth century for this poet to use Ph. as a comic figure interested in *erōs* and philosophy.[47]

(2) *Postclassical literature, rhetoric, and philosophy*: Plato was a rich source for postclassical ancient writers who made allusion to the classical canon an art in itself and a means of articulating one's message. The *Phaedrus* was exploited for this purpose by Hellenistic poets (3rd c. BCE), Cicero in his rhetorical and philosophical dialogues (1st c. BCE), and the rhetorically sophisticated prose-writers of the Second Sophistic (late 1st c.–mid 3rd c. CE). Among the latter were not only classicizing writers such as Plutarch, Lucian, Aristides, and Philostratus, rhetorical theorists such as Hermogenes and Menander Rhetor, and epideictic writers such as Dio of Prusa and Maximus of Tyre, but also the physician Galen and the Christian apologist Clement of Alexandria.[48]

The extramural, sacred grove where S. and Ph. find relief from the summer heat and talk of *erōs* became a touchstone for the *locus amoenus* in Hellenistic pastoral poetry (230b2–c4n.). Theocritus' *Idyll* 7 uses the *Phaedrus* as a model for its pastoral competition of love songs.[49] Callimachus includes the *Phaedrus*'

[44] Aristotle did not retain Plato's view of dialectic (*Rh.* 1.1.1, 14; note 26 above) but introduced his own account of rhetorical argument. Schütrumpf 1994: 99–104 on the *Phaedrus* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

[45] Chiron 2002: LVII, LXXI–LXXIV.

[46] Clavaud 1974: 69–83 on [Dem.] 61, including Platonic influences.

[47] Cf. Arnott 1996: 691–704. On Plato's treatment by fourth-century comic poets, cf. Diog. Laert. 3.26–8; Webster 1953: 50–5.

[48] See Trapp 1990 for a survey of allusions to the *Phaedrus* in these Second Sophistic authors. Trapp 1990: 170–3 is an eclectic list of allusions to and citations of the *Phaedrus* from the Second Sophistic. The superior apparatus in Moreschini 1985 cites ancient testimonia that quote or paraphrase the *Phaedrus*.

[49] Hunter 1999: 145–6, 2003: 233–4.

cicadas in his programmatic statement of poetic values (*Aetia* frag. 1.29–34). Of the Hellenistic epigrams falsely attributed to Plato, three may have been inspired by the *Phaedrus* (*FGE*, "Plato" VI, X, XVI; 252e1n.). In *De oratore* Cicero refers to Plato's plane tree at the outset (1.28) and builds up a series of allusions to connect his argument on rhetoric with Plato's argument in the *Phaedrus*.[50]

Plutarch's *Amatorius* (Ἐρωτικός), which discusses *erōs* in pederasty and marriage, begins with an apparent rejection of the *Phaedrus*' *locus amoenus* (749a) but then includes a series of allusions to the *Phaedrus* and considers *erōs* as divine madness (758d–759d) and as an influence on the soul (765a–766b).[51] Philostratus' *Heroicus* establishes the allusive, playful nature of its protagonists' discourses with allusions to play (παιδιά) in the *Phaedrus*.[52] The *Phaedrus* is invoked at the beginning of Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon* (1.2.3) and by Longus in *Daphnis and Chloe* to deepen the portrayal of *erōs* and the use of myth.[53] Aristides (*Or.* 2, 3) uses the *Phaedrus*' argument on rhetoric and its exemplary treatment of Pericles to rebut the argument on rhetoric and the bad treatment of Pericles in the *Gorgias*.[54] Galen is interested in the *Phaedrus*' argument on rhetoric in his work *On the opinions of Hippocrates and Plato*.[55] In the fifth or sixth century CE the *Phaedrus*' account of divine *erōs*, strongly colored by Neoplatonist interpretation, served Musaeus as a model for *erōs* in his verse rendering of *Hero and Leander*.[56] Three passages from the *Phaedrus* belonged to a tradition of reflection on the fate and nature of the soul, conducted chiefly by Neoplatonists and Christians, that extends into the high Middle Ages: 250c4–5 on the body as the tomb of the soul; 246a3–249d3 on the soul's flight upwards towards the super-heavenly realm; 248b6 on "the plain of truth."[57]

The *Phaedrus* takes issue with fourth-century BCE approaches to style and diction (227c6n., 234e5–6n.), but its famous passages were enshrined as models in later stylistic theory. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (mid 1st c. BCE–early 1st c. CE) cites the dialogue to illustrate both Plato's plain style (ἰσχνόν), which he admires, and his elevated style (ὑψηλόν), which he dislikes (*Dem.* 5–7; 238b6–c4n.). Hermogenes (2nd c. CE) illustrated his view of Plato's "sweetness" (γλυκύτης) with several passages from the *Phaedrus*, including the opening of S.'s first speech (237a7–b1) that Dionysius finds artificial (*Id.* 330–8 Rabe).[58] To judge from fragments preserved in the work of Philodemus of Gadara, the Stoic philosopher Diogenes of Babylon (mid 2nd c. BCE–mid 1st c. BCE) pursued the Platonic goal of a philosophical rhetoric based on the *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*.[59] The *Phaedrus*' account

[50] Görler 1988: 215–23. Cf. also *Brut.* 24 (plane tree), *Leg.* 1.3 (Boreas-Oreithyia), 2.6 (Ilissus). Cicero translated *Phdr.* 245c5–246a2 (*Rep.* 6.27–8, *Tusc.* 1.53–4), 279a1–b2 (*Orat.* 41).

[51] Trapp 1990: 157–61.

[52] Hodkinson 2011. On παιδιά in the *Phaedrus*, cf. 274b7–278e3n.

[53] Hunter 1997. [54] Trapp 1990: 166–7. [55] Rocca 2006.

[56] Gelzer 1975: 310–11, 316–22. [57] Courcelle 1974: 394–414, 562–624, 655–60.

[58] Walsdorff 1927 on ancient judgments on Plato's style. [59] Aubert 2009.

of philosophical rhetoric also influenced the church father Gregory of Nazianzus (329–389 CE) in his account of the ideal Christian preacher.[60] However, beyond the *Phaedrus*' fundamental influence on Aristotle and Cicero and through them to later rhetorical theory, the dialogue was often misunderstood when it was cited as an authority for rhetorical precepts in the rhetorical treatises of late antiquity.[61] Presumably it was too complex and ironic to be integrated into this reductive tradition.

Among philosophers, the Stoic Posidonius (1st c. BCE) commented on the *Phaedrus* (frags. 24, 31, 290 Kidd). Apuleius (2nd c. CE) joined Plutarch (*On the generation of the soul in the Timaeus*) and other Middle Platonists (1st c. BCE–2nd c. CE) in seeking to reconcile the generated world-soul of the *Timaeus* with the immortal soul of the *Phaedrus*.[62] The Middle Platonist Harpocration of Argos (late 2nd c. CE) compiled a *Commentary on Plato*, from which two fragments concerning the *Phaedrus* are preserved.[63] The dialogue finds echoes in many Neoplatonic texts and contexts (3rd c. CE–6th c. CE), especially in passages regarding the soul, *erōs*, and beauty.[64] For instance, the depiction of divine *erōs* in the *Phaedrus* shaped the accounts of divine *erōs* of both Plotinus (205–269/70 CE) and Proclus (*c.* 410–485 CE).[65] The dialogue's account of the soul and the super-heavenly realm of true Being helped shape Plotinus' account of the soul.[66] Plotinus' essay *On the intelligible beauty* (*Enn.* 5.8) quotes and reworks several passages from the *Phaedrus*.[67] Proclus critiques Plotinus' account of evil in light of the descent of the soul in the dialogue.[68] The commentary compiled by Hermias of Alexandria (5th c. CE), the student of Syrianus (*c.* 360–*c.* 435 CE) and fellow student of Proclus, is the only extant Neoplatonic commentary on the *Phaedrus* and contains within it much of the inherited Neoplatonic tradition on the dialogue up to that point.[69]

[60] Kennedy 1980: 192–6.

[61] Even Quintilian, *Inst.* 3.10.11 (on the "Eleatic Palamedes," 261d6n.), who otherwise cites the *Phaedrus* infrequently but correctly. Examples of typical misunderstandings of the *Phaedrus* in late rhetorical treatises: Anonymous Seguerianus, *Art of political discourse* §207; Rabe 1931 (*Prolegomenon sylloge*): 281, 320.

[62] On the use of the *Phaedrus* by Middle Platonists generally, see Moreschini 1992; on Apuleius and the *Phaedrus*, see Finamore 2006: 41–2. The extent to which the *Phaedrus* influenced Apuleius' story of Cupid and Psyche (*Met.* 4.28–6.24) is controversial (Moreschini 1992: 195–8).

[63] Dillon 1971.

[64] Cf. 137 references to the *Phaedrus* in the *index fontium* in the Henry and Schwyzer (1964–82) edition of Plotinus. For an overview of Neoplatonic interest in the *Phaedrus*, see Bielmeier 1930.

[65] Armstrong 1961. [66] Rist 1967, Taran 1969. [67] Corrigan 2005: 189–227.

[68] Phillips 2007: 238–58. On Proclus' use of the *Phaedrus* generally, see Buckley 2006.

[69] On Hermias and the sources of his commentary, see Bernard 1997: 1–74, Moreschini 2009. See Dillon 1973: 92–9, 248–56 on the extant fragments of the *Phaedrus* commentary by Iamblichus (*c.* 245–325 CE).

(3) *Medieval and modern reception*: There is no evidence that the *Phaedrus* was translated into Arabic, but the contents of the dialogue were known to Al-Farabi (*c.* 870–950 CE; *Philosophy of Plato* §§25–8). Medieval Arabs knew the *Phaedrus*' account of love as divine madness, transposed to love for woman; and the doctrine of the soul's self-movement (245c5–246a2) was known to the Arabic tradition in garbled fashion through Neoplatonic sources.[70] Michael Psellus, the eleventh-century Byzantine scholar, composed an exegetical work on the *Phaedrus*, much of which is drawn from Hermias.[71] In the Italian Renaissance Leonardo Bruni (*c.* 1370–1444) translated the *Phaedrus* into Latin in a bowdlerized version that omitted references to pederasty. Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), the Florentine Christian Platonist and student of Neoplatonism, made a complete translation into Latin and published a commentary on the entire dialogue.[72] In France François Rabelais (*c.* 1494–1553) alludes to the *Phaedrus*' account of divine possession, the "plain of truth" (248b6), and the critique of writing.[73]

In England Edmund Spenser (1552–99) alludes extensively to the Phaedran charioteer in the *Faerie Queene*.[74] Benjamin Whichcote (1609–83), one of the Cambridge Platonists, made use of the *Phaedrus*' account of the descent and ascent of the soul.[75] Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834) studied the *Phaedrus*' doctrine of divine inspiration in relation to poetic creation.[76] William Wordsworth (1770–1850) used the *Phaedrus*' doctrine of recollection and the soul's prenatal existence in his *Ode on intimations of immortality*.[77] In the nineteenth century the role of pederasty in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* was at the center of controversy over Benjamin Jowett's influential but bowdlerized translation of Plato.[78] In the novel *Jacob's room* (1922) by Virginia Woolf (1882–1941) the protagonist's reading of the *Phaedrus* is a central element of the plot.[79]

Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), the German translator of Plato and founder of the modern field of hermeneutics, viewed the *Phaedrus* as Plato's first dialogue and the origin of Plato's systematically organized corpus.[80] In the twentieth century, readings of the *Phaedrus* by Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) and Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) have made the dialogue prominent in continental philosophy. In his 1924/5 lectures on Plato's *Sophist*, Heidegger examines the second, dialectical, part of the *Phaedrus* in search of a *logos* that can "see the

70 Rosenthal 1940: 419–20, Wakelnig 2006: 368–9. 71 Jahn 1899.

72 On Bruni's *Phaedrus*, see Hankins 1990: 66–72. Allen 2008 contains Ficino's commentary and his translation of S.'s palinode. Allen 1984 is a study of Ficino's work on the *Phaedrus*.

73 Menini 2009. 74 Gray 2006: xviii–xx. 75 Scott 1994: 142, 149.

76 Vigus 2009: 76–81. 77 Price 1994: 219–21.

78 Cruzalegui Sotelo 2006: 589–706. On English translations of Plato from the seventeenth through the twentieth centuries, see the introductions to the relevant section (by century) in Baldwin and Hutton 1994.

79 Lyons 1994: 293–7.

80 Asmuth 2006: 187–218 on the role of the *Phaedrus* in Schleiermacher's translation project. Lafrance 1990 on the *Phaedrus* and Schleiermacher's hermeneutics.

truth."[81] In his 1936/7 lectures on "Nietzsche: the will to power as art," Heidegger considers the relationship between truth and beauty in S.'s palinode.[82] In both cases Heidegger is concerned with the way Being shows itself, a problem common to Plato's epistemology (*Phdr.* 249d4–250d7) and Heidegger's phenomenology. Derrida's essay "Plato's pharmacy" (1968), now a canonical part of the reception of the *Phaedrus*, presents a deconstructive reading of the dialogue; that is, artfully avoiding the pursuit of Plato's meanings, Derrida demonstrates his own freedom (which belongs to any reader) to discover significance in any aspect of the text in relation to any other aspect of the text or indeed of the world.[83] Derrida's baroque reading seeks to overturn the *Phaedrus*' conception of design in artistic discourse; the dialogue's complexity no longer reflects authorial control but enables the reader's interpretive autonomy. Gone not only is Plato the author, but along with him the possibility of receiving his messages, of understanding his arguments, and of appreciating his irony.[84]

Partly as a result of its connection to contemporary philosophy, the modern study of rhetoric has regained its ancient sophistication, and the *Phaedrus* is again significant for rhetorical theorists concerned with argumentation, design in discourse, and the nature and purpose of the art.[85]

9. THE TEXT AND APPARATUS IN THIS EDITION

The text printed here represents the editor's judgment of what Plato most likely wrote, based on the available evidence and the generations of scholarly acumen brought to bear on the question.[86] Information about the readings in the medieval manuscripts and scholarly emendations was drawn from the critical editions of Moreschini 1966, 1985 and Robin 1933. All published papyri containing portions of the *Phaedrus* have been consulted.[87]

81 Heidegger 1992: 308–52 (*Plato's Sophist* §§50–5).

82 Heidegger 1985: 231–48 (*Nietzsche: the will to power as art* §26).

83 Derrida 1968. Derrida emerges from the same Heideggerian background as Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002), for whom the *Phaedrus* is also a fundamental text; cf. Gadamer 1989: 362–9, 480–91, Schmid 2003.

84 On Derrida's reading of the *Phaedrus*, cf. Griswold 1986: 230–41, Rinon 1992, 1993.

85 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, Hunter 1984, Stewart 1984, Sloane 1997.

86 On the manuscript tradition of the *Phaedrus* and the ancient tradition as evidenced in the papyri and testimonia, see Moreschini 1985: CCVI–CCXXIII. On the ancient and medieval transmission of Plato generally, see Carlini 1972: 3–141. The medieval manuscripts containing the *Phaedrus* are listed in Brumbaugh and Wells 1968: 106–9. On the ancient Plato lexica, see Dyck 1985.

87 Eight papyri containing portions of the *Phaedrus* have been published (all CE, *CPF* 80.48–54): *P. Oxy.* 1016 (3rd c., 227a1–230e4); *P. Turner* 7 + *P. Oxy.* 2102 (2nd c., 233c2–234b2, 242d4–244e1); *P. Oxy.* 1017 (2nd–3rd c., 238c5–240d5, 245a3–251b4); *P. Ant.* 77 (2nd–3rd c., 257d2–e1); *P. Col.* 203 (2nd–3rd c., 266b1–6, 266d2–e3); *P. Mil. Vogl.* 9 (2nd–3rd c., 267b3–d1, 268b8–c7); *P. Oxy.* 3677 (2nd c., 267c3–6). Two papyri quote the *Phaedrus* (both CE, *CPF* 80.110T–111T): *P. Berl.* 8 (= *BKT* 2.52–3, 2nd c., 265c8–d6); *P. Oxy.* 3543 (2nd c., 279a1–4).

The purpose of the brief textual apparatus is to alert the reader to those problems of the text that require consideration for understanding Plato's meaning. Superficial errors and discrepancies among the primary sources are ignored. The apparatus reports only two kinds of cases: (1) the adopted reading is one of two or more variants in the primary manuscripts (i.e. the medieval manuscripts BTW and the papyri), none of the variants is obviously correct, and a decision among the variants affects what Plato means; (2) the adopted reading departs from all the primary manuscripts, i.e. it is either an editorial emendation or a reading found only in a secondary manuscript or ancient testimonium. Except for problems discussed in the commentary, all other textual variants, proposed emendations, and editorial decisions have been passed over in silence. To check the provenance of all readings that are adopted in the text but not reported in the apparatus, the reader is referred to the *apparatus criticus* in Moreschini 1985. In order to facilitate fluent reading, editorial brackets have been excluded from the text and confined to the apparatus. The marginal page numbers and section letters (a–e), used everywhere to refer to Plato's text, stem from and have been checked against the Plato edition of Henri Estienne (Stephanus), Geneva 1578.[88]

Abbreviations used in the apparatus

B	Oxford, codex Bodleianus, MS E. D. Clarke 39, 895 CE[89]
T	Venice, codex Marcianus graecus appendix classis IV, 1 (collocazione 542), 10th c. CE
W	Vienna, codex Vindobonensis supplementum graecum 7, 11th c. CE[90]
btw	additional hands in BTW without regard for date of inscription or location in the MS
rec.	one or more secondary MSS (codices recentiores), either the original hand or that of a corrector
Π	papyrus
Σ	scholion
[text]	either (1) text absent in primary MSS or (2) text found in primary MSS but absent in an ancient source or deleted by a modern editor; in context there is no ambiguity

Abbreviations of papyri follow *Checklist of Editions of Greek, Latin, Demotic and Coptic Papyri, Ostraca and Tablets*, available at: http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/papyrus/texts/clist.html.

[88] The line numbers within the lettered sections vary from one edition of Plato to another.

[89] The relationship between B and codex Venetus Marcianus graecus 185, known as D, is controversial. This edition follows the judgment of Brockmann 1992: 49–60, based mainly on the *Symposium*, that D is an apograph of B; it is thus not included among the primary MSS. In six places in the *Phaedrus* D departs from B by a single letter and joins TW for the correct reading (Moreschini 1985: CCXI).

[90] Codex Vaticanus Palatinus graecus 173, known as P, is extant for the *Phaedrus* only in extracts and follows W (Moreschini 1985: CCXII–CCXIII).

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

ΣΩ. Ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν; 227

ΦΑΙ. Παρὰ Λυσίου, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ Κεφάλου, πορεύομαι δὲ πρὸς περίπατον ἔξω τείχους· συχνὸν γὰρ ἐκεῖ διέτριψα χρόνον καθήμενος ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ. τῶι δὲ σῶι καὶ ἐμῶι ἑταίρωι πειθόμενος Ἀκουμενῶι κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ποιοῦμαι τοὺς περιπάτους· φησὶ γὰρ ἀκοπωτέρους εἶναι τῶν ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις. b

ΣΩ. Καλῶς γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λέγει. ἀτὰρ Λυσίας ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν ἄστει;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί, παρ' Ἐπικράτει, ἐν τῆιδε τῆι πλησίον τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου οἰκίαι τῆι Μορυχίαι.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν δὴ ἦν ἡ διατριβή; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἱστία;

ΦΑΙ. Πεύσηι, εἴ σοι σχολὴ προϊόντι ἀκούειν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; οὐκ ἂν οἴει με κατὰ Πίνδαρον "καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον" πρᾶγμα ποιήσεσθαι τὸ σήν τε καὶ Λυσίου διατριβὴν ἀκοῦσαι;

ΦΑΙ. Πρόαγε δή. c

ΣΩ. Λέγοις ἄν.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, προσήκουσα γέ σοι ἡ ἀκοή· ὁ γάρ τοι λόγος ἦν, περὶ ὃν διετρίβομεν, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον ἐρωτικός. γέγραφε γὰρ δὴ ὁ Λυσίας πειρώμενόν τινα τῶν καλῶν, οὐχ ὑπ' ἐραστοῦ δέ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ κεκόμψευται· λέγει γὰρ ὡς χαριστέον μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρῶντι.

ΣΩ. Ὢ γενναῖος, εἴθε γράψειεν ὡς χρὴ πένητι μᾶλλον ἢ πλουσίωι, καὶ πρεσβυτέρωι ἢ νεωτέρωι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐμοί τε πρόσεστι καὶ τοῖς d
πολλοῖς ἡμῶν· ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἀστεῖοι καὶ δημωφελεῖς εἶεν οἱ λόγοι. ἔγωγ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμηκα ἀκοῦσαι, ὥστ' ἐὰν βαδίζων ποιῆι τὸν περίπατον Μέγαράδε καὶ κατὰ Ἡρόδικον προσβὰς τῶι τείχει πάλιν ἀπίηις, οὐ μή σου ἀπολειφθῶ.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ βέλτιστε Σώκρατες; οἴει με, ἃ Λυσίας ἐν πολλῶι 228
χρόνωι κατὰ σχολὴν συνέθηκε, δεινότατος ὢν τῶν νῦν γράφειν, ταῦτα ἰδιώτην ὄντα ἀπομνημονεύσειν ἀξίως ἐκείνου; πολλοῦ γε δέω· καίτοι ἐβουλόμην γ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ μοι πολὺ χρυσίον γενέσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερά ἐστι τούτων, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι Λυσίου λόγον ἀκούων ἐκεῖνος οὐ μόνον ἅπαξ ἤκουσεν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐπαναλαμβάνων

b ἐκέλευέν οἱ λέγειν, ὁ δὲ ἐπείθετο προθύμως. τῶι δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἦν ἱκανά,
ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν παραλαβὼν τὸ βιβλίον ἃ μάλιστα ἐπεθύμει ἐπεσκόπει,
καὶ τοῦτο δρῶν ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ καθήμενος ἀπειπὼν εἰς περίπατον ἤιει, ὡς
μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἐξεπιστάμενος τὸν λόγον, εἰ μὴ πάνυ τις
ἦν μακρός. ἐπορεύετο δ' ἐκτὸς τείχους ἵνα μελετώιη. ἀπαντήσας δὲ τῶι
νοσοῦντι περὶ λόγων ἀκοήν, ἰδὼν μέν, ἰδὼν ἥσθη ὅτι ἕξοι τὸν συγκο-
c ρυβαντιῶντα, καὶ προάγειν ἐκέλευε. δεομένου δὲ λέγειν τοῦ τῶν λόγων
ἐραστοῦ, ἐθρύπτετο ὡς δὴ οὐκ ἐπιθυμῶν λέγειν· τελευτῶν δὲ ἔμελλε καὶ
εἰ μή τις ἑκὼν ἀκούοι βίαι ἐρεῖν. σὺ οὖν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, αὐτοῦ δεήθητι ὅπερ
τάχα πάντως ποιήσει νῦν ἤδη ποιεῖν.
ΦΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολὺ κράτιστόν ἐστιν οὕτως ὅπως δύναμαι
λέγειν, ὥς μοι δοκεῖς σὺ οὐδαμῶς με ἀφήσειν πρὶν ἂν εἴπω ἁμῶς γέ πως.
ΣΩ. Πάνυ γάρ σοι ἀληθῆ δοκῶ.
d ΦΑΙ. Οὑτωσὶ τοίνυν ποιήσω. τῶι ὄντι γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, παντὸς
μᾶλλον τά γε ῥήματα οὐκ ἐξέμαθον· τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν σχεδὸν ἁπάν-
των, οἷς ἔφη διαφέρειν τὰ τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἢ τὰ τοῦ μή, ἐν κεφαλαίοις
ἕκαστον ἐφεξῆς δίειμι, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου.
ΣΩ. Δείξας γε πρῶτον, ὦ φιλότης, τί ἄρα ἐν τῆι ἀριστερᾶι ἔχεις
ὑπὸ τῶι ἱματίωι· τοπάζω γάρ σε ἔχειν τὸν λόγον αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτό
ἐστιν, οὑτωσὶ διανοοῦ περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγώ σε πάνυ μὲν φιλῶ, παρόντος
e δὲ καὶ Λυσίου, ἐμαυτόν σοι ἐμμελετᾶν παρέχειν οὐ πάνυ δέδοκται. ἀλλ'
ἴθι, δείκνυε.
ΦΑΙ. Παῦε. ἐκκέκρουκάς με ἐλπίδος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἣν εἶχον ἐν σοὶ ὡς
ἐγγυμνασόμενος. ἀλλὰ ποῦ δὴ βούλει καθιζόμενοι ἀναγνῶμεν;
229 ΣΩ. Δεῦρ' ἐκτραπόμενοι κατὰ τὸν Ἰλισὸν ἴωμεν, εἶτα ὅπου ἂν δόξηι
ἐν ἡσυχίαι καθιζησόμεθα.
ΦΑΙ. Εἰς καιρόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνυπόδητος ὢν ἔτυχον· σὺ μὲν γὰρ δὴ
ἀεί. ῥᾶιστον οὖν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ ὑδάτιον βρέχουσι τοὺς πόδας ἰέναι, καὶ
οὐκ ἀηδές, ἄλλως τε καὶ τήνδε τὴν ὥραν τοῦ ἔτους τε καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας.
ΣΩ. Πρόαγε δή, καὶ σκόπει ἅμα ὅπου καθιζησόμεθα.
ΦΑΙ. Ὁρᾶις οὖν ἐκείνην τὴν ὑψηλοτάτην πλάτανον;
ΣΩ. Τί μήν;
b ΦΑΙ. Ἐκεῖ σκιά τ' ἐστὶν καὶ πνεῦμα μέτριον, καὶ πόα καθίζεσθαι ἢ ἂν
βουλώμεθα κατακλιθῆναι.
ΣΩ. Προάγοις ἄν.
ΦΑΙ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἐνθένδε μέντοι ποθὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰλισοῦ
λέγεται ὁ Βορέας τὴν Ὠρείθυιαν ἁρπάσαι;
ΣΩ. Λέγεται γάρ.

228e1 δὲ καὶ Λυσίου B: δὲ Λυσίου TWΠ

ΦΑΙ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐνθένδε; χαρίεντα γοῦν καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ διαφανῆ τὰ
ὑδάτια φαίνεται, καὶ ἐπιτήδεια κόραις παίζειν παρ' αὐτά.

ΣΩ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ κάτωθεν ὅσον δύ' ἢ τρία στάδια, ἧι πρὸς τὸ c
ἐν Ἄγρας διαβαίνομεν· καί πού τίς ἐστι βωμὸς αὐτόθι Βορέου.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ νενόηκα· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκρατες, σὺ τοῦτο
τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθει ἀληθὲς εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἀπιστοίην, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοί, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἴην· εἶτα
σοφιζόμενος φαίην αὐτὴν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίον πετρῶν
σὺν Φαρμακείαι παίζουσαν ὦσαι, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τελευτήσασαν λεχθῆναι
ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀνάρπαστον γεγονέναι – ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου· λέγεται d
γὰρ αὖ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἐκεῖθεν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνθένδε ἡρπάσθη. ἐγὼ
δέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίεντα ἡγοῦμαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ
καὶ ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρός, κατ' ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὅτι δ'
αὐτῶι ἀνάγκη μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ τῶν Ἱπποκενταύρων εἶδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι
καὶ αὖθις τὸ τῆς Χιμαίρας, καὶ ἐπιρρεῖ δὲ ὄχλος τοιούτων Γοργόνων καὶ
Πηγάσων καὶ ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων e
τινῶν φύσεων· αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾶι κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον
ἅτε ἀγροίκωι τινὶ σοφίαι χρώμενος, πολλῆς αὐτῶι σχολῆς δεήσει. ἐμοὶ
δὲ πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σχολή· τὸ δὲ αἴτιον, ὦ φίλε, τού-
του τόδε. οὐ δύναμαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν·
γελοῖον δή μοι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. ὅθεν 230
δὴ χαίρειν ἐάσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῶι νομιζομένωι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὃ
νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε τι θηρίον τυγχάνω
Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον, εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν
τε καὶ ἁπλούστερον ζῶιον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέ-
χον. ἀτάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων, ἆρ' οὐ τόδε ἦν τὸ δένδρον ἐφ'
ὅπερ ἦγες ἡμᾶς;

ΦΑΙ. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτό. b

ΣΩ. Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, καλή γε ἡ καταγωγή. ἥ τε γὰρ πλάτανος αὕτη
μάλ' ἀμφιλαφής τε καὶ ὑψηλή, τοῦ τε ἄγνου τὸ ὕψος καὶ τὸ σύσκιον
πάγκαλον, καὶ ὡς ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἄνθης, ὡς ἂν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι
τὸν τόπον· ἥ τε αὖ πηγὴ χαριεστάτη ὑπὸ τῆς πλατάνου ῥεῖ μάλα
ψυχροῦ ὕδατος, ὥς γε τῶι ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι. νυμφῶν τέ τινων καὶ
Ἀχελώιου ἱερὸν ἀπὸ τῶν κορῶν τε καὶ ἀγαλμάτων ἔοικεν εἶναι. εἰ δ' αὖ
βούλει, τὸ εὔπνουν τοῦ τόπου ὡς ἀγαπητὸν καὶ σφόδρα ἡδύ· θερινόν τε c
καὶ λιγυρὸν ὑπηχεῖ τῶι τῶν τεττίγων χορῶι. πάντων δὲ κομψότατον
τὸ τῆς πόας, ὅτι ἐν ἠρέμα προσάντει ἱκανὴ πέφυκε κατακλινέντι τὴν
κεφαλὴν παγκάλως ἔχειν. ὥστε ἄριστά σοι ἐξενάγηται, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε.

229c2 ἐν Ἄγρας Σ: τῆς Ἄγρας ΒΤWΠ 229e4 τὰ τοιαῦτα Π: ταῦτα TW: αὐτὰ B

ΦΑΙ. Σὺ δέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἀτοπώτατός τις φαίνει. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ, ὃ λέγεις, ξεναγουμένωι τινὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίωι ἔοικας· οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ
d ἄστεως οὔτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀποδημεῖς οὔτ' ἔξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξιέναι.

ΣΩ. Συγγίγνωσκέ μοι, ὦ ἄριστε. φιλομαθὴς γάρ εἰμι· τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδέν μ' ἐθέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δ' ἐν τῶι ἄστει ἄνθρωποι. σὺ μέντοι δοκεῖς μοι τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξόδου τὸ φάρμακον ηὑρηκέναι· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰ πεινῶντα θρέμματα θαλλὸν ἤ τινα καρπὸν προσείοντες ἄγουσιν, σὺ ἐμοὶ λόγους οὕτω προτείνων ἐν βιβλίοις τήν τε
e Ἀττικὴν φαίνει περιάξειν ἅπασαν καὶ ὅποι ἂν ἄλλοσε βούληι. νῦν δ' οὖν ἐν τῶι παρόντι δεῦρ' ἀφικόμενος ἐγὼ μέν μοι δοκῶ κατακείσεσθαι, σὺ δ' ἐν ὁποίωι σχήματι οἴει ῥᾷστα ἀναγνώσεσθαι, τοῦθ' ἑλόμενος ἀναγίγνωσκε.

ΦΑΙ. Ἄκουε δή.

Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν
231 ἡμῖν τούτων γενομένων ἀκήκοας· ἀξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι ὧν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστὴς ὤν σου τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ὧν ἂν εὖ ποιήσωσιν, ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται· τοῖς δὲ οὐκ ἔστι χρόνος ἐν ὧι μεταγνῶναι προσήκει. οὐ γὰρ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἀλλ' ἑκόντες, ὡς ἂν ἄριστα περὶ τῶν οἰκείων βουλεύσαιντο, πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τὴν αὑτῶν εὖ ποιοῦσιν.

Ἔτι δὲ οἱ μὲν ἐρῶντες σκοποῦσιν ἅ τε κακῶς διέθεντο τῶν αὑτῶν
b διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα καὶ ἃ πεποιήκασιν εὖ, καὶ ὃν εἶχον πόνον προστιθέντες ἡγοῦνται πάλαι τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδεδωκέναι χάριν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις· τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσιν οὔτε τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀμέλειαν διὰ τοῦτο ἔστι προφασίζεσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς παρεληλυθότας πόνους ὑπολογίζεσθαι, οὔτε τὰς πρὸς τοὺς προσήκοντας διαφορὰς αἰτιάσασθαι· ὥστε περιῃρημένων τοσούτων κακῶν οὐδὲν ὑπολείπεται ἀλλ' ἢ ποιεῖν προθύμως ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς οἴωνται πράξαντες χαριεῖσθαι.

c Ἔτι δὲ εἰ διὰ τοῦτο ἄξιον τοὺς ἐρῶντας περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, ὅτι τούτους μάλιστά φασιν φιλεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐρῶσιν καὶ ἕτοιμοί εἰσι καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπεχθανόμενοι τοῖς ἐρωμένοις χαρίζεσθαι, ῥάιδιον γνῶναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν, ὅτι ὅσων ἂν ὕστερον ἐρασθῶσιν, ἐκείνους αὐτῶν περὶ πλείονος ποιήσονται, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι, ἐὰν ἐκείνοις δοκῆι, καὶ τούτους κακῶς ποιήσουσιν.

Καίτοι πῶς εἰκός ἐστι τοιοῦτον πρᾶγμα προέσθαι τοιαύτην ἔχοντι
d συμφοράν, ἣν οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσειεν οὐδεὶς ἔμπειρος ὢν ἀποτρέπειν; καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦσι νοσεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι ὅτι κακῶς φρονοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύνασθαι αὑτῶν κρατεῖν· ὥστε πῶς ἂν εὖ

φρονήσαντες ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν ἡγήσαιντο περὶ ὧν οὕτω διακείμενοι
βουλεύονται;

Καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐρώντων τὸν βέλτιστον αἱροῖο, ἐξ ὀλίγων
ἄν σοι ἡ ἔκλεξις εἴη· εἰ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τὸν σαυτῶι ἐπιτηδειότατον,
ἐκ πολλῶν· ὥστε πολὺ πλείων ἐλπὶς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὄντα τυχεῖν τὸν
ἄξιον τῆς σῆς φιλίας.

Εἰ τοίνυν τὸν νόμον τὸν καθεστηκότα δέδοικας, μὴ πυθομένων e
τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄνειδός σοι γένηται, εἰκός ἐστι τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶντας, οὕτως
ἂν οἰομένους καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζηλοῦσθαι ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς ὑφ' αὑτῶν, 232
ἐπαρθῆναι τῶι λέγειν καὶ φιλοτιμουμένους ἐπιδείκνυσθαι πρὸς ἅπαν-
τας ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πεπόνηται· τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶντας, κρείττους
αὑτῶν ὄντας, τὸ βέλτιστον ἀντὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
αἱρεῖσθαι.

Ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶντας πολλοὺς ἀνάγκη πυθέσθαι καὶ ἰδεῖν
ἀκολουθοῦντας τοῖς ἐρωμένοις καὶ ἔργον τοῦτο ποιουμένους, ὥστε,
ὅταν ὀφθῶσι διαλεγόμενοι ἀλλήλοις, τότε αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἢ
γεγενημένης ἢ μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας συνεῖναι· τοὺς δὲ b
μὴ ἐρῶντας οὐδ' αἰτιᾶσθαι διὰ τὴν συνουσίαν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἰδότες
ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἢ διὰ φιλίαν τωι διαλέγεσθαι ἢ δι' ἄλλην τινὰ
ἡδονήν.

Καὶ μὲν δὴ εἴ σοι δέος παρέστηκεν ἡγουμένωι χαλεπὸν εἶναι φιλίαν
συμμένειν, καὶ ἄλλωι μὲν τρόπωι διαφορᾶς γενομένης κοινὴν ἀμφοτέροις
καταστῆναι τὴν συμφοράν, προεμένου δέ σου ἃ περὶ πλείστου ποιῆι c
μεγάλην ἂν σοὶ βλάβην ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰκότως ἂν τοὺς ἐρῶντας μᾶλλον
ἂν φοβοῖο· πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτούς ἐστι τὰ λυποῦντα, καὶ πάντ' ἐπὶ τῆι
αὐτῶν βλάβηι νομίζουσι γίγνεσθαι. διόπερ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους
τῶν ἐρωμένων συνουσίας ἀποτρέπουσιν, φοβούμενοι τοὺς μὲν οὐσίαν
κεκτημένους μὴ χρήμασιν αὐτοὺς ὑπερβάλωνται, τοὺς δὲ πεπαιδευμέ-
νους μὴ συνέσει κρείττους γένωνται· τῶν δὲ ἄλλο τι κεκτημένων ἀγαθὸν
τὴν δύναμιν ἑκάστου φυλάττονται. πείσαντες μὲν οὖν ἀπεχθέσθαι σε d
τούτοις εἰς ἐρημίαν φίλων καθιστᾶσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ σεαυτοῦ σκοπῶν
ἄμεινον ἐκείνων φρονῆις, ἥξεις αὐτοῖς εἰς διαφοράν· ὅσοι δὲ μὴ ἐρῶν-
τες ἔτυχον ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν ἔπραξαν ὧν ἐδέοντο, οὐκ ἂν τοῖς συνοῦσι
φθονοῖεν ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὴ ἐθέλοντας μισοῖεν, ἡγούμενοι ὑπ' ἐκείνων μὲν
ὑπερορᾶσθαι, ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων δὲ ὠφελεῖσθαι, ὥστε πολὺ πλείων
ἐλπὶς φιλίαν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἢ ἔχθραν γενέσθαι. e

231d5 βουλεύονται Stephanus: βούλονται BTW
232c2 ἂν γενέσθαι B: γενέσθαι TW 232c3 ἂν φοβοῖο B: φοβοῖο TW

Καὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν μὲν ἐρώντων πολλοὶ πρότερον τοῦ σώματος ἐπεθύμησαν ἢ τὸν τρόπον ἔγνωσαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων ἔμπειροι ἐγένοντο, ὥστε ἄδηλον αὐτοῖς εἰ ἔτι τότε βουλήσονται φίλοι εἶναι, ἐπειδὰν τῆς
233 ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται· τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσιν, οἳ καὶ πρότερον ἀλλήλοις φίλοι ὄντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἂν εὖ πάθωσι ταῦτα εἰκὸς ἐλάττω τὴν φιλίαν αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μνημεῖα καταλειφθῆναι τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι.

Καὶ μὲν δὴ βελτίονί σοι προσήκει γενέσθαι ἐμοὶ πειθομένωι ἢ ἐραστῆι. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ πραττόμενα ἐπαινοῦσιν, τὰ μὲν δεδιότες μὴ ἀπέχθωνται, τὰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
b χεῖρον διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν γιγνώσκοντες. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ὁ ἔρως ἐπιδείκνυται· δυστυχοῦντας μέν, ἃ μὴ λύπην τοῖς ἄλλοις παρέχει, ἀνιαρὰ ποιεῖ νομίζειν· εὐτυχοῦντας δέ, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἡδονῆς ἄξια παρ᾽ ἐκείνων ἐπαίνου ἀναγκάζει τυγχάνειν· ὥστε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐλεεῖν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις ἢ ζηλοῦν αὐτοὺς προσήκει. ἐὰν δέ μοι πείθηι, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ τὴν παροῦσαν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύων συνέσομαί σοι ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν ὠφέλειαν
c ἔσεσθαι, οὐχ ὑπ᾽ ἔρωτος ἡττώμενος ἀλλ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ κρατῶν, οὐδὲ διὰ σμικρὰ ἰσχυρὰν ἔχθραν ἀναιρούμενος ἀλλὰ διὰ μεγάλα βραδέως ὀλίγην ὀργὴν ποιούμενος, τῶν μὲν ἀκουσίων συγγνώμην ἔχων, τὰ δὲ ἑκούσια πειρώμενος ἀποτρέπειν· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι φιλίας πολὺν χρόνον ἐσομένης τεκμήρια. εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα σοι τοῦτο παρέστηκεν, ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἰσχυρὰν φιλίαν γενέσθαι ἐὰν μή τις ἐρῶν τυγχάνηι, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι χρὴ ὅτι οὔτ᾽ ἂν τοὺς
d ὑεῖς περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμεθα οὔτ᾽ ἂν τοὺς πατέρας καὶ τὰς μητέρας, οὔτ᾽ ἂν πιστοὺς φίλους ἐκεκτήμεθα, οἳ οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιθυμίας τοιαύτης γεγόνασιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἑτέρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

Ἔτι δὲ εἰ χρὴ τοῖς δεομένοις μάλιστα χαρίζεσθαι, προσήκει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μὴ τοὺς βελτίστους ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους εὖ ποιεῖν· μεγίστων γὰρ ἀπαλλαγέντες κακῶν πλείστην χάριν αὐτοῖς εἴσονται. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις δαπάναις οὐ τοὺς φίλους ἄξιον παρακαλεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς
e προσαιτοῦντας καὶ τοὺς δεομένους πλησμονῆς· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ καὶ ἀγαπήσουσιν καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσιν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἥξουσι καὶ μάλιστα ἡσθήσονται καὶ οὐκ ἐλαχίστην χάριν εἴσονται καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς εὔξονται. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως προσήκει οὐ τοῖς σφόδρα δεομένοις χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μάλιστα ἀποδοῦναι χάριν δυναμένοις· οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐρῶσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ
234 τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἀξίοις· οὐδὲ ὅσοι τῆς σῆς ὥρας ἀπολαύσονται, ἀλλ᾽ οἵτινες πρεσβυτέρωι γενομένωι τῶν σφετέρων ἀγαθῶν μεταδώσουσιν· οὐδὲ οἳ διαπραξάμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοτιμήσονται, ἀλλ᾽ οἵτινες αἰσχυνόμενοι πρὸς ἅπαντας σιωπήσονται· οὐδὲ τοῖς ὀλίγον χρόνον σπουδάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὁμοίως διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου φίλοις ἐσομένοις· οὐδὲ οἵτινες παυόμενοι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχθρας πρόφασιν ζητήσουσιν,

ἀλλ' οἳ παυσαμένου τῆς ὥρας τότε τὴν αὑτῶν ἀρετὴν ἐπιδείξονται. σὺ b
οὖν τῶν τε εἰρημένων μέμνησο καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἐνθυμοῦ, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶν-
τας οἱ φίλοι νουθετοῦσιν ὡς ὄντος κακοῦ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, τοῖς δὲ
μὴ ἐρῶσιν οὐδεὶς πώποτε τῶν οἰκείων ἐμέμψατο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο κακῶς
βουλευομένοις περὶ ἑαυτῶν.

Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἔροιό με εἰ ἅπασίν σοι παραινῶ τοῖς μὴ ἐρῶσι χαρίζεσθαι.
ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι οὐδ' ἂν τὸν ἐρῶντα πρὸς ἅπαντάς σε κελεύειν τοὺς ἐρῶντας
ταύτην ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν· οὔτε γὰρ τῶι λαμβάνοντι χάριτος ἴσης c
ἄξιον, οὔτε σοὶ βουλομένωι τοὺς ἄλλους λανθάνειν ὁμοίως δυνατόν· δεῖ
δὲ βλάβην μὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ μηδεμίαν, ὠφέλειαν δὲ ἀμφοῖν γίγνεσθαι.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἱκανά μοι νομίζω τὰ εἰρημένα· εἰ δέ τι σὺ ποθεῖς, ἡγού-
μενος παραλελεῖφθαι, ἐρώτα.

Τί σοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ λόγος; οὐχ ὑπερφυῶς τά τε ἄλλα καὶ
τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εἰρῆσθαι; d

ΣΩ. Δαιμονίως μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὥστε με ἐκπλαγῆναι. καὶ τοῦτο
ἐγὼ ἔπαθον διὰ σέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, πρὸς σὲ ἀποβλέπων, ὅτι ἐμοὶ ἐδόκεις
γάνυσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου μεταξὺ ἀναγιγνώσκων· ἡγούμενος γὰρ σὲ
μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ἐπαΐειν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοὶ εἱπόμην, καὶ ἑπόμενος
συνεβάκχευσα μετὰ σοῦ τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς.

ΦΑΙ. Εἶεν· οὕτω δὴ δοκεῖ παίζειν;

ΣΩ. Δοκῶ γάρ σοι παίζειν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐσπουδακέναι;

ΦΑΙ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς εἰπὲ πρὸς Διὸς Φιλίου, e
οἴει ἄν τινα ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἄλλον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἕτερα τούτων μείζω καὶ
πλείω περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; καὶ ταύτηι δεῖ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ τὸν λόγον ἐπαινεθῆναι,
ὡς τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνηι μόνον, ὅτι σαφῆ
καὶ στρογγύλα καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἕκαστα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀποτετόρνευται;
εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, συγχωρητέον χάριν σήν, ἐπεὶ ἐμέ γε ἔλαθεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐμῆς
οὐδενίας· τῶι γὰρ ῥητορικῶι αὐτοῦ μόνωι τὸν νοῦν προσεῖχον, τοῦτο 235
δὲ οὐδ' αὐτὸν ὤιμην Λυσίαν οἴεσθαι ἱκανὸν εἶναι. καὶ οὖν μοι ἔδοξεν, ὦ
Φαῖδρε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, δὶς καὶ τρὶς τὰ αὐτὰ εἰρηκέναι, ὡς οὐ
πάνυ εὐπορῶν τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτῶι
μέλον τοῦ τοιούτου· καὶ ἐφαίνετο δή μοι νεανιεύεσθαι ἐπιδεικνύμενος
ὡς οἷός τε ὢν ταὐτὰ ἑτέρως τε καὶ ἑτέρως λέγων ἀμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν
ἄριστα.

234b1 παυσαμένου G. Hermann: παυσαμένοι BTW: παυσαμένης rec.
234c1 τῶι λαμβάνοντι T: τῶι λόγωι λαμβάνοντι BW
234c4 ποθεῖς rec.: ὑποθεῖς T: ὑποθῆις BW
235a2 καὶ οὖν C. Fr. Hermann: δικαιοῦν B: δίκαιον οὖν TW

b ΦΑΙ. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ μάλιστα ὁ
λόγος ἔχει. τῶν γὰρ ἐνόντων ἀξίως ῥηθῆναι ἐν τῶι πράγματι οὐδὲν
παραλέλοιπεν, ὥστε παρὰ τὰ ἐκείνωι εἰρημένα μηδέν' ἂν ποτε δύνασθαι
εἰπεῖν ἄλλα πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια.
ΣΩ. Τοῦτο ἐγώ σοι οὐκέτι οἷός τ' ἔσομαι πιθέσθαι· παλαιοὶ γὰρ
καὶ σοφοὶ ἄνδρες τε καὶ γυναῖκες περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρηκότες καὶ γεγραφότες
ἐξελέγξουσί με, ἐάν σοι χαριζόμενος συγχωρῶ.
c ΦΑΙ. Τίνες οὗτοι; καὶ ποῦ σὺ βελτίω τούτων ἀκήκοας;
ΣΩ. Νῦν μὲν οὕτως οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τινῶν ἀκήκοα, ἤ
που Σαπφοῦς τῆς καλῆς ἢ Ἀνακρέοντος τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ καὶ συγγραφέων
τινῶν. πόθεν δὴ τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω; πλῆρές πως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τὸ
στῆθος ἔχων αἰσθάνομαι παρὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χείρω.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν παρά γε ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐννενόηκα, εὖ οἶδα, συνειδὼς
ἐμαυτῶι ἀμαθίαν· λείπεται δὴ οἶμαι ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων ποθὲν ναμάτων διὰ
d τῆς ἀκοῆς πεπληρῶσθαί με δίκην ἀγγείου. ὑπὸ δὲ νωθείας αὖ καὶ αὐτὸ
τοῦτο ἐπιλέλησμαι, ὅπως τε καὶ ὧντινων ἤκουσα.
ΦΑΙ. Ἀλλ', ὦ γενναιότατε, κάλλιστα εἴρηκας. σὺ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ὧντινων
μὲν καὶ ὅπως ἤκουσας μηδ' ἂν κελεύω εἴπηις, τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεις
ποίησον· τῶν ἐν τῶι βιβλίωι βελτίω τε καὶ μὴ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ὑπέσχησαι
εἰπεῖν τούτων ἀπεχόμενος, καί σοι ἐγώ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες, ὑπισ-
e χνοῦμαι χρυσῆν εἰκόνα ἰσομέτρητον εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀναθήσειν, οὐ μόνον
ἐμαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σήν.
ΣΩ. Φίλτατος εἶ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυσοῦς, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἴ με οἴει λέγειν
ὡς Λυσίας τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτηκεν καὶ οἷόν τε δὴ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα
ἄλλα εἰπεῖν· τοῦτο δὲ οἶμαι οὐδ' ἂν τὸν φαυλότατον παθεῖν συγγραφέα.
αὐτίκα περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, τίνα οἴει λέγοντα ὡς χρὴ μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον
236 ἢ ἐρῶντι χαρίζεσθαι, παρέντα τοῦ μὲν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐγκωμιάζειν, τοῦ
δὲ τὸ ἄφρον ψέγειν, ἀναγκαῖα γοῦν ὄντα, εἶτ' ἄλλ' ἄττα ἕξειν λέγειν;
ἀλλ' οἶμαι τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἐατέα καὶ συγγνωστέα λέγοντι· καὶ τῶν
μὲν τοιούτων οὐ τὴν εὕρεσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν διάθεσιν ἐπαινετέον, τῶν δὲ μὴ
ἀναγκαίων τε καὶ χαλεπῶν εὑρεῖν πρὸς τῆι διαθέσει καὶ τὴν εὕρεσιν.
ΦΑΙ. Συγχωρῶ ὃ λέγεις· μετρίως γάρ μοι δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ποιήσω
b οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ οὕτως· τὸ μὲν τὸν ἐρῶντα τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος μᾶλλον νοσεῖν
δώσω σοι ὑποτίθεσθαι, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἕτερα πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια
εἰπὼν τῶνδε παρὰ τὸ Κυψελιδῶν ἀνάθημα σφυρήλατος ἐν Ὀλυμπίαι
στάθητι.

235b3 μηδέν' ἂν editio Aldina: μηδένα BTW: μηδ' ἂν ἕνα Hermias
235d5 ἕτερα ὑπέσχησαι Jackson: ἑτέραι ὑποσχέσει BTW 236b3 τῶνδε [Λυσίου] Burnet

ΣΩ. Ἐσπούδακας, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὅτι σου τῶν παιδικῶν ἐπελαβόμην ἐρεσχηλῶν σε, καὶ οἴει δή με ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιχειρήσειν εἰπεῖν παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου σοφίαν ἕτερόν τι ποικιλώτερον;

ΦΑΙ. Περὶ μὲν τούτου, ὦ φίλε, εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας λαβὰς ἐλήλυθας. ῥητέον
μὲν γάρ σοι παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ὅπως οἷός τε εἶ· ἵνα δὲ μὴ τὸ τῶν c
κωμωιδῶν φορτικὸν πρᾶγμα ἀναγκαζώμεθα ποιεῖν ἀνταποδιδόντες
ἀλλήλοις, εὐλαβήθητι, καὶ μὴ βούλου με ἀναγκάσαι λέγειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ "εἰ
ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, Σωκράτην ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι," καὶ ὅτι
"ἐπεθύμει μὲν λέγειν, ἐθρύπτετο δέ·" ἀλλὰ διανοήθητι ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν οὐκ
ἄπιμεν πρὶν ἂν σὺ εἴπηις ἃ ἔφησθα ἐν τῶι στήθει ἔχειν. ἐσμὲν δὲ μόνω
ἐν ἐρημίαι, ἰσχυρότερος δ' ἐγὼ καὶ νεώτερος, ἐκ δὲ ἁπάντων τούτων d
"σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω," καὶ μηδαμῶς πρὸς βίαν βουληθῆις μᾶλλον ἢ ἑκὼν
λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε Φαῖδρε, γελοῖος ἔσομαι παρ' ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΦΑΙ. Οἶσθ' ὡς ἔχει; παῦσαι πρός με καλλωπιζόμενος· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἔχω ὃ εἰπὼν ἀναγκάσω σε λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Μηδαμῶς τοίνυν εἴπηις.

ΦΑΙ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὴ λέγω· ὁ δέ μοι λόγος ὅρκος ἔσται. ὄμνυμι
γάρ σοι – τίνα μέντοι, τίνα θεῶν; ἢ βούλει τὴν πλάτανον ταυτηνί; – e
ἦ μήν, ἐάν μοι μὴ εἴπηις τὸν λόγον ἐναντίον αὐτῆς ταύτης, μηδέποτέ
σοι ἕτερον λόγον μηδένα μηδενὸς μήτε ἐπιδείξειν μήτε ἐξαγγελεῖν.

ΣΩ. Βαβαῖ, ὦ μιαρέ, ὡς εὖ ἀνηῦρες τὴν ἀνάγκην ἀνδρὶ φιλολόγωι ποιεῖν ὃ ἂν κελεύηις.

ΦΑΙ. Τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφει;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἐπειδὴ σύ γε ταῦτα ὀμώμοκας. πῶς γὰρ ἂν οἷός τ' εἴην τοιαύτης θοίνης ἀπέχεσθαι;

ΦΑΙ. Λέγε δή. 237

ΣΩ. Οἶσθ' οὖν ὡς ποιήσω;

ΦΑΙ. Τοῦ πέρι;

ΣΩ. Ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἐρῶ, ἵνα ὅτι τάχιστα διαδράμω τὸν λόγον καὶ μὴ βλέπων πρὸς σὲ ὑπ' αἰσχύνης διαπορῶμαι.

ΦΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὅπως βούλει ποίει.

ΣΩ. Ἄγετε δή, ὦ Μοῦσαι, εἴτε δι' ὠιδῆς εἶδος λίγειαι εἴτε διὰ γένος
μουσικὸν τὸ Λιγύων ταύτην ἔσχετ' ἐπωνυμίαν, ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε τοῦ
μύθου, ὅν με ἀναγκάζει ὁ βέλτιστος οὑτοσὶ λέγειν, ἵνα ὁ ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ,
καὶ πρότερον δοκῶν τούτωι σοφὸς εἶναι, νῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον δόξηι. b

236d2 ὅ τοι Schanz: ὅ σοι BTW

Ἦν οὕτω δὴ παῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μειρακίσκος, μάλα καλός· τούτωι δὲ ἦσαν ἐρασταὶ πάνυ πολλοί. εἷς δέ τις αὐτῶν αἱμύλος ἦν, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἐρῶν ἐπεπείκει τὸν παῖδα ὡς οὐκ ἐρώιη. καί ποτε αὐτὸν αἰτῶν ἔπειθεν τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὡς μὴ ἐρῶντι πρὸ τοῦ ἐρῶντος δέοι χαρίζεσθαι, ἔλεγέν τε ὧδε·

Περὶ παντός, ὦ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βουλεύσεσθαι·
c εἰδέναι δεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἦι ἡ βουλή, ἢ παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν ἀνάγκη. τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς λέληθεν ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν οὐσίαν ἑκάστου. ὡς οὖν εἰδότες οὐ διομολογοῦνται ἐν ἀρχῆι τῆς σκέψεως, προελθόντες δὲ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀποδιδόασιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογοῦσιν. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ σὺ μὴ πάθωμεν ὃ ἄλλοις ἐπιτιμῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὁ λόγος πρόκειται πότερα ἐρῶντι ἢ μὴ μᾶλλον εἰς φιλίαν ἰτέον, περὶ ἔρωτος
d οἷόν τ' ἔστι καὶ ἣν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὁμολογίαι θέμενοι ὅρον, εἰς τοῦτο ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιώμεθα εἴτε ὠφέλειαν εἴτε βλάβην παρέχει.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν δὴ ἐπιθυμία τις ὁ ἔρως, ἅπαντι δῆλον· ὅτι δ' αὖ καὶ μὴ ἐρῶντες ἐπιθυμοῦσι τῶν καλῶν, ἴσμεν. τῶι δὴ τὸν ἐρῶντά τε καὶ μὴ κρινοῦμεν; δεῖ αὖ νοῆσαι ὅτι ἡμῶν ἐν ἑκάστωι δύο τινέ ἐστον ἰδέα ἄρχοντε καὶ ἄγοντε, οἷν ἑπόμεθα ἧι ἂν ἄγητον, ἡ μὲν ἔμφυτος οὖσα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, ἄλλη δὲ ἐπίκτητος δόξα ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου. τούτω δὲ ἐν
e ἡμῖν τοτὲ μὲν ὁμονοεῖτον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε στασιάζετον· καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἡ ἑτέρα, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα κρατεῖ. δόξης μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄριστον λόγωι
238 ἀγούσης καὶ κρατούσης τῶι κράτει σωφροσύνη ὄνομα· ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἀλόγως ἑλκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀρξάσης ἐν ἡμῖν τῆι ἀρχῆι ὕβρις ἐπωνομάσθη. ὕβρις δὲ δὴ πολυώνυμον – πολυμερὲς γὰρ καὶ πολυειδές – καὶ τούτων τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐκπρεπὴς ἣ ἂν τύχηι γενομένη, τὴν αὑτῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ὀνομαζόμενον τὸν ἔχοντα παρέχεται, οὔτε τινὰ καλὴν οὔτ' ἐπαξίαν κεκτῆσθαι. περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐδωδὴν κρατοῦσα τοῦ λόγου τε τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπιθυμία γαστριμαργία τε καὶ τὸν
b ἔχοντα ταὐτὸν τοῦτο κεκλημένον παρέξεται· περὶ δ' αὖ μέθας τυραννεύσασα, τὸν κεκτημένον ταύτηι ἄγουσα, δῆλον οὗ τεύξεται προσρήματος· καὶ τἆλλα δὴ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ ἀδελφῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀνόματα τῆς ἀεὶ δυναστευούσης, ἧι προσήκει καλεῖσθαι πρόδηλον.

Ἧς δ' ἕνεκα πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν εἴρηται, σχεδὸν μὲν ἤδη φανερόν, λεχθὲν δὲ ἢ μὴ λεχθὲν πάντως σαφέστερον· ἡ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου δόξης
c ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν ὁρμώσης κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία, πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀχθεῖσα κάλλους καὶ ὑπὸ αὖ τῶν ἑαυτῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ σωμάτων

237c3 προελθόντες t: προσελθόντες BTW 238a3 πολυμερὲς TW: πολυμελὲς B
238a6 κεκτῆσθαι B: κεκλῆσθαι TW 238b6 πάντως rec. Stobaeus: πᾶν πως BTW

κάλλος ἐρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖσα, νικήσασα ἀγωγῆι, ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ῥώμης ἐπωνυμίαν λαβοῦσα, ἔρως ἐκλήθη.

Ἀτάρ, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, δοκῶ τι σοί, ὥσπερ ἐμαυτῶι, θεῖον πάθος πεπονθέναι;

ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς εὔροιά τίς σε εἴληφεν.

ΣΩ. Σιγῆι τοίνυν μου ἄκουε. τῶι ὄντι γὰρ θεῖος ἔοικεν ὁ τόπος εἶναι, ὥστε ἐὰν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου γένωμαι, d
μὴ θαυμάσηις· τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκέτι πόρρω διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι σὺ αἴτιος. ἀλλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄκουε· ἴσως γὰρ κἂν ἀποτράποιτο τὸ ἐπιόν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν θεῶι μελήσει, ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς τὸν παῖδα πάλιν τῶι λόγωι ἰτέον.

Εἶεν, ὦ φέριστε· ὃ μὲν δὴ τυγχάνει ὂν περὶ οὗ βουλευτέον, εἴρηταί τε καὶ ὥρισται, βλέποντες δὲ δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὰ λοιπὰ λέγωμεν τίς ὠφέλεια e
ἢ βλάβη ἀπό τε ἐρῶντος καὶ μὴ τῶι χαριζομένωι ἐξ εἰκότος συμβήσεται.

Τῶι δὴ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχομένωι δουλεύοντί τε ἡδονῆι ἀνάγκη που τὸν ἐρώμενον ὡς ἥδιστον ἑαυτῶι παρασκευάζειν· νοσοῦντι δὲ πᾶν ἡδὺ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτεῖνον, κρεῖττον δὲ καὶ ἴσον ἐχθρόν. οὔτε δὴ κρείττω οὔτε 239
ἰσούμενον ἑκὼν ἐραστὴς παιδικὰ ἀνέξεται, ἥττω δὲ καὶ ὑποδεέστερον ἀεὶ ἀπεργάζεται· ἥττων δὲ ἀμαθὴς σοφοῦ, δειλὸς ἀνδρείου, ἀδύνατος εἰπεῖν ῥητορικοῦ, βραδὺς ἀγχίνου. τοσούτων κακῶν καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐραστὴν ἐρωμένωι ἀνάγκη γιγνομένων τε καὶ φύσει ἐνόντων μὲν ἥδεσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάζειν, ἢ στέρεσθαι τοῦ παραυτίκα ἡδέος. φθονερὸν δὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν b
ἀπείργοντα καὶ ὠφελίμων ὅθεν ἂν μάλιστ' ἀνὴρ γίγνοιτο, μεγάλης αἴτιον εἶναι βλάβης, μεγίστης δὲ τῆς ὅθεν ἂν φρονιμώτατος εἴη. τοῦτο δὲ ἡ θεία φιλοσοφία τυγχάνει ὄν, ἧς ἐραστὴν παιδικὰ ἀνάγκη πόρρωθεν εἴργειν, περίφοβον ὄντα τοῦ καταφρονηθῆναι· τά τε ἄλλα μηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως ἂν ἦι πάντα ἀγνοῶν καὶ πάντα ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸν ἐραστήν, οἷος ὢν τῶι μὲν ἥδιστος, ἑαυτῶι δὲ βλαβερώτατος εἴη. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐπίτροπός τε καὶ κοινωνὸς οὐδαμῆι λυσιτελὴς ἀνὴρ ἔχων c
ἔρωτα.

Τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν τε καὶ θεραπείαν οἵαν τε καὶ ὡς θεραπεύσει οὗ ἂν γένηται κύριος, ὃς ἡδὺ πρὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἠνάγκασται διώκειν, δεῖ μετὰ ταῦτα ἰδεῖν. ὀφθήσεται δὲ μαλθακόν τινα καὶ οὐ στερεὸν διώκων, οὐδ' ἐν ἡλίωι καθαρῶι τεθραμμένον ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ συμμιγεῖ σκιᾶι, πόνων μὲν ἀνδρείων καὶ ἱδρώτων ξηρῶν ἄπειρον, ἔμπειρον δὲ ἁπαλῆς καὶ

239a6 ἐνόντων [τῶν] μὲν Nutzhorn

d ἀνάνδρου διαίτης, ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμασι καὶ κόσμοις χήτει οἰκείων κοσ-
μούμενον, ὅσα τε ἄλλα τούτοις ἕπεται πάντα ἐπιτηδεύοντα, ἃ δῆλα,
καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον περαιτέρω προβαίνειν ἀλλὰ ἓν κεφάλαιον ὁρισαμένους ἐπ'
ἄλλο ἰέναι· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον σῶμα ἐν πολέμωι τε καὶ ἄλλαις χρείαις
ὅσαι μεγάλαι οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ θαρροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ φίλοι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ
φοβοῦνται.

Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ὡς δῆλον ἐατέον, τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς ῥητέον, τίνα ἡμῖν
e ὠφέλειαν ἢ τίνα βλάβην περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν ἡ τοῦ ἐρῶντος ὁμιλία τε καὶ
ἐπιτροπεία παρέξεται. σαφὲς δὴ τοῦτό γε παντὶ μέν, μάλιστα δὲ τῶι
ἐραστῆι, ὅτι τῶν φιλτάτων τε καὶ εὐνουστάτων καὶ θειοτάτων κτη-
μάτων ὀρφανὸν πρὸ παντὸς εὔξαιτ' ἂν εἶναι τὸν ἐρώμενον· πατρὸς
γὰρ καὶ μητρὸς καὶ συγγενῶν καὶ φίλων στέρεσθαι ἂν αὐτὸν δέξ-
240 αιτο, διακωλυτὰς καὶ ἐπιτιμητὰς ἡγούμενος τῆς ἡδίστης πρὸς αὐτὸν
ὁμιλίας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐσίαν γ' ἔχοντα χρυσοῦ ἤ τινος ἄλλης κτήσεως
οὔτε εὐάλωτον ὁμοίως οὔτε ἁλόντα εὐμεταχείριστον ἡγήσεται· ἐξ ὧν
πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἐραστὴν παιδικοῖς φθονεῖν μὲν οὐσίαν κεκτημένοις, ἀπολ-
λυμένης δὲ χαίρειν. ἔτι τοίνυν ἄγαμον, ἄπαιδα, ἄοικον ὅτι πλεῖστον
χρόνον παιδικὰ ἐραστὴς εὔξαιτ' ἂν γενέσθαι, τὸ αὑτοῦ γλυκὺ ὡς πλεῖσ-
τον χρόνον καρποῦσθαι ἐπιθυμῶν.

Ἔστι μὲν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα κακά, ἀλλά τις δαίμων ἔμειξε τοῖς πλείστοις ἐν
b τῶι παραυτίκα ἡδονήν, οἷον κόλακι, δεινῶι θηρίωι καὶ βλάβηι μεγάληι,
ὅμως ἐπέμειξεν ἡ φύσις ἡδονήν τινα οὐκ ἄμουσον, καί τις ἑταίραν ὡς
βλαβερὸν ψέξειεν ἄν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων θρεμμάτων
τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων, οἷς τό γε καθ' ἡμέραν ἡδίστοισιν εἶναι ὑπάρχει·
παιδικοῖς δὲ ἐραστὴς πρὸς τῶι βλαβερῶι καὶ εἰς τὸ συνημερεύειν πάντων
c ἀηδέστατον. ἥλικα γὰρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπειν τὸν ἥλικα – ἡ
γὰρ οἶμαι χρόνου ἰσότης ἐπ' ἴσας ἡδονὰς ἄγουσα δι' ὁμοιότητα φιλίαν
παρέχεται – ἀλλ' ὅμως κόρον γε καὶ ἡ τούτων συνουσία ἔχει.

Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἀναγκαῖον αὖ βαρὺ παντὶ περὶ πᾶν λέγεται· ὃ δὴ πρὸς
τῆι ἀνομοιότητι μάλιστα ἐραστὴς πρὸς παιδικὰ ἔχει. νεωτέρωι γὰρ
πρεσβύτερος συνὼν οὔθ' ἡμέρας οὔτε νυκτὸς ἑκὼν ἀπολείπεται, ἀλλ'
d ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τε καὶ οἴστρου ἐλαύνεται, ὃς ἐκείνωι μὲν ἡδονὰς ἀεὶ διδοὺς
ἄγει, ὁρῶντι, ἀκούοντι, ἁπτομένωι, καὶ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν αἰσθανομένωι
τοῦ ἐρωμένου, ὥστε μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀραρότως αὐτῶι ὑπηρετεῖν· τῶι δὲ
δὴ ἐρωμένωι ποῖον παραμύθιον ἢ τίνας ἡδονὰς διδοὺς ποιήσει τὸν
ἴσον χρόνον συνόντα μὴ οὐχὶ ἐπ' ἔσχατον ἐλθεῖν ἀηδίας, ὁρῶντι μὲν
ὄψιν πρεσβυτέραν καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὥραι, ἑπομένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ταύτηι, ἃ
e καὶ λόγωι ἐστὶν ἀκούειν οὐκ ἐπιτερπές, μὴ ὅτι δὴ ἔργωι ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ
προσκειμένης μεταχειρίζεσθαι, φυλακάς τε δὴ καχυποτόπους φυλατ-
τομένωι διὰ παντὸς καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας, ἀκαίρους τε ἐπαίνους καὶ

ὑπερβάλλοντας ἀκούοντι, ὡς δ' αὕτως ψόγους νήφοντος μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκ-
τούς, εἰς δὲ μέθην ἰόντος πρὸς τῶι μὴ ἀνεκτῶι ἐπαισχεῖς, παρρησίαι
κατακορεῖ καὶ ἀναπεπταμένηι χρωμένου;

Καὶ ἐρῶν μὲν βλαβερός τε καὶ ἀηδής, λήξας δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος εἰς τὸν
ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄπιστος, εἰς ὃν πολλὰ καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν ὅρκων τε καὶ
δεήσεων ὑπισχνούμενος μόγις κατεῖχε τήν γ' ἐν τῶι τότε συνουσίαν, 241
ἐπίπονον οὖσαν φέρειν, δι' ἐλπίδα ἀγαθῶν. τότε δὴ δέον ἐκτίνειν, μετα-
βαλὼν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὑτῶι καὶ προστάτην, νοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνην
ἀντ' ἔρωτος καὶ μανίας, ἄλλος γεγονὼς λέληθε τὰ παιδικά. καὶ ὁ
μὲν αὐτὸν χάριν ἀπαιτεῖ τῶν τότε, ὑπομιμνήισκων τὰ πραχθέντα
καὶ λεχθέντα, ὡς τῶι αὐτῶι διαλεγόμενος· ὁ δὲ ὑπ' αἰσχύνης οὔτε
εἰπεῖν τολμᾶι ὅτι ἄλλος γέγονεν, οὔθ' ὅπως τὰ τῆς προτέρας ἀνοήτου
ἀρχῆς ὁρκωμόσιά τε καὶ ὑποσχέσεις ἐμπεδώσηι ἔχει, νοῦν ἤδη ἐσχηκὼς b
καὶ σεσωφρονηκώς, ἵνα μὴ πράττων ταὐτὰ τῶι πρόσθεν ὅμοιός τε
ἐκείνωι καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πάλιν γένηται. φυγὰς δὴ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτων,
καὶ ἀπεστερηκὼς ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ὁ πρὶν ἐραστής, ὀστράκου μεταπεσόν-
τος, ἵεται φυγῆι μεταβαλών· ὁ δὲ ἀναγκάζεται διώκειν ἀγανακτῶν καὶ
ἐπιθεάζων, ἠγνοηκὼς τὸ ἅπαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα ἔδει ποτὲ ἐρῶντι
καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἀνοήτωι χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον μὴ ἐρῶντι c
καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἐνδοῦναι ἑαυτὸν ἀπίστωι,
δυσκόλωι, φθονερῶι, ἀηδεῖ, βλαβερῶι μὲν πρὸς οὐσίαν, βλαβερῶι δὲ
πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν, πολὺ δὲ βλαβερωτάτωι πρὸς τὴν τῆς
ψυχῆς παίδευσιν, ἧς οὔτε ἀνθρώποις οὔτε θεοῖς τῆι ἀληθείαι τιμιώτερον
οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε ποτὲ ἔσται.

Ταῦτά τε οὖν χρή, ὦ παῖ, συννοεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι τὴν ἐραστοῦ φιλίαν
ὅτι οὐ μετ' εὐνοίας γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ σιτίου τρόπον, χάριν πλησμονῆς,

ὡς λύκοι ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ', ὣς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί. d

Τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Φαῖδρε. οὐκέτ' ἂν τὸ πέρα ἀκούσαις ἐμοῦ λέγοντος,
ἀλλ' ἤδη σοι τέλος ἐχέτω ὁ λόγος.

ΦΑΙ. Καίτοι ὤιμην σε μεσοῦν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐρεῖν τὰ ἴσα περὶ τοῦ μὴ
ἐρῶντος, ὡς δεῖ ἐκείνωι χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον, λέγων ὅσα αὖ ἔχει ἀγαθά·
νῦν δὲ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἀποπαύει;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἤισθου, ὦ μακάριε, ὅτι ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι ἀλλ' οὐκέτι e
διθυράμβους, καὶ ταῦτα ψέγων; ἐὰν δ' ἐπαινεῖν τὸν ἕτερον ἄρξωμαι, τί
με οἴει ποιήσειν; ἆρ' οἶσθ' ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν, αἷς με σὺ προύβαλες
ἐκ προνοίας, σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάσω; λέγω οὖν ἑνὶ λόγωι ὅτι ὅσα τὸν

240e5 ἐπαισχεῖς Heindorf: ἐπ' αἴσχει BTW
241d1 ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ' Hermias: ἄρνας ἀγαπῶσιν BTW 241d4 σε C. Fr. Hermann: γε BTW

ἕτερον λελοιδορήκαμεν, τῶι ἑτέρωι τἀναντία τούτων ἀγαθὰ πρόσεστιν. καὶ τί δεῖ μακροῦ λόγου; περὶ γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὁ μῦθος, ὅ τι πάσχειν προσήκει αὐτῶι, τοῦτο πείσεται·
242 κἀγὼ τὸν ποταμὸν τοῦτον διαβὰς ἀπέρχομαι πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τι μεῖζον ἀναγκασθῆναι.

ΦΑΙ. Μήπω γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὶν ἂν τὸ καῦμα παρέλθηι. ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾶις ὡς σχεδὸν ἤδη μεσημβρία ἵσταται; ἀλλὰ περιμείναντες καὶ ἅμα περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων διαλεχθέντες, τάχα ἐπειδὰν ἀποψυχῆι ἴμεν.

ΣΩ. Θεῖός γ' εἶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς θαυμάσιος.
b οἶμαι γὰρ ἐγὼ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σοῦ βίου γεγονότων λόγων μηδένα πλείους ἢ σὲ πεποιηκέναι γεγενῆσθαι ἤτοι αὐτὸν λέγοντα ἢ ἄλλους ἑνί γέ τωι τρόπωι προσαναγκάζοντα – Σιμμίαν Θηβαῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πάμπολυ κρατεῖς – καὶ νῦν αὖ δοκεῖς αἴτιός μοι γεγενῆσθαι λόγωι τινὶ ῥηθῆναι.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἀγγέλλεις. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνι τούτωι;

ΣΩ. Ἡνίκ' ἔμελλον, ὠγαθέ, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο – ἀεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει ὃ
c ἂν μέλλω πράττειν – καί τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἥ με οὐκ ἐᾶι ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὥς τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν μάντις μέν, οὐ πάνυ δὲ σπουδαῖος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαῦλοι, ὅσον μὲν ἐμαυτῶι μόνον ἱκανός· σαφῶς οὖν ἤδη μανθάνω τὸ ἁμάρτημα. ὡς δή τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μαντικόν γέ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχή· ἐμὲ γὰρ ἔθραξε μέν τι καὶ πάλαι λέγοντα τὸν λόγον, καί πως ἐδυσωπούμην κατ' Ἴβυκον, μή τι παρὰ θεοῖς

d ἀμβλακὼν τιμὰν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀμείψω.

νῦν δ' ᾔσθημαι τὸ ἁμάρτημα.

ΦΑΙ. Λέγεις δὲ δὴ τί;

ΣΩ. Δεινόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δεινὸν λόγον αὐτός τε ἐκόμισας ἐμέ τε ἠνάγκασας εἰπεῖν.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δή;

ΣΩ. Εὐήθη καὶ ὑπό τι ἀσεβῆ· οὗ τίς ἂν εἴη δεινότερος;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐδείς, εἴ γε σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἔρωτα οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ θεόν τινα ἡγῆι;

ΦΑΙ. Λέγεταί γε δή.

e ΣΩ. Οὔ τι ὑπό γε Λυσίου, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ὃς διὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ στόματος καταφαρμακευθέντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐλέχθη. εἰ δ' ἔστιν, ὥσπερ

242a4 ἵσταται [ἡ δὴ καλουμένη σταθερά]; ἀλλὰ Ruhnken
242b1 γεγονότων λόγων T: γεγονότων BW

οὖν ἔστι, θεὸς ἤ τι θεῖον ὁ Ἔρως, οὐδὲν ἂν κακὸν εἴη, τὼ δὲ λόγω τὼ
νῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπέτην ὡς τοιούτου ὄντος· ταύτηι τε οὖν ἡμαρ-
τανέτην περὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα, ἔτι τε ἡ εὐήθεια αὐτοῖν πάνυ ἀστεία, τὸ
μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγοντε μηδὲ ἀληθὲς σεμνύνεσθαι ὥς τι ὄντε, εἰ ἄρα ἀνθρω- 243
πίσκους τινὰς ἐξαπατήσαντε εὐδοκιμήσετον ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ
φίλε, καθήρασθαι ἀνάγκη· ἔστι δὲ τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι περὶ μυθολογίαν
καθαρμὸς ἀρχαῖος, ὃν Ὅμηρος μὲν οὐκ ᾔσθετο, Στησίχορος δέ. τῶν γὰρ
ὀμμάτων στερηθεὶς διὰ τὴν Ἑλένης κακηγορίαν οὐκ ἠγνόησεν ὥσπερ
Ὅμηρος, ἀλλ' ἅτε μουσικὸς ὢν ἔγνω τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ ποιεῖ εὐθύς·

> οὐκ ἔστ' ἔτυμος λόγος οὗτος,
> οὐδ' ἔβας ἐν νηυσὶν εὐσέλμοις,
> οὐδ' ἵκεο Πέργαμα Τροίας. b

Καὶ ποιήσας δὴ πᾶσαν τὴν καλουμένην Παλινωιδίαν παραχρῆμα
ἀνέβλεψεν. ἐγὼ οὖν σοφώτερος ἐκείνων γενήσομαι κατ' αὐτό γε τοῦτο·
πρὶν γάρ τι παθεῖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἔρωτος κακηγορίαν πειράσομαι αὐτῶι
ἀποδοῦναι τὴν παλινωιδίαν, γυμνῆι τῆι κεφαλῆι καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τότε
ὑπ' αἰσχύνης ἐγκεκαλυμμένος.

ΦΑΙ. Τουτωνί, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔστιν ἅττ' ἂν ἐμοὶ εἶπες ἡδίω.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γάρ, ὠγαθὲ Φαῖδρε, ἐννοεῖς ὡς ἀναιδῶς εἰρησθον τὼ λόγω, c
οὗτός τε καὶ ὁ ἐκ τοῦ βιβλίου ῥηθείς. εἰ γὰρ ἀκούων τις τύχοι ἡμῶν
γεννάδας καὶ πρᾶιος τὸ ἦθος, ἑτέρου δὲ τοιούτου ἐρῶν ἢ καὶ πρότερόν
ποτε ἐρασθείς, λεγόντων ὡς διὰ σμικρὰ μεγάλας ἔχθρας οἱ ἐρασταὶ
ἀναιροῦνται καὶ ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ φθονερῶς τε καὶ βλαβερῶς,
πῶς οὐκ ἂν οἴει αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀκούειν ἐν ναύταις που τεθραμμένων καὶ
οὐδένα ἐλεύθερον ἔρωτα ἑωρακότων, πολλοῦ δ' ἂν δεῖν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν
ἃ ψέγομεν τὸν Ἔρωτα; d

ΦΑΙ. Ἴσως νὴ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτόν γε τοίνυν ἔγωγε αἰσχυνόμενος καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Ἔρωτα
δεδιώς, ἐπιθυμῶ ποτίμωι λόγωι οἷον ἁλμυρὰν ἀκοὴν ἀποκλύσασθαι·
συμβουλεύω δὲ καὶ Λυσίαι ὅτι τάχιστα γράψαι ὡς χρὴ ἐραστῆι μᾶλλον
ἢ μὴ ἐρῶντι ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων χαρίζεσθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἕξει τοῦθ' οὕτω· σοῦ γὰρ εἰπόντος τὸν τοῦ
ἐραστοῦ ἔπαινον, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη Λυσίαν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀναγκασθῆναι γράψαι
αὖ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγον. e

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν πιστεύω, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἦις ὃς εἶ.

ΦΑΙ. Λέγε τοίνυν θαρρῶν.

ΣΩ. Ποῦ δή μοι ὁ παῖς πρὸς ὃν ἔλεγον; ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀκούσηι καὶ
μὴ ἀνήκοος ὢν φθάσηι χαρισάμενος τῶι μὴ ἐρῶντι.

ΦΑΙ. Οὗτος παρά σοι μάλα πλησίον ἀεὶ πάρεστιν, ὅταν σὺ βούληι.

ΣΩ. Οὑτωσὶ τοίνυν, ὦ παῖ καλέ, ἐννόησον, ὡς ὁ μὲν πρότερος ἦν
244 λόγος Φαίδρου τοῦ Πυθοκλέους, Μυρρινουσίου ἀνδρός· ὃν δὲ μέλλω
λέγειν, Στησιχόρου τοῦ Εὐφήμου, Ἱμεραίου. λεκτέος δὲ ὧδε, ὅτι οὐκ
ἔστ᾽ ἔτυμος λόγος ὃς ἂν παρόντος ἐραστοῦ τῶι μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον φῆι
δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, διότι δὴ ὁ μὲν μαίνεται, ὁ δὲ σωφρονεῖ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν
ἁπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγετο· νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας θείαι μέντοι δόσει διδομένης.
b Ἥ τε γὰρ δὴ ἐν Δελφοῖς προφῆτις αἵ τ᾽ ἐν Δωδώνηι ἱέρειαι μανεῖσαι
μὲν πολλὰ δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἰδίαι τε καὶ δημοσίαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἠργάσαντο,
σωφρονοῦσαι δὲ βραχέα ἢ οὐδέν· καὶ ἐὰν δὴ λέγωμεν Σίβυλλάν τε
καὶ ἄλλους, ὅσοι μαντικῆι χρώμενοι ἐνθέωι πολλὰ δὴ πολλοῖς προλέ-
γοντες εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὤρθωσαν, μηκύνοιμεν ἂν δῆλα παντὶ λέγοντες.
τόδε μὴν ἄξιον ἐπιμαρτύρασθαι, ὅτι καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ τὰ ὀνόματα
c τιθέμενοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦντο οὐδὲ ὄνειδος μανίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τῆι
καλλίστηι τέχνηι, ἧι τὸ μέλλον κρίνεται, αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἐμπλέκον-
τες μανικὴν ἐκάλεσαν. ἀλλ᾽ ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος ὅταν θείαι μοίραι γίγνηται,
οὕτω νομίσαντες ἔθεντο, οἱ δὲ νῦν ἀπειροκάλως τὸ ταῦ ἐπεμβάλλοντες
μαντικὴν ἐκάλεσαν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τήν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων ζήτησιν τοῦ μέλλον-
τος, διά τε ὀρνίθων ποιουμένων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σημείων, ἅτ᾽ ἐκ διανοίας
ποριζομένων ἀνθρωπίνηι οἰήσει νοῦν τε καὶ ἱστορίαν, οἰονοϊστικὴν
d ἐπωνόμασαν, ἣν νῦν οἰωνιστικὴν τῶι ω σεμνύνοντες οἱ νέοι καλοῦ-
σιν· ὅσωι δὴ οὖν τελεώτερον καὶ ἐντιμότερον μαντικὴ οἰωνιστικῆς τό
τε ὄνομα τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔργον τ᾽ ἔργου, τόσωι κάλλιον μαρτυροῦσιν
οἱ παλαιοὶ μανίαν σωφροσύνης τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ τῆς παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπων γιγ-
νομένης.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσων γε καὶ πόνων τῶν μεγίστων, ἃ δὴ παλαιῶν
ἐκ μηνιμάτων ποθὲν ἔν τισι τῶν γενῶν, ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ
e προφητεύσασα οἷς ἔδει ἀπαλλαγὴν ηὕρετο, καταφυγοῦσα πρὸς θεῶν
εὐχάς τε καὶ λατρείας· ὅθεν δὴ καθαρμῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν τυχοῦσα ἐξάντη
ἐποίησε τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἔχοντα πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον,
λύσιν τῶι ὀρθῶς μανέντι τε καὶ κατασχομένωι τῶν παρόντων κακῶν
εὑρομένη.

245 Τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχή τε καὶ μανία, λαβοῦσα ἁπαλὴν καὶ
ἄβατον ψυχήν, ἐγείρουσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατά τε ᾠδὰς καὶ κατὰ
τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν, μυρία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπιγιγ-
νομένους παιδεύει· ὃς δ᾽ ἂν ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας
ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελὴς

244b5 ὤρθωσαν rec. Aristides: ὀρθῶς BTW

αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἡ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος
ἠφανίσθη.

Τοσαῦτα μέν σοι καὶ ἔτι πλείω ἔχω μανίας γιγνομένης ἀπὸ θεῶν b
λέγειν καλὰ ἔργα. ὥστε τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ μὴ φοβώμεθα, μηδέ τις ἡμᾶς
λόγος θορυβείτω δεδιττόμενος ὡς πρὸ τοῦ κεκινημένου τὸν σώφρονα
δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι φίλον· ἀλλὰ τόδε πρὸς ἐκείνωι δείξας φερέσθω τὰ
νικητήρια, ὡς οὐκ ἐπ' ὠφελείαι ὁ ἔρως τῶι ἐρῶντι καὶ τῶι ἐρωμένωι ἐκ
θεῶν ἐπιπέμπεται. ἡμῖν δὲ ἀποδεικτέον αὖ τοὐναντίον, ὡς ἐπ' εὐτυχίαι
τῆι μεγίστηι παρὰ θεῶν ἡ τοιαύτη μανία δίδοται· ἡ δὲ δὴ ἀπόδειξις c
ἔσται δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή. δεῖ οὖν πρῶτον ψυχῆς
φύσεως πέρι θείας τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης, ἰδόντα πάθη τε καὶ ἔργα, τἀληθὲς
νοῆσαι· ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως ἥδε.

Ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον· τὸ δ' ἄλλο
κινοῦν καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου κινούμενον, παῦλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει
ζωῆς. μόνον δὴ τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπολεῖπον ἑαυτό, οὔποτε
λήγει κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα κινεῖται τοῦτο πηγὴ καὶ
ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγένητον. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ γιγνό- d
μενον γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μηδ' ἐξ ἑνός· εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του ἀρχὴ γίγνοιτο,
οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγένητόν ἐστιν, καὶ ἀδιάφθορον
αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ἀρχῆς γὰρ δὴ ἀπολομένης οὔτε αὐτή ποτε ἔκ του
οὔτε ἄλλο ἐξ ἐκείνης γενήσεται, εἴπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῖ τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι.
οὕτω δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτ' ἀπόλ-
λυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν e
συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι καὶ μήποτε αὖθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινηθέντα γενήσεται.
ἀθανάτου δὲ πεφασμένου τοῦ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινουμένου, ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε
καὶ λόγον τοῦτον αὐτόν τις λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται. πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα, ὧι
μὲν ἔξωθεν τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἄψυχον, ὧι δὲ ἔνδοθεν αὐτῶι ἐξ αὑτοῦ, ἔμψυ-
χον, ὡς ταύτης οὔσης φύσεως ψυχῆς· εἰ δ' ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, μὴ
ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν ἢ ψυχήν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγένητόν τε 246
καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἱκανῶς· περὶ δὲ τῆς ἰδέας αὐτῆς ὧδε
λεκτέον· οἷον μέν ἐστι, πάντηι πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως,
ὧι δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος· ταύτηι οὖν λέγωμεν. ἐοικέτω
δὴ συμφύτωι δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου. θεῶν μὲν οὖν
ἵπποι τε καὶ ἡνίοχοι πάντες αὐτοί τε ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν, τὸ δὲ τῶν
ἄλλων μέμεικται. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ ἄρχων συνωρίδος ἡνιοχεῖ, b
εἶτα τῶν ἵππων ὁ μὲν αὐτῶι καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων, ὁ
δ' ἐξ ἐναντίων τε καὶ ἐναντίος· χαλεπὴ δὴ καὶ δύσκολος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ

245c5 ἀεικίνητον BTW: αὐτοκίνητον Π   245e2 ἔχειν Π Stobaeus: ἔχειν στῆναι BTW

περὶ ἡμᾶς ἡνιόχησις. πῆι δὴ οὖν θνητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ζῶιον ἐκλήθη,
πειρατέον εἰπεῖν.
Ψυχὴ πᾶσα παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου, πάντα δὲ οὐρανὸν
c περιπολεῖ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλοις εἴδεσι γιγνομένη. τελέα μὲν οὖν οὖσα
καὶ ἐπτερωμένη μετεωροπορεῖ τε καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον διοικεῖ, ἡ δὲ
πτερορρυήσασα φέρεται ἕως ἂν στερεοῦ τινος ἀντιλάβηται, οὗ κατοι-
κισθεῖσα, σῶμα γήϊνον λαβοῦσα αὐτὸ αὑτὸ δοκοῦν κινεῖν διὰ τὴν
ἐκείνης δύναμιν, ζῶιον τὸ ξύμπαν ἐκλήθη – ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα παγέν –
θνητόν τ' ἔσχεν ἐπωνυμίαν, ἀθάνατον δὲ οὐδ' ἐξ ἑνὸς λόγου λελογισμέ-
νου, ἀλλὰ πλάττομεν, οὔτε ἰδόντες οὔτε ἱκανῶς νοήσαντες, θεὸν ἀθά-
d νατόν τι ζῶιον, ἔχον μὲν ψυχήν, ἔχον δὲ σῶμα, τὸν ἀεὶ δὲ χρόνον ταῦτα
συμπεφυκότα. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δή, ὅπηι τῶι θεῶι φίλον, ταύτηι ἐχέτω
τε καὶ λεγέσθω· τὴν δὲ αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποβολῆς, δι' ἣν ψυχῆς
ἀπορρεῖ, λάβωμεν. ἔστι δέ τις τοιάδε.
Πέφυκεν ἡ πτεροῦ δύναμις τὸ ἐμβριθὲς ἄγειν ἄνω μετεωρίζουσα ἧι
τὸ τῶν θεῶν γένος οἰκεῖ, κεκοινώνηκε δέ πηι μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα
e τοῦ θείου, τὸ δὲ θεῖον καλόν, σοφόν, ἀγαθόν, καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι τοιοῦτον· τού-
τοις δὴ τρέφεταί τε καὶ αὔξεται μάλιστά γε τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα,
αἰσχρῶι δὲ καὶ κακῶι καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις φθίνει τε καὶ διόλλυται.
Ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῶι Ζεύς, ἐλαύνων πτηνὸν ἅρμα,
πρῶτος πορεύεται, διακοσμῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπιμελούμενος· τῶι δ' ἕπεται
247 στρατιὰ θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων, κατὰ ἕνδεκα μέρη κεκοσμημένη· μένει
γὰρ Ἑστία ἐν θεῶν οἴκωι μόνη. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐν τῶι τῶν δώδεκα
ἀριθμῶι τεταγμένοι θεοὶ ἄρχοντες ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τάξιν ἣν ἕκαστος
ἐτάχθη. πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ μακάριαι θέαι τε καὶ διέξοδοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ,
ἃς θεῶν γένος εὐδαιμόνων ἐπιστρέφεται πράττων ἕκαστος αὐτῶν τὸ
αὑτοῦ, ἕπεται δὲ ὁ ἀεὶ ἐθέλων τε καὶ δυνάμενος· φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου
χοροῦ ἵσταται. ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρὸς δαῖτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην ἴωσιν, ἄκραν
b ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἁψῖδα πορεύονται πρὸς ἄναντες, ἧι δὴ τὰ μὲν
θεῶν ὀχήματα ἰσορρόπως εὐήνια ὄντα ῥαιδίως πορεύεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα
μόγις· βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς κάκης ἵππος μετέχων, ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ῥέπων τε καὶ
βαρύνων ὧι μὴ καλῶς ἦι τεθραμμένος τῶν ἡνιόχων. ἔνθα δὴ πόνος τε
καὶ ἀγὼν ἔσχατος ψυχῆι πρόκειται. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατοι καλούμεναι,
c ἡνίκ' ἂν πρὸς ἄκρωι γένωνται, ἔξω πορευθεῖσαι ἔστησαν ἐπὶ τῶι τοῦ
οὐρανοῦ νώτωι, στάσας δὲ αὐτὰς περιάγει ἡ περιφορά, αἱ δὲ θεωροῦσι
τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.

246b6 ψυχὴ πᾶσα Π Plotinus Hermias Simplicius: πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ B: ἡ ψυχὴ πᾶσα TW
246e1 τοῦ θείου [ψυχή] Plutarch 247c2 στάσας t: ἱστάσας BTW

Τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον τόπον οὔτε τις ὕμνησέ πω τῶν τῇδε ποιητὴς οὔτε ποτὲ ὑμνήσει κατ' ἀξίαν. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε – τολμητέον γὰρ οὖν τό γε ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀληθείας λέγοντα – ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτηι μόνωι θεατὴ νῶι, περὶ ἣν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης γένος, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον. ἅτ' οὖν θεοῦ διάνοια νῶι τε καὶ ἐπιστήμηι ἀκηράτωι **d** τρεφομένη, καὶ ἁπάσης ψυχῆς ὅση ἂν μέλληι τὸ προσῆκον δέξασθαι, ἰδοῦσα διὰ χρόνου τὸ ὂν ἀγαπᾶι τε καὶ θεωροῦσα τἀληθῆ τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ, ἕως ἂν κύκλωι ἡ περιφορὰ εἰς ταὐτὸν περιενέγκηι. ἐν δὲ τῆι περιόδωι καθορᾶι μὲν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθορᾶι δὲ σωφροσύνην, καθορᾶι δὲ ἐπιστήμην, οὐχ ἧι γένεσις πρόσεστιν, οὐδ' ἥ ἐστίν που ἑτέρα ἐν ἑτέρωι οὖσα ὧν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῶι ὅ ἐστιν ὂν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν· καὶ τἆλλα ὡσαύτως τὰ ὄντα ὄντως **e** θεασαμένη καὶ ἑστιαθεῖσα, δῦσα πάλιν εἰς τὸ εἴσω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἴκαδε ἦλθεν. ἐλθούσης δὲ αὐτῆς ὁ ἡνίοχος πρὸς τὴν φάτνην τοὺς ἵππους στήσας παρέβαλεν ἀμβροσίαν τε καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῆι νέκταρ ἐπότισεν.

Καὶ οὗτος μὲν θεῶν βίος· αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί, ἡ μὲν ἄριστα θεῶι ἑπομένη **248** καὶ εἰκασμένη ὑπερῆρεν εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἡνιόχου κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπεριηνέχθη τὴν περιφοράν, θορυβουμένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἵππων καὶ μόγις καθορῶσα τὰ ὄντα· ἡ δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἦρεν, τοτὲ δ' ἔδυ, βιαζομένων δὲ τῶν ἵππων τὰ μὲν εἶδεν, τὰ δ' οὔ. αἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλαι γλιχόμεναι μὲν ἅπασαι τοῦ ἄνω ἕπονται, ἀδυνατοῦσαι δὲ ὑποβρύχιαι συμπεριφέρονται, πατοῦσαι ἀλλήλας καὶ ἐπιβάλλουσαι, ἑτέρα πρὸ τῆς ἑτέρας πειρωμένη γενέσθαι. **b** θόρυβος οὖν καὶ ἅμιλλα καὶ ἱδρὼς ἔσχατος γίγνεται, οὗ δὴ κακίαι ἡνιόχων πολλαὶ μὲν χωλεύονται, πολλαὶ δὲ πολλὰ πτερὰ θραύονται, πᾶσαι δὲ πολὺν ἔχουσαι πόνον ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας ἀπέρχονται, καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι τροφῆι δοξαστῆι χρῶνται. οὗ δὴ ἕνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον οὗ ἐστιν, ἥ τε δὴ προσήκουσα ψυχῆς τῶι ἀρίστωι νομὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὖσα, ἥ τε τοῦ πτεροῦ **c** φύσις, ὧι ψυχὴ κουφίζεται, τούτωι τρέφεται.

Θεσμός τε Ἀδραστείας ὅδε. ἥτις ἂν ψυχὴ θεῶι συνοπαδὸς γενομένη κατίδηι τι τῶν ἀληθῶν, μέχρι τε τῆς ἑτέρας περιόδου εἶναι ἀπήμονα, κἂν ἀεὶ τοῦτο δύνηται ποιεῖν, ἀεὶ ἀβλαβῆ εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀδυνατήσασα ἐπισπέσθαι μὴ ἴδηι, καί τινι συντυχίαι χρησαμένη λήθης τε καὶ κακίας πλησθεῖσα βαρυνθῆι, βαρυνθεῖσα δὲ πτερορρυήσηι τε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πέσηι, τότε νόμος ταύτην μὴ φυτεῦσαι εἰς μηδεμίαν θήρειον φύσιν ἐν **d** τῆι πρώτηι γενέσει, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν πλεῖστα ἰδοῦσαν εἰς γονὴν ἀνδρὸς γενησομένου φιλοσόφου ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μουσικοῦ τινος καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν εἰς βασιλέως ἐννόμου ἢ πολεμικοῦ καὶ ἀρχικοῦ, τρίτην εἰς πολιτικοῦ ἤ τινος οἰκονομικοῦ ἢ χρηματιστικοῦ, τετάρτην εἰς

φιλοπόνου γυμναστικοῦ ἢ περὶ σώματος ἴασίν τινα ἐσομένου, πέμπτην
e μαντικὸν βίον ἤ τινα τελεστικὸν ἕξουσαν· ἕκτηι ποιητικὸς ἢ τῶν περὶ
μίμησίν τις ἄλλος ἁρμόσει, ἑβδόμηι δημιουργικὸς ἢ γεωργικός, ὀγδόηι
σοφιστικὸς ἢ δημοκοπικός, ἐνάτηι τυραννικός.

Ἐν δὴ τούτοις ἅπασιν ὃς μὲν ἂν δικαίως διαγάγηι ἀμείνονος μοίρας
μεταλαμβάνει, ὃς δ' ἂν ἀδίκως, χείρονος· εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅθεν
ἥκει ἡ ψυχὴ ἑκάστη οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων – οὐ γὰρ πτεροῦ-
249 ται πρὸ τοσούτου χρόνου – πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαντος ἀδόλως
ἢ παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας, αὗται δὲ τρίτηι περιόδωι τῆι
χιλιετεῖ, ἐὰν ἕλωνται τρὶς ἐφεξῆς τὸν βίον τοῦτον, οὕτω πτερωθεῖσαι
τρισχιλιοστῶι ἔτει ἀπέρχονται. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι, ὅταν τὸν πρῶτον βίον
τελευτήσωσιν, κρίσεως ἔτυχον, κριθεῖσαι δὲ αἱ μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς δικαι-
ωτήρια ἐλθοῦσαι δίκην ἐκτίνουσιν, αἱ δ' εἰς τοὐρανοῦ τινα τόπον ὑπὸ
b τῆς Δίκης κουφισθεῖσαι διάγουσιν ἀξίως οὗ ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει ἐβίωσαν
βίου. τῶι δὲ χιλιοστῶι ἀμφότεραι ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπὶ κλήρωσίν τε καὶ
αἵρεσιν τοῦ δευτέρου βίου αἱροῦνται ὃν ἂν θέληι ἑκάστη· ἔνθα καὶ εἰς
θηρίου βίον ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ ἀφικνεῖται, καὶ ἐκ θηρίου ὅς ποτε ἄνθρω-
πος ἦν πάλιν εἰς ἄνθρωπον. οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε μήποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν
εἰς τόδε ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα. δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον,
c ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῶι συναιρούμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν
ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἅ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῶι καὶ
ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὂν ὄντως. διὸ δὴ
δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις
ἀεί ἐστι μνήμηι κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεῖός ἐστιν. τοῖς δὲ
δὴ τοιούτοις ἀνὴρ ὑπομνήμασιν ὀρθῶς χρώμενος, τελέους ἀεὶ τελετὰς
d τελούμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται· ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρω-
πίνων σπουδασμάτων καὶ πρὸς τῶι θείωι γιγνόμενος, νουθετεῖται μὲν
ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθε τοὺς πολλούς.

Ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας, ἥν,
ὅταν τὸ τῆιδέ τις ὁρῶν κάλλος, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμιμνηισκόμενος, πτερῶ-
ταί τε καὶ ἀναπτερούμενος προθυμούμενος ἀναπτέσθαι, ἀδυνατῶν δέ,
ὄρνιθος δίκην βλέπων ἄνω, τῶν κάτω δὲ ἀμελῶν, αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς
e διακείμενος – ὡς ἄρα αὕτη πασῶν τῶν ἐνθουσιάσεων ἀρίστη τε καὶ
ἐξ ἀρίστων τῶι τε ἔχοντι καὶ τῶι κοινωνοῦντι αὐτῆς γίγνεται, καὶ
ὅτι ταύτης μετέχων τῆς μανίας ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν ἐραστὴς καλεῖται.
καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, πᾶσα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ φύσει τεθέαται τὰ
250 ὄντα, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦλθεν εἰς τόδε τὸ ζῶιον· ἀναμιμνήισκεσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε
ἐκεῖνα οὐ ῥάιδιον ἁπάσηι, οὔτε ὅσαι βραχέως εἶδον τότε τἀκεῖ, οὔθ' αἳ
δεῦρο πεσοῦσαι ἐδυστύχησαν, ὥστε ὑπό τινων ὁμιλιῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδικον
τραπόμεναι λήθην ὧν τότε εἶδον ἱερῶν ἔχειν. ὀλίγαι δὴ λείπονται αἷς

τὸ τῆς μνήμης ἱκανῶς πάρεστιν· αὗται δέ, ὅταν τι τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμοίωμα
ἴδωσιν, ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέθ' αὑτῶν γίγνονται, ὃ δ' ἔστι τὸ πάθος
ἀγνοοῦσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεσθαι.

Δικαιοσύνης μὲν οὖν καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τίμια ψυχαῖς b
οὐκ ἔνεστι φέγγος οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὁμοιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀμυδρῶν
ὀργάνων μόγις αὐτῶν καὶ ὀλίγοι ἐπὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἰόντες θεῶνται τὸ τοῦ
εἰκασθέντος γένος· κάλλος δὲ τότ' ἦν ἰδεῖν λαμπρόν, ὅτε σὺν εὐδαίμονι
χορῶι μακαρίαν ὄψιν τε καὶ θέαν, ἑπόμενοι μετὰ μὲν Διὸς ἡμεῖς, ἄλλοι
δὲ μετ' ἄλλου θεῶν, εἶδόν τε καὶ ἐτελοῦντο τῶν τελετῶν ἣν θέμις λέγειν
μακαριωτάτην, ἣν ὠργιάζομεν ὁλόκληροι μὲν αὐτοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀπαθεῖς c
κακῶν ὅσα ἡμᾶς ἐν ὑστέρωι χρόνωι ὑπέμενεν, ὁλόκληρα δὲ καὶ ἁπλᾶ
καὶ ἀτρεμῆ καὶ εὐδαίμονα φάσματα μυούμενοί τε καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες ἐν
αὐγῆι καθαρᾶι, καθαροὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτου ὃ νῦν δὴ σῶμα
περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν, ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μνήμηι κεχαρίσθω, δι' ἣν πόθωι τῶν τότε νῦν
μακρότερα εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ κάλλους, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, μετ' ἐκείνων τε d
ἔλαμπεν ὄν, δεῦρό τ' ἐλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης
αἰσθήσεως τῶν ἡμετέρων στίλβον ἐναργέστατα. ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν
ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ἧι φρόνησις οὐχ
ὁρᾶται· δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑαυτῆς ἐναργὲς
εἴδωλον παρείχετο εἰς ὄψιν ἰόν, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἐραστά. νῦν δὲ κάλλος
μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν, ὥστ' ἐκφανέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ νεοτελὴς ἢ διεφθαρμένος οὐκ ὀξέως ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φέρεται e
πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος, θεώμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν τῇδε ἐπωνυμίαν, ὥστ' οὐ
σέβεται προσορῶν, ἀλλ' ἡδονῆι παραδοὺς τετράποδος νόμον βαίνειν
ἐπιχειρεῖ καὶ παιδοσπορεῖν, καὶ ὕβρει προσομιλῶν οὐ δέδοικεν οὐδ' 251
αἰσχύνεται παρὰ φύσιν ἡδονὴν διώκων· ὁ δὲ ἀρτιτελής, ὁ τῶν τότε
πολυθεάμων, ὅταν θεοειδὲς πρόσωπον ἴδηι κάλλος εὖ μεμιμημένον ἤ
τινα σώματος ἰδέαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἔφριξε καί τι τῶν τότε ὑπῆλθεν αὐτὸν
δειμάτων, εἶτα προσορῶν ὡς θεὸν σέβεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐδεδίει τὴν τῆς
σφόδρα μανίας δόξαν, θύοι ἂν ὡς ἀγάλματι καὶ θεῶι τοῖς παιδικοῖς.
ἰδόντα δ' αὐτὸν οἷον ἐκ τῆς φρίκης μεταβολή τε καὶ ἱδρὼς καὶ θερμότης b
ἀήθης λαμβάνει· δεξάμενος γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροὴν διὰ τῶν
ὀμμάτων ἐθερμάνθη ἧι ἡ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἄρδεται, θερμανθέντος δὲ
ἐτάκη τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκφυσιν, ἃ πάλαι ὑπὸ σκληρότητος συμμεμυκότα
εἶργε μὴ βλαστάνειν, ἐπιρρυείσης δὲ τῆς τροφῆς ὤιδησέ τε καὶ ὥρμησε
φύεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς ῥίζης ὁ τοῦ πτεροῦ καυλὸς ὑπὸ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
εἶδος· πᾶσα γὰρ ἦν τὸ πάλαι πτερωτή. ζεῖ οὖν ἐν τούτωι ὅλη καὶ

250a6 οὐκέθ' αὑτῶν Hermias: οὐκέτ' αὐτῶν BTW 250b6 ἣν rec.: ἧι BTW

c ἀνακηκίει, καὶ ὅπερ τὸ τῶν ὀδοντοφυούντων πάθος περὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας γίγνεται ὅταν ἄρτι φύωσιν, κνῆσίς τε καὶ ἀγανάκτησις περὶ τὰ οὖλα, ταὐτὸν δὴ πέπονθεν ἡ τοῦ πτεροφυεῖν ἀρχομένου ψυχή· ζεῖ τε καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ γαργαλίζεται φύουσα τὰ πτερά.

Ὅταν μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα πρὸς τὸ τοῦ παιδὸς κάλλος, ἐκεῖθεν μέρη ἐπιόντα καὶ ῥέοντ' – ἃ δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ἵμερος καλεῖται – δεχομένη ἄρ-
d δηταί τε καὶ θερμαίνηται, λωφᾶι τε τῆς ὀδύνης καὶ γέγηθεν· ὅταν δὲ χωρὶς γένηται καὶ αὐχμήσηι, τὰ τῶν διεξόδων στόματα, ἧι τὸ πτερὸν ὁρμᾶι, συναυαινόμενα μύσαντα ἀποκλήιει τὴν βλάστην τοῦ πτεροῦ· ἡ δ' ἐντὸς μετὰ τοῦ ἱμέρου ἀποκεκληιμένη, πηδῶσα οἷον τὰ σφύζοντα, τῆι διεξόδωι ἐγχρίει ἑκάστη τῆι καθ' αὑτήν, ὥστε πᾶσα κεντουμένη κύκλωι ἡ ψυχὴ οἰστρᾶι καὶ ὀδυνᾶται, μνήμην δ' αὖ ἔχουσα τοῦ καλοῦ γέγηθεν. ἐκ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων μεμειγμένων ἀδημονεῖ τε τῆι ἀτοπίαι τοῦ
e πάθους καὶ ἀποροῦσα λυττᾶι, καὶ ἐμμανὴς οὖσα οὔτε νυκτὸς δύναται καθεύδειν οὔτε μεθ' ἡμέραν οὗ ἂν ἦι μένειν, θεῖ δὲ ποθοῦσα ὅπου ἂν οἴηται ὄψεσθαι τὸν ἔχοντα τὸ κάλλος· ἰδοῦσα δὲ καὶ ἐποχετευσαμένη ἵμερον ἔλυσε μὲν τὰ τότε συμπεφραγμένα, ἀναπνοὴν δὲ λαβοῦσα κέντρων τε καὶ ὠδίνων ἔληξεν, ἡδονὴν δ' αὖ ταύτην γλυκυτάτην ἐν τῶι
252a παρόντι καρποῦται. ὅθεν δὴ ἑκοῦσα εἶναι οὐκ ἀπολείπεται οὐδέ τινα τοῦ καλοῦ περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖται, ἀλλὰ μητέρων τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν καὶ ἑταίρων πάντων λέλησται, καὶ οὐσίας δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀπολλυμένης παρ' οὐδὲν τίθεται, νομίμων δὲ καὶ εὐσχημόνων, οἷς πρὸ τοῦ ἐκαλλωπίζετο, πάντων καταφρονήσασα δουλεύειν ἑτοίμη καὶ κοιμᾶσθαι ὅπου ἂν ἐᾶι τις ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ πόθου· πρὸς γὰρ τῶι σέβεσθαι τὸν τὸ κάλλος ἔχοντα ἰατρὸν ηὕρηκε μόνον τῶν μεγίστων πόνων.

b Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πάθος, ὦ παῖ καλέ, πρὸς ὃν δή μοι ὁ λόγος, ἄνθρωποι μὲν ἔρωτα ὀνομάζουσιν, θεοὶ δὲ ὃ καλοῦσιν ἀκούσας εἰκότως διὰ νεότητα γελάσει. λέγουσι δὲ οἶμαί τινες Ὁμηριδῶν ἐκ τῶν ἀποθέτων ἐπῶν δύο ἔπη εἰς τὸν Ἔρωτα, ὧν τὸ ἕτερον ὑβριστικὸν πάνυ καὶ οὐ σφόδρα τι ἔμμετρον· ὑμνοῦσι δὲ ὧδε·

τὸν δ' ἤτοι θνητοὶ μὲν Ἔρωτα καλοῦσι ποτηνόν,
c ἀθάνατοι δὲ Πτέρωτα διὰ πτεροφύτορ' ἀνάγκην.

τούτοις δὴ ἔξεστι μὲν πείθεσθαι, ἔξεστιν δὲ μή· ὅμως δὲ ἥ γε αἰτία καὶ τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐρώντων τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὄν.

251c2 κνῆσίς T: κίνησίς BW 251c6 δεχομένη [τὸν ἵμερον] Stallbaum
251d5 ἑκάστη Ruhnken: ἑκάστηι BTW
252c1 πτεροφύτορ' Stobaeus: πτερόφυτον B: πτερόφοιτον TW

Τῶν μὲν οὖν Διὸς ὀπαδῶν ὁ ληφθεὶς ἐμβριθέστερον δύναται φέρειν
τὸ τοῦ πτερωνύμου ἄχθος· ὅσοι δὲ Ἄρεώς τε θεραπευταὶ καὶ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου
περιεπόλουν, ὅταν ὑπ᾽ Ἔρωτος ἁλῶσι καί τι οἰηθῶσιν ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπὸ
τοῦ ἐρωμένου, φονικοὶ καὶ ἕτοιμοι καθιερεύειν αὑτούς τε καὶ τὰ παιδικά. d
καὶ οὕτω καθ᾽ ἕκαστον θεόν, οὗ ἕκαστος ἦν χορευτής, ἐκεῖνον τιμῶν
τε καὶ μιμούμενος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ζῆι, ἕως ἂν ἦι ἀδιάφθορος καὶ τὴν
τῆιδε πρώτην γένεσιν βιοτεύηι, καὶ τούτωι τῶι τρόπωι πρός τε τοὺς
ἐρωμένους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὁμιλεῖ τε καὶ προσφέρεται. τόν τε οὖν ἔρωτα
τῶν καλῶν πρὸς τρόπου ἐκλέγεται ἕκαστος, καὶ ὡς θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον
ὄντα ἑαυτῶι οἷον ἄγαλμα τεκταίνεταί τε καὶ κατακοσμεῖ, ὡς τιμήσων
τε καὶ ὀργιάσων.

Οἱ μὲν δὴ οὖν Διὸς δῖόν τινα εἶναι ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν ὑφ᾽ αὑτῶν e
ἐρώμενον· σκοποῦσιν οὖν εἰ φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν, καὶ
ὅταν αὐτὸν εὑρόντες ἐρασθῶσι, πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὅπως τοιοῦτος ἔσται.
ἐὰν οὖν μὴ πρότερον ἐμβεβῶσι τῶι ἐπιτηδεύματι, τότε ἐπιχειρήσαντες
μανθάνουσί τε ὅθεν ἄν τι δύνωνται καὶ αὐτοὶ μετέρχονται, ἰχνεύοντες δὲ
παρ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ἀνευρίσκειν τὴν τοῦ σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν εὐποροῦσι διὰ τὸ 253
συντόνως ἠναγκάσθαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτοῦ
τῆι μνήμηι ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐξ ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύ-
ματα, καθ᾽ ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπωι μετασχεῖν· καὶ τούτων δὴ τὸν
ἐρώμενον αἰτιώμενοι ἔτι τε μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσι, κἂν ἐκ Διὸς ἀρύτωσιν,
ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι, ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου ψυχὴν ἐπαντλοῦντες ποιοῦσιν
ὡς δυνατὸν ὁμοιότατον τῶι σφετέρωι θεῶι.

Ὅσοι δ᾽ αὖ μεθ᾽ Ἥρας εἵποντο, βασιλικὸν ζητοῦσι καὶ εὑρόντες περὶ b
τοῦτον πάντα δρῶσι τὰ αὐτά. οἱ δὲ Ἀπόλλωνός τε καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν
θεῶν οὕτω κατὰ τὸν θεὸν ἰόντες ζητοῦσι τὸν σφέτερον παῖδα πεφυκέ-
ναι, καὶ ὅταν κτήσωνται, μιμούμενοι αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πείθον-
τες καὶ ῥυθμίζοντες εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ ἰδέαν ἄγουσιν, ὅση
ἑκάστωι δύναμις, οὐ φθόνωι οὐδ᾽ ἀνελευθέρωι δυσμενείαι χρώμενοι πρὸς
τὰ παιδικά, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ὁμοιότητα αὑτοῖς καὶ τῶι θεῶι ὃν ἂν τιμῶσι πᾶσαν c
πάντως ὅτι μάλιστα πειρώμενοι ἄγειν οὕτω ποιοῦσι. προθυμία μὲν
οὖν τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐρώντων καὶ τελετή, ἐάν γε διαπράξωνται ὃ προ-
θυμοῦνται ἧι λέγω, οὕτω καλή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονικὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δι᾽ ἔρωτα
μανέντος φίλου τῶι φιληθέντι γίγνεται, ἐὰν αἱρεθῆι· ἁλίσκεται δὲ δὴ ὁ
αἱρεθεὶς τοιῶιδε τρόπωι.

253b1 Ἥρας t Hermias: ἡμέρας BTW 253c3 τελετή rec.: τελευτή BTW
253c3 ἐάν γε διαπράξωνται rec.: ἐάν τ᾽ ἐνδιαπράξωνται BT: ἐάν γ᾽ ἐνδιαπράξωνται W
253c4 ἧι λέγω Heindorf: ἣν λέγω TW: ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ B

Καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῆι τοῦδε τοῦ μύθου τριχῆι διείλομεν ψυχὴν ἑκάστην,
d ἱππομόρφω μὲν δύο τινὲ εἴδη, ἡνιοχικὸν δὲ εἶδος τρίτον, καὶ νῦν ἔτι
ἡμῖν ταῦτα μενέτω. τῶν δὲ δὴ ἵππων ὁ μέν, φαμέν, ἀγαθός, ὁ δ' οὔ·
ἀρετὴ δὲ τίς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ κακία, οὐ διείπομεν, νῦν δὲ λεκ-
τέον. ὁ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτοῖν ἐν τῆι καλλίονι στάσει ὢν τό τε εἶδος ὀρθὸς
καὶ διηρθρωμένος, ὑψαύχην, ἐπίγρυπος, λευκὸς ἰδεῖν, μελανόμματος,
τιμῆς ἐραστὴς μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς καὶ ἀληθινῆς δόξης
ἑταῖρος, ἄπληκτος, κελεύσματι μόνον καὶ λόγωι ἡνιοχεῖται· ὁ δ' αὖ
e σκολιός, πολὺς εἰκῆι συμπεφορημένος, κρατεραύχην, βραχυτράχηλος,
σιμοπρόσωπος, μελάγχρως, γλαυκόμματος, ὕφαιμος, ὕβρεως καὶ ἀλα-
ζονείας ἑταῖρος, περὶ ὦτα λάσιος, κωφός, μάστιγι μετὰ κέντρων μόγις
ὑπείκων.

Ὅταν δ' οὖν ὁ ἡνίοχος ἰδὼν τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα, πᾶσαν αἰσθή-
σει διαθερμήνας τὴν ψυχήν, γαργαλισμοῦ τε καὶ πόθου κέντρων
254 ὑποπλησθῆι, ὁ μὲν εὐπειθὴς τῶι ἡνιόχωι τῶν ἵππων, ἀεί τε καὶ
τότε αἰδοῖ βιαζόμενος, ἑαυτὸν κατέχει μὴ ἐπιπηδᾶν τῶι ἐρωμένωι· ὁ
δὲ οὔτε κέντρων ἡνιοχικῶν οὔτε μάστιγος ἔτι ἐντρέπεται, σκιρτῶν
δὲ βίαι φέρεται, καὶ πάντα πράγματα παρέχων τῶι σύζυγί τε καὶ
ἡνιόχωι ἀναγκάζει ἰέναι τε πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ μνείαν ποιεῖσθαι τῆς
τῶν ἀφροδισίων χάριτος. τὼ δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀντιτείνετον ἀγανακ-
b τοῦντε, ὡς δεινὰ καὶ παράνομα ἀναγκαζομένω· τελευτῶντε δέ, ὅταν
μηδὲν ἦι πέρας κακοῦ, πορεύεσθον ἀγομένω, εἴξαντε καὶ ὁμολογήσαντε
ποιήσειν τὸ κελευόμενον.

Καὶ πρὸς αὐτῶι τ' ἐγένοντο καὶ εἶδον τὴν ὄψιν τὴν τῶν παιδικῶν
ἀστράπτουσαν. ἰδόντος δὲ τοῦ ἡνιόχου ἡ μνήμη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάλ-
λους φύσιν ἠνέχθη, καὶ πάλιν εἶδεν αὐτὴν μετὰ σωφροσύνης ἐν ἁγνῶι
βάθρωι βεβῶσαν· ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἔδεισέ τε καὶ σεφθεῖσα ἀνέπεσεν ὑπτία,
c καὶ ἅμα ἠναγκάσθη εἰς τοὐπίσω ἑλκύσαι τὰς ἡνίας οὕτω σφόδρα,
ὥστ' ἐπὶ τὰ ἰσχία ἄμφω καθίσαι τὼ ἵππω, τὸν μὲν ἑκόντα διὰ τὸ
μὴ ἀντιτείνειν, τὸν δὲ ὑβριστὴν μάλ' ἄκοντα. ἀπελθόντε δὲ ἀπωτέρω,
ὁ μὲν ὑπ' αἰσχύνης τε καὶ θάμβους ἱδρῶτι πᾶσαν ἔβρεξε τὴν ψυχήν, ὁ
δέ, λήξας τῆς ὀδύνης ἣν ὑπὸ τοῦ χαλινοῦ τε ἔσχε καὶ τοῦ πτώματος,
μόγις ἐξαναπνεύσας ἐλοιδόρησεν ὀργῆι, πολλὰ κακίζων τόν τε ἡνίο-
d χον καὶ τὸν ὁμόζυγα ὡς δειλίαι τε καὶ ἀνανδρίαι λιπόντε τὴν τάξιν
καὶ ὁμολογίαν. καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἐθέλοντας προσιέναι ἀναγκάζων μόγις
συνεχώρησε δεομένων εἰς αὖθις ὑπερβαλέσθαι. ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ συν-
τεθέντος χρόνου ἀμνημονεῖν προσποιουμένω ἀναμιμνήισκων, βιαζό-
μενος, χρεμετίζων, ἕλκων ἠνάγκασεν αὖ προσελθεῖν τοῖς παιδικοῖς ἐπὶ

254d4 χρόνου [οὗ] ἀμνημονεῖν Heindorf

τοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ἦσαν, ἐγκύψας καὶ ἐκτείνας τὴν
κέρκον, ἐνδακὼν τὸν χαλινόν, μετ' ἀναιδείας ἕλκει· ὁ δ' ἡνίοχος ἔτι μᾶλλον e
ταὐτὸν πάθος παθών, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ ὕσπληγος ἀναπεσών, ἔτι μᾶλλον
τοῦ ὑβριστοῦ ἵππου ἐκ τῶν ὀδόντων βίαι ὀπίσω σπάσας τὸν χαλινόν,
τήν τε κακηγόρον γλῶτταν καὶ τὰς γνάθους καθῄμαξεν καὶ τὰ σκέλη
τε καὶ τὰ ἰσχία πρὸς τὴν γῆν ἐρείσας ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν. ὅταν δὲ ταὐτὸν
πολλάκις πάσχων ὁ πονηρὸς τῆς ὕβρεως λήξηι, ταπεινωθεὶς ἕπεται
ἤδη τῆι τοῦ ἡνιόχου προνοίαι, καὶ ὅταν ἴδηι τὸν καλόν, φόβωι διόλ-
λυται· ὥστε συμβαίνει τότ' ἤδη τὴν τοῦ ἐραστοῦ ψυχὴν τοῖς παιδικοῖς
αἰδουμένην τε καὶ δεδιυῖαν ἕπεσθαι.

Ἅτε οὖν πᾶσαν θεραπείαν ὡς ἰσόθεος θεραπευόμενος οὐχ ὑπὸ σχημα- 255
τιζομένου τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πεπονθότος, καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν
φύσει φίλος τῶι θεραπεύοντι, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ ἐν τῶι πρόσθεν ὑπὸ συμ-
φοιτητῶν ἤ τινων ἄλλων διαβεβλημένος ἦι, λεγόντων ὡς αἰσχρὸν
ἐρῶντι πλησιάζειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπωθῆι τὸν ἐρῶντα, προϊόντος δὲ
ἤδη τοῦ χρόνου ἥ τε ἡλικία καὶ τὸ χρεὼν ἤγαγεν εἰς τὸ προσέσθαι αὐτὸν b
εἰς ὁμιλίαν· οὐ γὰρ δήποτε εἵμαρται κακὸν κακῶι φίλον οὐδ' ἀγαθὸν
μὴ φίλον ἀγαθῶι εἶναι. προσεμένου δὲ καὶ λόγον καὶ ὁμιλίαν δεξαμέ-
νου, ἐγγύθεν ἡ εὔνοια γιγνομένη τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἐκπλήττει τὸν ἐρώμενον
διαισθανόμενον ὅτι οὐδ' οἱ σύμπαντες ἄλλοι φίλοι τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοῖραν
φιλίας οὐδεμίαν παρέχονται πρὸς τὸν ἔνθεον φίλον. ὅταν δὲ χρονίζηι
τοῦτο δρῶν καὶ πλησιάζηι μετὰ τοῦ ἅπτεσθαι ἔν τε γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν
ταῖς ἄλλαις ὁμιλίαις, τότ' ἤδη ἡ τοῦ ῥεύματος ἐκείνου πηγή, ὃν ἵμερον c
Ζεὺς Γανυμήδους ἐρῶν ὠνόμασε, πολλὴ φερομένη πρὸς τὸν ἐραστήν, ἡ
μὲν εἰς αὐτὸν ἔδυ, ἡ δ' ἀπομεστουμένου ἔξω ἀπορρεῖ· καὶ οἷον πνεῦμα ἤ
τις ἠχὼ ἀπὸ λείων τε καὶ στερεῶν ἁλλομένη πάλιν ὅθεν ὡρμήθη φέρε-
ται, οὕτω τὸ τοῦ κάλλους ῥεῦμα πάλιν εἰς τὸν καλὸν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων
ἰόν, ἧι πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἰέναι ἀφικόμενον καὶ ἀναπτερῶσαν,
τὰς διόδους τῶν πτερῶν ἄρδει τε καὶ ὥρμησε πτεροφυεῖν καὶ τὴν τοῦ d
ἐρωμένου αὖ ψυχὴν ἔρωτος ἐνέπλησεν. ἐρᾶι μὲν οὖν, ὅτου δὲ ἀπορεῖ· καὶ
οὔθ' ὅτι πέπονθεν οἶδεν οὐδ' ἔχει φράσαι, ἀλλ' οἷον ἀπ' ἄλλου ὀφθαλμίας
ἀπολελαυκὼς πρόφασιν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔχει, ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν κατρόπτωι ἐν τῶι
ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθεν.

Καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἐκεῖνος παρῆι, λήγει κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐκείνωι τῆς ὀδύνης,
ὅταν δὲ ἀπῆι, κατὰ ταὐτὰ αὖ ποθεῖ καὶ ποθεῖται, εἴδωλον ἔρωτος
ἀντέρωτα ἔχων· καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ οἴεται οὐκ ἔρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαν εἶναι. e
ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ ἐκείνωι παραπλησίως μέν, ἀσθενεστέρως δέ, ὁρᾶν, ἅπτεσθαι,

255a5 ἐρῶντα t: ἔρωτα BTW 255b1 προσέσθαι rec.: προέσθαι BT: πορεύεσθαι W
255d1 πτεροφυεῖν [τε] καὶ Eusebius

φιλεῖν, συγκατακεῖσθαι· καὶ δή, οἷον εἰκός, ποιεῖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ταχὺ ταῦτα. ἐν οὖν τῆι συγκοιμήσει τοῦ μὲν ἐραστοῦ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἵππος ἔχει ὅτι λέγηι πρὸς τὸν ἡνίοχον, καὶ ἀξιοῖ ἀντὶ πολλῶν πόνων σμικρὰ
256 ἀπολαῦσαι· ὁ δὲ τῶν παιδικῶν ἔχει μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, σπαργῶν δὲ καὶ ἀπορῶν περιβάλλει τὸν ἐραστὴν καὶ φιλεῖ, ὡς σφόδρ' εὔνουν ἀσπαζόμενος, ὅταν τε συγκατακέωνται, οἷός ἐστι μὴ ἂν ἀπαρνηθῆναι τὸ αὑτοῦ μέρος χαρίσασθαι τῶι ἐρῶντι, εἰ δεηθείη τυχεῖν· ὁ δὲ ὁμόζυξ αὖ μετὰ τοῦ ἡνιόχου πρὸς ταῦτα μετ' αἰδοῦς καὶ λόγου ἀντιτείνει.

Ἐὰν μὲν δὴ οὖν εἰς τεταγμένην τε δίαιταν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν νικήσηι
b τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίας ἀγαγόντα, μακάριον μὲν καὶ ὁμονοητικὸν τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον διάγουσιν – ἐγκρατεῖς αὑτῶν καὶ κόσμιοι ὄντες, δουλωσάμενοι μὲν ὧι κακία ψυχῆς ἐνεγίγνετο, ἐλευθερώσαντες δὲ ὧι ἀρετή – τελευτήσαντες δὲ δὴ ὑπόπτεροι καὶ ἐλαφροὶ γεγονότες τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν ἓν νενικήκασιν, οὗ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτε σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη οὔτε θεία μανία δυνατὴ πορίσαι ἀνθρώπωι. ἐὰν δὲ δὴ διαίτηι φορτικωτέραι τε καὶ ἀφιλοσόφωι,
c φιλοτίμωι δὲ χρήσωνται, τάχ' ἄν που ἐν μέθαις ἤ τινι ἄλληι ἀμελείαι τὼ ἀκολάστω αὐτοῖν ὑποζυγίω λαβόντε τὰς ψυχὰς ἀφρούρους, συναγαγόντε εἰς ταὐτόν, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μακαριστὴν αἵρεσιν εἱλέτην τε καὶ διεπράξαντο· καὶ διαπραξαμένω τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη χρῶνται μὲν αὐτῆι, σπανίαι δέ, ἅτε οὐ πάσηι δεδογμένα τῆι διανοίαι πράττοντες. φίλω μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτω, ἧττον δὲ ἐκείνων, ἀλλήλοιν διά τε τοῦ
d ἔρωτος καὶ ἔξω γενομένω διάγουσι, πίστεις τὰς μεγίστας ἡγουμένω ἀλλήλοιν δεδωκέναι τε καὶ δεδέχθαι, ἃς οὐ θεμιτὸν εἶναι λύσαντας εἰς ἔχθραν ποτὲ ἐλθεῖν. ἐν δὲ τῆι τελευτῆι ἄπτεροι μέν, ὡρμηκότες δὲ πτεροῦσθαι ἐκβαίνουσι τοῦ σώματος, ὥστε οὐ σμικρὸν ἆθλον τῆς ἐρωτικῆς μανίας φέρονται· εἰς γὰρ σκότον καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ γῆς πορείαν οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἔτι ἐλθεῖν τοῖς κατηργμένοις ἤδη τῆς ὑπουρανίου πορείας,
e ἀλλὰ φανὸν βίον διάγοντας εὐδαιμονεῖν μετ' ἀλλήλων πορευομένους καὶ ὁμοπτέρους ἔρωτος χάριν, ὅταν γένωνται, γενέσθαι.

Ταῦτα τοσαῦτα, ὦ παῖ, καὶ θεῖα οὕτω σοι δωρήσεται ἡ παρ' ἐραστοῦ φιλία· ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος οἰκειότης, σωφροσύνηι θνητῆι κεκραμένη, θνητά τε καὶ φειδωλὰ οἰκονομοῦσα, ἀνελευθερίαν ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐπαινουμένην ὡς ἀρετὴν τῆι φίληι ψυχῆι ἐντεκοῦσα, ἐννέα χιλ-
257 ιάδας ἐτῶν περὶ γῆν κυλινδουμένην αὐτὴν καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἄνουν παρέξει.

Αὕτη σοι, ὦ φίλε Ἔρως, εἰς ἡμετέραν δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστη καὶ ἀρίστη δέδοταί τε καὶ ἐκτέτειсται παλινωιδία, "τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν" ἠναγκασμένη ποιητικοῖς τισιν διὰ Φαῖδρον εἰρῆσθαι. ἀλλὰ τῶν

255e5 λέγηι Bekker: λέγει BTW

προτέρων τε συγγνώμην καὶ τῶνδε χάριν ἔχων, εὐμενὴς καὶ ἵλεως τὴν
ἐρωτικήν μοι τέχνην ἣν ἔδωκας μήτε ἀφέληι μήτε πηρώσηις δι' ὀργήν,
δίδου τ' ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν παρὰ τοῖς καλοῖς τίμιον εἶναι. ἐν τῶι πρόσθεν b
δ' εἴ τι λόγωι σοι ἀπηνὲς εἴπομεν Φαῖδρός τε καὶ ἐγώ, Λυσίαν τὸν τοῦ
λόγου πατέρα αἰτιώμενος παῦε τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν
δέ, ὥσπερ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Πολέμαρχος τέτραπται, τρέψον, ἵνα καὶ ὁ
ἐραστὴς ὅδε αὐτοῦ μηκέτι ἐπαμφοτερίζηι καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς
πρὸς Ἔρωτα μετὰ φιλοσόφων λόγων τὸν βίον ποιῆται.

ΦΑΙ. Συνεύχομαί σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ ἄμεινον ταῦθ' ἡμῖν εἶναι,
ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι. τὸν λόγον δέ σου πάλαι θαυμάσας ἔχω, ὅσωι καλλίω c
τοῦ προτέρου ἀπηργάσω, ὥστε ὀκνῶ μή μοι ὁ Λυσίας ταπεινὸς φανῆι,
ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ ἐθελήσηι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄλλον ἀντιπαρατεῖναι. καὶ γάρ τις
αὐτόν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἔναγχος τῶν πολιτικῶν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ λοιδορῶν
ὠνείδιζε καὶ διὰ πάσης τῆς λοιδορίας ἐκάλει λογογράφον· τάχ' οὖν
ἂν ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας ἐπίσχοι ἡμῖν ἂν τοῦ γράφειν.

ΣΩ. Γελοῖόν γ', ὦ νεανία, τὸ δόγμα λέγεις, καὶ τοῦ ἑταίρου συχνὸν
διαμαρτάνεις, εἰ αὐτὸν οὕτως ἡγῆι τινα ψοφοδεᾶ. ἴσως δὲ καὶ τὸν d
λοιδορούμενον αὐτῶι οἴει ὀνειδίζοντα λέγειν ἃ ἔλεγεν.

ΦΑΙ. Ἐφαίνετο γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ σύνοισθά που καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι
οἱ μέγιστον δυνάμενοί τε καὶ σεμνότατοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν αἰσχύνον-
ται λόγους τε γράφειν καὶ καταλείπειν συγγράμματα ἑαυτῶν, δόξαν
φοβούμενοι τοῦ ἔπειτα χρόνου μὴ σοφισταὶ καλῶνται.

ΣΩ. "Γλυκὺς ἀγκών," ὦ Φαῖδρε, λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ μακροῦ
ἀγκῶνος τοῦ κατὰ Νεῖλον ἐκλήθη· καὶ πρὸς τῶι ἀγκῶνι λανθάνει σε ὅτι
οἱ μέγιστον φρονοῦντες τῶν πολιτικῶν μάλιστα ἐρῶσι λογογραφίας e
τε καὶ καταλείψεως συγγραμμάτων, οἵ γε καὶ ἐπειδάν τινα γράφωσι
λόγον, οὕτως ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς ἐπαινέτας, ὥστε προσπαραγράφουσι
πρώτους οἳ ἂν ἑκασταχοῦ ἐπαινῶσιν αὐτούς.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι ἐν ἀνδρὸς πολιτικοῦ συγγράμματι πρῶτος 258
ὁ ἐπαινέτης γέγραπται.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. "Ἔδοξέ," πού φησιν, "τῆι βουλῆι" ἢ "τῶι δήμωι" ἢ
ἀμφοτέροις, καὶ "ὃς καὶ ὃς εἶπεν," τὸν αὑτὸν δὴ λέγων μάλα σεμνῶς καὶ
ἐγκωμιάζων ὁ συγγραφεύς· ἔπειτα λέγει δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐπιδεικνύμενος
τοῖς ἐπαινέταις τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σοφίαν, ἐνίοτε πάνυ μακρὸν ποιησάμενος

257d2 ὀνειδίζοντα Postgate: ὀνειδίζοντα νομίζοντα B: νομίζοντα TW Hermias
258a1 ἐν [ἀρχῆι] ἀνδρὸς Madvig 258a5 ὃς καὶ ὃς Winckelmann: ὃς BTW
258a7 μακρὸν BT: μικρὸν W

σύγγραμμα· ἢ σοι ἄλλο τι φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ λόγος
b συγγεγραμμένος;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὲν οὗτος ἐμμένηι, γεγηθὼς ἀπέρχεται ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου ὁ ποιητής· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξαλειφθῆι καὶ ἄμοιρος γένηται λογογραφίας τε καὶ τοῦ ἄξιος εἶναι συγγράφειν, πενθεῖ αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἑταῖροι.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Δῆλόν γε ὅτι οὐχ ὡς ὑπερφρονοῦντες τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος ἀλλ' ὡς τεθαυμακότες.

ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ὅταν ἱκανὸς γένηται ῥήτωρ ἢ βασιλεύς, ὥστε λαβὼν
c τὴν Λυκούργου ἢ Σόλωνος ἢ Δαρείου δύναμιν ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι
λογογράφος ἐν πόλει, ἆρ' οὐκ ἰσόθεον ἡγεῖται αὐτός τε αὑτὸν ἔτι ζῶν
καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα γιγνόμενοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ νομίζουσι, θεώμενοι
αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα;

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Οἴει τινὰ οὖν τῶν τοιούτων, ὅστις καὶ ὁπωστιοῦν δύσνους Λυσίαι, ὀνειδίζειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι συγγράφει;

ΦΑΙ. Οὔκουν εἰκός γε ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τῆι ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμίαι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὀνειδίζοι.

d ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν αὐτό γε τὸ γράφειν λόγους.

ΦΑΙ. Τί γάρ;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι αἰσχρὸν ἤδη, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν ἀλλ' αἰσχρῶς τε καὶ κακῶς.

ΦΑΙ. Δῆλον δή.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος τοῦ καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν; δεόμεθά τι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, Λυσίαν τε περὶ τούτων ἐξετάσαι καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις πώποτέ τι γέγραφεν ἢ γράψει, εἴτε πολιτικὸν σύγγραμμα εἴτε ἰδιωτικόν, ἐν μέτρωι ὡς ποιητὴς ἢ ἄνευ μέτρου ὡς ἰδιώτης;

e ΦΑΙ. Ἐρωτᾶις εἰ δεόμεθα; τίνος μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα κἄν τις ὡς εἰπεῖν ζώιη ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν ἕνεκα; οὐ γάρ που ἐκείνων γε ὧν προλυπηθῆναι δεῖ ἢ μηδὲ ἡσθῆναι, ὃ δὴ ὀλίγου πᾶσαι αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναὶ ἔχουσι· διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἀνδραποδώδεις κέκληνται.

ΣΩ. Σχολὴ μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε· καὶ ἅμα μοι δοκοῦσιν ὡς ἐν τῶι
259 πνίγει ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἡμῶν οἱ τέττιγες ᾄδοντες καὶ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγό-
μενοι καθορᾶν καὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰ οὖν ἴδοιεν καὶ νὼ καθάπερ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν

259a2 καθορᾶν καὶ ἡμᾶς TW Stobaeus: καθορᾶν B

μεσημβρίαι μὴ διαλεγομένους ἀλλὰ νυστάζοντας καὶ κηλουμένους ὑφ' αὑτῶν δι' ἀργίαν τῆς διανοίας, δικαίως ἂν καταγελῷιεν, ἡγούμενοι ἀνδράποδ' ἄττα σφίσιν ἐλθόντα εἰς τὸ καταγώγιον ὥσπερ προβάτια μεσημβριάζοντα περὶ τὴν κρήνην εὕδειν· ἐὰν δὲ ὁρῶσι διαλεγομένους καὶ παραπλέοντάς σφας ὥσπερ Σειρῆνας ἀκηλήτους, ὃ γέρας παρὰ b θεῶν ἔχουσιν ἀνθρώποις διδόναι, τάχ' ἂν δοῖεν ἀγασθέντες.

ΦΑΙ. Ἔχουσι δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο; ἀνήκοος γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τυγχάνω ὤν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὲν δὴ πρέπει γε φιλόμουσον ἄνδρα τῶν τοιούτων ἀνήκοον εἶναι. λέγεται δ' ὥς ποτ' ἦσαν οὗτοι ἄνθρωποι τῶν πρὶν Μούσας γεγονέναι, γενομένων δὲ Μουσῶν καὶ φανείσης ὠιδῆς οὕτως ἄρα τινὲς τῶν τότε ἐξεπλάγησαν ὑφ' ἡδονῆς, ὥστε ᾄδοντες ἠμέλησαν c σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν, καὶ ἔλαθον τελευτήσαντες αὑτούς· ἐξ ὧν τὸ τεττίγων γένος μετ' ἐκεῖνο φύεται, γέρας τοῦτο παρὰ Μουσῶν λαβόν, μηδὲν τροφῆς δεῖσθαι γενόμενον ἀλλ' ἄσιτόν τε καὶ ἄποτον εὐθὺς ᾄδειν ἕως ἂν τελευτήσηι, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλθὸν παρὰ Μούσας ἀπαγγέλλειν τίς τίνα αὐτῶν τιμᾶι τῶν ἐνθάδε. Τερψιχόραι μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς τετιμηκότας αὐτὴν ἀπαγγέλλοντες ποιοῦσι προσφιλεστέρους, τῆι δὲ Ἐρατοῖ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις οὕτως κατὰ τὸ d εἶδος ἑκάστης τιμῆς· τῆι δὲ πρεσβυτάτηι Καλλιόπηι καὶ τῆι μετ' αὐτὴν Οὐρανίαι τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίαι διάγοντάς τε καὶ τιμῶντας τὴν ἐκείνων μουσικὴν ἀγγέλλουσιν, αἳ δὴ μάλιστα τῶν Μουσῶν περί τε οὐρανὸν καὶ λόγους οὖσαι θείους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους ἱᾶσιν καλλίστην φωνήν. πολλῶν δὴ οὖν ἕνεκα λεκτέον τι καὶ οὐ καθευδητέον ἐν τῆι μεσημβρίαι.

ΦΑΙ. Λεκτέον γὰρ οὖν. e

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ νῦν προυθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, τὸν λόγον ὅπηι καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅπηι μή, σκεπτέον.

ΦΑΙ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τοῖς εὖ γε καὶ καλῶς ῥηθησομένοις τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος διάνοιαν εἰδυῖαν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὧν ἂν ἐρεῖν πέρι μέλληι;

ΦΑΙ. Οὑτωσὶ περὶ τούτου ἀκήκοα, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, οὐκ εἶναι ἀνάγκην τῶι μέλλοντι ῥήτορι ἔσεσθαι τὰ τῶι ὄντι δίκαια μανθάνειν 260 ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντ' ἂν πλήθει οἵπερ δικάσουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ ἢ καλὰ ἀλλ' ὅσα δόξει· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων εἶναι τὸ πείθειν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας.

ΣΩ. "Οὔ τοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος" εἶναι δεῖ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὃ ἂν εἴπωσι σοφοί, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν μή τι λέγωσι· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν οὐκ ἀφετέον.

ΦΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

259d6 οὖν ἕνεκα Schanz: οὖν ἕνεκεν TW: οὕνεκεν B: οὕνεκα Hermias

ΣΩ. Ὧδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν αὐτό.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς;

b ΣΩ. Εἴ σε πείθοιμι ἐγὼ πολεμίους ἀμύνειν κτησάμενον ἵππον, ἄμφω δὲ ἵππον ἀγνοοῖμεν, τοσόνδε μέντοι τυγχάνοιμι εἰδὼς περὶ σοῦ, ὅτι Φαῖδρος ἵππον ἡγεῖται τὸ τῶν ἡμέρων ζώιων μέγιστα ἔχον ὦτα –

ΦΑΙ. Γελοῖόν γ' ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴη.

ΣΩ. Οὔπω γε· ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ σπουδῆι σε πείθοιμι, συντιθεὶς λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ τοῦ ὄνου, ἵππον ἐπονομάζων καὶ λέγων ὡς παντὸς ἄξιον τὸ θρέμμα οἴκοι τε κεκτῆσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς, ἀποπολεμεῖν
c τε χρήσιμον καὶ πρός γ' ἐνεγκεῖν δυνατὸν σκεύη καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὠφέλιμον –

ΦΑΙ. Παγγέλοιόν γ' ἂν ἤδη εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ κρεῖττον γελοῖον καὶ φίλον ἢ δεινόν τε καὶ ἐχθρὸν εἶναι;

ΦΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν οὖν ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀγνοῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, λαβὼν πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν πείθηι, μὴ περὶ ὄνου σκιᾶς ὡς ἵππου τὸν ἔπαινον ποιούμενος ἀλλὰ περὶ κακοῦ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ, δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκὼς πείσηι κακὰ πράττειν ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν, ποῖόν τινα οἴει μετὰ
d ταῦτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπὸν ὧν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ γε ἐπιεικῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, ἀγροικότερον τοῦ δέοντος λελοιδορήκαμεν τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην; ἡ δ' ἴσως ἂν εἴποι· "τί ποτ', ὦ θαυμάσιοι, ληρεῖτε; ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐδέν' ἀγνοοῦντα τἀληθὲς ἀναγκάζω μανθάνειν λέγειν, ἀλλ', εἴ τι ἐμὴ συμβουλή, κτησάμενον ἐκεῖνο οὕτως ἐμὲ λαμβάνειν· τόδε δ' οὖν μέγα λέγω, ὡς ἄνευ ἐμοῦ τῶι τὰ ὄντα εἰδότι οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἔσται πείθειν τέχνηι."

e ΦΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν δίκαια ἐρεῖ, λέγουσα ταῦτα;

ΣΩ. Φημί, ἐὰν οἵ γε ἐπιόντες αὐτῆι λόγοι μαρτυρῶσιν εἶναι τέχνηι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀκούειν δοκῶ τινων προσιόντων καὶ διαμαρτυρομένων λόγων, ὅτι ψεύδεται καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἀλλ' ἄτεχνος τριβή· τοῦ δὲ λέγειν, φησὶν ὁ Λάκων, ἔτυμος τέχνη ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἧφθαι οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε μή ποτε ὕστερον γένηται.

261 ΦΑΙ. Τούτων δεῖ τῶν λόγων, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δεῦρο αὐτοὺς παράγων ἐξέταζε τί καὶ πῶς λέγουσιν.

260c1 πρός γ' ἐνεγκεῖν Thompson: προσενεγκεῖν BTW
260c4–5 γελοῖον καὶ φίλον ἢ δεινόν τε καὶ ἐχθρὸν εἶναι Robin: γελοῖον ἢ δεινόν τε καὶ ἐχθρὸν εἶναι ἢ φίλον BTW: [ἢ φίλον] Bekker: γελοῖον καὶ φίλον ἢ δεινὸν καὶ ἐχθρόν Hermias
260d6 κτησάμενον rec.: κτησάμενος BTW

ΣΩ. Πάριτε δή, θρέμματα γενναῖα, καλλίπαιδά τε Φαῖδρον πείθετε ὡς ἐὰν μὴ ἱκανῶς φιλοσοφήσηι, οὐδὲ ἱκανός ποτε λέγειν ἔσται περὶ οὐδενός. ἀποκρινέσθω δὴ ὁ Φαῖδρος.

ΦΑΙ. Ἐρωτᾶτε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις, ἡ αὐτὴ σμικρῶν τε καὶ μεγάλων πέρι καὶ οὐδὲν b
ἐντιμότερον τό γε ὀρθὸν περὶ σπουδαῖα ἢ περὶ φαῦλα γιγνόμενον; ἢ πῶς σὺ ταῦτ' ἀκήκοας;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί' οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μέν πως περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεταί τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνηι, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας· ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἢ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ὀδυσσέως τέχνας μόνον περὶ λόγων ἀκήκοας, ἃς ἐν Ἰλίωι σχολάζοντες συνεγραψάτην, τῶν δὲ Παλαμήδους ἀνήκοος γέγονας; c

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε τῶν Νέστορος, εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις ἤ τινα Θρασύμαχόν τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὀδυσσέα.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτους ἐῶμεν· σὺ δ' εἰπέ, ἐν δικαστηρίοις οἱ ἀντίδικοι τί δρῶσιν; οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσι μέντοι; ἢ τί φήσομεν;

ΦΑΙ. Τοῦτ' αὐτό.

ΣΩ. Περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τε καὶ ἀδίκου;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνηι τοῦτο δρῶν ποιήσει φανῆναι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δίκαιον, ὅταν δὲ βούληται, ἄδικον; d

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν δημηγορίαι δὴ τῆι πόλει δοκεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθά, τοτὲ δ' αὖ τἀναντία;

ΦΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τὸν οὖν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσμεν τέχνηι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλά, μένοντά τε αὖ καὶ φερόμενα;

ΦΑΙ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον περὶ δικαστήριά τέ ἐστιν ἡ ἀντιλογικὴ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίαν, ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικε, περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη, e
εἴπερ ἔστιν, αὕτη ἂν εἴη, ἧι τις οἷός τ' ἔσται πᾶν παντὶ ὁμοιοῦν τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ οἷς δυνατόν, καὶ ἄλλου ὁμοιοῦντος καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένου εἰς φῶς ἄγειν.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τῆιδε δοκῶ ζητοῦσιν φανεῖσθαι. ἀπάτη πότερον ἐν πολὺ διαφέρουσι γίγνεται μᾶλλον ἢ ὀλίγον;

262 ΦΑΙ. Ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγον.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά γε δὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν μεταβαίνων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ κατὰ μέγα.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα τὸν μέλλοντα ἀπατήσειν μὲν ἄλλον, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴ ἀπατήσεσθαι, τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ἀκριβῶς διειδέναι.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν οἷός τε ἔσται, ἀλήθειαν ἀγνοῶν ἑκάστου, τὴν τοῦ ἀγνοουμένου ὁμοιότητα σμικράν τε καὶ μεγάλην ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
b διαγιγνώσκειν;

ΦΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζουσι καὶ ἀπατωμένοις δῆλον ὡς τὸ πάθος τοῦτο δι' ὁμοιοτήτων τινῶν εἰσερρύη.

ΦΑΙ. Γίγνεται γοῦν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως τεχνικὸς ἔσται μεταβιβάζειν κατὰ σμικρὸν διὰ τῶν ὁμοιοτήτων ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστοτε ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἀπάγων, ἢ αὐτὸς τοῦτο διαφεύγειν, ὁ μὴ ἐγνωρικὼς ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ μή ποτε.

c ΣΩ. Λόγων ἄρα τέχνην, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδώς, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκώς, γελοίαν τινά, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄτεχνον παρέξεται.

ΦΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν ἐν τῶι Λυσίου λόγωι ὃν φέρεις καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν ἰδεῖν τι ὧν φαμεν ἀτέχνων τε καὶ ἐντέχνων εἶναι;

ΦΑΙ. Πάντων γέ που μάλιστα, ὡς νῦν γε ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν, οὐκ ἔχοντες ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν κατὰ τύχην γέ τινα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐρρηθήτην τὼ λόγω
d ἔχοντέ τι παράδειγμα, ὡς ἂν ὁ εἰδὼς τὸ ἀληθὲς προσπαίζων ἐν λόγοις παράγοι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. καὶ ἔγωγε, ὦ Φαῖδρε, αἰτιῶμαι τοὺς ἐντοπίους θεούς· ἴσως δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφῆται οἱ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ὠιδοὶ ἐπιπεπνευκότες ἂν ἡμῖν εἶεν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας· οὐ γάρ που ἔγωγε τέχνης τινὸς τοῦ λέγειν μέτοχος.

ΦΑΙ. Ἔστω ὡς λέγεις· μόνον δήλωσον ὃ φῄς.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή μοι ἀνάγνωθι τὴν τοῦ Λυσίου λόγου ἀρχήν.

e ΦΑΙ. "Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τούτων γενομένων ἀκήκοας· ἀξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι ὧν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστὴς ὤν σου τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει" –

262c5 ἀτέχνων ... ἐντέχνων Heindorf: ἄτεχνον ... ἔντεχνον BTW

ΣΩ. Παῦσαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὗτος ἁμαρτάνει καὶ ἄτεχνον ποιεῖ λεκτέον· ἢ γάρ; **263**

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ παντὶ δῆλον τό γε τοιόνδε, ὡς περὶ μὲν ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ὁμονοητικῶς ἔχομεν, περὶ δ' ἔνια στασιωτικῶς;

ΦΑΙ. Δοκῶ μὲν ὃ λέγεις μανθάνειν, ἔτι δ' εἰπὲ σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν τις ὄνομα εἴπηι σιδήρου ἢ ἀργύρου, ἆρ' οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες διενοήθημεν;

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὅταν δικαίου ἢ ἀγαθοῦ; οὐκ ἄλλος ἄλληι φέρεται, καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;

ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς συμφωνοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὔ. **b**

ΦΑΙ. Οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Ποτέρωθι οὖν εὐαπατητότεροί ἐσμεν, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐν ποτέροις μεῖζον δύναται;

ΦΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅτι ἐν οἷς πλανώμεθα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνην ῥητορικὴν μετιέναι πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ ταῦτα ὁδῶι διηιρῆσθαι, καὶ εἰληφέναι τινὰ χαρακτῆρα ἑκατέρου τοῦ εἴδους, ἐν ὧι τε ἀνάγκη τὸ πλῆθος πλανᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν ὧι μή.

ΦΑΙ. Καλὸν γοῦν ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶδος εἴη κατανενοηκὼς ὁ τοῦτο **c** λαβών.

ΣΩ. Ἔπειτά γε οἶμαι πρὸς ἑκάστωι γιγνόμενον μὴ λανθάνειν ἀλλ' ὀξέως αἰσθάνεσθαι περὶ οὗ ἂν μέλληι ἐρεῖν ποτέρου ὂν τυγχάνει τοῦ γένους.

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τὸν ἔρωτα; πότερον φῶμεν εἶναι τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων ἢ τῶν μή;

ΦΑΙ. Τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων δήπου· ἢ οἴει ἄν σοι συγχωρῆσαι εἰπεῖν ἃ νῦν δὴ εἶπες περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς βλάβη τέ ἐστι τῶι ἐρωμένωι καὶ ἐρῶντι, καὶ αὖθις ὡς μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνει; **d**

ΣΩ. Ἄριστα λέγεις· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ καὶ τόδε – ἐγὼ γάρ τοι διὰ τὸ ἐνθουσιαστικὸν οὐ πάνυ μέμνημαι – εἰ ὡρισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου.

ΦΑΙ. Νὴ Δία, ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα.

ΣΩ. Φεῦ, ὅσωι λέγεις τεχνικωτέρας Νύμφας τὰς Ἀχελώιου καὶ Πᾶνα τὸν Ἑρμοῦ Λυσίου τοῦ Κεφάλου πρὸς λόγους εἶναι. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Λυσίας ἀρχόμενος τοῦ ἐρωτικοῦ ἠνάγκασεν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν

263b8 πλῆθος TW: εἶδος B   263d7 πάνα bt: πάντα BTW

e τὸν ἔρωτα ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων ὃ αὐτὸς ἐβουλήθη, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἤδη συνταξάμενος πάντα τὸν ὕστερον λόγον διεπεράνατο; βούλει πάλιν ἀναγνῶμεν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ;

ΦΑΙ. Εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ· ὃ μέντοι ζητεῖς οὐκ ἔστ' αὐτόθι.

ΣΩ. Λέγε, ἵνα ἀκούσω αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου.

ΦΑΙ. "Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὡς νομίζω 264 συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τούτων γενομένων ἀκήκοας· ἀξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι ὧν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστὴς ὤν σου τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ὧν ἂν εὖ ποιήσωσιν, ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται·"

ΣΩ. Ἦ πολλοῦ δεῖν ἔοικε ποιεῖν ὅδε γε ὃ ζητοῦμεν, ὃς οὐδὲ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐξ ὑπτίας ἀνάπαλιν διανεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἄρχεται ἀφ' ὧν πεπαυμένος ἂν ἤδη ὁ ἐραστὴς λέγοι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά. ἢ οὐδὲν εἶπον, Φαῖδρε, φίλη κεφαλή;

b ΦΑΙ. Ἔστιν γέ τοι δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τελευτή, περὶ οὗ τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τἆλλα; οὐ χύδην δοκεῖ βεβλῆσθαι τὰ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ φαίνεται τὸ δεύτερον εἰρημένον ἔκ τινος ἀνάγκης δεύτερον δεῖν τεθῆναι ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν ῥηθέντων; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔδοξεν, ὡς μηδὲν εἰδότι, οὐκ ἀγεννῶς τὸ ἐπιὸν εἰρῆσθαι τῶι γράφοντι· σὺ δ' ἔχεις τινὰ ἀνάγκην λογογραφικὴν ἧι ταῦτα ἐκεῖνος οὕτως ἐφεξῆς παρ' ἄλληλα ἔθηκεν;

c ΦΑΙ. Χρηστὸς εἶ, ὅτι με ἡγῆι ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ ἐκείνου οὕτως ἀκριβῶς διιδεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γε οἶμαί σε φάναι ἄν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶιον συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῶι ὅλωι γεγραμμένα.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι τοίνυν τὸν τοῦ ἑταίρου σου λόγον εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει, καὶ εὑρήσεις τοῦ ἐπιγράμματος οὐδὲν διαφέροντα, ὃ Μίδαι d τῶι Φρυγί φασίν τινες ἐπιγεγράφθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Ποῖον τοῦτο καὶ τί πεπονθός;

ΣΩ. Ἔστι μὲν τοῦτο τόδε·

χαλκῆ παρθένος εἰμί, Μίδα δ' ἐπὶ σήματι κεῖμαι.
ὄφρ' ἂν ὕδωρ τε νάηι καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ τεθήληι,
αὐτοῦ τῆιδε μένουσα πολυκλαύτου ἐπὶ τύμβου,

264a7 ἐραστὴς rec.: ἐρασθεὶς BTW

ἀγγελέω παριοῦσι Μίδας ὅτι τῇδε τέθαπται.

ὅτι δ' οὐδὲν διαφέρει αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ ὕστατόν τι λέγεσθαι, ἐννοεῖς που, e
ὡς ἐγῷμαι.

ΦΑΙ. Σκώπτεις τὸν λόγον ἡμῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἵνα μὴ σὺ ἄχθηι, ἐάσωμεν—καίτοι συχνά γε ἔχειν μοι δοκεῖ παραδείγματα πρὸς ἅ τις βλέπων ὀνίναιτ' ἄν, μιμεῖσθαι αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν μὴ πάνυ τι—εἰς δὲ τοὺς ἑτέρους λόγους ἴωμεν. ἦν γάρ
τι ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὡς δοκῶ, προσῆκον ἰδεῖν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ λόγων 265
σκοπεῖν.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐναντίω που ἤστην· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὡς τῶι ἐρῶντι, ὁ δ' ὡς τῶι μὴ δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐλεγέτην.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλ' ἀνδρικῶς.

ΣΩ. Ὤιμην σε τἀληθὲς ἐρεῖν, ὅτι μανικῶς· ὃ μέντοι ἐζήτουν ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τοῦτο. μανίαν γάρ τινα ἐφήσαμεν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα· ἢ γάρ;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Μανίας δέ γε εἴδη δύο, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένην.

ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ γε. b

ΣΩ. Τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν τέτταρα μέρη διελόμενοι, μαντικὴν μὲν ἐπίπνοιαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες, Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικήν, Μουσῶν δ' αὖ ποιητικήν, τετάρτην δὲ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἔρωτος, ἐρωτικὴν μανίαν ἐφήσαμέν τε ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπηι τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος ἀπεικάζοντες, ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς τινος ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε
παραφερόμενοι, κεράσαντες οὐ παντάπασιν ἀπίθανον λόγον, μυθικόν c
τινα ὕμνον προσεπαίσαμεν μετρίως τε καὶ εὐφήμως τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σὸν δεσπότην Ἔρωτα, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλῶν παίδων ἔφορον.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα ἔμοιγε οὐκ ἀηδῶς ἀκοῦσαι.

ΣΩ. Τόδε τοίνυν αὐτόθεν λάβωμεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψέγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐπαινεῖν ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος μεταβῆναι.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν αὐτὸ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῶι ὄντι παιδιᾶι πεπαῖσθαι,
τούτων δέ τινων ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοῖν εἰδοῖν, εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν d
τέχνηι λαβεῖν δύναιτό τις, οὐκ ἄχαρι.

ΦΑΙ. Τίνων δή;

ΣΩ. Εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῆι διεσπαρμένα, ἵνα ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῆι περὶ οὗ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέληι· ὥσπερ τὰ νῦν δὴ περὶ ἔρωτος—ὃ ἔστιν ὁρισθέν—εἴτ' εὖ εἴτε κακῶς ἐλέχθη, τὸ γοῦν σαφὲς καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτῶι ὁμολογούμενον διὰ ταῦτα ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν ὁ λόγος.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ δ' ἕτερον δὴ εἶδος τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

e ΣΩ. Τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἴδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα ᾗι πέφυκεν,
καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδὲν κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπωι χρώ-
μενον· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄρτι τὼ λόγω τὸ μὲν ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας ἕν τι κοινῆι
266 εἶδος ἐλαβέτην, ὥσπερ δὲ σώματος ἐξ ἑνὸς διπλᾶ καὶ ὁμώνυμα πέφυκε,
σκαιά, τὰ δὲ δεξιὰ κληθέντα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς παρανοίας ὡς ἓν ἐν
ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς εἶδος ἡγησαμένω τὼ λόγω, ὁ μὲν τὸ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τεμνό-
μενος μέρος, πάλιν τοῦτο τέμνων οὐκ ἐπανῆκεν πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐφευρὼν
ὀνομαζόμενον σκαιόν τινα ἔρωτα ἐλοιδόρησεν μάλ' ἐν δίκηι, ὁ δ' εἰς τὰ ἐν
δεξιᾶι τῆς μανίας ἀγαγὼν ἡμᾶς, ὁμώνυμον μὲν ἐκείνωι, θεῖον δ' αὖ τινα
b ἔρωτα ἐφευρὼν καὶ προτεινάμενος ἐπήινεσεν ὡς μεγίστων αἴτιον ἡμῖν
ἀγαθῶν.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν
διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵνα οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· ἐάν
τέ τιν' ἄλλον ἡγήσωμαι δυνατὸν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθ' ὁρᾶν,
τοῦτον διώκω "κατόπισθε μετ' ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο." καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς
δυναμένους αὐτὸ δρᾶν εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θεὸς οἶδε, καλῶ
c δὲ οὖν μέχρι τοῦδε διαλεκτικούς. τὰ δὲ νῦν παρὰ σοῦ τε καὶ Λυσίου
μαθόντας εἰπὲ τί χρὴ καλεῖν· ἢ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ἡ λόγων τέχνη ᾗι
Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι χρώμενοι σοφοὶ μὲν αὐτοὶ λέγειν γεγό-
νασιν, ἄλλους τε ποιοῦσιν, οἳ ἂν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεῦσιν
ἐθέλωσιν;

ΦΑΙ. Βασιλικοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες, οὐ μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμονές γε ὧν ἐρωτᾶις.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ εἶδος ὀρθῶς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς καλεῖν, διαλεκτικὸν καλῶν·
d τὸ δὲ ῥητορικὸν δοκεῖ μοι διαφεύγειν ἔθ' ἡμᾶς.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φήις; καλόν πού τι ἂν εἴη, ὃ τούτων ἀπολειφθὲν ὅμως
τέχνηι λαμβάνεται. πάντως δ' οὐκ ἀτιμαστέον αὐτὸ σοί τε καὶ ἐμοί,
λεκτέον δὲ τί μέντοι καὶ ἔστι τὸ λειπόμενον τῆς ῥητορικῆς.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα που συχνά, ὦ Σώκρατες, τά γ' ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς
περὶ λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοις.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε ὑπέμνησας. προοίμιον μὲν οἶμαι πρῶτον ὡς δεῖ τοῦ
e λόγου λέγεσθαι ἐν ἀρχῆι· ταῦτα λέγεις, ἦ γάρ, τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δὲ δὴ διήγησίν τινα μαρτυρίας τ' ἐπ' αὐτῆι, τρίτον
τεκμήρια, τέταρτον εἰκότα· καὶ πίστωσιν οἶμαι καὶ ἐπιπίστωσιν λέγειν
τόν γε βέλτιστον λογοδαίδαλον Βυζάντιον ἄνδρα.

266a2 τὰ δὲ Stobaeus: τάδε ἢ BTW 266a2 ἓν ἐν Heindorf: ἐν BTW
266b6 πεφυκόθ' editio Aldina Stephanus: πεφυκὸς BTW 266d7 [καὶ] καλῶς Hirschig

ΦΑΙ. Τὸν χρηστὸν λέγεις Θεόδωρον;

ΣΩ. Τί μήν; καὶ ἔλεγχόν γε καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχον ὡς ποιητέον ἐν κατη- 267
γορίαι τε καὶ ἀπολογίαι. τὸν δὲ κάλλιστον Πάριον Εὔηνον ἐς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν, ὃς ὑποδήλωσίν τε πρῶτος ηὗρεν καὶ παρεπαίνους; οἱ δ' αὐτὸν καὶ παραψόγους φασὶν ἐν μέτρωι λέγειν μνήμης χάριν· σοφὸς γὰρ ἀνήρ. Τεισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσομεν εὕδειν, οἳ πρὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον, τά τε αὖ σμικρὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι διὰ ῥώμην λόγου, καινά τε ἀρχαίως b
τά τ' ἐναντία καινῶς, συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἄπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνηῦρον; ταῦτα δὲ ἀκούων ποτέ μου Πρόδικος ἐγέλασεν, καὶ μόνος αὐτὸς ηὑρηκέναι ἔφη ὧν δεῖ λόγων· δεῖν δὲ οὔτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων ἀλλὰ μετρίων.

ΦΑΙ. Σοφώτατά γε, ὦ Πρόδικε.

ΣΩ. Ἱππίαν δὲ οὐ λέγομεν; οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν σύμψηφον αὐτῶι καὶ τὸν Ἠλεῖον ξένον γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Τί δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ Πώλου πῶς φράσωμεν αὖ μουσεῖα λόγων – ὡς διπλασι- c
ολογίαν καὶ γνωμολογίαν καὶ εἰκονολογίαν – ὀνομάτων τε Λικυμνίων ἃ ἐκείνωι ἐδωρήσατο πρὸς ποίησιν εὐεπείας;

ΦΑΙ. Πρωταγόρεια δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαῦτ' ἄττα;

ΣΩ. Ὀρθοέπειά γέ τις, ὦ παῖ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλά. τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἑλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνηι μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, ὀργίσαι τε αὖ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονεν καὶ πάλιν ὠργισμένοις ἐπάιδων κηλεῖν, ὡς ἔφη· d
διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὁθενδὴ κράτιστος. τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων κοινῆι πᾶσιν ἔοικε συνδεδογμένον εἶναι, ὧι τινες μὲν ἐπάνοδον, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο τίθενται ὄνομα.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ἐν κεφαλαίωι ἕκαστα λέγεις ὑπομνῆσαι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοὺς ἀκούοντας περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω, καὶ εἴ τι σὺ ἄλλο ἔχεις εἰπεῖν λόγων τέχνης πέρι –

ΦΑΙ. Σμικρά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἐῶμεν δὴ τά γε σμικρά· ταῦτα δὲ ὑπ' αὐγὰς μᾶλλον ἴδωμεν, 268
τίνα καί ποτ' ἔχει τὴν τῆς τέχνης δύναμιν.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα ἐρρωμένην, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔν γε δὴ πλήθους συνόδοις.

ΣΩ. Ἔχει γάρ. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἰδὲ καὶ σὺ εἰ ἄρα καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται διεστηκὸς αὐτῶν τὸ ἤτριον ὥσπερ ἐμοί.

267b4 λόγων [τέχνην] Ast 267c1 ὡς B: ὃς TW: λόγων [ὡς] διπλασιολογίαν Hackforth
267d2 ὁθενδὴ rec.: ὅθεν δεῖ BTW

ΦΑΙ. Δείκνυε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δή μοι· εἴ τις προσελθὼν τῶι ἑταίρωι σου Ἐρυξιμάχωι ἢ τῶι πατρὶ αὐτοῦ Ἀκουμενῶι εἴποι ὅτι "ἐγὼ ἐπίσταμαι τοιαῦτ' ἄττα
b σώμασι προσφέρειν, ὥστε θερμαίνειν τ', ἐὰν βούλωμαι, καὶ ψύχειν, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δόξηι μοι, ἐμεῖν ποιεῖν, ἐὰν δ' αὖ, κάτω διαχωρεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ ἐπιστάμενος αὐτὰ ἀξιῶ ἰατρικὸς εἶναι καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖν ὧι ἂν τὴν τούτων ἐπιστήμην παραδῶ," τί ἂν οἴει ἀκούσαντας εἰπεῖν;

ΦΑΙ. Τί δ' ἄλλο γε ἢ ἐρέσθαι εἰ προσεπίσταται καὶ οὕστινας δεῖ καὶ ὁπότε ἕκαστα τούτων ποιεῖν καὶ μέχρι ὁπόσου;

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἴποι ὅτι "οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλ' ἀξιῶ τὸν ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ
c μαθόντα αὐτὸν οἷόν τ' εἶναι ποιεῖν ἃ ἐρωτᾶις";

ΦΑΙ. Εἴποιεν ἂν οἶμαι ὅτι μαίνεται ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐκ βιβλίου ποθὲν ἀκούσας ἢ περιτυχὼν φαρμακίοις ἰατρὸς οἴεται γεγονέναι, οὐδὲν ἐπαΐων τῆς τέχνης.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ Σοφοκλεῖ αὖ προσελθὼν καὶ Εὐριπίδηι τις λέγοι ὡς ἐπίσταται περὶ σμικροῦ πράγματος ῥήσεις παμμήκεις ποιεῖν καὶ περὶ μεγάλου πάνυ σμικράς, ὅταν τε βούληται οἰκτρὰς καὶ τοὐναντίον αὖ
d φοβερὰς καὶ ἀπειλητικὰς ὅσα τ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ διδάσκων αὐτὰ τραγωιδίας ποίησιν οἴεται παραδιδόναι;

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ οὗτοι ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι καταγελῶιεν εἴ τις οἴεται τραγωιδίαν ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῶι ὅλωι συνισταμένην.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἀγροίκως γε οἶμαι λοιδορήσειαν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν μουσικὸς ἐντυχὼν ἀνδρὶ οἰομένωι ἁρμονικῶι εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τυγχάνει ἐπιστάμενος ὡς οἷόν τε ὀξυτάτην καὶ βαρυτάτην χορδὴν ποιεῖν, οὐκ
e ἀγρίως εἴποι ἄν, "ὦ μοχθηρέ, μελαγχολᾶις," ἀλλ' ἅτε μουσικὸς ὢν πραιότερον ὅτι "ὦ ἄριστε, ἀνάγκη μὲν καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπίστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ἁρμονικὸν ἔσεσθαι, οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἁρμονίας ἐπαΐειν τὸν τὴν σὴν ἕξιν ἔχοντα· τὰ γὰρ πρὸ ἁρμονίας ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἐπίστασαι ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἁρμονικά."

ΦΑΙ. Ὀρθότατά γε.

269 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς τὸν σφισιν ἐπιδεικνύμενον τὰ πρὸ τραγωιδίας ἂν φαίη ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ τραγικά, καὶ ὁ Ἀκουμενὸς τὰ πρὸ ἰατρικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἰατρικά.

ΦΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τὸν μελίγηρυν Ἄδραστον οἰόμεθα ἢ καὶ Περικλέα, εἰ ἀκούσειαν ὧν νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς διῆιμεν τῶν παγκάλων τεχνημάτων – βραχ-

268c2 εἴποιεν Stephanus: εἴποι BTWΠ

υλογιῶν τε καὶ εἰκονολογιῶν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα διελθόντες ὑπ' αὐγὰς ἔφαμεν
εἶναι σκεπτέα – πότερον χαλεπῶς ἂν αὐτούς, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, b
ὑπ' ἀγροικίας ῥῆμά τι εἰπεῖν ἀπαίδευτον εἰς τοὺς ταῦτα γεγραφότας τε
καὶ διδάσκοντας ὡς ῥητορικὴν τέχνην, ἢ ἅτε ἡμῶν ὄντας σοφωτέρους
κἂν νῷν ἐπιπλῆξαι εἰπόντας, "ὦ Φαῖδρέ τε καὶ Σώκρατες, οὐ χρὴ
χαλεπαίνειν ἀλλὰ συγγιγνώσκειν, εἴ τινες μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι
ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο ὁρίσασθαι τί ποτ' ἔστιν ῥητορική, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ
πάθους τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἔχοντες ῥητορικὴν
ᾠήθησαν ηὑρηκέναι, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ διδάσκοντες ἄλλους ἡγοῦνταί c
σφισιν τελέως ῥητορικὴν δεδιδάχθαι, τὸ δὲ ἕκαστα τούτων πιθανῶς
λέγειν τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον συνίστασθαι, οὐδὲν ἔργον ὄν, αὐτοὺς δεῖν παρ'
ἑαυτῶν τοὺς μαθητάς σφων πορίζεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις."

ΦΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύει γε τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι τὸ τῆς
τέχνης ἣν οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες ὡς ῥητορικὴν διδάσκουσίν τε καὶ γράφουσιν,
καὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ εἰρηκέναι· ἀλλὰ δὴ τὴν τοῦ τῶι ὄντι ῥητορικοῦ
τε καὶ πιθανοῦ τέχνην πῶς καὶ πόθεν ἄν τις δύναιτο πορίσασθαι; d

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὥστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον
γενέσθαι, εἰκός, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ἔχειν ὥσπερ τἆλλα· εἰ μέν
σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει ῥητορικῶι εἶναι, ἔσει ῥήτωρ ἐλλόγιμος, προσλαβὼν
ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ μελέτην, ὅτου δ' ἂν ἐλλείπηις τούτων, ταύτηι ἀτελὴς
ἔσει. ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη, οὐχ ἧι Λυσίας τε καὶ Θρασύμαχος πορεύεται
δοκεῖ μοι φαίνεσθαι ἡ μέθοδος.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πῆι δή;

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰκότως ὁ Περικλῆς πάντων τελεώτατος e
εἰς τὴν ῥητορικὴν γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Πᾶσαι ὅσαι μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν προσδέονται ἀδολεσχίας
καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως πέρι· τὸ γὰρ ὑψηλόνουν τοῦτο καὶ πάν- 270
τηι τελεσιουργὸν ἔοικεν ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν εἰσιέναι. ὃ καὶ Περικλῆς πρὸς
τῶι εὐφυὴς εἶναι ἐκτήσατο· προσπεσὼν γὰρ οἶμαι τοιούτωι ὄντι Ἀναξ-
αγόραι, μετεωρολογίας ἐμπλησθεὶς καὶ ἐπὶ φύσιν νοῦ τε καὶ ἀνοίας
ἀφικόμενος, ὧν δὴ πέρι τὸν πολὺν λόγον ἐποιεῖτο Ἀναξαγόρας, ἐντεῦθεν
εἵλκυσεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην τὸ πρόσφορον αὐτῆι.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὁ αὐτός που τρόπος τέχνης ἰατρικῆς ὅσπερ καὶ ῥητορικῆς. b

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δή;

ΣΩ. Ἐν ἀμφοτέραις δεῖ διελέσθαι φύσιν, σώματος μὲν ἐν τῆι ἑτέραι,
ψυχῆς δὲ ἐν τῆι ἑτέραι, εἰ μέλλεις, μὴ τριβῆι μόνον καὶ ἐμπειρίαι ἀλλὰ

269c3 οὐδὲν ἔργον ὄν Heindorf: οὐδὲν ἔργον BTW: ὡς οὐδὲν ἔργον ὄν Hermias

τέχνηι, τῶι μὲν φάρμακα καὶ τροφὴν προσφέρων ὑγίειαν καὶ ῥώμην ἐμποιήσειν, τῆι δὲ λόγους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεις νομίμους πειθὼ ἣν ἂν βούληι καὶ ἀρετὴν παραδώσειν.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως.

c ΣΩ. Ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι οἴει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως;

ΦΑΙ. Εἰ μὲν Ἱπποκράτει γε τῶι τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πιθέσθαι, οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος ἄνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λέγει· χρὴ μέντοι πρὸς τῶι Ἱπποκράτει τὸν λόγον ἐξετάζοντα σκοπεῖν εἰ συμφωνεῖ.

ΦΑΙ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν περὶ φύσεως σκόπει τί ποτε λέγει Ἱπποκράτης τε
d καὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος. ἆρ' οὐχ ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ὁτουοῦν φύσεως· πρῶτον μέν, ἁπλοῦν ἢ πολυειδές ἐστιν οὗ πέρι βουλησόμεθα εἶναι αὐτοὶ τεχνικοὶ καὶ ἄλλον δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν, ἔπειτα δέ, ἂν μὲν ἁπλοῦν ἦι, σκοπεῖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν εἰς τὸ δρᾶν ἔχον ἢ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ, ἐὰν δὲ πλείω εἴδη ἔχηι, ταῦτα ἀριθμησαμένους, ὅπερ ἐφ' ἑνός, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἐφ' ἑκάστου, τῶι τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἢ τῶι τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ;

ΦΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

e ΣΩ. Ἡ γοῦν ἄνευ τούτων μέθοδος ἐοίκοι ἂν ὥσπερ τυφλοῦ πορείαι. ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν ἀπεικαστέον τόν γε τέχνηι μετιόντα ὁτιοῦν τυφλῶι οὐδὲ κωφῶι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς, ἄν τωι τις τέχνηι λόγους διδῶι, τὴν οὐσίαν δείξει ἀκριβῶς τῆς φύσεως τούτου πρὸς ὃ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει· ἔσται δέ που ψυχὴ τοῦτο.

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

271 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἅμιλλα αὐτῶι τέταται πρὸς τοῦτο πᾶσα· πειθὼ γὰρ ἐν τούτωι ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ. ἢ γάρ;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ὁ Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ ὃς ἂν ἄλλος σπουδῆι τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῶι, πρῶτον πάσηι ἀκριβείαι γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἓν καὶ ὅμοιον πέφυκεν ἢ κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολυειδές· τοῦτο γάρ φαμεν φύσιν εἶναι δεικνύναι.

ΦΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δέ γε, ὅτωι τί ποιεῖν ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν.

270c3 γε Heindorf: τε BTW
270d5 ἀριθμησαμένους Stephanus: ἀριθμησάμενος BTW: ἀριθμησάμενον Galen: καταριθμησάμενον Hermias
270d6 αὐτὸ rec.: αὐτῶι BTW

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τρίτον δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενος τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη καὶ τὰ b
τούτων παθήματα δίεισι τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων ἕκαστον ἑκάστωι
καὶ διδάσκων οἵα οὖσα ὑφ' οἵων λογων δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ μὲν
πείθεται, ἡ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ.

ΦΑΙ. Κάλλιστα γοῦν ἄν, ὡς ἔοικ', ἔχοι οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὔτοι μὲν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλως ἐνδεικνύμενον ἢ λεγόμενον τέχ-
νηι ποτὲ λεχθήσεται ἢ γραφήσεται οὔτε τι ἄλλο οὔτε τοῦτο. ἀλλ'
οἱ νῦν γράφοντες, ὧν σὺ ἀκήκοας, τέχνας λόγων πανοῦργοί εἰσιν c
καὶ ἀποκρύπτονται, εἰδότες ψυχῆς πέρι παγκάλως· πρὶν ἂν οὖν τὸν
τρόπον τοῦτον λέγωσί τε καὶ γράφωσι, μὴ πειθώμεθα αὐτοῖς τέχνηι
γράφειν.

ΦΑΙ. Τίνα τοῦτον;

ΣΩ. Αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ ῥήματα εἰπεῖν οὐκ εὐπετές· ὡς δὲ δεῖ γράφειν, εἰ μέλλει τεχνικῶς ἔχειν καθ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, λέγειν ἐθέλω.

ΦΑΙ. Λέγε δή.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὖσα, τὸν μέλ-
λοντα ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα εἴδη ἔχει. ἔστιν d
οὖν τόσα καὶ τόσα καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα, ὅθεν οἱ μὲν τοιοίδε, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε
γίγνονται· τούτων δὲ δὴ οὕτω διηιρημένων, λόγων αὖ τόσα καὶ τόσα
ἔστιν εἴδη, τοιόνδε ἕκαστον. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοίδε ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε λόγων
διὰ τήνδε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐς τὰ τοιάδε εὔπειθεῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε διὰ τάδε δυσ-
πειθεῖς· δεῖ δὴ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα θεώμενον αὐτὰ ἐν
ταῖς πράξεσιν ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα, ὀξέως τῆι αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι e
ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἢ μηδὲν εἶναί πω πλέον αὐτῶι ὧν τότε ἤκουε λόγων
συνών. ὅταν δὲ εἰπεῖν τε ἱκανῶς ἔχηι οἷος ὑφ' οἵων πείθεται, παραγιγνό-
μενόν τε δυνατὸς ἦι διαισθανόμενος ἑαυτῶι ἐνδείκνυσθαι ὅτι οὗτός ἐστι
καὶ αὕτη ἡ φύσις περὶ ἧς τότε ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι, νῦν ἔργωι παροῦσά οἱ, 272
ἧι προσοιστέον τούσδε ὧδε τοὺς λόγους ἐπὶ τὴν τῶνδε πειθώ, ταῦτα
δ' ἤδη πάντα ἔχοντι, προσλαβόντι καιροὺς τοῦ πότε λεκτέον καὶ ἐπισ-
χετέον, βραχυλογίας τε αὖ καὶ ἐλεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως ἑκάστων τε
ὅσα ἂν εἴδη μάθηι λόγων, τούτων τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν δια-
γνόντι, καλῶς τε καὶ τελέως ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη ἀπειργασμένη, πρότερον δ'
οὔ· ἀλλ' ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῶν τις ἐλλείπηι λέγων ἢ διδάσκων ἢ γράφων, φῆι b
δὲ τέχνηι λέγειν, ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ. "τί δὴ οὖν," φήσει ἴσως

271b2 τὰς B: πάσας TW 271d6 αὐτὰ rec.: αὐτὸν BTW: αὐτὸ Galen
271e2 ἢ μηδὲν εἶναι Galen: ἢ μηδὲν εἰδέναι Hermias: ἢ μηδὲ εἰδέναι TW: εἰ μὴ εἰδέναι B
272a1 παροῦσά οἱ rec.: [οἱ] BTW: σοι Galen

ὁ συγγραφεύς, "ὦ Φαῖδρέ τε καὶ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖ οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως πως
ἀποδεκτέον λεγομένης λόγων τέχνης;"

ΦΑΙ. Ἀδύνατόν που, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως· καίτοι οὐ σμικρόν γε
φαίνεται ἔργον.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. τούτου τοι ἕνεκα χρὴ πάντας τοὺς λόγους ἄνω
c καὶ κάτω μεταστρέφοντα ἐπισκοπεῖν εἴ τίς πηι ῥάιων καὶ βραχυτέρα
φαίνεται ἐπ' αὐτὴν ὁδός, ἵνα μὴ μάτην πολλὴν ἀπίηι καὶ τραχεῖαν, ἐξὸν
ὀλίγην τε καὶ λείαν. ἀλλ' εἴ τινά πηι βοήθειαν ἔχεις ἐπακηκοὼς Λυσίου
ἤ τινος ἄλλου, πειρῶ λέγειν ἀναμιμνηισκόμενος.

ΦΑΙ. Ἕνεκα μὲν πείρας ἔχοιμ' ἄν, ἀλλ' οὔτι νῦν γ' οὕτως ἔχω.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν ἐγώ τιν' εἴπω λόγον ὃν τῶν περὶ ταῦτά τινων
ἀκήκοα;

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Λέγεται γοῦν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοῦ λύκου εἰπεῖν.

d ΦΑΙ. Καὶ σύ γε οὕτω ποίει.

ΣΩ. Φασὶ τοίνυν οὐδὲν οὕτω ταῦτα δεῖν σεμνύνειν οὐδ' ἀνάγειν ἄνω
μακρὰν περιβαλλομένους· παντάπασι γάρ, ὃ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν
τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δέοι δικαίων ἢ ἀγαθῶν
περὶ πραγμάτων ἢ καὶ ἀνθρώπων γε τοιούτων φύσει ὄντων ἢ τροφῆι
τὸν μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι. τὸ παράπαν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν
τοῖς δικαστηρίοις τούτων ἀληθείας μέλειν οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ·
e τοῦτο δ' εἶναι τὸ εἰκός, ὧι δεῖν προσέχειν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνηι ἐρεῖν. οὐδὲ
γὰρ αὖ τὰ πραχθέντα δεῖν λέγειν ἐνίοτε, ἐὰν μὴ εἰκότως ἦι πεπραγ-
μένα, ἀλλὰ τὰ εἰκότα, ἔν τε κατηγορίαι καὶ ἀπολογίαι, καὶ πάντως
λέγοντα τὸ δὴ εἰκὸς διωκτέον εἶναι, πολλὰ εἰπόντα χαίρειν τῶι ἀληθεῖ·
273 τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ λόγου γιγνόμενον τὴν ἅπασαν τέχνην
πορίζειν.

ΦΑΙ. Αὐτά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, διελήλυθας ἃ λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τοὺς
λόγους τεχνικοὶ προσποιούμενοι εἶναι· ἀνεμνήσθην γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τῶι
πρόσθεν βραχέως τοῦ τοιούτου ἐφηψάμεθα, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦτο πάμμεγα
εἶναι τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τόν γε Τεισίαν αὐτὸν πεπάτηκας ἀκριβῶς· εἰπέτω
b τοίνυν καὶ τόδε ἡμῖν ὁ Τεισίας, μή τι ἄλλο λέγει τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ τῶι πλήθει
δοκοῦν.

ΦΑΙ. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δή, ὡς ἔοικε, σοφὸν εὑρὼν ἅμα καὶ τεχνικὸν ἔγραψεν ὡς
ἐάν τις ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀνδρικὸς ἰσχυρὸν καὶ δειλὸν συγκόψας, ἱμάτιον ἤ

272d7 μέλειν Ficinus: μέλει BTW Hermias 273b1 λέγει rec.: λέγειν BTW

τι ἄλλο ἀφελόμενος, εἰς δικαστήριον ἄγηται, δεῖ δὴ τἀληθὲς μηδέτερον λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν δειλὸν μὴ ὑπὸ μόνου φάναι τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ συγκεκόφθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐλέγχειν ὡς μόνω ἤστην, ἐκείνωι δὲ καταχρήσασθαι τῶι "πῶς δ' ἂν ἐγὼ τοιόσδε τοιῶιδε ἐπεχείρησα;" ὁ δ' οὐκ c
ἐρεῖ δὴ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κάκην, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο ψεύδεσθαι ἐπιχειρῶν τάχ' ἂν ἔλεγχόν πηι παραδοίη τῶι ἀντιδίκωι. καὶ περὶ τἆλλα δὴ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐστὶ τὰ τέχνηι λεγόμενα. οὐ γάρ, ὦ Φαῖδρε;

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Φεῦ, δεινῶς γ' ἔοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην ἀνευρεῖν ὁ Τεισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δή ποτ' ὢν τυγχάνει καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος. ἀτάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τούτωι ἡμεῖς πότερον λέγωμεν ἢ μὴ – d

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι "ὦ Τεισία, πάλαι ἡμεῖς, πρὶν καὶ σὲ παρελθεῖν, τυγχάνομεν λέγοντες ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο τὸ εἰκὸς τοῖς πολλοῖς δι' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τυγχάνει ἐγγιγνόμενον· τὰς δὲ ὁμοιότητας ἄρτι διήλθομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰδὼς κάλλιστα ἐπίσταται εὑρίσκειν. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἄλλο τι περὶ τέχνης λόγων λέγεις, ἀκούοιμεν ἄν· εἰ δὲ μή, οἷς νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν πεισόμεθα, ὡς ἐὰν μή τις τῶν τε ἀκουσομένων τὰς φύσεις διαριθμήσηται, καὶ κατ' εἴδη τε διαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα καὶ μιᾶι ἰδέαι e
δυνατὸς ἦι καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον περιλαμβάνειν, οὔ ποτ' ἔσται τεχνικὸς λόγων πέρι καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπωι. ταῦτα δὲ οὐ μή ποτε κτήσηται ἄνευ πολλῆς πραγματείας, ἣν οὐχ ἕνεκα τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι τὸν σώφρονα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῖς κεχαρισμένα μὲν λέγειν δύνασθαι, κεχαρισμένως δὲ πράττειν τὸ πᾶν εἰς δύναμιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄρα, ὦ Τεισία, φασὶν οἱ σοφώτεροι ἡμῶν, ὁμοδούλοις δεῖ 274
χαρίζεσθαι μελετᾶν τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα, ὅτι μὴ πάρεργον, ἀλλὰ δεσπόταις ἀγαθοῖς τε καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν. ὥστ' εἰ μακρὰ ἡ περίοδος, μὴ θαυμάσηις· μεγάλων γὰρ ἕνεκα περιιτέον, οὐχ ὡς σὺ δοκεῖς. ἔσται μήν, ὡς ὁ λόγος φησίν, ἐάν τις ἐθέληι, καὶ ταῦτα κάλλιστα ἐξ ἐκείνων γιγνόμενα."

ΦΑΙ. Παγκάλως ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ οἷός τέ τις εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντί τοι τοῖς καλοῖς καλὸν καὶ πάσχειν ὅ τι b
ἂν τωι συμβῆι παθεῖν.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων πέρι ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω.

274a1 ἡμῶν rec.: ἡμῶν ἢ TW: ἢ B 274a6 οἷός τέ rec.: οἷός γέ TW: οἷος B

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' εὐπρεπείας δὴ γραφῆς πέρι καὶ ἀπρεπείας, πῆι γιγνόμενον καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ὅπηι ἀπρεπῶς, λοιπόν. ἢ γάρ;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθ' οὖν ὅπηι μάλιστα θεῶι χαριεῖ λόγων πέρι πράττων ἢ λέγων;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς· σὺ δέ;

c ΣΩ. Ἀκοήν γ' ἔχω λέγειν τῶν προτέρων, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο εὕροιμεν αὐτοί, ἆρά γ' ἂν ἔθ' ἡμῖν μέλοι τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων
δοξασμάτων;

ΦΑΙ. Γελοῖον ἤρου· ἀλλ' ἃ φῄς ἀκηκοέναι λέγε.

ΣΩ. Ἤκουσα τοίνυν περὶ Ναύκρατιν τῆς Αἰγύπτου γενέσθαι τῶν
ἐκεῖ παλαιῶν τινα θεῶν, οὗ καὶ τὸ ὄρνεον τὸ ἱερὸν ὃ δὴ καλοῦσιν Ἶβιν,
αὐτῶι δὲ ὄνομα τῶι δαίμονι εἶναι Θεύθ· τοῦτον δὴ πρῶτον ἀριθμόν
d τε καὶ λογισμὸν εὑρεῖν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἔτι δὲ πεττείας
τε καὶ κυβείας, καὶ δὴ καὶ γράμματα. βασιλέως δ' αὖ τότε ὄντος
Αἰγύπτου ὅλης Θαμοῦ περὶ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τοῦ ἄνω τόπου ἣν οἱ
Ἕλληνες Αἰγυπτίας Θήβας καλοῦσι καὶ τὸν Θαμοῦν Ἄμμωνα, παρὰ
τοῦτον ἐλθὼν ὁ Θεὺθ τὰς τέχνας ἐπέδειξεν, καὶ ἔφη δεῖν διαδοθῆναι
τοῖς ἄλλοις Αἰγυπτίοις. ὁ δὲ ἤρετο ἥντινα ἑκάστη ἔχοι ὠφέλειαν, διεξιόντος
δέ, ὅ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς δοκοῖ λέγειν, τὸ μὲν ἔψεγεν, τὸ δ'
e ἐπῄνει. πολλὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ ἑκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἐπ' ἀμφότερα Θαμοῦν
τῶι Θεὺθ λέγεται ἀποφήνασθαι, ἃ λόγος πολὺς ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν· ἐπειδὴ
δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς γράμμασιν ἦν, "τοῦτο δέ, ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὸ μάθημα," ἔφη ὁ
Θεύθ, "σοφωτέρους Αἰγυπτίους καὶ μνημονικωτέρους παρέξει· μνήμης
τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον ηὑρέθη." ὁ δ' εἶπεν· "ὦ τεχνικώτατε Θεύθ,
ἄλλος μὲν τεκεῖν δυνατὸς τὰ τέχνης, ἄλλος δὲ κρῖναι τίν' ἔχει μοῖραν
275 βλάβης τε καὶ ὠφελείας τοῖς μέλλουσι χρῆσθαι· καὶ νῦν σύ, πατὴρ
ὢν γραμμάτων, δι' εὔνοιαν τοὐναντίον εἶπες ἢ δύναται. τοῦτο γὰρ
τῶν μαθόντων λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἀμελετησίαι, ἅτε
διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἔξωθεν ὑπ' ἀλλοτρίων τύπων, οὐκ ἔνδοθεν αὐτοὺς
ὑφ' αὑτῶν ἀναμιμνῃσκομένους· οὔκουν μνήμης ἀλλὰ ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον
ηὗρες. σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν, οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις·
πολυήκοοι γάρ σοι γενόμενοι ἄνευ διδαχῆς πολυγνώμονες εἶναι δόξ-
b ουσιν, ἀγνώμονες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες καὶ χαλεποὶ συνεῖναι, δοξόσοφοι
γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν."

274b10 θεῶι Stobaeus: θεῶν BTW 274c6 δὴ Stobaeus: δὲ BTW
274d3 ἣν rec.: ὃν BTW 274d4 Θαμοῦν Postgate: θεὸν BTW
274e4 παρέξει rec. Stobaeus: παρέξοι B: παρέξειν TW

ΦΑΙ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως σὺ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ ὁποδαποὺς ἂν ἐθέλῃς λόγους ποιεῖς.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δέ γ', ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῶι τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Δωδωναίου ἱερῶι δρυὸς λόγους ἔφησαν μαντικοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι. τοῖς μὲν οὖν τότε, ἅτε οὐκ οὖσι σοφοῖς ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι, ἀπέχρη δρυὸς καὶ πέτρας ἀκούειν ὑπ' εὐηθείας, εἰ μόνον ἀληθῆ λέγοιεν· σοὶ δ' ἴσως διαφέρει τίς ὁ λέγων καὶ c
ποδαπός. οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖς, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει.

ΦΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς ἐπέπληξας, καί μοι δοκεῖ περὶ γραμμάτων ἔχειν ἧιπερ ὁ Θηβαῖος λέγει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην οἰόμενος ἐν γράμμασι καταλιπεῖν, καὶ αὖ ὁ παραδεχόμενος ὥς τι σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἐκ γραμμάτων ἐσόμενον, πολλῆς ἂν εὐηθείας γέμοι καὶ τῶι ὄντι τὴν Ἄμμωνος μαντείαν ἀγνοοῖ, πλέον τι οἰόμενος εἶναι λόγους γεγραμμένους τοῦ τὸν εἰδότα ὑπομνῆσαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἧι τὰ γεγραμμένα. d

ΦΑΙ. Ὀρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφὴ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅμοιον ζωγραφίαι. καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἕστηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέρηι τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾶι. ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι· δόξαις μὲν ἂν ὥς τι φρονοῦντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δέ τι ἔρηι τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἕν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταὐτὸν ἀεί. ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ γραφῆι, κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος ὁμοίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐπαΐουσιν, ὡς e
δ' αὔτως παρ' οἷς οὐδὲν προσήκει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς δεῖ τε καὶ μή. πλημμελούμενος δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκηι λοιδορηθεὶς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ· αὐτὸς γὰρ οὔτ' ἀμύνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατὸς αὑτῶι.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ ταῦτά σοι ὀρθότατα εἴρηται.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἄλλον ὁρῶμεν λόγον τούτου ἀδελφὸν γνήσιον, τῶι 276
τρόπωι τε γίγνεται καὶ ὅσωι ἀμείνων καὶ δυνατώτερος τούτου φύεται;

ΦΑΙ. Τίνα τοῦτον καὶ πῶς λέγεις γιγνόμενον;

ΣΩ. Ὃς μετ' ἐπιστήμης γράφεται ἐν τῆι τοῦ μανθάνοντος ψυχῆι, δυνατὸς μὲν ἀμῦναι ἑαυτῶι, ἐπιστήμων δὲ λέγειν τε καὶ σιγᾶν πρὸς οὓς δεῖ.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον λέγεις ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον, οὗ ὁ γεγραμμένος εἴδωλον ἄν τι λέγοιτο δικαίως.

ΣΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. τόδε δή μοι εἰπέ· ὁ νοῦν ἔχων γεωργός, ὧν b
σπερμάτων κήδοιτο καὶ ἔγκαρπα βούλοιτο γενέσθαι, πότερα σπουδῆι ἂν θέρους εἰς Ἀδώνιδος κήπους ἀρῶν χαίροι θεωρῶν καλοὺς ἐν ἡμέραισιν ὀκτὼ γιγνομένους, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ ἑορτῆς χάριν δρώιη

275d3 γραφὴ b rec.: γραφὴν BTW   275e3 τε Hirschig: γε BTW

ἄν, ὅτε καὶ ποιοῖ, ἐφ' οἷς δὲ ἐσπούδακεν, τῆι γεωργικῆι χρώμενος ἂν τέχνηι, σπείρας εἰς τὸ προσῆκον, ἀγαπώιη ἂν ἐν ὀγδόωι μηνὶ ὅσα ἔσπειρεν τέλος λαβόντα;

c ΦΑΙ. Οὕτω που, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν σπουδῆι, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἑτέρως ἂν ἧι λέγεις ποιοῖ.

ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντα τοῦ γεωργοῦ φῶμεν ἧττον νοῦν ἔχειν εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ σπέρματα;

ΦΑΙ. Ἥκιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σπουδῆι αὐτὰ ἐν ὕδατι γράψει, μέλανι σπείρων διὰ καλάμου μετὰ λόγων ἀδυνάτων μὲν αὑτοῖς λόγωι βοηθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων δὲ ἱκανῶς τἀληθῆ διδάξαι.

ΦΑΙ. Οὔκουν δὴ τό γ' εἰκός.

d ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ· ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἐν γράμμασι κήπους, ὡς ἔοικε, παιδιᾶς χάριν σπερεῖ τε καὶ γράψει, ὅταν γράφηι, ἑαυτῶι τε ὑπομνήματα θησαυριζόμενος, εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας ἐὰν ἵκηται, καὶ παντὶ τῶι ταὐτὸν ἴχνος μετιόντι, ἡσθήσεταί τε αὐτοὺς θεωρῶν φυομένους ἁπαλούς· ὅταν δὲ ἄλλοι παιδιαῖς ἄλλαις χρῶνται, συμποσίοις τε ἄρδοντες αὑτοὺς ἑτέροις τε ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, τότ' ἐκεῖνος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀντὶ τούτων οἷς λέγω παίζων διάξει.

e ΦΑΙ. Παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδιάν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ ἐν λόγοις δυναμένου παίζειν, δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄλλων ὧν λέγεις πέρι μυθολογοῦντα.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι γάρ, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, οὕτω· πολὺ δ' οἶμαι καλλίων σπουδὴ περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τῆι διαλεκτικῆι τέχνηι χρώμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύηι τε καὶ σπείρηι μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους,
277 οἳ ἑαυτοῖς τῶι τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἱκανοὶ καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα – ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἤθεσι φυόμενοι τοῦτ' ἀεὶ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἱκανοί – καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπωι δυνατὸν μάλιστα.

ΦΑΙ. Πολὺ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔτι κάλλιον λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴ ἐκεῖνα ἤδη, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δυνάμεθα κρίνειν, τούτων ὡμολογημένων.

ΦΑΙ. Τὰ ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Ὧν δὴ πέρι βουληθέντες ἰδεῖν ἀφικόμεθα εἰς τόδε, ὅπως τὸ
b Λυσίου τε ὄνειδος ἐξετάσαιμεν τῆς τῶν λόγων γραφῆς πέρι καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους οἳ τέχνηι καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης γράφοιντο. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔντεχνον καὶ μὴ δοκεῖ μοι δεδηλῶσθαι μετρίως.

ΦΑΙ. Ἔδοξέ γε δή· πάλιν δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με πῶς.

276d2 ὅταν [δὲ] γράφηι Bekker 276d5 ὅταν δὲ ἄλλοι rec.: ὅταν ἄλλοι BTW

ΣΩ. Πρὶν ἄν τις τό τε ἀληθὲς ἑκάστων εἰδῆι περὶ ὧν λέγει ἢ γράφει,
κατ' αὐτό τε πᾶν ὁρίζεσθαι δυνατὸς γένηται, ὁρισάμενός τε πάλιν κατ'
εἴδη μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν ἐπιστηθῆι, περί τε ψυχῆς φύσεως διιδὼν
κατὰ ταὐτά, τὸ προσαρμόττον ἑκάστηι φύσει εἶδος ἀνευρίσκων, οὕτω c
τιθῆι καὶ διακοσμῆι τὸν λόγον, ποικίληι μὲν ποικίλους ψυχῆι καὶ παν-
αρμονίους διδοὺς λόγους, ἁπλοῦς δὲ ἁπλῆι, οὐ πρότερον δυνατὸν τέχ-
νηι ἔσεσθαι καθ' ὅσον πέφυκε μεταχειρισθῆναι τὸ λόγων γένος οὔτε τι
πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ πεῖσαι, ὡς ὁ ἔμπροσθεν πᾶς μεμήνυκεν
ἡμῖν λόγος.

ΦΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε οὕτω πως ἐφάνη.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ λόγους λέγειν τε d
καὶ γράφειν, καὶ ὅπηι γιγνόμενον ἐν δίκηι λέγοιτ' ἂν ὄνειδος ἢ μή; ἆρα
οὐ δεδήλωκεν τὰ λεχθέντα ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν –

ΦΑΙ. Τὰ ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Ὡς εἴτε Λυσίας ἤ τις ἄλλος πώποτε ἔγραψεν ἢ γράψει ἰδίαι ἢ
δημοσίαι – νόμους τιθείς, σύγγραμμα πολιτικὸν γράφων – καὶ μεγάλην
τινὰ ἐν αὐτῶι βεβαιότητα ἡγούμενος καὶ σαφήνειαν, οὕτω μὲν ὄνειδος
τῶι γράφοντι, εἴτε τίς φησιν εἴτε μή· τὸ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν ὕπαρ τε καὶ e
ὄναρ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων πέρι καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐκφεύγει τῆι
ἀληθείαι μὴ οὐκ ἐπονείδιστον εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσηι.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γε ἐν μὲν τῶι γεγραμμένωι λόγωι περὶ ἑκάστου παιδιάν
τε ἡγούμενος πολλὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ οὐδένα πώποτε λόγον
ἐν μέτρωι οὐδ' ἄνευ μέτρου μεγάλης ἄξιον σπουδῆς γραφῆναι οὐδὲ
λεχθῆναι ὡς οἱ ῥαψωιδούμενοι ἄνευ ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαχῆς πειθοῦς
ἕνεκα ἐλέχθησαν, ἀλλὰ τῶι ὄντι αὐτῶν τοὺς βελτίστους εἰδότων 278
ὑπόμνησιν γεγονέναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδασκομένοις καὶ μαθήσεως χάριν
λεγομένοις καὶ τῶι ὄντι γραφομένοις ἐν ψυχῆι περὶ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν
καὶ ἀγαθῶν μόνοις τό τε ἐναργὲς εἶναι καὶ τέλεον καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς,
δεῖν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἷον ὑεῖς γνησίους εἶναι,
πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν αὐτῶι, ἐὰν εὑρεθεὶς ἐνῆι, ἔπειτα εἴ τινες τούτου
ἔκγονοί τε καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἅμα ἐν ἄλλαισιν ἄλλων ψυχαῖς κατ' ἀξίαν ἐνέφυ- b
σαν, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους χαίρειν ἐῶν – οὗτος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ κινδυνεύει,
ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἶναι οἷον ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εὐξαίμεθ' ἂν σέ τε καὶ ἐμὲ γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε βούλομαί τε καὶ εὔχομαι ἃ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη πεπαίσθω μετρίως ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ λόγων· καὶ σύ
τε ἐλθὼν φράζε Λυσίαι ὅτι νὼ καταβάντε ἐς τὸ Νυμφῶν νᾶμά τε καὶ

278a4 ἀγαθῶν [ἐν] μόνοις [ἡγούμενος] τό Heindorf: ἐν μόνοις ἡγούμενος TW: ἐν μόνοις B

c μουσεῖον ἠκούσαμεν λόγων, οἳ ἐπέστελλον λέγειν Λυσίαι τε καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος συντίθησι λόγους, καὶ Ὁμήρωι καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὖ ποίησιν ψιλὴν ἢ ἐν ὠιδῆι συντέθηκε, τρίτον δὲ Σόλωνι καὶ ὅστις ἐν πολιτικοῖς λόγοις νόμους ὀνομάζων συγγράμματα ἔγραψεν· εἰ μὲν εἰδὼς ἧι τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχει συνέθηκε ταῦτα, καὶ ἔχων βοηθεῖν, εἰς ἔλεγχον ἰὼν περὶ ὧν ἔγραψε, καὶ λέγων αὐτὸς δυνατὸς τὰ γεγραμμένα φαῦλα ἀποδεῖξαι, οὔ τι τῶνδε
d ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχοντα δεῖ λέγεσθαι τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἐφ' οἷς ἐσπούδακεν ἐκείνων.

ΦΑΙ. Τίνας οὖν τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶι νέμεις;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν σοφόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλεῖν ἔμοιγε μέγα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ θεῶι μόνωι πρέπειν· τὸ δὲ ἢ φιλόσοφον ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι μᾶλλόν τε ἂν αὐτῶι ἁρμόττοι καὶ ἐμμελεστέρως ἔχοι.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα τιμιώτερα ὧν συνέθηκεν ἢ ἔγραψεν ἄνω κάτω στρέφων ἐν χρόνωι, πρὸς ἄλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν,
e ἐν δίκηι που ποιητὴν ἢ λόγων συγγραφέα ἢ νομογράφον προσερεῖς;

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν τῶι ἑταίρωι φράζε.

ΦΑΙ. Τί δὲ σύ; πῶς ποιήσεις; οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸν σὸν ἑταῖρον δεῖ παρελθεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τίνα τοῦτον;

ΦΑΙ. Ἰσοκράτη τὸν καλόν· ὧι τί ἀπαγγελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες; τίνα αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι;

279 ΣΩ. Νέος ἔτι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, Ἰσοκράτης· ὃ μέντοι μαντεύομαι κατ' αὐτοῦ, λέγειν ἐθέλω.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή;

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἀμείνων ἢ κατὰ τοὺς περὶ Λυσίαν εἶναι λόγους τὰ τῆς φύσεως, ἔτι τε ἤθει γεννικωτέρωι κεκρᾶσθαι· ὥστε οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτο θαυμαστὸν προϊούσης τῆς ἡλικίας εἰ περὶ αὐτούς τε τοὺς λόγους, οἷς νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ, πλέον ἢ παίδων διενέγκοι τῶν πώποτε ἁψαμένων λόγων, ἔτι τε εἰ αὐτῶι μὴ ἀποχρήσαι ταῦτα, ἐπὶ μείζω δέ τις αὐτὸν ἄγοι
b ὁρμὴ θειοτέρα· φύσει γάρ, ὦ φίλε, ἔνεστί τις φιλοσοφία τῆι τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίαι. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν παρὰ τῶνδε τῶν θεῶν ὡς ἐμοῖς παιδικοῖς Ἰσοκράτει ἐξαγγέλλω, σὺ δ' ἐκεῖνα ὡς σοῖς Λυσίαι.

ΦΑΙ. Ταῦτ' ἔσται· ἀλλὰ ἴωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πνῖγος ἠπιώτερον γέγονεν.

278d6 ἁρμόττοι B: καὶ ἁρμόττοι TW 279a8 ἔτι τε TW: εἴτε B
279a8 μείζω rec. Cicero *Orator* 41 maiora: μείζων BT: μεῖζον W

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εὐξαμένω πρέπει τοῖσδε πορεύεσθαι;

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ὦ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί, δοίητέ μοι καλῶι
γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν· ἔξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια. πλού- c
σιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν· τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε
φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτο ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων. ἔτ' ἄλλου του δεόμεθα,
ὦ Φαῖδρε; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρίως ηὖκται.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτα συνεύχου· κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων.

ΣΩ. Ἴωμεν.

279b6 εὐξαμένω Bekker: εὐξαμένωι BTW

COMMENTARY

227a1–230e5: PROLOGUE

Two friends, S. and Ph., meet on the street by chance and S. discovers Ph.'s enthusiasm for a speech by Lysias that he has just heard. After S. good-naturedly prods Ph. into admitting that he has a copy of the speech in his possession, they decide to retire to the nearby countryside where they will find relief from the summer heat and Ph. will read the speech to his companion. They converse easily as they walk and when they find a cool pleasant spot underneath a tall plane tree, they assume comfortable positions, the one to read, the other to listen.

The lively and realistic narrative constitutes a prime example of Plato's remarkable literary art. As in the opening of the *Republic*, the effect is complex: knowing that Plato is in control, the reader is nonetheless lulled into accepting the momentous conversation that follows as arising naturally in consequence of a chance, everyday encounter. All the more remarkable is Plato's ability to convey simultaneously beneath the narrative surface of smooth banter and innocent meandering another quasi-narrative of potentially transformative drama. Taking the measure of Ph.'s character, S. feigns enthusiasm for Lysias' speech in order to entice Ph. into a dialogue on *erōs* and discourse that will challenge his values and might possibly change his life. Without his being aware of it, Ph. is maneuvered into a position where the attractions of philosophy will make themselves felt. S. thereby enacts the theory of psychagogic rhetoric that he later puts forward in argument, using discourse to move Ph.'s soul in the direction of his choosing (271c9–272b2). Plato discloses this double-layered narrative through a rich vein of comic irony in S.'s utterances, informing and amusing the reader while gently mocking Ph., for instance, when S. effortlessly deflects Ph.'s eagerness to display his own rhetorical skill and manipulates him into producing the written copy of Lysias' speech that he is hiding under his mantle (228a5–e4). Such high spirits prevail from the start of the dialogue through to the end.

Away from their urban haunts and ensconced under the plane tree, S. and Ph. have exposed themselves to an unfamiliar, unpredictable environment. The consequences will become clear in due course but are hinted at in the prologue. For Ph., the tastes, conventions, and values of Athens' city life, to which he is devoted, will be put in question (229c3–230a6). S., the paradigm of self-control, begins to experience unexpected influences at the hands of the local, unfamiliar divinities (230b2–c4). On the prologue and its relationship to the rest of the dialogue, see Görgemanns 1993.

227a1 Ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν; Ph. is well known to S. (228a5, 242a6–b3), hence the friendly intervention. The question, ostensibly a formulaic greeting, suggests the dialogue's central concern – in which direction should the soul go and what moves it there? – and lures Ph. into the conversation that

follows. Cf. Burnyeat 1997 on the way Plato's opening lines suggest the dialogues' central themes. The verb of motion is omitted (*AGPS* 62.3.1); the particle δή, emphasizing the interrogative, adds a hint of insistence (*GP* 210–11). **a2 Λυσίου, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ Κεφάλου:** Plato wastes no time introducing Lysias and making him into S.'s foil. **a4–5 τῶι δὲ σῶι καὶ ἐμῶι ἑταίρωι . . . ποιοῦμαι τοὺς περιπάτους:** Ph. follows recognized experts, the speechwriter Lysias and the physician Acumenus, and politely includes S. in his circle of sophisticated friends (τῶι δὲ σῶι καὶ ἐμῶι ἑταίρωι). Even before Lysias comes under explicit examination, Plato suggests his opinion: the innocuousness of Acumenus' advice (walking on open roads is more refreshing than walking under porticos) and the earnestness of Ph.'s regard for it mock them both gently. Ph. and his friend Eryximachus (268a7–8), son of Acumenus, receive similar treatment at *Prt.* 315c, *Smp.* 176d. **a5 ἀκοπωτέρους** "more invigorating," a medical term (*Laws* 7.789d, Hippoc. *Aph.* 2.48, *Acut.* 66), naturally borrowed from the physician Acumenus. **a5–b1 τῶν ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις:** *sc.* περιπάτων. The "portico" (δρόμοι), where people might walk while having a discussion, especially in summer, was attached to a gymnasium (*Euthd.* 273a).

227b2 Καλῶς γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λέγει: polite dismissal of Acumenus in order to focus on Lysias; cf. 270c5, polite dismissal of Hippocrates. **b2–3 ἐν ἄστει:** as opposed to Piraeus, where Lysias lived with his brother Polemarchus in the house of their father, Cephalus (*Rep.* 1.328b, Lys. 12.8–16). **b4 Ἐπικράτει:** an Athenian politician active in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, and likely the Epicrates prosecuted by the speaker of Lysias 27 (Nails 2002: 139–40). **b4–5 τῆιδε τῆι πλησίον τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου οἰκίαι:** *sc.* ἱεροῦ. A conspicuous landmark, the temple of Olympian Zeus was located at the southeastern edge of the city just within the city wall and a short walk from the Ilissus. The deictic pronoun (τῆιδε) puts S. and Ph. at a specific starting point well known to contemporary Athenians, and as they walk Plato indicates their movements by referring to landmarks and scenic details (Wycherley 1963, Travlos 1971: 289–91); see Map 1 (based on Travlos). Having exited the city (227a3) by the gate near the Morychian house on the north side of the Olympieum (227b4), they walk eastward along a path until they turn off the path and go south towards the Ilissus (229a1). They then walk back along the riverbed downstream (229a4). At that point they identify as their destination a tall plane tree nearby (229a7) and S. speaks of the altar of Boreas and the crossing point towards Agra as about two or three stades (300–500 meters) further downstream (229c1–2). After walking a bit more (229c3–230a6) they reach the plane tree (230a6–7) which stands on the south side of the river (242a1) beside a sanctuary of nymphs, Achelous, and Pan (230b6–7, 278b6, 279b8). **b5 τῆι Μορυχίαι:** Epicrates' "Morychian house" acquired its name from its former owner or occupant, Morychus, notorious for gluttony and high living (Ar. *Ach.* 887, *Pax* 1008–9, *Vesp.* 506). **b6–7 τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἱστία** "feasted you on his speeches." The metaphor, common in Plato (*Grg.* 447a,

Rep. 1.354a–b, 9.571d, *Ti.* 27b), relies on the parallel between food for the body and discourse for the soul (270b5–7, *Prt.* 313c–314b, *Grg.* 462c–465e; cf. 248b5–c2 on the soul's proper food). Here Plato suggests that Lysias' speeches nourished base desire as did the actual feasts of Morychus just alluded to. By contrast, the conversation to be played out in the *Phaedrus* will not be an urban symposium but will take place in the countryside and, like the cicadas they later take as their model (259c1–5), the participants will abstain from food and drink while they pursue their inquiry. **b9–10 οὐκ ἂν οἴει με κατὰ Πίνδαρον . . . διατριβὴν ἀκοῦσαι;** "do you not believe that I would – in Pindar's words – that I will regard listening to how you and Lysias spent the time as an affair 'above even business'?" ἄν anticipates that S. will say ποιήσασθαι (potential optative in indirect speech). But the quotation from Pindar (*Isthm.* 1.2, word order changed) postpones the infinitive, and S. changes his construction to ποιήσεσθαι, which, representing the future indicative in indirect speech, is not modified by ἄν (*AGPS* 64.2.2). Cf. *Ap.* 29c for a similar anacoluthon. The Pindaric quotation lends mock grandeur to this pledge of leisure (σχολή) and thus suggests that the pledge contains an irony, which is revealed shortly (229e4n.).

227c1 Πρόαγε δή "lead on then," picking up προϊόντι (227b8) and initiating a play, while they walk, on who is leading whom (228c1, 229a6, b3, 230a7, d5–e1). **c3–4 προσήκουσα γέ σοι ἡ ἀκοή· ὁ γάρ τοι λόγος ἦν . . . ἐρωτικός:** the erotic subject matter makes the speech pertinent to S. because S. is an expert in *erōs* (257a6) and, as Ph. attests, is known as such (*Smp.* 177d, 198c–d (ironic denial), *Lys.* 204b–c; Rynearson 2006). Cf. the account of Alcibiades' experience (*Smp.* 215a–222b), which is a touchstone of S.'s erotic expertise, as well as mention of this expertise in other Socratic authors (Aeschines Socraticus *SSR* 53, Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.28, 4.1.2, *Smp.* 8, [Pl.] *Theages* 128b). S.'s erotic expertise has two facets: he is able to instill in young men whose sexuality has been awakened a desire for, or at least an openness to, philosophy (257b1n.); and he is able to advise others on where their true erotic interests lie (Introd. 3). By introducing S.'s erotic expertise early in the dialogue, Plato ensures that we are aware from the outset that S.'s speeches on *erōs* are delivered by one who is an expert in the subject matter (confirmed below, 262d1–2), and that S.'s interactions with Ph. are themselves shaped by this expertise. Though clearly aware of S.'s reputation, Ph. does not perceive that S. may be using this expertise on him. **c4 οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον:** adverbial (lit. "in I don't know what sort of way"), referring to the paradoxical quality of the *erōs* described in Lysias' speech (227c5–7), but also, in reference to the dialogue as a whole, suggesting an openness to considering *erōs* afresh. **c5 πειρώμενον** "being propositioned," as Thuc. 6.54.3 πειραθεὶς δὲ ὁ Ἁρμόδιος ὑπὸ Ἱππάρχου τοῦ Πεισιστράτου. **c6 αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ κεκόμψευται** "precisely (δή) this very point (αὐτὸ τοῦτο) has truly (καί) been cleverly done." The elaboration of the paradox in Lysias' speech – that the young man "should bestow his favor on one who does not love him rather than on one who does love him"

(c6–7) – is precisely where the artistry is meant to lie. From Ph. κεκόμψευται is sincere praise, from Plato ironic (230c2, *Lach.* 197d, *Rep.* 6.495d; de Vries 1984: 441). **χαριστέον:** sexually (*Smp.* 182a; LSJ s.v. 1.3). **c8 Ὢ γενναῖος:** an exclamation referring to Lysias and ironic in intent: S. immediately surmises the sort of witty, useless argument put forward by Lysias (cf. 242e4–243a2). The nominative in exclamation is absolute (*AGPS* 45.2.4), though here it furnishes the subject of the following sentence. ὦ is an outburst of emotion, like φεῦ (263d6, 273c6). **c8–d2 εἴθε γράψειεν . . . ἀστεῖοι καὶ δημωφελεῖς εἶεν οἱ λόγοι:** an argument that the handsome young man should offer his favors (*sc.* χαρίζεσθαι with χρή) to a poor old man would be equally paradoxical; thus it would serve Lysias' purpose while also benefiting common citizens, like S., who lack the attractions of wealth, power, and physical beauty. But the combination of "witty and useful for common people" is inherently unlikely and anyway irrelevant to a speechwriter like Lysias, whose interest lies solely in being witty. The joke looks forward to S.'s later assertion of benefit for the audience as the appropriate norm of rhetoric (260b1–d2). The joke is also ironic, as if S. needed any help in securing the attention of young men (not for sex, but for discourse).

227d3–5 οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμηκα . . . ἀπολειφθῶ: irony, not in S.'s professed desire for discourse or even in the distance he says he will go to hear it, but in the notion that Lysias' speech is the enticement and that it is Ph. who is leading S. (229e4n., 230d7–e1n.). **d4 Μέγαράδε:** about forty kilometers from Athens, too far for a leisurely stroll. **κατὰ Ἡρόδικον προσβὰς τῶι τείχει** "in accord with Herodicus you walk [right up] to the wall [of Megara]." Plato is poking fun again at the sort of expert favored by Ph. (227a4–5n.). Originally from Megara, Herodicus was a physical trainer whom Plato disparaged for his misguided efforts in prolonging mere life (*Rep.* 3.406a–b, *Prt.* 316e; cf. Hippoc. *Epid.* 6.3.18). In explanation of this passage but without citing an authority, Hermias 24.25–30 describes an exercise supposedly devised by Herodicus: running up to a wall from a moderate distance away and doing so again many times. S. would then be combining into one incongruous image the notion of walking all the way to Megara and in addition performing there one of Herodicus' exercises. **d4–5 οὐ μή σου ἀπολειφθῶ:** οὐ μή with the subjunctive for emphatic denial (*AGPS* 53.7.6), here a rare instance following ὥστε (*AGPS* 65.3.0.E).

228a2–3 δεινότατος ὢν τῶν νῦν γράφειν, ταῦτα ἰδιώτην ὄντα: the superlative and partitive genitive (τῶν νῦν), "most skillful of this generation," augment the standard distinction between expert and non-expert (236d5, 258d9–10; LSJ s.v. ἰδιώτης III.1). γράφειν, specifying the *technē* in which Lysias has his expertise, refers to speechwriting (λογογραφία) in particular (257c5n.). But the ambiguity inherent in referring to speechwriting by the simple verb γράφειν is later exploited to expand the inquiry to writing in general (257e1–2n.). **a3 ἀπομνημονεύσειν** "shall be able to relate from memory." **a4 ἐβουλόμην γ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἤ μοι πολὺ χρυσίον γενέσθαι:** Ph.'s priority – pursuit of beauty in preference to

wealth – puts him in fundamental alignment with S. (279c2–3n.), a fact that shapes the dialogue as a whole. What Ph. stands in need of, and what S. will offer, is not a change in this priority but enlightenment about what true beauty is and where it is to be sought. Contrast the *Gorgias*, where S.'s interlocutor Callicles, who desires only wealth and power (*Grg.* 491d–492c), stands in need of a change in priorities but he is ultimately immune to S.'s influence (*Grg.* 505d, 506c, *passim*). **a5 Ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι:** addressing Ph. while referring to him in the third person is typical of the role-playing that goes on in the dialogue (236c1–d3, 243e4–6, 261a3–5; Griswold 1986: 29–30). The third-person address is maintained throughout this utterance (ἐκεῖνος, 228a7) and caps it at the end (228c3). The knowledge of Ph.'s character that S. claims is crucial for his ability to put his discourse into the form that will make it most compelling to Ph. (257a3–4n., 271b2–4n.). **a6 ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερά ἐστι τούτων, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι** "but (ἀλλά), since (γάρ) neither of these things is the case, I know well that…" ("complex" use of ἀλλὰ γάρ, *GP* 98–9).

228b1 προθύμως: a dig at Lysias, implying vanity. **b2 τὸ βιβλίον:** a "book" consisted of rectangular sheets of prepared papyrus (βίβλος), glued together one after the other to form a roll (Bülow-Jacobsen 2009: 18–23, Johnson 2009: 256–65). Given the length of Lysias' speech, the whole thing would fit on a very short roll or else Lysias' speech occupied part of a longer roll. **b3 δρῶν ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ καθήμενος ἀπειπών:** the participles without conjunctions speed the narrative (*AGPS* 56.15.0). ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ καθήμενος echoes Ph. with gentle mockery (227a3–4). **b4 νὴ τὸν κύνα:** referring to the Egyptian jackal-headed god Anubis, this oath is frequent in S.'s mouth but not unique to him (Ar. *Vesp.* 83, Cratinus *PCG* 249; Dodds 1959: 262 ad *Grg.* 482b). Here it contributes to S.'s bantering tone. ἐξεπιστάμενος "knowing by heart." **b5–c2 τῶι νοσοῦντι περὶ λόγων ἀκοήν… τὸν συγκορυβαντιῶντα… τοῦ τῶν λόγων ἐραστοῦ:** the terms of S.'s self-description anticipate the divine madness and desire of the lover in S.'s palinode. "Sick [i.e. with desire] for hearing discourses" suggests the extreme desire that torments the lover (251a2–252a7). "Fellow celebrant of the Corybantes" is metaphorical for companion in ecstasy, as S.'s later self-description συνεβάκχευσα (234d6). The ecstatic mystery rites of the Corybantes suggest both the ecstatic initiation that is the primary metaphor for S.'s vision of true Being in the palinode (249c5–d1, 250b4–c5n.) and the initiatory madness of Dionysus that is akin to divine *erōs* as one of the types of divine madness (265b3). On the Corybantes, attendants of the Mother goddess, cf. Dodds 1951: 77–80. "Lover of discourses" suggests the lover of S.'s palinode in his philosophical aspect (248d2–3, 249b6–d3) and anticipates S.'s later self-description – a "lover of divisions and collections" – that explicitly brings together the pursuit of knowledge and the (erotic) pursuit of a partner in dialectic (266b4–c1). **b6 ἰδὼν μέν, ἰδὼν ἥσθη:** the doubling conveys, and gently mocks, the excitement that Ph. tries in vain to suppress; on this figure and Plato's use of it, cf. Denniston 1952: 90–1. The

connection of sight and desire, which will be exploited in the palinode (251a2–b3, 253e5), goes back to Homer, when Zeus sees Hera, intent on seducing him (*Il.* 14.293–4; note the repetition of ἴδε): ἴδε δὲ νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς. | ὡς δ' ἴδεν, ὥς μιν ἔρως πυκινὰς φρένας ἀμφεκάλυψεν.

228c2 ἐθρύπτετο "he was coy." The language of flirtation (Xen. *Smp.* 8.4) and ironic δή (*GP* 229–30) show that S. sees right through Ph.'s feigned reluctance to speak, another indication of S.'s erotic skill. **c2–3** καὶ εἰ μή τις ἑκὼν ἀκούοι βίαι "even by force if someone were unwilling to listen." In view of the erotic context the humor includes the mock threat of rape (229b4–5n., 236c6–d3). **c3** σὺ οὖν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, αὐτοῦ δεήθητι: on the form of expression, see 228a5n. **c4** τάχα πάντως "presently in any case." **c7** Πάνυ γάρ σοι ἀληθῆ δοκῶ = πάνυ γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν ἅ σοι δοκῶ ποιήσειν (Stallbaum 1857: 12).

228d1–2 παντὸς μᾶλλον... οὐκ "absolutely not" (*AGPS* 47.27.3). **d2–4** τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν... ἐφεξῆς δίειμι: ἕκαστον introduces a slight anacoluthon, as if ἅπαντα stood in place of τὴν διάνοιαν ἁπάντων: "as for the thought of nearly all the passages in which he said the lover's case differs from that of the non-lover, I will summarize each one and go through them in order." Invoking the distinction between the words (ῥήματα) of Lysias' speech and its thought (διάνοια), Ph. reveals that he aims not to recite Lysias' speech from memory, as S. may have supposed (228b4), but to deliver his own version of the argument contained in the speech (and thereby to practice his rhetorical skill, 228e4). S. uses a similar distinction to characterize Ion's practice of reciting Homer's verses (ἔπη) and explaining their meaning (διάνοια) (*Ion* 530b–d). Ph.'s dependence on a written text to formulate his own discourse (as Ion's dependence on a memorized text) exemplifies S.'s later claim that written texts promote spurious wisdom by causing individuals to neglect their own resources for learning (275a2–b2). **d5** Δείξας γε πρῶτον "sure (γέ), when you have first shown..." (*GP* 135). **ὦ φιλότης** "love," addressing Ph. This abstract noun in the nominative as a form of address is striking, much livelier than φίλε (*AGPS* 43.4.15), and unique in surviving Attic prose. **d5–6** τί ἄρα ἐν τῆι ἀριστερᾶι ἔχεις ὑπὸ τῶι ἱματίωι: the mantle was worn draped around the right side, its ends gathered on the left and covering the left shoulder, arm, and, sometimes, hand (Bieber 1967: 32–3, Plates 15–16). Some have suggested that S. jokingly refers to Ph.'s erect penis, similar in shape under the mantle to a papyrus roll. Plato would be establishing erotic by-play between the interlocutors as a prelude to their discussion of *erōs*; *Chrm.* 155d is mentioned as a parallel. The suggestion is unlikely. Unlike Charmides, Ph. is not a youth and potential *erōmenos* (Introd. 3); and S. reports the erotic moment at *Chrm.* 155d explicitly while experiencing it privately. Further, the autoerotic implications of the suggested interpretation would make no sense. On the sexual innuendo in the opening conversation, see Introd. note 20. **d7–e1** παρόντος δὲ καὶ... οὐ πάνυ δέδοκται "but since Lysias too is present it is certainly not my

intention to furnish myself to you to practice on." The practice that Ph. intends (also 228e3–4 ἐν σοὶ . . . ἐγγυμνασόμενος) is to deliver his own version of Lysias' argument to S. (228d2–4) and determine his success by observing S.'s reaction. Learning to compose speeches by imitating models was a staple of contemporary rhetorical education (Cole 1991a: 71–94). S. later rejects that practice in favor of his new theory of rhetorical education (273b3–274a6). Though S. prevents Ph. from recasting Lysias' speech as a rhetorical exercise, that is essentially what S. himself does, at Ph.'s urging, in his first speech. By insisting that Ph. read out Lysias' speech, S. keeps the focus on Lysias, the contemporary standard of rhetorical excellence, and sets up the encounter between Lysias and himself that will force Ph. to choose between them as models. Lysias' "presence" by means of the written text of his speech is ironic in view of S.'s later distinction between written texts and oral dialectic on the basis of the author's ability to respond to objections in person (275d3–e6).

228e3 Παῦε "stop"; intransitive, absolute (LSJ s.v. II). **ἐκκέκρουκάς με ἐλπίδος:** the asyndeton palpably conveys Ph.'s disappointment.

229a1 ἐκτραπόμενοι κατὰ τὸν Ἰλισόν: 227b4–5n. **a3–4 σὺ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἀεί:** it was S.'s distinctive habit to go unshod (*Smp.* 174a, 220b, Ar. *Nu.* 103, 363, Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.2). γάρ, emphasized by δή, explains why Ph. referred only to himself in the preceding clause (*GP* 60–1). μέν stands on its own because ἐγὼ δ' οὔ is suppressed. **a4 κατὰ τὸ ὑδάτιον** "downstream" (*AGPS* 68.25.1.A on the preposition); the diminutive because in summer the flow of the Ilissus was reduced. **a5 τήνδε τὴν ὥραν τοῦ ἔτους τε καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας:** midday in the heat of summer (242a4, 259a1, d6, 279b4).

229b1–2 πόα καθίζεσθαι ἢ . . . κατακλιθῆναι "grass to sit on or . . . lie on" (epexegetic infinitives). **b4–5 Εἰπέ μοι . . . τὴν Ὠρείθυιαν ἁρπάσαι;** Boreas, god of the north wind, seized Oreithyia, daughter of Erechtheus, the Athenian king and progenitor of Athens' royal line, and took her to his home in Thrace (Hdt. 7.189, Aesch. *TrGF* 281; Simon 1967: 107–23). The abduction for sexual purposes suggests *erōs*, which Ibycus (*PMG* 286) also associates with Boreas. This chance remark reveals Ph.'s interest in the gods, which S. exploits in his second speech. μέντοι is interrogative, expecting an affirmative answer (*GP* 403). **b7–8 χαρίεντα γοῦν καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ διαφανῆ τὰ ὑδάτια:** a late fifth-century decree forbad the tanning of hides at the Ilissus (Lind 1987). If it was enforced, it would have maintained the purity of the water. In any case, the water is clean and pleasant to suit the mood of the conversation to follow.

229c1–2 κάτωθεν . . . πρὸς τὸ ἐν Ἄγρας διαβαίνομεν "downstream about two or three stades [300–500 meters], where there is a crossing [lit. we (Athenians) cross] over [the Ilissus] to the [sanctuary] in Agra"; cf. 227b4–5n. on the topography and Map 1. Agra (or Agrai) – a locality, not a deme – extended from the south bank of the Ilissus up the hills towards Helicon and contained

two notable shrines, that of Artemis Agrotera (Paus. 1.19.6) and the Metroon, where the Lesser Mysteries were celebrated (Parker 2005: 56, 344). **τὸ ἐν Ἄγρας:** *sc.* ἱερόν. Ἄγρας is an archaic genitive of place and follows the preposition ἐν because of its locative force. The locution ἐν Ἄγρας, preserved by the conservative force of religious usage, is found in contemporary inscriptions in connection with the Lesser Mysteries (*IG* i³ 369.91, *SEG* 21.541.A39; restored in *IG* i³ 234.5, 383.50), and it attracted the attention of ancient lexicographers who found it in the comic poet Pherecrates (*PCG* 40) and the fourth-century Attic historian Cleidemus (*FGrH* 323 F1) (Chantraine 1956, 1966: 37–9; *pace* Simms 2002/3). **c2 βωμός:** built after Boreas, the Athenians' "son-in-law" through Oreithyia (229b4–5n.), responded to their prayer and destroyed the Persian fleet in a storm off the coast of Thessaly in 480 (Hdt. 7.189). **c3 πρὸς Διός** suggests Ph.'s incredulity that S. may not share his sense of intellectual superiority and his confidence in recognized experts who rationalize the Boreas myth; cf. οἱ σοφοί in S.'s reply (229c5–d1n.) and 227a4–5n.

229c5–230a6 Rejecting Ph.'s intellectual pretense with good humor, S. has no time for learned, rationalizing approaches to traditional myths because they would distract him from his primary task, the pursuit of self-knowledge. (S. rejects allegorical interpretation of myth in *Rep.* 2.378d–e for a different reason: children, to whom the myths are directed, cannot understand allegory.) He mentions the mythical monster Typho in a manner that suggests the usefulness of myth for the project of self-knowledge. Plato's extensive use of his own, non-traditional, myths, in the *Phaedrus* and elsewhere, indicates that he was fully cognizant of the power of myth to communicate, and that he sought to use that power for his own purposes (255c1–2n.; Partenie 2009). By warning Ph. away from analyzing myth and reducing it to what is "probable" (τὸ εἰκός), S. encourages Ph., and the reader, to maintain an openness to myth and its imaginative power that he will exploit in his palinode. Plato's rhetorical art can be seen not only in the mythical passages themselves but also in the preparation for those passages that goes on here.

229c5–d1 Ἀλλ' εἰ ἀπιστοίην . . . ἀνάρπαστον γεγονέναι: interpretation of myth goes back to Homer (Ford 2002: 68–80), but rationalizing and allegorical interpretations with the aim of removing supernatural or morally objectionable actions on the part of gods became a trend among natural scientists, sophists, historians, and literary men of the fifth and fourth centuries (Pépin 1958, Morgan 2000: 62–7, 98–105). The terms οἱ σοφοί ("the intellectuals") and σοφιζόμενος ("cleverly" or "in the manner of an intellectual") cover this broad group by their very vagueness (Ferrari 1987: 234–5). **c5 οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἴην:** the first strike against the rationalizers: there would be nothing odd in disbelieving this myth because the proffered interpretation (not stolen away by the god Boreas, but blown away by the north wind Boreas) is an obvious one. **c6 φαίην:** *sc.* ἄν from the preceding clause (*AGPS* 54.3.11). **c7 Φαρμακείᾳ:** otherwise

unknown, Pharmacea must have belonged to the story in Plato's day as a playmate of Oreithyia; cf. 229b8 ἐπιτήδεια κόραις παίζειν.

229d1–2 ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου . . . ἡρπάσθη: by including another version of the story, S. indicates both his knowledge of details and his lack of concern for historical precision. The wording is compact and vivid; αὖ quickly "turns the thought . . . around and faces it in a different direction" (*AGPS* 69.12.0). **d3–e3 λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου . . . αὐτῶι σχολῆς δεήσει:** the tedium, and therefore the misfortune, of the excessively clever interpreter of myth is made keenly evident: there is always more material to interpret (μετὰ τοῦτο, καὶ αὖθις, καὶ ἐπιρρεῖ δὲ ὄχλος, ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλήθη); the objects of scrutiny are inhuman monstrosities (Ἱπποκενταύρων, Χιμαίρας, Γοργόνων, Πηγάσων) and bizarre freaks of nature (ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων); the interpreter's crude reasoning (ἀγροίκωι τινὶ σοφίαι) addresses one item at a time (προσβιβᾶι . . . ἕκαστον) in spite of the obvious sameness of the material. S.'s point is well illustrated in the work *On incredible things* (Περὶ ἀπίστων) of Palaephatus, a (probable) contemporary of Aristotle and rationalizer of the fantastic characters and events of Greek myth (Stern 1996, 1999). For example, regarding the Centaurs, patently impossible creatures with a horse body and a human head, Palaephatus recounts that some young men killed wild bulls with javelins and from pricking the bulls with the javelins received the name Centaurs (τὸ μὲν ὄνομα ἐντεῦθεν ἔλαβον οἱ Κένταυροι, ὅτι τοὺς ταύρους κατεκεντάννυσαν). Later, after a fight at a wedding feast among the Lapiths, the Centaurs raided the Lapiths and as they were riding off all that could be seen by those watching from a distance were the backs of the horses and the heads of the human riders. From this visible shape came the unbelievable myth of the Centaurs (*On incredible things* 1). **d4 κατ' ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὅτι δ':** lit. "for no other reason, but since"; i.e. "if only because." **d5 ἐπανορθοῦσθαι** "to rectify," which in this case is to replace the marvelous with the mundane.

229e1–2 ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων "masses of other monstrosities and curiosities that consist of assorted fantastic creatures." The word order is chiastic. The latter genitive shows the material of which the noun it depends on is composed (*AGPS* 47.8.0). **e2 προσβιβᾶι κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον** "he will bring each item into line with the probable." The probable (τὸ εἰκός), which figures in the critique of sophistic rhetoric (259e7–260d1, 272d2–274a5), is what the masses believe (273a7–b2). Insofar as the probable is the norm for which mythical interpretation strives, mythical interpretation is doomed to be a vain, unproductive pursuit. **e4 οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σχολή:** this definitive rejection of leisure for mythical interpretation makes evident the irony in S.'s earlier readiness to spend his leisure (σχολή) on Lysias' speech (227b9–10). S. is actually interested not in the speech itself, which is utterly predictable (227c8–d2) and as useless to him as mythical interpretation, but in the opportunity to cooperate with Ph. on evaluating the speech, which will be instructive to Ph.

and will raise the prospect of evaluating discourse as a whole (261a7–b2). **e5** κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν: in its context in the forecourt of Apollo's temple in Delphi (*Prt.* 343b, Paus. 10.24.1), the "inscription" (γράμμα) γνῶθι σαυτόν meant "know your limits," i.e. as a human being. As is the norm with such maxims, individuals construed it differently according to circumstances (*Chrm.* 164d–165a; Denyer 2001: 191 ad *Alc.* 124b1, Courcelle 1974: 11–291), as S. is about to do (230a3–6). Yet in common with Delphi, S. understands the self-knowledge in question as knowledge not about himself *qua* unique individual, but about himself *qua* human being, hence applicable to all human beings. The (rational, truthful, beautiful) god of Delphi contrasts with the monstrosities of mythical interpretation (229d5–e2, 246e1).

230a1 γελοῖον δή μοι φαίνεται: the inference – "thus it seems ridiculous . . . " – is based on the starkness of the contrast between the pointless tedium of mythical interpretation (229d3–e3n.) and the evident pertinence of the pursuit of self-knowledge. **a2** τῶι νομιζομένωι: "the conventional practice" was to forgo the intellectuals' rationalizing approach (Thuc. 1.20–1; Veyne 1988). In following convention on this matter, S. is not so much affirming the literal truth of myth as professing a lack of interest in the question. **a3–6** εἴτε τι θηρίον . . . φύσει μετέχον "whether I happen to be some kind of beast (τι θηρίον), more twisted and furious than Typho, or a gentler, simpler creature, whom nature has endowed with a kind of divine (θείας τινός), un-Typhonic portion." τυγχάνω without a supplementary nominative participle functions as a copula; cf. *AGPS* 56.4.3, Dodds 1959: 324 ad *Grg.* 502b for examples. Appropriately for Ph., the lover of artistic discourse (257a3–4n.), S. explains his pursuit of self-knowledge in terms that are metaphorical and etymologically playful (see below) and embedded in an ABC–CBA pattern (from the center outwards): μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον–ἡμερώτερον, πολυπλοκώτερον–ἁπλούστερον, Τυφῶνος–θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας. These dichotomies (wild–gentle, disordered–orderly, monstrous–divine) are used elsewhere by Plato to suggest fundamental qualities of the soul or self (*Grg.* 516a–d, *Rep.* 2.361b, 3.410e, 9.588b–589b). The nature of the soul and the need to understand it will be expanded into a central focus of both S.'s palinode and the theory of rhetoric (Griswold 1986). **a4** Τυφῶνος: a monster born of the earth with a hundred fiery snake heads atop his shoulders, Typho (or Typhoeus) challenged Zeus and was defeated (Hes. *Theog.* 820–80; West 1966: 379–83 ad loc.). Having just rejected the tendency to rationalize away the marvelous features of mythical monsters (229d5–e2), S. mentions Typho in a manner that focuses precisely on his traditional, marvelous qualities, for it is that sense of Typho which contributes to the contrast of monstrous and divine. By extending the contrast with etymological puns on Typho (ἐπιτεθυμμένον, ἀτύφου), S. implies that the qualities represented by Typho and the un-Typhonic alternative are basic ones that need to be scrutinized, not explained away. πολυπλοκώτερον "more twisted" (in a figurative sense) than Typho, whose hundred

writhing heads were akin to plaited hair (cf. πλόκοι). **ἐπιτεθυμμένον** "furious," metaphorical from ἐπιτύφομαι ("to be burning up," from simple verb τύφω), whence the etymological pun with Τυφῶν. It is uncertain whether Τυφῶν and τύφω actually share a common root (West 1966: 252, 381). **a5 ἀτύφου** "un-Typhonic" (Hackforth 1952); lit. "not puffed up," as with pride. **a6 ἆρ' οὐ τόδε ἦν τὸ δένδρον:** ἆρ' οὐ and the imperfect suggest the lively manner in which S. at once sees the tree and recalls their decision to seek it out (229a7–b3).

230b2–e1 Arriving at their destination, S. breaks out into a highly stylized, formal utterance (230b2–c4) that makes a startling departure from the natural, conversational style so far. It is the first sign of S.'s possibly losing control in the presence of the beautiful under divine influence (238c5–d6). S.'s enthusiasm is conspicuous and calls for explanation. Mundanely, Ph. attributes it to the novelty of his being in the countryside (230c5–d2). S. reveals the true cause, which accounts for both his normal abode in the city and his exceptional presence outside the city now: the desire for instruction (regarding the nature of the soul, 229c5–230a6), which normally keeps him in the city in conversation with other men, has on this occasion been inflamed by the promise of hearing Lysias' speech (230d3–e1). By characterizing his own movements as the result of the manipulation of desire (230d6–e1), S. anticipates the theory of rhetoric as *psychagōgia*.

230b2 Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν: suggesting the immediacy, and thus the sincerity, of S.'s reaction to the beauty of the spot, the oath heightens the jarring effect of the stylized utterance that follows. S. swears by Hera because she is ἐρατή ("lovely") to Zeus (*Cra.* 404b). Alluding to Hera's seduction of Zeus (*Il.* 14, cf. 228b6n.), Hermias (31.29–32.1) calls her the "generative and organizing production of beauty" (γεννητικῆς καὶ κοσμητικῆς τοῦ κάλλους τῆς δημιουργίας). S. swears by Hera elsewhere (*Ap.* 24e, *Grg.* 449d, *Tht.* 154d; Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.9), in each case to express approbation. **b2–c4 καλή γε ἡ καταγωγή . . . παγκάλως ἔχειν:** S.'s first show of rhetorical brilliance, suggesting more to follow. καταγωγή ("stopping-place") is formal in place of the usual καταγώγιον (259a5). Parataxis with τε inventories the physical components of the scene (plane tree, chaste tree, flowers, stream, shrine, breeze, cicadas, grass) and the corresponding pleasant sense perceptions (the sight of the trees, the smell of the flowers, the coolness of the stream, the sound of the cicadas, the comfort of the grass). A moderate tempo is produced by doublets (ἀμφιλαφής τε καὶ ὑψηλή, τὸ ὕψος καὶ τὸ σύσκιον, νυμφῶν τέ . . . καὶ Ἀχελῴου, τῶν κορῶν τε καὶ ἀγαλμάτων, ἀγαπητὸν καὶ . . . ἡδύ, θερινόν τε καὶ λιγυρόν) and the spondaic (– –) and cretic (– ⏑ –) rhythms that close the clauses (ὑψηλή, πάγκαλον, τὸν τόπον, εἶναι, ἡδύ, τεττίγων χορῶι, παγκάλως ἔχειν). The style and diction suggest studied artifice: neuter substantives (τὸ σύσκιον, τὸ εὔπνουν, τὸ τῆς πόας), poetic words (μάλα, ἀμφιλαφής, λιγυρόν), a polite potential optative (ἂν . . . παρέχοι), small detail (ὥς γε τῶι ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι), affectation (εἰ δ' αὖ βούλει, πάντων δὲ κομψότατον); cf. Thesleff 1967 on the artificial style. S. has produced a formal display piece (an

ekphrasis as discussed by Webb 2009), which constitutes a *locus amoenus*, a literary depiction of a beautiful natural setting that fosters *erōs* and discourse (Murley 1940). Plato's *locus amoenus* has antecedents in Homer (Haß 1998); and it became a programmatic reference-point for Hellenistic poets and postclassical authors generally to reflect on discourse and love (Fantuzzi and Hunter 2004: 143–52, Introd. 8). The striking qualities of this passage imprint in the reader's mind a vivid sense of the setting in which the dialogue unfolds (Ferrari 1987). The local divinities (238c5–d6, 279b8–c4) and the cicadas (258e5–259d6) receive conspicuous treatment later. **b4–5 ὡς ἀκμὴν ἔχει . . . παρέχοι τὸν τόπον** "since [the chaste tree] is in full flower, it would make the spot as fragrant as possible." The chaste tree (ἄγνος), which can grow to six meters, reaches full bloom in mid summer with aromatic violet flowers. **b5–6 ῥεῖ . . . ψυχροῦ ὕδατος** "flows with cold water"; the genitive as with verbs of filling (*AGPS* 47.16.0.B). **b6–7 νυμφῶν τέ τινων καὶ Ἀχελῴου:** later, as S.'s discourse more overtly exceeds his control, he will deflect responsibility onto these local divinities (238d1, 241e3–4, 262d2–5, 263d6–7). Achelous, from the major river of that name in Acarnania, was the god of freshwater streams and the father of the nymphs (263d6; Henderson 1987: 116 ad Ar. *Lys.* 381). **b7 ἀπὸ τῶν κορῶν τε καὶ ἀγαλμάτων** "[judging] from the figurines and statuettes," i.e. that were set up as votive offerings; cf. *AGPS* 68.16.8.E on this use of the preposition. A fourth-century inscribed votive relief depicting Achelous, nymphs, and Pan (263d6–7, 279b8) was discovered in the vicinity, attesting to this cult (Travlos 1971: Plate 382, *IG* II² 2934; 279b2–3n.).

230c2 ὑπηχεῖ τῶι τῶν τεττίγων χορῶι: *sc.* ὁ τόπος. The metaphor in τῶι τῶν τεττίγων χορῶι combines elevated (χορῶι) and humble (τεττίγων), producing mock grandeur. The effect is reproduced and extended in the myth of the cicadas (258e5–259d6), which focuses on their chirping, anticipated by ὑπηχεῖ. **c2–4 πάντων δὲ κομψότατον . . . παγκάλως ἔχειν** "most exquisite of all is a feature of the grass [lit. the matter of the grass], that it has grown on a gentle incline so that a person lying down on it has his head [positioned] just right." κομψότατον plays on Ph.'s use of κεκόμψευται in reference to the refinement of Lysias' speech (227c6n.), as if the spot was cleverly designed for the present purpose. **c4 ἄριστά σοι ἐξενάγηται** "you have done an excellent job as guide." **c6–d2 οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως . . . τὸ παράπαν ἐξιέναι:** the *Phaedrus* is the only instance in Plato or Xenophon that emphasizes S.'s presence in a non-urban setting. When Plato otherwise portrays S. outside the city proper, it is nevertheless in an urban setting in the company of other men (*Cri.* 52b, *Lys.* 203b, *Smp.* 223d). Yet Ph.'s supposition that S. is an utter stranger to the countryside is belied by S.'s knowledge about the altar of Boreas (229c1–2).

230d3 φιλομαθής: for Plato virtually an equivalent of φιλόσοφος (*Rep.* 2.376b, 5.475c, *Phd.* 66b–67b). **d4 οὐδέν μ' ἐθέλει διδάσκειν** "do not wish to teach me anything," evident from the fact that country places and trees do not speak.

Later S. discovers the divine, articulate presence in this place (258e5–259d6, 263d6–7, 278b6–c1); cf. also 275b5–6 on Zeus's prophetic oak in Dodona. At *Phd.* 96a–99c S. explains his interest in ethics over natural science. **d5 τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξόδου τὸ φάρμακον** "the drug for my going out [of the city]"; cf. 274e4–5n. on the metaphor. Here the metaphor is invoked with irony, as indicated in the next line by S.'s comparison of leading around dumb animals by hanging bits of food in front of them (d6–7). In S.'s later analogy between medicine and rhetoric (270b3–7), drugs are analogous to discourse as the means of implementing *psychagōgia*. **d6 οἱ τὰ πεινῶντα θρέμματα:** *sc.* ἄγοντες (*AGPS* 56.16.0 on the ellipse of participles). **θαλλὸν ἤ τινα καρπόν** "a twig or perhaps a fruit." **d7-e1 σὺ ἐμοὶ λόγους... ὅποι ἂν ἄλλοσε βούλῃ:** irony in the notion that S. can be enticed by speeches in books and that it is Ph. who is leading S. (227c1n., d3–5n.).

230e1 φαίνει περιάξειν "you will clearly be able to lead me round." **νῦν δ' οὖν** "but in any case"; combining νῦν δέ and δ' οὖν (des Places 1929: 212).

230e6–234c5: LYSIAS' SPEECH

A man propositions a young man, arguing that the young man should offer sexual favors not to a man who loves him, but to the speaker precisely because he does not love him. To appreciate the virtues of the speech one must imagine it in the context for which it was originally written, or rather for which Plato pretends that it was written. The speech adopts the form of a λόγος ἐρωτικός (227c3–4; Lasserre 1944), in which a speaker woos, praises, or advises the object of his desire, as discussed, for instance, at the beginning of the *Lysis* (204d–206c). But this speech was never intended for actual wooing. Designed rather for rhetorical enthusiasts like those whom Ph. leaves behind when he runs into S. at the outset of the dialogue, Lysias' speech makes a display of the author's wit and verbal skill, entertaining the cognoscenti and serving as a model for this kind of display piece. This audience would have been pleased not only with the theme of Lysias' speech, which cleverly reverses the conventions of Athenian pederasty (227c5–7), but also with its verbal patterning (e.g. 233c1–4) and its studied indifference to common sense in deference to the "probable" (e.g. 231d6–9, 232e2–233a4). Gorgias' *Helen*, called a παίγνιον at its conclusion, became the prototype of paradoxical epideictic speeches (234c5n.; Nightingale 1995: 100–2). Plato's contemporary Polycrates made a career of such speeches (*AS* B 21; Livingstone 2001: 28–40).

Yet what might have been appropriate as a rhetorical bagatelle is out of place, and egregiously exposed, in Plato's world. Even the haphazard arrangement (230e6–231a1n., 231a7n.) and lack of coherence (233b5–c1n.) might be considered stylistic refinements among rhetorical enthusiasts (Alcid. *Soph.* 13), but they are glaring faults in a context where, as it will turn out, it matters what *erōs* is

and how the nature of *erōs* can be effectively communicated to a young man. There is a serious idea in the speech (Ferrari 1987: 88–95) – that the young man should offer sex to the person who will benefit him most, and since *erōs* warps the mind and makes the lover unstable, not the lover, but the sane, stable non-lover will most likely bestow that benefit on the young man – but the speaker is oblivious to the seriousness of this idea and how it might effectively be advanced (231a4–6n., 232b5–e1n.). The candid pursuit of self-interest (230e6–231a1n.) and the destructive power of *erōs* (231d2n.) are put forward for reasons no more compelling than their immediate rhetorical usefulness. Such ideas receive serious treatment in S.'s first speech, but then S. rejects the rhetorical games pursued by Lysias and promoted by Ph. and the dialogue takes its decisive turn (242b7–243a3).

Scholars have considered whether Plato may have inserted a genuine Lysianic composition. The speech is not preserved in the corpus of Lysias' speeches that has come down from antiquity. References to the speech by ancient writers add nothing on the question (Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 1, Fronto, *Eroticus* 1 = 250 van den Hout, Hermog. *Id.* 297 Rabe, Maximus of Tyre, *Dialexis* 18.7, Diog. Laert. 3.25, Hermias 35.19–23). Apart from the possible case of Lysias 24 (*For the invalid*), which seems to be rather epideictic than logographic (Usher 1999: 106–10), no other παίγνια by Lysias have been preserved, though some were apparently among the numerous speeches attached to his corpus in antiquity (Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 3, [Plut.] *X orat.* 836a–b). Lysias cannot be ruled out as the author on stylistic grounds (Dover 1968a: 69–71, Döpp 1983), but Lysianic features suggest rather imitation (231d6n.), of which Plato was a master. The set speeches delivered by historical figures in his dialogues are seamlessly incorporated into the overall presentation of those figures; e.g. Protagoras' myth (*Prt.* 320c–328d), the speeches in the *Symposium*, and S.'s *Apology* itself. Lysias' speech is no different because he speaks not *in propria persona* but from a written text; compare S.'s delivery of the memorized funeral oration he ascribes to Aspasia (*Menex.* 236d–249d). The verbatim quotation of Lysias' speech, which has given rise to modern anxiety about authorship, is essential for Plato's purposes: it sets up the competition between S. and the expert rhetorician; it stresses Lysias' status as the author of written texts (228a2, 257c5, 278c1–2); and it allows for the contrast between Ph.'s dependence on written texts and dialectical learning (228d7–e1n.).

That Plato should compose the speech that makes his rhetorical opponent look inept is appropriate. As elsewhere in Plato's work (*Prt.* 339d–347a, *Ion*, *Euthd.*), so in the *Phaedrus* parody works towards the same goal as argument and is an instrument in the creation of a literary fiction that serves Plato's philosophical objectives (Dalfen 1985–6). The speech exhibits precisely the cynical attitudes on love and discourse that Plato ascribes to Athens' cultural elite and that he seeks to revise in the course of the dialogue. And in its artfully inept way the speech broaches the dichotomy of *erōs* that Plato will exploit in S.'s two formal speeches.

230e6–231a1 Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν . . . ἀκήκοας: the opening suggests a discourse already underway, but also introduces the main contention: it is in the young man's interest to offer the speaker sexual favors. By opening with this point the speech seems to S. to assume what needs to be demonstrated (264a5–8). συμφέρειν ἡμῖν: the speech will focus on the advantages that will accrue to the young man (231a4–6n.), but in admitting his own self-interested motives too, a sophistic commonplace (Kerferd 1981: 111–30), the speaker implicitly solicits praise for his honesty and imputes hypocrisy to traditional *erastai*, it being inconceivable that an *erastēs* would seek his *erōmenos*' best interests out of *erōs*.

231a1 τούτων γενομένων: sex is referred to discreetly here and throughout the speech: ὧν δέομαι (231a1–2), τοιοῦτον πρᾶγμα προέσθαι (231c7), τῆς ἐπιθυμίας (232b1), προεμένου . . . ἃ περὶ πλείστου ποιῇ (232c1), ὧν ἐδέοντο (232d4), ταῦτα (233a2, 3), τοῦ πράγματος (232e1, 234a1), διαπραξάμενοι (234a3), αὐτοῦ (234c3). This is the norm in formal speech (Dover 1989: 44–5). The pleasure arising from the sex is precisely what will advance the speaker's interests. As the passive partner, the young man is treated as though he will derive no pleasure from the sex (240d3–e2; Dover 1989: 52–3), so he is due favor of another kind (231a4–6n.). **a2** ὡς "because," following in thought from the previous sentence. ἐκείνοις μέν: lovers. **a3** εὖ ποιήσωσιν: *sc.* τοὺς ἐρωμένους, as also εὖ ποιοῦσιν (231a6), πεποιήκασιν εὖ (231b1). τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται: the lover's *erōs* is mere physical desire, which naturally wanes after it is satisfied. **a3–4** τοῖς δὲ . . . προσήκει "for non-lovers (τοῖς δέ) there is no time at which it is to be expected they will change their minds [about treating their *erōmenoi* well]" because they were not in love in the first place. **a4–6** οὐ γὰρ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης . . . εὖ ποιοῦσιν "not under constraint but willingly, as they would best look after their own affairs, they treat [their *erōmenoi*] well to the full extent of their ability." *Erōs*, a form of constraint, prevents lovers from acting in the interests of their *erōmenoi*, while non-lovers, not under this constraint, choose to devote themselves as much to the welfare of their *erōmenoi* as to their own. But why? Beyond a vague sense of social advancement (232b5–e1n.), how the young man benefits from the relationship with the non-lover is a matter of generalities and never specified: εὖ ποιεῖν (*passim*), χαρίζεσθαι (*passim*), φιλεῖν (231c2), τὸ βέλτιστον (232a4), φιλίαν (232b5, e1), βελτίονι . . . γενέσθαι (233a5), τῶν σφετέρων ἀγαθῶν μεταδώσουσιν (234a2). **a7** Ἔτι δέ: this colorless connective (also 231c1, 232a6, 233d4), as well as the equally drab καὶ μὲν δή (231d6n.), allows the speaker to tick off new points one after the other, but it also evokes the serial tedium of the entire speech (censured by S., 264b3–e2): one point follows another for no discernible reason and the various points could be reordered without making a difference.

231b3 οὔτε τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀμέλειαν . . . προφασίζεσθαι: non-lovers cannot plead neglect of their own affairs (as an excuse to withhold favor from their *erōmenoi*) because, not being in love, they do not neglect their affairs. διὰ τοῦτο =

διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα (231b1). **b4 τοὺς παρεληλυθότας πόνους:** there have not been any "previous exertions." **b4–5 τὰς πρὸς τοὺς προσήκοντας διαφοράς:** not being in love, non-lovers are too sensible to quarrel with their relatives. **b6 αὐτοῖς:** i.e. τοῖς ἐρωμένοις.

231c2 τούτους μάλιστά φασιν φιλεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐρῶσιν "[lovers] say that they especially care for those with whom they are in love." **c4–6 ῥάδιον γνῶναι . . . κακῶς ποιήσουσιν** "it is easy to understand that, if [lovers] speak the truth, they will esteem those with whom they have recently fallen in love (ὅσων ἂν ὕστερον ἐρασθῶσιν, ἐκείνους) more than the previous ones (αὐτῶν), and it is clear that, if the recent ones (ἐκείνοις) wish it, [lovers] will treat the previous ones (τούτους) badly." **c7 τοιοῦτον πρᾶγμα προέσθαι:** "such a thing" which the young man would "give away" is his good name, which he would do by offering sexual favors (231a1n., 232b6–c2n.). **c7–d1 τοιαύτην . . . συμφοράν:** viz. being in love.

231d1 ἣν οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσειεν οὐδεὶς ἔμπειρος ὢν ἀποτρέπειν "which no one who had experience [of it] would even try to ward off." **d2 αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦσι νοσεῖν:** *erōs* was traditionally viewed, especially in poetry, as a kind of destructive madness or sickness (Calame 1999: 14–19, 148–9). αὐτοί = οἱ ἐρῶντες. **d3–5 ὥστε πῶς ἂν εὖ φρονήσαντες . . . οὕτω διακείμενοι βουλεύονται;** "so how, when they are in their right mind [i.e. no longer in love], could they suppose that the decisions they made when they were in that condition [i.e. in love and thus not in their right mind] were good ones?" **d6 Καὶ μὲν δή:** this connective, which serves merely to add another item (231a7n.), is more common in Lysias than other contemporary writers (*GP* 395–7). Its frequency in this short speech seems to be a sign of Platonic parody (Shorey 1933). **d8 πλείων ἐλπίς:** equivalent to εἰκός [ἐστι].

231e1 τὸν νόμον τὸν καθεστηκότα: not statute law, which indeed regulated certain aspects of homoerotic and pederastic conduct (Cohen 1991: 175–82), but the social norms that would affect both *erastēs* and *erōmenos* when their relations became public knowledge (πυθομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων). Pederastic "courtship was an elaborate and public game of honor, a 'zero-sum' game in which the *erastēs* won honor by conquering, the boy by attracting much attention but not submitting . . . In this dynamic the *erastēs* is shamed by his failure to conquer, the boy by his submission" (Cohen 1991: 196–7). Pausanias in the *Symposium* (182d–185c) reflects the combination of admiration and anxiety surrounding pederasty in Athens. **e1–2 μὴ . . . ὄνειδός σοι γένηται:** underlying the scorn that could be directed at the *erōmenos* was the stigma of being used sexually as a woman (Cohen 1991: 183–93), an unhappy prospect for an Athenian male. **e2–232a3 εἰκός ἐστι τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶντας . . . αὐτοῖς πεπόνηται** "it is likely that lovers, believing that others admire them just as they do themselves, get excited in talking [about the conquest] and triumphantly show everyone that they have not labored in vain."

232a4 τὸ βέλτιστον ἀντὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων: though what is "best" would include the satisfaction of the speaker's sexual desire, that satisfaction would be kept secret, which makes it best for the young man too. For "fame among men," see 231e1n. **a6–7** τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶντας . . . τοῦτο ποιουμένους "many people necessarily find out about lovers and see them following their *erōmenoi* and making this [i.e. following the *erōmenoi*] their business." For young men trailed by suitors, cf. *Euthd.* 273a, *Chrm.* 154a, *Lys.* 207b. τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶντας in primary position, juxtaposed with πολλούς, is an awkward attempt to secure a formal opposition with τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶντας (232b1–2). **a8** αὐτοὺς οἴονται: *sc.* πολλοί. αὐτούς = τοὺς ἐρῶντας καὶ τοὺς ἐρωμένους. **a8–b1** ἢ γεγενημένης ἢ μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας: lit. "because their craving has either just come about or is about to"; another euphemism for sex (231a1n.). Hence, because they have either just had sex or are about to have it.

232b2 οὐδ' αἰτιᾶσθαι . . . ἐπιχειροῦσιν "[people] do not even attempt to cast any blame on . . ." **b3–4** ἢ δι' ἄλλην τινὰ ἡδονήν: i.e. apart from sex. **b5–e1** Καὶ μὲν δὴ εἴ σοι δέος . . . ἔχθραν γενέσθαι: the nature of the stable friendship (φιλίαν συμμένειν, b5–6) that is preferable to unstable, unpredictable *erōs* is not explained (231a4–6n.), but the easygoing social life that results from friendship with the non-lover (232d3–e1) suggests a smooth introduction into elite Athenian society. In this sense Lysias' speech appeals to and reinforces conventional Athenian upper-class values. **b6–c2** ἄλλῳ μὲν τρόπῳ . . . προεμένου δέ σου . . . ἂν γενέσθαι: the accusative–infinitive constructions in the μέν and δέ clauses, each with genitive absolute, depend on ἡγουμένῳ (232b5): "[supposing] that if a dispute arises under other circumstances the trouble would be common to both, but if you gave away what you value most you would incur serious harm." What the young man values most is his good name, which would be seriously damaged if he allowed an *erastēs* to have sex with him (231c7n., e1n., e1–2n.).

232c1 καταστῆναι: gnomic aorist (indirect speech for κατέστη), which indicates typical, timeless action (*AGPS* 53.10.2.B). **c2–3** μεγάλην ἂν . . . ἂν φοβοῖο: repetition of ἄν, in second position and again next to the verb it modifies, is not uncommon even after a brief interval (257c6, *AGPS* 69.7.3). Here, amid the repetitive structure of the speech as a whole and this paragraph in particular (232b5–e1), the twofold repetition has an annoying jingling quality. **c4–5** τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους τῶν ἐρωμένων συνουσίας "relations which their *erōmenoi* have with other men."

232d1–2 πείσαντες μὲν οὖν . . . καθιστᾶσιν: σε is both subject of ἀπεχθέσθαι and object of καθιστᾶσιν. **d3** ἄμεινον ἐκείνων φρονῇς "you are shrewder than they." ἐκείνων = lovers, as also αὐτοῖς (d3). **d4** ἀρετήν: the excellence that non-lovers rely on to obtain sex (ἔπραξαν ὧν ἐδέοντο) includes rhetorical skill, evident in this speech, S.'s first speech (237a7–241d1n.), and the rhetorical

pretensions of the genre of the λόγος ἐρωτικός generally. **d5–6** ἡγούμενοι ὑπ' ἐκείνων . . . ὠφελεῖσθαι: the subject of the infinitives is the nominative "non-lovers" referred to in the participle (*AGPS* 55.2.1). ἐκείνων refers to τοὺς μὴ ἐθέλοντας (*sc.* συνεῖναι).

232e1 αὐτοῖς: the young men. τοῦ πράγματος: i.e. sex (231a1n.). **e2–3** ἐπεθύμησαν . . . ἔγνωσαν . . . ἐγένοντο: gnomic aorists (232c1n.). **e3** τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων "his other personal traits." **e4** αὐτοῖς: lovers.

233a1–2 οἳ καὶ πρότερον ἀλλήλοις φίλοι ὄντες: ἀλλήλοις is awkward: the point is that before they had sex (ταῦτα, cf. 231a1n.) non-lovers were friends not with each other (taking ἀλλήλοις literally) but with their *erōmenoi* (taking ἀλλήλοις loosely). **a2–4** οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἂν εὖ πάθωσι . . . τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι "[for non-lovers] that from which they benefit [i.e. sex] is likely not to diminish their friendship [i.e. with their *erōmenoi*], but to remain as a memorial of that which is yet to come [i.e. more sex]." The sex that took place is both a memorial of that sex and a sign of more to come. That the young man can secure continued friendship with the non-lover by giving him sex comes deliciously close (as Lysias' urbane audience would perceive it) to encouraging the young man to behave like a prostitute, a condition that was unacceptable socially (Ar. *Plut.* 153–9) and legally (Cohen 1991: 176), but one that social peers might be prepared to overlook if the older man was actually in love with the younger one (Aeschin. 1.136–7). **a5** βελτίονί σοι προσήκει γενέσθαι: the improvement or education of the *erōmenos* was an incentive for the young man to enter into a pederastic relationship (Dover 1989: 91, 202–3), stressed by Pausanias in the *Symposium* (esp. 184c–185c). Again, no details about what the improvement consists in (231a4–6n.). ἢ ἐραστῆι: *sc.* πειθομένωι. **a6** ἐκεῖνοι: οἱ ἐρασταί.

233b1 χεῖρον . . . γιγνώσκοντες "judging more poorly"; cf. 231d2. **b2–3** δυστυχοῦντας μέν . . . ποιεῖ νομίζειν: *sc.* ὁ ἔρως. The participle is conditional, agreeing with the implied subject of νομίζειν, viz. τοὺς ἐρῶντας. **b3–4** εὐτυχοῦντας δέ . . . ἀναγκάζει τυγχάνειν: the accusative participle anticipates a construction parallel to the μέν clause, but as the new construction unfolds (again *sc.* ὁ ἔρως), the participle is left hanging and when successful lovers are mentioned as the object of παρά, they are referred to by ἐκείνων. **b4–5** ὥστε πολὺ μᾶλλον . . . αὐτοὺς προσήκει: τοῖς ἐρωμένοις goes with προσήκει. αὐτούς (= τοὺς ἐρῶντας) is the object of the infinitives. ζηλοῦν means "emulate" (at 232a1 it means "admire"). In the *Symposium* (178c–180b) Ph. depicts the *erōmenos*' emulation of his *erastēs*' virtues as the means by which the *erōmenos* becomes a better person. That will hardly happen if the young man pities his older partner. **b5–c1** οὐ τὴν παροῦσαν ἡδονὴν . . . τὴν μέλλουσαν ὠφέλειαν ἔσεσθαι: the speaker renounces his own immediate pleasure in favor of the young man's future benefit (230e6–231a1n.). It is appropriate in this paradoxical *epideixis* that the speaker implicitly renounces his only logical motive for wanting sex with the young man

in the first place. What matters is not the sense, but the impression of producing an overwhelming amount of argument (235b2n.). καί = "actually," emphasizing the following words (*GP* 320; *pace* Dimock 1952: 391–3).

233c1–4 οὐδὲ διὰ σμικρὰ . . . πειρώμενος ἀποτρέπειν: showy, antithetical, vacuous phrasing in the Gorgianic manner (Denniston 1952: 10–12) becomes denser precisely as the speaker addresses how the non-lover will educate, and thus improve, the young man. The contrast with S. in the palinode could not be starker. **c1–2 διὰ σμικρὰ . . . διὰ μεγάλα** "for trivial reasons . . . for important reasons." **c3 τῶν μὲν ἀκουσίων . . . τὰ δὲ ἑκούσια** "unintentional mistakes . . . intentional misdeeds." **c5 εἰ δ' ἄρα** "so if . . . ," adding a new thought that follows from what went before (*GP* 37–8).

233d3 ἑτέρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων "pursuits of a different kind." **d4 τοῖς δεομένοις μάλιστα** "those who ask most insistently" (cf. τοῖς σφόδρα δεομένοις, 233e4), evoking desperate lovers. The proposition that favor should be bestowed on lovers will be shot down in a *reductio ad absurdum* (233d6–e4). **d4–5 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις:** neuter, dative of respect: "in other situations too" (*AGPS* 46.4.1, 48.15.15; *pace* Renehan 1981: 382–4). **d5 μὴ τοὺς βελτίστους ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους:** the speaker has already spoken of himself and his influence as "best" (231d6, 232a4, 233a5), but now, implicitly aligning his opponent, the lover, with "the most needy," his use of τοὺς βελτίστους evokes connotations of superior social class, which he exploits in the next sentence (233d6–e4). **d6 αὐτοῖς** refers to the implicit subject of χαρίζεσθαι (233d4) and εὖ ποιεῖν (233d5), "people" or "one." **d7 καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις δαπάναις** "even in private feasts," a setting dear to the intended audience of this speech, the cultural elite. **d7–e4 ἀλλὰ τοὺς προσαιτοῦντας . . . αὐτοῖς εὔξονται:** a concrete depiction of the excessive gratitude of "beggars and those in need of a filling" who have unexpectedly received the bounty of a symposium and supplanted the host's friends. πλησμονῆς is vivid (241c8n.). This passage provides a rare instance of wit and is the most effective moment in the speech. On the needy at the homes of the rich, cf. *Rep.* 2.364b, *Smp.* 203b, Xen. *Smp.* 1.11–16.

233e4 ἀλλ' ἴσως: understatement. **e5 ἀποδοῦναι χάριν:** returning the favor in kind as opposed to just acknowledging gratitude in words or gesture (εἰδέναι χάριν, 233d6, e3).

234a1 τοῦ πράγματος: i.e. sex (231a1n.). **ὥρας** "youth," with a sense of its fleetingness (LSJ s.v. B.II). **a3–4 οὐδὲ οἱ διαπραξάμενοι . . . σιωπήσονται:** on the contrast between vaunting and discretion, cf. 231e1–232a5. On the advantage of discretion to the young man, cf. 231e1n. On διαπραξάμενοι, cf. 231a1n. The *homoioteleuton* of the verbs (διαπραξάμενοι . . . φιλοτιμήσονται | αἰσχυνόμενοι . . . σιωπήσονται) is Gorgianic (233c1–4n.).

234b1 παυσαμένου τῆς ὥρας: *sc.* σοῦ. **b2–3 τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶντας . . . τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος:** the extreme behavior to which a lover can be driven and which would provoke concern on the part of friends and family is described (and then excused) by Pausanias (*Smp.* 183a–b). **b6–c3 Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἔροιό . . . ἀμφοῖν γίγνεσθαι:** if the young man will benefit from offering sex to one non-lover, why not maximize the benefit by offering sex to as many non-lovers as possible? Clearly the young man will not be restrained by affection for one particular non-lover; and he has been advised to put his own interests first. Still, the harm that would arise from notoriety will check the impulse and keep the young man within the bounds of propriety.

234c1–2 οὔτε γὰρ τῶι λαμβάνοντι . . . ὁμοίως δυνατόν: *sc.* χάριν ("favor" as euphemism for sex) after τῶι λαμβάνοντι: "for neither would it merit equal gratitude (χάριτος) on the part of one who receives [favor], nor could you maintain the secrecy you want in the same way [as if you had bestowed favor on just one person]." **c3 ὠφέλειαν δὲ ἀμφοῖν:** mutual benefit was stressed at the beginning (230e6–231a1). **c4–5 ἡγούμενός παραλελεῖφθαι:** the rhetorical virtue of exhaustive argument is stressed by Ph. in the immediate sequel (235b2–4). **c5 ἐρώτα** "ask," puns on ἔρωτα; ἐρωτᾶν and ἔρως are connected in a punning etymology at *Cra.* 398d–e. This wink to the audience in the final sentence emphasizes epideictic wit at the expense of content, not unlike the final words of Gorgias' *Helen*, ἐμὸν δὲ παίγνιον, that stress the epideictic status of that paradigmatic epideictic speech.

234c6–237a6: FIRST INTERLUDE

Exploiting Ph.'s passion for discourse and his pride as a purveyor of discourses, S. maneuvers Ph. into insisting that S. respond to Lysias with a speech of his own. Ph. provides the opening when he declares his unqualified enthusiasm for both the style and the argument of Lysias' speech, which S. cannot share (234c6–235a1). S. forgoes discussion of Lysias' style with ironic praise (234e5–6). But when S. criticizes the argument in Lysias' speech as utterly inadequate and then claims that even he, a rank amateur, could do better off the cuff (235a1–d2), Ph. seizes the bait. At first incredulous about S.'s prospects (235d3–e2), Ph. perceives that S. is serious and grows positively excited about a contest between Lysias and S. (235e3–236b4). Reversing the roles of the earlier exchange over Ph.'s reading of Lysias' speech (227d2–228e4), S. demurs (236b5–7) as Ph. exercises his wit to compel S. to make good on his claim and outdo Lysias, if he can, with a better speech on the same theme. Ph. urges, cajoles, and eventually swears an oath to withhold from S. all *logoi* in the future if he does not comply (236b8–e8). S. now surrenders, having turned Ph. into the driving force of his own education.

By focusing on the absence of effective argument in Lysias' speech and challenging Ph.'s conventional view of what constitutes a good argument (235b2–4,

235e3–236a5) S. looks forward to both the demonstration of effective argument in his own first speech and the radically innovative theory of rhetorical argument based on dialectic in the latter part of the dialogue (264e4–266d4). Even while S. prepares to offer a rhetorical model of his own, he maintains ambiguity about his rhetorical expertise by disclaiming credit for his speech in advance (235b5–d2), which looks forward to the divine inspiration that he cultivates as a *rhētōr* (237a7–9, 238c5–d6, 263d6–7).

234c6–d1 τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν "especially in its language"; i.e. in its style.

234d1 εἰρῆσθαι: *sc.* φαίνεται. **d2–6** Δαιμονίως μὲν οὖν ... τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς: unlike S.'s usual irony which passes Ph. by and is evident only to the reader, the heavy-handed irony in this comment is meant to be evident to Ph. (cf. 234d7). In that spirit γάνυσθαι (lit. "brighten," metaphorical for "become ecstatic") plays on Ph.'s name ("bright"). **d5–6** σοὶ εἰπόμην ... συνεβάκχευσα: S. is interested less in the speech itself than in Ph.'s enthusiasm for it (228a5–c3, 234d4 γάνυσθαι), which enables S. to attract Ph. into his educational agenda (236a6–b4). S.'s love of discourse is so great as to be potentially ecstatic (228b5–c2n., 250b4–c5), but it is laughable that he should become ecstatic over Lysias' speech. **d6** τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς: κεφαλή is a synecdoche for "person," stemming from Homer and common afterwards (LSJ s.v. 1.2), here in apposition with σοῦ (cf. 264a8 φίλη κεφαλή).

234e1 Μηδαμῶς: *sc.* παῖζε. Φιλίου: a traditional aspect of Zeus (Parker 1996: 241–2), indicating the earnestness of Ph.'s request (*Euthphr.* 6b, *Grg.* 500b). **e2–3** μείζω καὶ πλείω περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος: to say "more important and more abundant things about the same subject" refers to the speech's arguments (235b2n.). **e4–6** καὶ ταύτῃ δεῖ ... ἀποτετόρνευται; following Ph.'s lead, S. divides his consideration of Lysias' speech into the rubrics of style and argument. He concedes the speech's stylistic refinements, though he does so with irony (234e5–6n.), but contests the notion that Lysias' speech deserves praise for the persuasiveness of its argument. **e5** τὰ δέοντα: Plato plays on an ambiguity between two senses of τὰ δέοντα: "the things that are necessary [to do]" and "the things that are necessary [to say, i.e. for persuasive purposes]." From the dialogue's ultimate perspective Lysias did not say "the things that are necessary [to do]" insofar as he advised the young man to offer sexual favors to a non-lover. But S. knows that Ph. will take τὰ δέοντα in the other sense, i.e. as a term of rhetorical theory, referring to the arguments that are needed for persuasive purposes (Thuc. 1.22.1, Gorg. *Hel.* 2, *Funeral Oration* (DK 82 B6), Isoc. 13.8; Gondos 1996: 60–71). It is with respect to the rhetorical inadequacy of Lysias' arguments that S. goes on to engage Ph. (235a1n.). τοῦ ποιητοῦ: this way of referring to the author suggests that he has artistic pretensions; cf. 236d4, 258b4, *Euthd.* 305b ποιητὴς τῶν λόγων, Isoc. 13.15 λόγων

ποιητάς, Alcid. *Soph.* 34 ποιητὴς λόγων. **e5–6 σαφῆ . . . ἀποτετόρνευται** "every word is clear, well-rounded, and precisely turned." The overly generous quality of this comment suggests irony, but so does the fact that S. conspicuously adopts criteria that contemporary writers associated with written epideictic composition of the type exemplified by Lysias' speech on *erōs* (Ar. *Ach.* 685–6, *Thesm.* 54, Alcid. *Soph.* 16, 25, Isoc. 5.4, 155; O'Sullivan 1992: 42–62, 139). All four criteria invoked by S. – clarity (σαφήνεια), well-roundedness (στρογγύλον), precision (ἀκρίβεια), refined craftsmanship (often κομψόν, here implicit in the metaphorical use of ἀποτορνεύω, "round off as on a lathe") – refer to stylistic qualities that arise from the careful and deliberate choosing, combining, and ordering of words. Later critics, referring to Lysias' genuine works, saw the same virtues in Lysias' style (Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 4, 6, 13). **e7 ἔλαθεν:** the subject is "the need to praise the speech on account of its argument in addition to its style."

235a1 τῶι γὰρ ῥητορικῶι: "the rhetorical aspect" of the speech refers to the argument, whether the speaker "said what he ought" (234e5), the aspect of the speech that S. finds lacking and is about to criticize explicitly. A pervasive misreading of Plato's text here is instructive. Evidently influenced by the later, common association of rhetoric with style (Müller 1981, Calboli 1999), virtually all commentators and translators (except Bekker 1826: 31 ad loc., Calvo 1992: 54) have erred in understanding "the rhetorical aspect" as referring to the speech's style even though that understanding has two untenable consequences: S. would be saying that he paid exclusive attention to the style of the speech even though his criticism here focuses on the argument and (except for the irony of 234e5–6) ignores the style; and it would force an unnatural understanding of τοῦτο (235a1) as "that other [or that first] aspect" of the speech, referring all the way back to the speaker's saying "what he ought" (234e5). This passage initiates the focus on argument that Plato develops into one of the two chief concerns of his proposed rhetorical *technē* (261a7–266d4; the other being psychology, 269d2–272b4). Aristotle concurred, viewing argument as the most important aspect of rhetoric (*Rh.* 1.1–2), and devoted most of the *Rhetoric* to it. **a1–2 τοῦτο δὲ . . . ἱκανὸν εἶναι** "and I was thinking that not even Lysias himself thought this [the rhetorical aspect of the speech, i.e. the argument] was adequate." **a5 τοῦ τοιούτου:** i.e. devising many arguments on this subject. **νεανιεύεσθαι** "to swagger like a youth." **a5–7 ἐπιδεικνύμενος . . . εἰπεῖν ἄριστα** "demonstrating his ability to say the same thing now one way, now another, and do it superbly in both cases." S. exposes Lysias' true motive as epideictic speaker: not to make a case for the non-lover (which would require a better argument), but to impress the audience with a display of verbal skill.

235b1 αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο: i.e. what S. found lacking, the author's saying what he ought (234e5). **b2 τῶν γὰρ ἐνόντων ἀξίως ῥηθῆναι ἐν τῶι πράγματι** "of the possible arguments belonging to the subject that merit expression." This is an effective statement of the traditional goal of rhetorical argument, which is both

quantitative and qualitative: the inclusion of every important argument that is entailed by the subject matter. Such argumentation is, in Aristotle's expression "the available means of persuasion" (τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν, *Rh.* 1.2.1), the aim of rhetoric. Isocrates expressed a similar view (13.9): "[sophists] promise to make their students such good orators that they will miss none of the possibilities in their cases (μηδὲν τῶν ἐνόντων ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι)" (trans. Mirhady). **b4** πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια: cf. μείζω καὶ πλείω (234e2–3). **b5–6** παλαιοὶ γὰρ . . . καὶ γεγραφότες: 235c3n.

235c2–d2 Νῦν μὲν οὕτως . . . ὅντινων ἤκουσα: proposing to outdo Lysias with a speech of his own, S. uses the self-effacing manner that frequently accompanies a creative effort beyond his customary mode of discourse (274c1–3, *Ap.* 17a–18a, *Cra.* 396d, *Menex.* 235e–236c, *Rep.* 6.506c–507a). **c2** οὕτως "simply." **c3** Σαπφοῦς τῆς καλῆς ἢ Ἀνακρέοντος τοῦ σοφοῦ: just naming Sappho and Anacreon suggests the power of their erotic compositions (Calame 1999: 13–38), which by contrast makes the weakness of Lysias' composition palpable. Erotic terms and ideas stemming from both poets surface in S.'s speeches (246a6n., 251a4–b2n., 252b6–c1n.; Carson 1986: 123–67, Pender 2007). καλή is not a comment on Sappho's physical appearance, but a response to the connection between *erōs* and beauty in her poetry. Anacreon's epithet acknowledges his expertise in erotic matters. **c3–4** συγγραφέων τινῶν: prose discourses on *erōs* became fashionable in the late fifth century and proliferated in the fourth (Lasserre 1944). Apart from speeches contained within the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon, the earliest preserved example is the erotic speech preserved in the Demosthenic corpus (late fourth century), which signals its indebtedness to the *Phaedrus* by the name of its addressee, Epicrates ([Dem.] 61.1), the host of the rhetorical gathering from which Ph. has just come (227b4). **c6–7** παρά γε ἐμαυτοῦ . . . συνειδὼς ἐμαυτῶι ἀμαθίαν: elsewhere S.'s disavowal of knowledge is an important element in his understanding of the ethics of philosophy (*Ap.* 20d–23b; Vlastos 1994). Here, where S. goes on to admit his erotic expertise (257a6) and demonstrate it at length, the disavowal is a ploy, luring Ph. further into S.'s educational agenda. **c7** λείπεται "there remains the possibility that" + accusative (με) and infinitive (πεπληρῶσθαι). **c7–d1** ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων ποθὲν ναμάτων . . . δίκην ἀγγείου: the notion that hearing is like liquid filling a jar may have come from Democritus (DK 68 A126a).

235d4 μηδ' ἂν κελεύω εἴπηις "don't tell [me] even if I urge [you]." **d5–6** τῶν ἐν τῶι βιβλίωι . . . τούτων ἀπεχόμενος: to produce arguments that are different, better, and more abundant than the ones in the papyrus roll while abstaining from the ones in the roll (τούτων ἀπεχόμενος) amounts to an impossible task, as S. clarifies in a moment (235e3–236a2). **d6** εἰπεῖν: in a promise both the aorist infinitive and the future infinitive (235e1 ἀναθήσειν) refer to the future (*AGPS* 53.6.10). **d6–e2** ὥσπερ οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ σήν: a dare, on the order of "I'll eat my hat if . . . ," expressing Ph.'s utter confidence that S.

cannot outdo Lysias. The background is the oath taken by the Nine Archons, Athens' chief magistrates, not to accept bribes on pain of dedicating a golden statue ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 7.1, 55.5). Only in this passage (and Plut. *Sol.* 25.3, probably dependent) do we hear about the statue being life-size (lit. "equal in measure") and dedicated at Delphi. Ph.'s promise to dedicate a statue of S. too is clearly a supplement to the archons' oath, defying S. even further by increasing the extravagance of his dare.. See also 236b3–4n.

235e3 ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυσοῦς "truly golden," meaning "truly a fine fellow" (Verdenius 1955: 272) and continuing the play of wit in the talk of gold. There is also a touch of irony, since (according to the pose he has adopted, 234c6–237a6n.) S. is feigning reluctance to accede to Ph.'s wishes and deliver a speech. **e4–5** καὶ οἷόν τε... ἄλλα εἰπεῖν "and that it is indeed possible to utter arguments that differ from all those arguments." **e5** τοῦτο: τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἡμαρτηκέναι. **e6** αὐτίκα περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος "for example, with regard to the theme of the speech." On αὐτίκα = "for example," cf. *AGPS* 66.1.8.C.

236a1–2 τοῦ μὲν... τοῦ δέ "of the one [the non-lover]... of the other [the lover]." **a2** ἀναγκαῖα: praising the non-lover's sober good sense and condemning the lover's mad folly are "indispensable" (LSJ s.v. II.4) arguments because they are the main reasons for the young man to expect benefit from the non-lover and harm from the lover. To omit them would weaken the case irredeemably. These indispensable arguments constitute Lysias' only arguments: he merely repeated them in different words (δὶς καὶ τρὶς τὰ αὐτὰ εἰρηκέναι, 235a3). **a3** τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα: the indispensable arguments just mentioned. **a3–4** τῶν μὲν τοιούτων οὐ τὴν εὕρεσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν διάθεσιν: because indispensable arguments (τῶν μὲν τοιούτων) are not so much invented by the speaker as given with the case, their presence in the speech is no cause to praise the speaker's skill. However, arranging such arguments to have maximal persuasive effect is a matter of skill, at which Lysias is later shown to have failed abysmally (264b3–e2). As rhetoric evolved into an elaborate discipline in later centuries, εὕρεσις ("invention" of arguments, Lat. *inuentio*) and διάθεσις ("arrangement" of arguments), later known as τάξις (Lat. *dispositio*), were identified as the first two of an orator's five basic tasks, along with wording (λέξις, *elocutio*), memory (μνήμη, *memoria*), and delivery (ὑπόκρισις, *actio*), in the composition and presentation of a speech (Vickers 1988: 62–7). **a4–5** τῶν δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίων... καὶ τὴν εὕρεσιν: skill in argument lies in discovering compelling arguments that are not indispensable (and thus not given with the case), especially clever ones (χαλεπῶν εὑρεῖν), and in arranging those arguments in the speech.

236b2 τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν "as for the remaining [arguments]"; cf. *AGPS* 47.3.1 on the genitive to introduce a thought. πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια: cf. 234e2–3 μείζω καὶ πλείω, 235b4 πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια. **b3** τῶνδε: the arguments in Lysias' speech. **b3–4** παρὰ τὸ Κυψελιδῶν ἀνάθημα σφυρήλατος

ἐν Ὀλυμπίαι σταθήτι: lit. "be stood up [1 aor. pass. impera.] as a wrought-metal statue in Olympia next to the dedication of the Cypselids." Whereas Ph.'s previous offer emphasized his incredulity that S. could outdo Lysias (235d6–e2n.), Ph. now warms to the idea of a real contest between S. and Lysias and makes (in jest) a gesture intended to encourage S. actually to try to outdo Lysias. The Cypselid dedication, by either Cypselus himself or his son Periander, tyrants of Corinth *c.* 657–587, was a κολοσσός of Zeus of wrought gold in the temple of Hera in Olympia (Phot. *Lexicon* s.v. Κυψελιδῶν ἀνάθημα; Servais 1965). (A κολοσσός was a statue of an upright figure with legs joined, this one probably life-size.) Thus Ph. is offering to commemorate S., if he can outdo Lysias, with the grandeur of an archaic tyrant in the very heart of the Hellenic competitive world. This is the first stage of Ph.'s effort to cajole and push S. into delivering a speech in response to Lysias (236a6–237a1), an effort that is itself encouraged by S. (236b5–7). This effort on Ph.'s part would be enhanced if Plato was also alluding to a statue of Gorgias that was erected in Olympia to commemorate his skill in rhetorical competition (Paus. 6.17.7–8, *CEG* 830.6–7). But the allusion is uncertain since the dedication cannot be dated more exactly than sometime in the fourth century and thus may have postdated the dialogue. **b5–7 Ἐσπούδακας . . . καὶ οἴει δή με . . . ;** "did you take my attack on your darling seriously, though I was just teasing you, and do you really believe that I . . . ?" **b5 τῶν παιδικῶν:** Lysias. This is the first of three instances where S. uses the language of pederasty metaphorically to characterize the intensity of Ph.'s enthusiasm for Lysias as a rhetorical artist (257b4–5, 279b3). Cf. the same usage in regard to the (purported) admiration of S. and others for Protagoras as a rhetorical artist (*Prt.* 317d): "[Protagoras] wanted to make a display before Prodicus and Hippias and show off that we had come as his lovers" (ὅτι ἐρασταὶ αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εἶμεν); likewise, Gorgias made the leading men of the Aleuadae (of Thessaly) "his lovers because of his wisdom" (ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίαι, *Meno* 70b). S.'s metaphorical use of pederastic terminology also points towards ethical consequences. Insofar as Ph. is cast as Lysias' *erastēs*, S. is inviting Ph. to consider the obligations that are incumbent on an *erastēs* in regard to his *erōmenos*, a question that arises in S.'s palinode and is explicitly placed before Ph. at 279b2–3. That S. intends and Ph. understands the pederastic terminology metaphorically is clear from Ph.'s suggestion and S.'s concurrence that S.'s relationship to Isocrates is parallel to Ph.'s relationship to Lysias (278e7n., 279b2–3). Like Ph., Lysias is fully adult in the *Phaedrus* and well past the age of being an *erōmenos* to another man (Introd. 3). **b7 ποικιλώτερον** "more elaborate," suggesting a greater variety of arguments; cf. 277c2–3n. **b8 εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας λαβὰς ἐλήλυθας** "I've got you in the same hold," i.e. as you had me when you compelled me to read Lysias' speech (227d2–228e4); a common metaphor from wrestling (LSJ s.v. λαβή III).

236c2–3 ἀνταποδιδόντες ἀλλήλοις "firing back at each other," instances of which are common in Old Comedy, e.g. a nice one at Ar. *Eq.* 904–11. **c3–5**

ἐκεῖνο τὸ "εἰ ἐγὼ . . . ἐθρύπτετο δέ": quoting S.'s words back at him (228a5, c1–2). **c6 ἃ ἔφησθα ἐν τῶι στήθει ἔχειν:** referring to 235c4–5. **c6–d3 ἐσμὲν δὲ μόνω . . . ἑκὼν λέγειν:** threatening physical violence to make S. speak (in jest, like Polemarchus at *Rep.* 1.327c), Ph. recycles S.'s claim that Ph. would use force to make him listen (228c2–3n.).

236d2 "σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω": the quotation from Pindar (frag. 105.1 Snell–Maehler) was well known (*Meno* 76d, Ar. *Av.* 945); here it adds to Ph.'s playful tone. **d4–5 παρ' ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων:** an impromptu speech by a non-expert (ἰδιώτης) provides the greatest contrast to a speech by a skilled writer (ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν). For the terms of the contrast, cf. 228a2–3, 234e5n., Isoc. 13.9. **d6 καλλωπιζόμενος** "being coy" (cf. *Prt.* 333d). **d6–7 σχεδὸν γὰρ ἔχω** "I think I have" (LSJ s.v. σχεδόν IV.2). **d9–e2 ὁ δέ μοι λόγος ὅρκος . . . ἦ μήν:** Ph. adopts the form of a solemn oath, reminiscent of Achilles' great oath (*Il.* 1.239 ὁ δέ τοι μέγας ἔσσεται ὅρκος), but comically undermines it by his choice of the plane tree to swear by. Thus indicating that he does not take himself seriously, he invites S.'s teasing response (236e4–5) and welcomes it (236e6).

236e2–3 μηδέποτέ σοι . . . ἐξαγγελεῖν: Ph.'s threat "never to recite nor to report one more discourse of any person" relies on his reputation as a leading purveyor of discourses (242b1–4; Ferrari 1987: 4–9). The accumulating negatives are a flourish appropriate to the oath (*AGPS* 67.12.1). **e4 φιλολόγωι:** cf. 228b5–c2n. on τοῦ τῶν λόγων ἐραστοῦ (228c1–2). **e6 Τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφει;** "why then do you keep twisting?," i.e. in an attempt to escape. Cf. *AGPS* 56.8.4 on the conative force of participial ἔχω with the present indicative, frequent in comedy. **e8 θοίνης:** i.e. a feast such as Ph. would provide; 227b6–7n. on the metaphor.

237a4 Ἐγκαλυψάμενος: presumably with his *himation*. **a5 αἰσχύνης:** having taken visible pride in Lysias' speech (234d3–4) and encouraged the contest, Ph. will understand that S. fears he may not, after all, be able to produce a better speech. That cannot be what S. means: not only is a better speech an easy task for S., but he does not suffer the conventional fear of humiliation. Rather, S. is ashamed of both the argument impugning *erōs* that he is for the moment about to endorse (242c5–243d6) and his involvement in an epideictic competition that is a distraction from worthier pursuits (230a1, 242c4–d1).

237a7–241d1: SOCRATES' FIRST SPEECH

According to the terms of the contest S. advances the same case as Lysias: persuade a young man to bestow his favors on a man who does not love him in preference to one who does; and S. shares with Lysias the "indispensable" argument that *erōs* is bad insofar as it is irrational (235e6–236a2). Beyond

these points, however, the contrast between the two speeches could hardly be starker, beginning with contrasting purposes. Lysias aimed to entertain Athens' rhetorical cognoscenti. S. takes seriously the deliberative task that was posed in Lysias' speech but never seriously treated there, and he aims to accomplish it in a manner that would actually compel a young Athenian man to act accordingly.

In contrast to Lysias' lack of structure, inconsequential thinking, tedious style, and reliance on likelihoods (εἰκότα), S. creates an organized, transparent web of novel, pertinent arguments based on necessity (ἀνάγκη) and expressed in diction and style that are subordinated to clarity and liveliness (Mras 1915: 88–97 for detailed analysis). Beginning with a statement on the nature of deliberation (237b7–d3), S. uses condensed dialectical reasoning to produce a definition of *erōs* (237d4–238c4). Since this is a piece of deliberative rhetoric, not a philosophical discourse, dialectic is used not for the sake of the truth, but for the sake of persuasion (as discussed later, 264e4–266d4). After a brief interruption (238c5–d6) that separates this introductory material from the body of the speech, S. uses the definition of *erōs* to demonstrate the inevitable harm inflicted by the *erastēs* on the *erōmenos* (238e3–4n.; Solmsen 1929: 272–82 on the rigor of the demonstration). In contrast to the merely troublesome *erōs* depicted in Lysias' speech, the picture of *erōs* that emerges from S.'s speech is horrific. S. shows how the desiring *erastēs* destroys the *erōmenos*' mind (238e3–239c2) and body (239c3–d6), deprives the *erōmenos* of family and possessions (239d7–240a7), imposes a regime of stultifying boredom (240a8–c3) and outright revulsion (240c4–e6), and betrays him in the end (240e7–241c6). The lesson for the young man is stunningly clear (241c7–d1): "as wolves love lambs, so *erastai* love their boy." S.'s serious pursuit of the persuasive task and his potent combination of form and content result in a speech that would seem, indeed, to create in a young male auditor an urgent motive to flee for his life from an *erastēs* who desires him. It is the very success of this endeavor that makes the palinode necessary.

This highly polished, tightly knit speech is conceived and delivered by S. off the cuff (235c2–d2) – and thus with the aid of the gods. S. invokes the Muses at the outset (237a7–b1), interrupts the speech as his rhetoric takes flight to remark that local nymphs may be about to inspire him (238c5–d6), and breaks into verse at the end, which confirms, so to speak, that they have inspired him (241d2–e4). But Plato drapes the talk of divine influence with irony (noticed by Aristotle, *Rh.* 3.1408b17–20); and the outbreak of verse that halts the speech is an evident device to maintain S.'s larger scheme to censure bad *erōs* in this speech and praise good *erōs* in the next one (265c5–266b2). As horrific as is the picture of *erōs* in this speech, it is not so much a false account of *erōs* as a partial one. By concluding where he does, S. completes his account of the ravages truly inflicted by the self-seeking *erastai* who are to be found, and shunned, in Athenian society, while he avoids having to praise the openly self-aggrandizing non-lover and recommend that young Athenian men trade sex for social advancement à la Lysias

(241e4–242a2n.). S.'s underlying values inspire this speech as much as they do his second speech, as he himself suggests (239b3–4, 241c4–6; Calvo 1992).

Whereas Lysias' speech was a bare, unadorned entity and the speaker's motives are transparent to his imagined auditor (230e6–231a1, 233b5–c1), S. sets his speech in a narrative frame, whereby a wily *erastēs* delivers it as a means of seduction (237b2–6). The considerable rhetorical skill that went into this speech, in particular its unwavering focus on the young man's best interests, is the tool for this *erastēs* to deceive the young man and realize his own desires at the young man's expense, precisely the scenario which he is ostensibly warning the young man to avoid. The narrative frame indicates nicely the depth of cynicism in play; and it pinpoints the problem of the speaker's motive, a vital issue that takes center stage in the immediate aftermath (242c7–d1).

237a7–8 Ἄγετε δή . . . ταύτην ἔσχετ' ἐπωνυμίαν: invoking the Muses is dramatically apt since S. disclaims skill, is improvising on the spot (236d5), and relies on inspiration (235c4–d2). Yet the traditional poetic gesture (Hom. *Il.* 2.484, Hes. *Op.* 1; Chapot and Laurot 2001: 64–5) is given a parodic turn, as indicated by poetic diction ("clear-voiced" Muses already in *Od.* 24.62; next note), by the pious expansiveness of formal prayer diction (Pulleyn 1997: 105–6 on εἴτε . . . εἴτε), and by the fanciful etymological play on Ligurians as the source of the Muses' epithet. In Plato's day the Ligurians were an exotic, distant people northwest of Italy with no connection to the Muses or music; later attempts to connect them with the Muses (Brisson 2004: 201–2) stem from this passage. In spite of the parody the nod towards the Muses, and thus towards the pursuit of beauty and pleasure which they represent (258e5–259d5), suggests the erotic mode of discourse that becomes S.'s concern later and contrasts with the coldness of Lysias' plea for sex in return for advancement. The appeal for divine aid also accords with the orientation towards the gods that characterizes S.'s values (249c1–d3, 273e3–274a3) in contrast with the purely human frame of reference of Lysias' speech. **a8–9 ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε τοῦ μύθου:** S. mimics poetic style: archaizing ξ for σ, euphonic change ν to μ before μ, tmesis (from συλλαμβάνω) (*AGPS* 68.2.3). On μύθου, cf. 241d1n. **a9–b1 ὃν με ἀναγκάζει . . . μᾶλλον δόξηι:** S. lays full responsibility for his epideictic effort on Ph. (ὁ βέλτιστος οὑτοσί).

237b2 οὕτω "once upon a time" (Fraenkel 1950: 338–9 ad Aesch. *Ag.* 718), appropriate for a μῦθος (237a9). **μειρακίσκος:** since an *erōmenos* could be called παῖς no matter his age, S. is making clear that the *erōmenos* is an adolescent, older than a mere boy (*Rep.* 6.498a). **b3–4 αἱμύλος ἦν . . . οὐκ ἐρώιη:** by means of this detail, which creates a plausible scenario for the following speech, S. removes the paradox inherent in Lysias' speech and thus shuns the pursuit of rhetorical brilliance through paradoxical praise (227c6n., 230e6–234c5n.). He will seek to win the rhetorical contest by putting forward a compelling argument. **b4–5 ἐπεπείκει . . . ἔπειθεν:** some time after he succeeded in persuading the young

man that he did not desire him, he tried to persuade him... **b4** αἰτῶν: absolute: "pressing his case." **b7–c1** Περὶ παντός... ἁμαρτάνειν ἀνάγκη: this deliberative speech begins by considering what constitutes good deliberation (καλῶς βουλεύσεσθαι) in general (περὶ παντός); contrast Lysias' abrupt opening (230e6–231a1n.). βουλή = "deliberation," picking up βουλεύσεσθαι; cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 3.1112a19 πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστιν ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; ("Is everything a possible subject of deliberation or is deliberation impossible about some things?").

237c1 εἰδέναι: the asyndeton is strongly emphatic. **c2** τὴν οὐσίαν ἑκάστου: lit. "the reality of each thing"; hence "what each thing really is." ὡς οὖν εἰδότες "in the belief that they [already] know." **c3–4** προελθόντες δὲ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀποδιδόασιν "and when they have gone further [in their deliberations], they pay the expected price." **c6–d1** περὶ ἔρωτος... θέμενοι ὅρον "having agreed on a definition of *erōs*, what sort of thing it is and what power it has." The rhetorical usefulness of the definition of *erōs* depends not on its truth but on the clarity with which it is stated (238b6); and it determines the course of the rest of the argument in the speech (237d1–3, 263d8–e2).

237d1 τοῦτο: i.e. the substance of the definition of *erōs*. **d2–3** εἴτε ὠφέλειαν εἴτε βλάβην παρέχει: *sc.* ἔρως. The question of benefit and harm is the essential one to be decided in a deliberative speech (Arist. *Rh.* 1.3.5).

237d4–238c4 This demonstration of a simple version of dialectical reasoning, consisting of collection and division, anticipates S.'s later argument that dialectic is necessary for rhetorical persuasion (265c8–266b5). S. collects the kinds of psychological motivation, the rational kind that aims at the good and the irrational kind that aims at pleasure. S. then divides the class of irrational motivations into its specific kinds, which results in the definition of *erōs* as the irrational, pleasure-seeking appetite for physical beauty. The argument is Platonic in form, but relies for its content on commonplace notions, not on Platonic psychology (237d6–8). The argument is colored by terms with strong moral connotations (στασιάζετον, σωφροσύνη, ὕβρις, τυραννεύσασα) and proceeds swiftly but for a strategic pause (238b5–6) before the climax. Verbal patterning is used not for display, as in Lysias' speech, but for clarity (237e2–238a3, 238b6–c4). S.'s amazement at his own formal eloquence (238c5–d6) is well founded.

237d5 τῶν καλῶν: neuter: at this stage S. is speaking of general principles. **d6–7** δύο τινέ ἐστον ἰδέα ἄρχοντε καὶ ἄγοντε "there are two types of ruling, leading principles." The masculine dual participles are common gender with the feminine dual noun (*AGPS* 58.1.3). **d7–8** ἡ μὲν ἔμφυτος... ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου: the psychology resting on two fundamental, opposed tendencies is popular, not Platonic (246b1–4n.; Hackforth 1952: 41–2). Opinion (δόξα), acquired (ἐπίκτητος) from an external source (tradition, elders, education, etc.), was commonly viewed as the basis of successful deliberation

and was notably utilized for that purpose by Isocrates (12.30, 15.271; T. Poulakos 2004).

238a1 τῶι κράτει σωφροσύνη ὄνομα "the name for the power is moderation." The entity being named is expressed in the dative, the name itself is a predicate nominative, here σωφροσύνη (*AGPS* 48.3.6). **a2–3 τῆι ἀρχῆι ὕβρις ἐπωνομάσθη** "hubris was given as the name for this domination." **a3 πολυμερὲς γὰρ καὶ πολυειδές:** appropriate terms for the division of irrational appetites that is about to take place (238a4–b4). πολυμερές – "having many parts" – anticipates the metaphor of division as a cutting off of the parts (μέρη) of a whole at natural articulations (265e1–266b2). The forms that are implied in πολυειδές – "having many forms" – are the classes that belong to each level of the taxonomy (265d4–266b2n.). **a4–6 τούτων τῶν ἰδεῶν . . . ἐπαξίαν κεκτῆσθαι** "of these kinds [of hubris], whichever turns out to be prominent causes the person who has [it] to be named after its own name, one that is neither pretty nor worth having." ἐκπρεπής is properly part of the relative clause, but placed before it for emphasis (*AGPS* 54.19.0).

238b1–3 περὶ δ' αὖ μέθας . . . προσρήματος: the nominatives τυραννεύσασα, ἄγουσα (*sc.* ἐπιθυμία) are left hanging as S. changes construction abruptly; with τεύξεται *sc.* ὁ κεκτημένος. **b3–4 καὶ τἆλλα δὴ . . . καλεῖσθαι πρόδηλον** "and so with respect to the rest of the names that are related to these and that belong to whichever of the related desires is dominant at any time, it is clear how it is fitting [for the person] to be called." τἆλλα . . . τῆς ἀεὶ δυναστευούσης = τὰ ἄλλα ὀνόματα τὰ τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀεὶ δυναστευούσης τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν. ἀεί in attributive position with the participle = "in each case" (*AGPS* 50.8.5.B). "The names that are related to these" are names like glutton or drunkard that describe persons ruled by a particular irrational appetite. **b5 Ἧς:** *sc.* ἐπιθυμίας. **b6 σαφέστερον:** 265d6–8 on clarity as a rhetorical virtue. **b6–c4 ἡ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου . . . ἔρως ἐκλήθη:** the anticipated definition of *erōs* (237c6–d1) is presented with a flourish: the striking, weighty accumulation of participles without conjunctions is countered by the punchy, punning conclusion (Denniston 1952: 68–70). Dionysius of Halicarnassus finds this sentence bombastic (*Dem.* 7) but he misses the irony of S.'s solemnity (237a7–8n.). ἡ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου . . . ἐπιθυμία = ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἡ ἄνευ λόγου κρατήσασα δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν ὁρμώσης.

238c3 νικήσασα ἀγωγῆι "having taken control by virtue of its leading position." **c4 ἔρως ἐκλήθη:** the etymological play – ἔρως from ἐρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖσα, recapitulated in ῥώμης – is not on a par with the naming pattern just established (238a4–b4) since the etymology concerns only the name of the appetite itself and does not link the name of the appetite and the affected person. This etymology is like those of S.'s palinode in that it reveals a layer of meaning about the activity in question (244b6–d5n.). **c5–6 θεῖον πάθος πεπονθέναι**

"to be subject to divine influence." S. is referring to the exhibition of concentrated argument that just came out of his mouth. **c7 παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς εὔροιά τις:** because S. normally refrains from speechmaking in favor of posing questions, which is his customary form of discourse (τὸ εἰωθός) (*Grg.* 449b–c, *Prt.* 335a), his fluency here is surprising, though it is a mere hint, of course, of what lies in store. **c9 Σιγῆι τοίνυν . . . εἶναι:** ritual silence in the presence of the local divinities, whom S. noticed previously (τῶι ὄντι γάρ) in the midst of his first rhetorical outburst (230b6–7).

238d1 πολλάκις "perhaps" (*AGPS* 66.1.8.B). **νυμφόληπτος:** to be "seized by nymphs" was a recognized condition in Plato's day in which nymphs of a particular location, in Attica always in the company of Pan (Parker 1996: 163–8), took possession of a person and endowed him with extraordinary powers such as prophecy or poetic composition (Connor 1988, Görgemanns 1993: 137–40). S.'s warning of impending nympholepsy, though ironic, indicates the intensity and unexpectedness of his extraordinary rhetorical effort (241e1–4); and it suggests the divine source of effective discourse that goes somehow beyond *tekhnē* (245a1–7, 263d6–7n.). **d2 διθυράμβων:** the sense that S.'s verbal display is about to reach a higher level of intensity by turning into verse is itself the sign of impending nympholepsy. But dithyrambic verse is particularly apt. As the cult song in honor of Dionysus, dithyramb suits the atmosphere of divinely inspired ecstasy (228b6–c1, 234d6; Zimmermann 1992). Because from the late fifth century on dithyramb began to incorporate ostentatious sound play and novel word formations (Ar. *Av.* 1372–1409; Csapo 2004), S. self-mockingly suggests a bombastic quality in his own rhetorical composition. Cf. *Cra.* 409c for a similar comment on dithyramb and bombast. **d4–5 ἴσως γὰρ κἂν ἀποτράποιτο τὸ ἐπιόν** "perhaps the threat (τὸ ἐπιόν) would even turn away." ἀποτράποιτο (middle) is intransitive, as *Smp.* 206d [τὸ κυοῦν] ἀποτρέπεται. What threatens is nympholepsy, the consequent loss of control, and the switch to verse. Beyond the basic irony in the talk of nympholepsy is the deeper irony, which becomes clear in S.'s second speech, that divine intervention is a bad thing and should be avoided.

238e3–4 Τῶι δὴ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας . . . παρασκευάζειν: the constraint upon the *erastēs* to pursue pleasure (ἀρχομένωι δουλεύοντί τε), which follows from the definition of *erōs* (238b6–c4), gives rise to the constraint (ἀνάγκη) in his (self-interested) treatment of the *erōmenos* (also 239a5, b1, 4, c4, 240a4, d1, 241b4).

239a1 κρεῖττον δὲ καὶ ἴσον "stronger or equal" (*GP* 292). **a1–2 κρείττω . . . ἰσούμενον . . . παιδικὰ . . . ἥττω . . . ὑποδεέστερον:** agreement according to sense since παιδικά is here equivalent to παῖδα. **a4 ῥητορικοῦ:** 260c7–d1n. **a4–b1 τοσούτων κακῶν . . . τοῦ παραυτίκα ἡδέος** "with regard to so many faults, and even more [of them], in the mental capacity of the *erōmenos*, the *erastēs* is compelled either (μέν) to take pleasure [in them] when they develop or if they are present [in him] by nature, or (δέ) to bring them about [i.e. if the

mental faults have not developed in the *erōmenos* or are not present in him by nature], or else (ἤ) to forfeit his momentary pleasure." The word order can be rearranged less elegantly – ἀνάγκη ἐραστήν, τοσούτων κακῶν καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐρωμένωι γιγνομένων μέν τε καὶ φύσει ἐνόντων ἥδεσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάζειν – which makes evident that Plato postponed μέν to avoid an awkward juxtaposition with τε (*GP* 373). The manuscript reading ἐνόντων τῶν μέν arose either from dittography or from an attempt to create a simpler τῶν μέν/τὰ δέ complex.

239b2 ἀνήρ: i.e. a grown man; cf. 233a5n. on the expectation that the *erastēs* contributes towards the *erōmenos*' passage into adulthood. **b3** μεγίστης δὲ τῆς ὅθεν ἂν φρονιμώτατος εἴη = μεγίστης δὲ βλάβης αἴτιον εἶναι ἀπείργοντα τῆς συνουσίας ὅθεν ἂν φρονιμώτατος εἴη. **b4** ἡ θεία φιλοσοφία: *philosophia* originally meant a general, useful, admirable interest in intellectual pursuits (Hdt. 1.30.2, Thuc. 2.40.1; Burkert 1960). Both Plato and Isocrates adopted the term to designate their particular (and mutually incompatible) views of the values, knowledge, and education that are essential for human prosperity (Nightingale 1995: 13–59). Isocrates' *philosophia* encompassed facility in political and rhetorical pursuits as well as cultural sophistication in support of traditional Athenian values (4.10, 15.170–323; Eucken 1983: 14–18). As S. utters the term *philosophia* in this passage without content and in support of conventional values, it has an Isocratean resonance. But Plato also undercuts that sense at the same time. The emphasis on the extraordinary value of *philosophia* – its absence constitutes the greatest harm to the *erōmenos* – and the epithet "divine" also suggest S.'s underlying adherence to his own values (237a5n., 241c5–6n.) and Plato's sense of philosophy as the pursuit of knowledge of true reality (248d3, 278d4–6). The highest justification of *erōs* in S.'s second speech is precisely the *erastēs*' ability to nurture (Platonic) *philosophia* in the *erōmenos* (252e2–253a7, 256a6–b7). **b7** εἴη: potential optative without ἄν (*AGPS* 54.3.11).

239c3–4 οἷαν τε καὶ ὡς θεραπεύσει οὗ ἂν γένηται κύριος = οἷά τε ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἕξις ἔσται καὶ ὡς θεραπεύσει ὁ ἐραστὴς τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἐρωμένου οὗ ἂν γένηται κύριος. κύριος is used informally, like ἐπίτροπος (239c1). **c4** ὃς ἡδὺ ... διώκειν: 238e3–4n. **c6–d1** οὐδ' ἐν ἡλίωι ... ἀνάνδρου διαίτης: two chiastic clauses, varied by οὐ ... ἀλλά surrounding τεθραμμένον and μέν/δέ surrounding ἄπειρον, ἔμπειρον. **c6** συμμιγεῖ σκιᾶι "mottled shade," opposed to the "pure sun." **c7** ἱδρώτων ξηρῶν: "dry sweats" are (perhaps) produced by exercise as opposed to the bath (so Hermias 57.28–32 and *Suda* though they cite no evidence); cf. Ar. *Ach.* 696 ἀνδρικὸν ἱδρῶτα. The plurals πόνων (239c6) and ἱδρώτων are distributive, i.e. they indicate sweats and labors that took place on numerous occasions (*AGPS* 44.3.5).

239d1–2 ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμασι ... κοσμούμενον: this *erōmenos*, pale from lack of sun, uses cosmetics to make himself look darker and thus more manly, the opposite

of the traditional female use of cosmetics (Grillet 1975). Pale skin in men could be associated with effeminacy (*Rep.* 8.556d, Eur. *Bacch.* 457–8). **d2 ὅσα τε ἄλλα . . . ἃ δῆλα:** a discreet suggestion that the sexual reproach which potentially threatened any *erōmenos* is particularly apt in the case of the effeminate *erōmenos* (231e1–2n.). **d3 ὁρισαμένους:** *sc.* ἡμᾶς as subject of the infinitives following ἄξιον. **d4–6 τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον . . . οἱ ἐρασταὶ φοβοῦνται:** the accusative object with the verbs of emotion is vivid and hard to translate into English directly (*AGPS* 46.10.0): "a body like that . . . gives heart to enemies and strikes fear in friends and even lovers." The lack of valor disrupts one of the traditional justifications for the bond of *erastēs* and *erōmenos*, viz. their steadfastness in war and times of peril (*Smp.* 178e–179a, 182c; Ogden 1996).

239e5–240a1 ἂν αὐτὸν δέξαιτο "he would have him," i.e. prefer him.

240a1–2 διακωλυτὰς . . . ὁμιλίας: the family of an adolescent son might take protective measures against an *erastēs* such as discouraging the courtship and hiring guardians (*Smp.* 183c–d; Cohen 1991: 195–6). **a3 ὁμοίως:** as in the case where the *erōmenos* has no wealth. **a4 πᾶσα ἀνάγκη** "it is completely necessary" (*AGPS* 50.11.8.A). **a5 ἄγαμον, ἄπαιδα, ἄοικον:** the asyndeton and assonance sound impressive but mask an exaggeration: by the time an Athenian male was ready to marry and have children and a household of his own, he was well past the point of being an *erōmenos* to another man. **a8 ἄλλα κακά:** apart from those caused by the *erastēs*.

240b1–2 κόλακι . . . ἑταίραν: flatterers (also referred to as parasites) and courtesans were permanent features of upper-class Athenian society, hence became stock characters in Athenian comedy. Flattery was particularly grievous (βλάβηι μεγάληι) for Plato because in addition to deceiving the person at whom it is aimed, it increases that person's appetite for pleasure at the expense of enlightened self-interest (*Grg.* 463a–465e). **b2 ἡ φύσις:** equivalent, for the sake of the argument, to τις δαίμων (240a8). ἡδονήν τινα οὐκ ἄμουσον: the pleasure that is "not without the Muses" is pleasure that is not lacking in culture (268d7n.). The flatterer's (deceptive) charm is essential for his success. **b3–4 τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων θρεμμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων** "such creatures and their practices"; the tone is disparaging.

240c1 ἧλικα γὰρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπειν τὸν ἧλικα "for also the old saying [has it] that peer enjoys peer." Cephalus alludes to this proverb at *Rep.* 1.329a. **c2** ἴσας ἡδονάς "the same pleasures."

240d1–2 ὑπ' ἀνάγκης . . . διδοὺς ἄγει "but he [the *erastēs*] is driven by a compelling frenzy, which [ὅς], constantly giving him [ἐκείνωι = the *erastēs*] pleasure, drives him [*sc.* αὐτόν]." The words ἀνάγκης τε καὶ οἴστρου form a hendiadys, but the relative pronoun ὅς picks up οἴστρου. ἐλαύνεται suggests that the cattle metaphor in οἶστρος ("gadfly") is still felt, as also *Rep.* 9.577e [ἡ ψυχὴ] ὑπὸ δὲ

οἴστρου ἀεὶ ἑλκομένη. **d3** ὥστε μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀραρότως αὐτῶι ὑπηρετεῖν "so that it is his pleasure to press close (ἀραρότως) while waiting on him [i.e. the *erōmenos*]." **d3–e2** τῶι δὲ δὴ ἐρωμένωι ... μεταχειρίζεσθαι "but what comfort or what pleasure does [that frenzy] give the *erōmenos* so as to prevent him, as he consorts with [the *erastēs*] for the same amount of time, from reaching the height of revulsion when he looks on a form that is older and past its prime and along with that follow the other things which one would not enjoy even hearing described, much less actually engaging in under unremitting pressure." Forced to engage repeatedly in certain sexual acts, referred to discreetly as τῶν ἄλλων (cf. 239d2), with an old, physically repulsive partner is so distasteful as to constitute a compelling reason for the *erōmenos* to abstain from the relationship. There is no question of the *erōmenos* deriving any pleasure from the sex (231a1n., 231e1–2n.). **d4** διδοὺς ποιήσει: the subject is still ὅς (240d1): the same "compelling frenzy" (240d1), although it is experienced just by the *erastēs*, drives the *erastēs* towards pleasure and the *erōmenos* towards disgust. **d5** μὴ οὐχί: the negative for an infinitive following a negative idea (*AGPS* 67.12.6), here that there is no comfort or pleasure. **d6** ὄψιν: not the *erastēs*' face, but his entire appearance (Xen. *Oec.* 6.16, [Dem.] 61.8; Oguse 1976).

240e1 μὴ ὅτι "much less." **e2** μεταχειρίζεσθαι "engage in"; for the sense, cf. Isoc. 5.105, 12.87; Oguse 1976. The object is ἅ (240d6), which refers to τῶν ἄλλων. **e2–3** φυλακάς τε δὴ καχυποτόπους φυλαττομένωι: lit. "[the *erōmenos*] is watched with suspicious watches [from φυλακή]"; cognate accusative (*AGPS* 46.5.1) modifying the passive participle φυλαττομένωι, which, along with ἀκούοντι (240e4), has τῶι ἐρωμένωι (240d3–4) as antecedent and resumes the construction of ὁρῶντι (240d5). **e4–6** νήφοντος ... ἰόντος ... χρωμένου: *sc.* τοῦ ἐραστοῦ. **e6** κατακορεῖ καὶ ἀναπεπταμένηι "boorish and unrestrained." **e8** εἰς ὅν: i.e. "the future time" (τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον) when the *erastēs*' promises are to come due.

241a1–2 μόγις κατεῖχε ... δι' ἐλπίδα ἀγαθῶν "he scarcely kept the relationship at that time in check, it being difficult [for the *erōmenos*] to endure, through the hope of [future] benefits." **a2** τότε: when the *erastēs*' desire has ceased. ἐκτίνειν: i.e. what he promised. **a2–3** μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὑτῶι καὶ προστάτην "having adopted a new ruler and leader inside himself." ἄλλον indicates the consequence of the action of the verb (proleptic, *AGPS* 57.4.2). The metaphor for the change from mad desire to intelligent moderation recalls the opening of the speech, where the two basic psychological conditions were defined (237d4–238a3) and metaphorically described as quarreling and governing the soul in turn (237e1–2). Because of the circumstances in which this change in the *erastēs* takes place – τότε δὴ δέον ἐκτίνειν – there is an insinuation that the *erastēs* discards his *erōs*, and the promises thereby incurred, when they become inconvenient. **a4** ἔρωτος καὶ μανίας: the first mention of *erōs* as μανία, though here μανία is understood as a bad thing. **a4–b3** ἄλλος

γεγονὼς . . . ὁ αὐτὸς πάλιν γένηται: the *erastēs*' desire having ceased, S. can speak of him as "having become another person" (ἄλλος γεγονώς) and as seeking to avoid becoming "the same person again" (ὁ αὐτὸς πάλιν) because the change in the ruling psychological principle affects his very nature. S. demonstrated that point in his discussion of the irrational appetites and the corresponding names applied to the persons who have them (238a4–b4). The *erastēs*' reluctance to follow through on his former promises because doing so would put his new self (i.e. his new state of moderation) at risk (241a7–b3) looks forward to S.'s conclusion (241c7–d1): the *erastēs*' self-interest trumps his obligation to, and the interests of, the *erōmenos*. **a4** λέληθε τὰ παιδικά: because the change in the *erastēs* is internal (ἐν αὐτῶι). **a4–5** ὁ μέν: the *erōmenos*. **a7–b1** οὐθ' ὅπως . . . ἐμπεδώσηι ἔχει "nor does [the *erastēs*] know how he could endorse the oaths and promises of his former foolish regime."

241b3 ἐκείνωι: the man he was before, in love. **b4** ἀπεστερηκὼς ὑπ' ἀνάγκης "having defaulted [on his promises to the *erōmenos*] by necessity." The *erastēs*' behavior is still a matter of constraint though now it is his self-interest (241a4–b3n.), not his passion (238e3–4n.), that drives him. **b4–5** ὀστράκου μεταπεσόντος: as S. himself explains, "the shard having fallen on the other side" means that the *erastēs* switches roles (μεταβαλών, intransitive) and takes flight (ἵεται φυγῆι). The allusion is to the children's game of ὀστρακίνδα in which a shard, black on one side, white on the other, was thrown in the air between two groups. As the shard landed, the resulting color sent one group running off and the other in hot pursuit (Plato comicus *PCG* 168, quoted by Hermias 59–60 ad loc.). **b5–6** ἀγανακτῶν καὶ ἐπιθεάζων: the *erōmenos* pursues the *erastēs* not out of desire for him but out of anger at his bad treatment. **b6–c2** οὐκ ἄρα ἔδει . . . νοῦν ἔχοντι: ἄρα with the imperfect expresses the realization of something that was true all along (cf. 237b4–5), hence also "rhetorical irony such as the feigned discovery of propositions which were never seriously doubted" (*AGPS* 53.2.6).

241c2 εἴη: indirect discourse following ὅτι (241b6). **c2–5** ἀπίστωι . . . τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς παίδευσιν: a compact summary of the speech, appropriately at the end. **c5–6** ἧς οὔτε ἀνθρώποις . . . οὔτε ποτὲ ἔσται "and a more valuable thing than that [i.e. the education of the soul] in truth neither exists nor ever will exist either for men or for gods." This assertion of S.'s underlying values (237a5n., 239b4n., 279b8–c4) at the close of the speech anticipates the palinode, not least in the hymnic character of the absolute perspective (οὔτε ἀνθρώποις οὔτε θεοῖς τῆι ἀληθείαι) and pleonastic diction (οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε ποτὲ ἔσται). **c8** σιτίου τρόπον, χάριν πλησμονῆς: this chiastic phrase modifies φιλοῦσιν (241d1). The adverbial accusative τρόπον functions like a preposition when accompanied by a genitive ("in the manner of"), parallel to χάριν ("for the sake of") (*AGPS* 46.3.5). πλησμονῆς suggests the satisfaction of raw physical need, whether for food or sex (233e1, *Laws* 831e).

241d1 ὡς λύκοι ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ', ὣς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί: a concluding display of skill that far surpasses the trivial pun at the end of Lysias' speech (234c5n.). S. follows the form of the traditional didactic fable by closing with a proverb – the moral of the story – thereby completing the frame of the opening μῦθος (237a9, b2; cf. *Phd.* 60b–61b; Adrados 1999: 367–409). By reciting the proverb likening *erastai* to wolves in the form of a dactylic hexameter verse (cited in prose in the scholia to *Il.* 22.263), S. enacts the loss of control under divine influence that he anticipated (238c5–d6), and thus provides an apt excuse for ending the speech here (241d2–e4). The verse is no mere epideictic gimmick, but a vivid statement of the point of S.'s argument. It is certain from S.'s next utterance (241e1 ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι) that Plato composed a hexameter verse for this spot. The metrical reading ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ', found in Hermias (61.26), must have given rise to the unmetrical reading ἄρνας ἀγαπῶσιν in the MSS.

241d2–243e6: SECOND INTERLUDE

When S. agreed to deliver a speech on the same theme as Lysias', he was uneasy (237a4–5) because the theme of Lysias' speech was not something he could endorse. Yet S. went ahead because the opportunity to engage Ph. on the subject of *erōs* and discourse was compelling, and his divine sign did not intervene to stop him. S. did his best to skirt the objectionable part of Lysias' plea: restricting himself to a condemnation of the *erastēs* – that is, the conventional *erastēs* who exploits the *erōmenos* for his own gratification – S. said nothing explicitly to encourage the young man to bestow his favors on a man who does not love him. Since S.'s stratagem affects the contest he proposed and is judging, Ph. notices that S. omitted a crucial aspect of the case and complains (241d4–6), which inflames S.'s unease and provokes a crisis. S. admits that a plea on behalf of the non-lover is implied by what he has already said, insists he will say no more, and rises to go back to the city in order to avoid being forced by Ph. to do something even worse than what he has already done (241e1–242a2). Though S. delivered his speech as part of an epideictic contest, and thus was merely demonstrating rhetorical skill and not actually advising a young man, his standing commitment to the ethical consequences of discourse prevents him from espousing Lysias' message even just for epideictic purposes. Epideictic discourse in itself violates S.'s moral principles (242c4–d1), since it is not merely indifferent to content, but places a premium on casting morally outrageous content in the most persuasive form.

As he moves to leave, S.'s divine sign intervenes, preventing his return to the city and shifting him into explicit control of the rest of the dialogue. Recalling the god Eros and the invariable goodness of all things divine, S. understands that he must deliver another speech in order to appease the god and repair the damage caused by the first one. Citing Stesichorus' *Palinode* as his model, S. will recant the speech that portrayed *erōs* as bad by delivering a new speech that will portray *erōs* as good (243a2–b6). Able to speak freely and with no unease

(243b5–6), S. will address the same imagined young man who was addressed previously so that he will be saved from harm and given the advice that truly serves his interests (243e4–6). A concern for the ethical consequences of discourse has now been explicitly introduced into the heart of S.'s and Ph.'s discussion of rhetorical skill.

Before beginning his palinode, S. prepares Ph. to listen to it in the proper frame of mind. He shames Ph. into discarding the vulgar tastes of Lysias' audience of rhetorical cognoscenti and adopting instead the elevated erotic aspirations of a nobler, gentler soul (243c1–d6).

241d2 Τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο: "this" (τοῦτο) – the eruption of verse – is "that" (ἐκεῖνο) – the nympholepsy which caused the verse (238d1–2). **d4–5 σε μεσοῦν . . . ἔχει ἀγαθά:** Ph.'s failure to see the moralizing line of verse as the apt conclusion to S.'s story is typical of his limited discernment; he also does not perceive that S. might be averse to advising the young male auditor to offer the non-lover sex in return for advancement. But Ph. is right that S. omitted the second half of Lysias' plea, which leaves the epideictic contest inconclusive. τὰ ἴσα = "the same amount." λέγων refers to S., as if Ph. reverted to direct speech, in place of an accusative agreeing with σε (*AGPS* 56.9.4.E).

241e1–2 Οὐκ ᾔσθου . . . καὶ ταῦτα ψέγων; S.'s verse was a dactylic hexameter (241d1), the verse of Homer. Hence S. speaks of his "epic poetry" (ἔπη), a more exalted form than the dithyrambs he mentioned when the intensity of his rhetoric first gave him a premonition of divine influence (238d2). In view of Homer's task to glorify the great deeds of men, epic verse is unsuited for censuring a self-seeking *erastēs*. Iambic was the traditional medium for blame. **e3–4 ἆρ' οἶσθ' . . . ἐνθουσιάσω;** ἆρα suggests that the answer to this question, posed in answer to the preceding question, is not in doubt (*AGPS* 69.9.1.C): S. will be thoroughly possessed by the nymphs if he continues, and Ph. has every reason to be aware of that fact. Ph.'s responsibility for the nympholepsy (as 238d4) belongs to his overall responsibility for S.'s speech. **e4–242a2 λέγω οὖν . . . τι μεῖζον ἀναγκασθῆναι:** S.'s brusque tone and wish to leave immediately arise from the unease that has bothered him since he agreed to deliver the speech (237a4–5, 242c5–6). The unease blossoms here as Ph. provokes the admission that, notwithstanding S.'s decision to end the speech where he did and thus avoid having to plead the advantages of sex with the non-lover (237a7–241d1n.), such a plea is implied in the rhetorical situation he agreed to address: ὅσα τὸν ἕτερον λελοιδορήκαμεν, τῶι ἑτέρωι τἀναντία τούτων ἀγαθὰ πρόσεστιν. Although it was not his intention, S. has placed the imagined young male auditor in jeopardy, as he indicates when he hastens to deliver his palinode before the imagined young man might go ahead and yield to the non-lover (243e4–5). **e7 οὕτω δὴ ὁ μῦθος . . . πείσεται:** the fate that is appropriate for the "story" (237a9) to suffer, the fate that it will suffer, is for it to be over. That at least will prevent any further harm.

242a1–2 **πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τι μεῖζον ἀναγκασθῆναι** "before I am compelled by you to something worse." τι μεῖζον is the accusative of the thing that one is forced to do, a regular construction with ἀναγκάζω in active and passive (254b1, *Rep.* 5.473a, *Smp.* 181e). The potential culpability for further harm that S. ascribes to Ph. (ὑπὸ σοῦ) arises from Ph.'s responsibility for the harm that has already been done by S.'s first speech. **a3–5** **Μήπω γε . . . ἐπειδὰν ἀποψυχῆι ἴμεν:** a comic touch: S. faces a crisis and Ph. is concerned with his physical comfort (227a4–5n.). But Ph.'s desire to continue the conversation, roused by S., propels it forward. In the MSS ἵσταται is followed by the phrase ἡ δὴ καλουμένη σταθερά, which adds nothing and in its didactic tone would distract from Ph.'s complaint. It looks like a marginal gloss on μεσημβρία that was later interpolated into the text. **a6** **Θεῖός . . . θαυμάσιος:** the adjectives indicate S.'s gently mocking tone. Ph. performs his service of occasioning another speech from S. inadvertently (242a3–5), but S. will give him credit nonetheless. Earlier Ph. himself treated his reputation as a purveyor of discourses ironically (236e2–3).

242b1–2 **τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σοῦ βίου . . . γεγενῆσθαι** "of the speeches that have come into existence during your lifetime no one has caused more to come into existence than you have." **b2–3** **ἤτοι αὐτὸν λέγοντα . . . προσαναγκάζοντα:** Ph.'s modest efforts at rhetorical composition are evident in this dialogue (228d1–4) and the *Symposium* (178a–180b). The generosity of Eryximachus in crediting Ph. as the "father of the discussion" in the *Symposium* (πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου, 177d) is on a par with S. here (also 261a3 καλλίπαιδα). ἑνί γέ τωι τρόπωι – "in some way or another" – indicates Ph.'s inadvertence in bringing about S.'s next speech. **b3** **Σιμμίαν:** one of S.'s two main interlocutors in the *Phaedo*, Simmias pushes S. at one point to revise his argument on the immortality of the soul (85c–d). **b4–5** **αἴτιός . . . λόγωι τινὶ ῥηθῆναι** "responsible for a speech being uttered." **b6** **Οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἀγγέλλεις:** a colloquial phrase meaning "good news" (Σ ad loc., *Laws* 3.702d). **b7–8** **τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο** "the sign that is divine and wont to occur to me occurred." δαιμόνιον is not a substantive but an adjective with the noun σημεῖον. A well-known and crucial feature of S.'s characterization in Plato, the divine sign expresses S.'s pious attitude towards the divine while remaining distinct from the traditional gods of myth and cult; and it provides him with a (virtually absolute) safeguard against doing wrong while allowing him to maintain the stance of uncertainty regarding moral truths (Destrée and Smith 2005). Usually S. or other characters merely speak about or refer to the divine sign (*Ap.* 31c–d, 40a–c, 41d, *Euthphr.* 3b, *Rep.* 6.496c, *Tht.* 151a). Here it is integrated into the plot: without the intervention of the sign there would be no palinode or dialectical inquiry into discourse. Yet the occurrence of the sign here is consistent with S.'s fundamental account of it in the *Apology*: the sign comes to S. as a voice from an unspecified god in a mundane situation; its utterance is equivalent to a simple μή – "do not [i.e. do what you are about to do]" – in order to prevent him from doing something bad or wrong;

and S. trusts the sign implicitly so that when it occurs he stops what he is doing – in this case, crossing the stream, going back to town, and missing the chance to expiate his flawed and harmful characterization of *erōs*. Other than the command of prohibition the divine sign gives S. no information about what is wrong in his intended action. S. is responsible for figuring out that himself (242c2–4). **b8** ἀεί = ἑκάστοτε (*AGPS* 50.10.5.C).

242c2 **πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὥς τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον** "before I purify myself for having committed some wrong against the divine." This information is not included in the sign, but is S.'s inference from it (242c2–5). On purification, cf. 243a2–4n. **c3** **οὐ πάνυ δὲ σπουδαῖος** "but not a very good one." **c3–4** **οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαῦλοι** "those who can barely read and write." **c5** **ὡς δή τοι** "for in fact." **c5–6** **ἐμὲ γάρ ἔθραξε ... ἐδυσωπούμην**: on S.'s unease, cf. 237a5n., 241e4–242a2n. **c7–d1** **μή τι παρὰ θεοῖς ἀμβλακὼν τιμὰν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀμείψω** "lest I commit some sin before the gods in exchange for honor among men." The honor among men pursued by S. was victory in the contest with Lysias, which would garner esteem in the eyes of Ph., symbolized by the latter's gesture at immortalizing S. in Olympia (236b2–4). Beyond the question of *technē* that occupies much of the dialogue, on the question of values S. later insists that the true *rhētōr* use his *technē* to secure the approval of the gods rather than that of men, the two being often opposed (273e4–274a3). Quoting verse to express the thought gives it prominence; Ibycus has already been suggested as an erotic authority (229b4–5n.). Plutarch quotes Plato's line of Ibycus with the preceding line intact (*Quaest. conv.* 748c = *PMG* 310): δέδοικα μή τι πὰρ θεοῖς | ἀμβλακὼν τιμὰν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀμείψω (iambic dimeter, trochaic trimeter).

242d4–5 **Δεινόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε δεινὸν ... εἰπεῖν**: the doubling for pathetic effect (Denniston 1952: 91) suits S.'s attempt to impress on Ph. the gravity of the situation. As conveyor of Lysias' speech and cause of S.'s, Ph. is implicated and must cooperate. **d9–10** **τὸν Ἔρωτα ... Λέγεταί γε δή**: the genealogy and divine status of Eros, like that of other entities of myth, were subject to variation, as in the *Symposium* (178a–b, 202b–203c). Here S. broaches Eros' divine status in the simplest way. Ph.'s lukewarm response avoids commitment while allowing S. to proceed.

242e2 **καταφαρμακευθέντος**: the metaphor (as 230d5) maintains the pose that Ph. compelled S. to deliver the speech against his will. **e3** **ἤ τι θεῖον**: not pressing the point about Eros' precise divine status (242d9–10); all S. requires for his argument is that Eros is divine in some sense. **οὐδὲν ἂν κακὸν εἴη** "[Eros] can't be something bad." On the goodness of the gods, cf. 246e1n. **e4** **τοιούτου**: i.e. κακοῦ. **e5–243a2** **ἡ εὐήθεια αὐτοῖν ... εὐδοκιμήσετον ἐν αὐτοῖς**: the nominative articular infinitive (τὸ σεμνύνεσθαι) is in apposition to ἡ εὐήθεια: "the fatuousness of the two speeches was quite refined, the fact that while they said nothing beneficial or true they put on airs as if they amounted to something

[lit. as being something], if only they could mislead some chaps and [thereby] gain credit in their eyes." S. treats the two speeches together because of their common offense against Eros but the combination of fatuousness (εὐήθεια, cf. 275c7n.) and self-importance (σεμνύνεσθαι) applies particularly to Lysias' speech (230e6–234c5n.) and underlay S.'s ironic tone in regard to it (227c8–d5, 234d2–6). The sarcasm in calling this achievement πάνυ ἀστεία is also apt in regard to Lysias' aspirations (227d2).

243a2–4 ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν . . . καθαρμὸς ἀρχαῖος: S. explained the need to purify himself at 242c1–2. Purification (καθαρμός), which is the eradication of pollution and is necessary for continued social interaction, is normally accomplished by water, fire, fumigation, sacrificial blood, or other ritual means (*Thesaurus cultus et rituum antiquorum* 2.19–34, Parker 1983). S. is viewing Stesichorus' *Palinode* in a new light when he casts it as an example of an "ancient purification" (καθαρμὸς ἀρχαῖος) that is available to him too as one who, like Stesichorus, offended a god in mythical discourse (μυθολογίαν). S.'s speech was a μῦθος (237a9, 241d1n.). The purifying act that S. will imitate is the formal, explicit retraction of the offending idea in another mythical discourse (243a7–b1). In the background lies Empedocles' poem Καθαρμοί, which added a moral dimension to the notions of pollution and purification (Osborne 1987). **a5 τὴν Ἑλένης κακηγορίαν:** Helen's presence in Troy and her adulterous relationship with Paris are salient features of the Homeric tradition (e.g. *Il.* 3), which Stesichorus (early 6th c.) followed in composing his *Helen* (*PMGF* 187–91). According to tradition Homer was blind; Plato makes his "slander" of Helen into the cause of his blindness. **a6 ἅτε μουσικὸς ὢν ἔγνω τὴν αἰτίαν:** to speak of Stesichorus as μουσικός in preference to Homer, traditionally the first and greatest follower of the Muses, slights Homer. But S. gives μουσικός a philosophical cast by connecting it with knowing causes; thus he turns his model of rhetorical expiation into a follower, like himself, of the philosophical Muses (248d3, 259d2–5). Referring to Stesichorus' *Palinode* in his *Helen* (10.64), Isocrates used the phrase γνοὺς τὴν αἰτίαν, but with none of the connotations evident in Plato's use. **a7–b1 οὐκ ἔστ' ἔτυμος . . . Πέργαμα Τροίας:** Plato quotes the lines from Stesichorus' *Palinode* that concisely and unambiguously retract the point that originally gave offense. The account (λόγος) that is not true is that Helen went to Troy: she is the subject of the verbs in the second and third lines. Hence she was not adulterous. Stesichorus said that it was a phantom (εἴδωλον) that Paris took to Troy in her place (*Rep.* 9.586c); cf. *PMGF* 192–3, Page 1963: 35–6 for the other sources for the *Palinode* including evidence that Stesichorus may have composed two *Palinodes*. The first and third lines are anapaestic paroemiac (x–⏑⏑–⏑⏑––); the second line (–⏑–––⏑–––) can be understood as either trochaic dimeter + – or lekythion + –– (West 1982: 49, 53).

243b4 τὴν τοῦ Ἔρωτος κακηγορίαν: viz. the claim that *erōs* causes the *erastēs* to exploit the *erōmenos* for his own gratification and thereby to harm him greatly. **b5–6 γυμνῆι τῆι κεφαλῆι . . . ἐγκεκαλυμμένος:** 237a5n.

243c2–3 **εἰ γὰρ ἀκούων τις τύχοι ἡμῶν γεννάδας καὶ πρᾶιος τὸ ἦθος:** shame (243c1, d3) requires an observer and an imagined one serves as well as a real one (Dem. 18.201; Williams 1993: 75–102). The gentle spectator imagined by S. replaces the rhetorical cognoscenti who "overheard" Lysias' speech and inspired in Lysias not shame, but pride. S. is implicitly asking Ph., as he listens to S.'s next speech, to drop the standards of Lysias' audience, to which he recently belonged, and adopt S.'s standards instead, the very ones that inspired S.'s earlier unease (242c5–d1). The implied contrast between the character of Lysias' spectators and that of S.'s imagined spectator corresponds to the contrast between wildness and gentleness drawn by S. in regard to the monster Typho (230a3–5). γεννάδας = "a gentleman" (Dover 1993: 46). **c4–5** **διὰ σμικρὰ . . . βλαβερῶς:** both speeches attributed utterly selfish behavior to the lover, which would offend S.'s gentle spectator. But in this phrase S. also signals that he will be challenging the notion, taken for granted in Lysias' speech, that the lover acts only out of base self-interest (230e6–231a1n., 231a4–6n.). **c6** **ναύταις:** rough, crude, and not likely to have any interest in love other than sex. **c7** **ἐλεύθερον ἔρωτα:** generous, not constrained by appetites, and possessed of the attributes that foster a desire for refined, non-physical forms of beauty.

243d3–4 **Τοῦτόν γε τοίνυν . . . τὸν Ἔρωτα δεδιώς:** S.'s moral standards, expressed as a matter of shame, and his religious standards, expressed as a fear of divine retribution, coalesce as motivation for delivering the palinode. **d4** **ποτίμωι λόγωι οἷον ἁλμυρὰν ἀκοὴν ἀποκλύσασθαι** "to wash off, as it were, the bitter things heard [i.e. S.'s first speech] with a fresh speech." The metaphor of fresh cleansing water is an extension of the purification that S. must perform (243a2–4n.). **d5–e1** **συμβουλεύω δὲ καὶ Λυσίαι . . . περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγον:** Lysias continues as a presence in the dialogue because S. treats him as a touchstone for the aspiring rhetorician (257b2–258d10, 278b5–e3). Clearly Lysias has the same burden to recant as does S., for the burden arises from moral and religious obligations that are not specific to S. but apply to anyone who delivers a speech based on Lysias' theme. Ph. does not understand that, since he is concerned just with Lysias' next (αὖ) contribution to an ongoing epideictic competition with S. **d6** **ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων** "on the basis of reciprocity" (cf. Fraenkel 1950: 669 ad Aesch. *Ag.* 1423). S. explains this reciprocity towards the end of his speech (245b5–6, 255a1–256b7).

243e2 **ὃς εἶ:** a purveyor of discourses (242a6–b5). **e4–5** **Ποῦ δή μοι . . . τῶι μὴ ἐρῶντι:** S. summons the imagined young man he addressed earlier (237b2, 7) in order to save him, as it were, from the harm that would ensue if he was persuaded by that speech (241e4–242a2n.) and to redirect him to the right kind of *erastēs*. **e6** **Οὗτος παρά σοι . . . ὅταν σὺ βούληι:** consonant with his status as facilitator of discourses (236d9–e3, 242a6–b5, 243e2), Ph. offers to stand in as the young male auditor whom S. will address. He thereby responds to S.'s call for the auditor who is needed if the palinode is to go forward and acknowledges S.'s premise that the young man who heard the previous speech and was endangered

by it is the auditor of this speech too. Taking on this role, Ph. starts to move away from being a disinterested spectator of an epideictic competition and towards becoming an interested party in a rhetorical situation that puts a critical choice before him too, which S. makes explicit at the close of the speech (257b4–6). In this sense Ph.'s own situation parallels that of the young man and potential *erōmenos* who is addressed in the speech (Introd. 3).

243e7–257b6: SOCRATES' PALINODE

To make amends to Eros for the blasphemous account of *erōs* in his first speech, S. argues that a young man will receive the greatest benefit from attaching himself to an older man who loves him rather than to one who does not love him. From the previous speeches S. retains the traditional notion that *erōs* is madness, but now he argues that madness, when it comes from the gods, is entirely good. This position is a paradox, which S. embraces not for epideictic purposes in the Lysianic manner but because it reflects reality. S. thereby assumes the burden of depicting reality in such a way that the paradoxical position on madness makes perfect sense. The burden is considerable, but it affords Plato the opportunity, which of course is his design, of injecting into the dialogue a picture of reality that reflects his philosophical priorities and his understanding of the cosmos and the place of human beings in it.

Within the dialogue the speech has three audiences. The epideictic contest having been abandoned for the sake of higher priorities, S. addresses the same imagined young man as before and aims to give him the advice he truly needs to hear. Since his life, so to speak, depends on whether he heeds this advice, Plato turns S.'s account of divine *erōs* into a deliberative speech for which the psychagogic outcome matters, in this case, moving the young man towards forming an attachment with a man who loves him. Ph. is S.'s auditor in a different sense. S. treats Ph. no longer as the epideictic connoisseur he wished to be at the outset, but as a serious student of serious discourse (243c1–d6, 245c1–2), i.e. one who genuinely wants to understand how discourse can be used to affect its audience. S.'s task with regard to Ph. is not only to provide him with an effective display of true psychagogic discourse, but to use that display to move Ph. towards philosophy. This aspect of S.'s task becomes explicit in his prayer at the end of the speech, that Ph. lead his life engaged in philosophical discourse (257b4–6), and in the direction the dialogue takes after the speech, as S. involves Ph. in a philosophical inquiry into the nature of persuasive discourse. The prayer is directed to Eros, the third audience of the speech. By fashioning the speech as the "finest and best" offering to the god that he can produce and praying for his own erotic success as well as that of Ph. (257a2–b1), S. ensures that, in contrast to his previous speech, the threat of irony is removed and the speech is meant as a serious display of philosophically informed psychagogic rhetoric.

S.'s argument on the benefit of divine *erōs* can be stripped of its rhetorical clothing and summarized thus. The soul is immortal and has a life of its own apart from the body before birth and after death. The fate of the soul determines each individual's happiness. In the soul's existence apart from the body it acquires godlike characteristics, including an understanding, to some extent, of true Being and the Forms. But when the soul is born into a life on earth, corporeal existence itself makes it lose its divine characteristics and forget what it knew of true Being and the Forms. The soul's proper task and natural desire is to regain its prior knowledge of true Being and the Forms, to approach the gods and live like them to the extent possible, and after death to live a higher, better, purer form of existence than anything possible in life on earth.

During its embodied existence on earth the soul has means of recollecting its prior knowledge of true Being and regaining its divine characteristics. Leading a virtuous life makes the task easier. Acquiring knowledge is itself a means of recollecting the Forms. (Plato introduces his theory of Forms and recollection abruptly and without argument, having argued for the theory at length in other dialogues; cf. 249c1–2n., 250a5n.) In addition, there is divine *erōs*, which is none other than recollection of the Form of beauty, a unique kind of recollection because only the Form of beauty can be recollected just at the sight of one of its earthly images, viz. that of a beautiful young man. *Erōs* is madness because, when the soul sees the beautiful boy and begins thereby to recall the Form of beauty, it experiences a shock and loses its bearings, because the soul's desire for the object that gives rise to the recollection (the beautiful boy) becomes so intense as to drive the lover to pursue his beloved ceaselessly and relentlessly, and because there erupts within the soul a vicious battle between the impulse to possess the beloved carnally and the effort to refrain from carnality and imbibe the beloved's beauty through sight and conversation alone.

As the means of prompting recollection of the Form of beauty, *erōs* benefits the lover, but from the lover's *erōs* benefit flows to the young man too. The lover forms a genuine and lasting friendship (*philia*) with his beloved, educates him in philosophy, and helps him to model his life on the gods to the extent possible. Further, the lover's *erōs*-inspiring vision of his beautiful beloved overflows and is reflected back to the beloved, which inspires in him a reciprocal *erōs* and gives him also both the turmoil and the benefit of recollecting the Form of beauty. *Erōs* bestows its ultimate prize on lover and beloved together: insofar as they succeed in restraining their carnal impulses and refrain from sex, they have taken a crucial, concrete step towards regaining their souls' pure, nearly divine state, which they will fully enjoy after death. Nothing could compare with that reward, least of all the vague promises of social advancement and worldly lessons offered by the sober, calculating non-lover in return for sex.

Thus the benefit which divine *erōs* brings the young male auditor is intangible, affects the soul, occurs mainly after death, involves the acquisition of abstract knowledge, and results in the perfection of character according to Plato's highly

idiosyncratic views of morality and divinity. It would be impossible to exaggerate the degree to which this set of benefits departs from the conventional values of a young Athenian man, as Plato is well aware. Needing to impress on this auditor a palpable sense of what is so good about these benefits and thus to persuade him to pursue them, Plato forgoes an argument based on expediency such as that which S. deployed in his first speech in support of conventional goods. Such an argument, no matter how cogent, would fail to convince, because from the perspective of this auditor the conclusion is so radical that no argument could convince. (Cf. Plato's handling of the same rhetorical problem with regard to philosopher-kings in the *Republic*, Yunis 2007a: 19–24.) Instead, Plato utilizes the affective properties of mimetic art to excite desire in the soul of the auditor (*Rep.* 10; Ferrari 1989). He casts the argument on the benefits of divine *erōs* in the form of a narrative that portrays those benefits in such a way that the imagined auditor will come to desire them on his own (Yunis 2005). The narrative likewise instills in Ph. a desire for erotic philosophy because of the way it is portrayed. The narrative accomplishes these objectives by making the soul the protagonist of a heroic story of cosmic struggle and sublime victory and by engaging the imagination with the vividness, fullness, and detail with which the story is presented. The narrative seizes the imagination, fills it to overflowing, and forces it to pay heed.

First, an overview, which reveals the simplicity of the underlying structure:

(1) 243e7–245c4: introduction: traditional examples of beneficial divine madness (inspired prophecy, ritual healing, poetry)
(2) 245c5–257a1: *erōs* as beneficial divine madness
  (2a) 245c5–249d3: the mythical setting
    245c5–246a2: formal proof of the immortality of the soul
    246a3–e3: the image of the soul as winged chariot
    246e4–247c3: the heavenly procession of divine and human souls
    247c4–e4: the divine view of the super-heavenly realm
    248a1–c2: the struggle of human souls to see true Being
    248c3–249d3: the law of Adrastea, the incarnation and reincarnation of souls, recollecting the Forms
  (2b) 249d4–257a1: the heroic struggle and sublime victory of divine *erōs*
    249d4–250d7: the recollection of beauty and the arousal of *erōs* in the soul
    250e1–252c3: the lover's maddening experience of *erōs* in his soul
    252c4–253c6: the lover educates his beloved whereby both become like their leading god
    253c7–254e9: the conflict in the lover's soul when he approaches his beloved
    255a1–257a1: conclusion: the triumph and benefits of divine *erōs*
(3) 257a2–b6: postscript: S. prays to Eros for himself, Lysias, and Ph.

"In fact, we get the greatest goods from madness, so long as it is given as a gift from the gods" (244a5–6). Picking up Ph.'s interest in the gods (229b4–5), S. shifts the focus from the manifest world of affairs, which was the setting for the previous speeches, to a level of reality that is normally hidden but is brought to light in this speech. He starts with traditional practices that suggest an older world where divinely imposed madness benefited human beings as part of the fabric of life. Socratic etymology, revealing that prophecy (*mantikē*) is madness (*manikē*) (244b6–d5), puts beneficial divine madness at the very origin of human language and civilization. With this background established, S. opens the account of divine *erōs* with a formal proof of the immortality of the soul. The proof establishes that the soul exists before birth and after death, when the crucial benefits of divine *erōs* will be shown to occur. Even apart from the coherence of the proof, the oracular style of this passage conveys the importance of soul and its essential property: as the single self-moving entity, it is responsible for the cosmos itself and all movement in it.

From cosmic soul to the protagonist of the narrative, the individual soul of any and every human being, which is likened to a winged chariot with charioteer and team of one good, obedient horse and one bad, disobedient one. The chariot image reveals the individual soul's essential task as movement; the wings suggest the natural direction upwards; the mixed team gives rise to the charioteer's struggle to control the chariot and move it in the direction of his choosing. The myth opens with a primordial scene. Before and after their corporeal lives on earth, human chariot-souls struggle to follow along with their divine counterparts in a stately, dance-like procession upwards within the vault of heaven to reach the pinnacle. From that vantage point they struggle to gain a view of the super-heavenly realm beyond where lie true Being and the Forms. This view, attained by the gods with ease, is the natural goal of all human striving, since it provides the soul with its proper nourishment and thus enables the soul to live as it is meant to live. This mythical scene incorporates the traditional Olympian gods with Zeus as leader. The cosmos functions in a natural orderly way. Human souls thrive insofar as they join in the cosmic order.

Erōs belongs to the beneficent divine cosmic order. As the vehicle for recollecting the Form of beauty, the madness caused by *erōs* offers the soul the opportunity to accelerate its movement upwards, but the opportunity must be seized. S. recalls the moment when as a pure soul in the company of the gods he attained his primordial glimpse of the Form of beauty. The utter bliss of that moment – its sublimity arising from the contrast between the purity of transcendence and the inevitability of human striving – inspires in the auditor a desire to attain such bliss himself. Even before this reminiscence S. had been using initiation into the Eleusinian mystery cult as a metaphor of the soul's glimpse of true Being: the oneness with deity that mystery cult offered its participants conveys the extreme emotion of the soul's transcendent arrival in the world of true Being. S.'s bliss when he sees the Form of beauty brings this metaphor to a climax with a densely

woven description of the cult's ritual drama, its shattering burst of light upon the dark, and its promise of spiritual purity and salvation (250b4–c5n.).

This bliss then propels the narrative to its most complex and heated moment as it plays out simultaneously in the world and within the soul (first of the lover, then of the beloved too). The lover's maddening experience of *erōs* at the sight of the beautiful boy is described vividly in physical terms: a Sapphic catalogue of symptoms (251a4–b2) is followed by an account of the regrowth of the soul's wings in language that is suggestive of mounting sexual tension (251b2–d7). *Erōs* drives the lover towards his beloved and precipitates a crisis: they seek consummation either in sexual gratification (as the bad horse desires) or (as the charioteer desires) in the chaste, mutual pursuit of virtue, godly habits, and, in the case of suitably equipped souls, philosophical discussion. At that moment a violent struggle erupts within the soul as the charioteer, supported by the good horse, attempts to restrain the bad horse and control the chariot's course. In profuse, vivid, concrete detail Plato depicts the bloody, straining efforts of charioteer and horses and the physical suppression of the bad horse, alluding to the violence of racing and crashing chariots (253e5–254e9). The crisis, experienced by lover and beloved together, is resolved by both together. If the charioteers in their souls win control, their erotic attachment leads to the mutual pursuit of philosophy in this world (the earthly goal of divine erotic striving) and bestows concrete progress towards the ultimate goal of rejoining the divine procession and regaining the view of true Being and the Forms after death.

When the narrative is complete, the imagined young male auditor is in a position to appreciate the epic nature of divine *erōs*: the normally hidden but utterly real world to which it belongs, its cosmic role, the heroic striving it requires, and the divine reward it offers when the opportunity is seized. In the *erastēs*' striving Ph. can see the true pursuit of beauty (228a4n.) and a model for a noble soul like his own to emulate in addressing potential *erōmenoi* (Introd. 3). Ph. has also been introduced to philosophy, in particular to its understanding of the cosmos and the place of human beings in it and to its captivating, defining pursuit of knowledge and the care of the soul.

243e7–245c4 Introduction: traditional examples of beneficial divine madness: inspired prophecy (244b1–d5), ritual healing (244d6–e5), poetry (245a1–7).

243e7 καλέ: the key attribute of the young man who is being addressed (237b2).

244a1 Φαίδρου τοῦ Πυθοκλέους, Μυρρινουσίου: Ph. is the author of S.'s first speech because he compelled S. to deliver it (236b8–237a1, 237a9–b1). The mock formality of naming Ph. with his patronymic ("son of Pythocles") and demotic ("of [the deme] Myrrhinus") sets up the coming witticism regarding Stesichorus. **a2** Στησιχόρου τοῦ Εὐφήμου, Ἱμεραίου: Stesichorus is the author of this speech because he is S.'s model in composing the palinode (243b2–6). Stesichorus as the son of Euphemus ("auspicious speech") from

Himera (a Sicilian city; cf. ἵμερος, "desire") is likely Plato's invention because the artifice is so evident. From here Euphemus and Himera found their way into Stesichorus' biographical tradition (*Suda*). However, an already existing tradition to this effect, convenient for Plato, cannot be ruled out. Cf. West 1971: 302–6 on the evidence for Stesichorus' life. **a2–3** οὐκ ἔστ' ἔτυμος λόγος: quoting Stesichorus (243a7). **a3** ὃς ἂν . . . φῆι: present general condition: any speech that argues for the non-lover over the lover is not true. **a4** διότι δὴ ὁ μὲν μαίνεται, ὁ δὲ σωφρονεῖ: these are the "indispensable" arguments of both Lysias' speech and S.'s first speech (236a1–2), but δή is ironic (*GP* 231), suggesting now that those arguments are inadequate. **a5** ἁπλοῦν "straightforward." **a6** θείαι μέντοι δόσει διδομένης "so long as it [i.e. madness] is given as a gift from the gods." This phrase anticipates S.'s argument because for Plato whatever comes from the gods must be good (246e1n.).

244b1–5 Ἥ τε γὰρ δὴ ἐν Δελφοῖς προφῆτις . . . δῆλα παντὶ λέγοντες: institutionally ensconced prophets, such as the Pythia at Apollo's oracle in Delphi and the priestesses at Zeus's oracle in Dodona, as well as individual diviners used ritual preparation and autosuggestion to attain a physically altered, ecstatic state in which they channeled the divine and thus performed their prophetic service (Dodds 1951: 68–75, Johnston 2008: 33–75). It is this "inspired prophecy" (μαντικῆι . . . ἐνθέωι, b4), distinguished below from rationalistic divination (244c5–d2), that Plato views as a form of divine madness (cf. a similar distinction at *Ti.* 71e–72b). The twofold typology of divination, followed by Cicero (*Div.*), reflects Plato's priorities and obscures phenomena that do not fit his categories neatly (Flower 2008: 84–91). **b2** ἰδίαι τε καὶ δημοσίαι: both individuals and *poleis* consulted the oracles at Delphi and Dodona. **b3** σωφρονοῦσαι δὲ βραχέα ἢ οὐδέν: when the Pythia and the priestesses were in a sober state, they did not prophesy and thus performed no service. Σίβυλλαν: a legendary figure, by the fourth century Sibylla was being treated as the source of prophetic utterances from a number of places in Greece (Parke 1988: 23–9). **b4** ἄλλους: individual diviners known as χρησμολόγοι, χρησμωιδοί, or μάντεις, operating on their own, prophesied after attaining an ecstatic state (*Ap.* 22c, *Meno* 99c, *Ion* 534c–d; Dillery 2005). **b5** εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὤρθωσαν "set [them] on the right path into the future." **b6** μήν "however." **b6–d5** καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενοι . . . τῆς παρ' ἀνθρώπων γιγνομένης: to the argument based on familiar phenomena is added this strikingly original one: *mantikē*, the prophetic art, whose value is obvious, was originally called and really is *manikē*, the mad art; etymology further reveals this mad prophetic art to be superior to rationalistic techniques of divination. As practiced by S. here and at length in the *Cratylus* (390e–427d), etymology is useful for the following reasons (Sedley 2003: 25–74): the ancients who first created words in Greek had an understanding of the things to which the words were designed to refer; for educational purposes the word-makers encoded in words information about the things to which the words

referred ("pronounceable strings of sound hinting with a suitable obliqueness at the true essences of their nominata," Sedley 2003: 63–4); phonetic changes introduced by later generations have obscured the encoded information, but that information can be recovered and the word's original educational purpose can be restored by means of etymology. Like word-making, etymology is an inexact art and effective only insofar as it is guided by dialectic (*Cra.* 390a–d, 435d–440e). Yet Socratic etymology is particularly useful in rhetorical contexts like the present one. The effectiveness of a word resides in the extent to which the word resembles the thing to which it refers (*Cra.* 423a–435c). Bringing this resemblance to light by means of etymology constitutes a weapon in the rhetor's arsenal of resemblances that he uses to manipulate his audiences (ὁμοιότητες, 262a5–b8; cf. *Cra.* 423a ὁμοιότατα, *Cra.* 434a–b ὅμοιον). S. uses etymologies of this kind for rhetorical purposes elsewhere in the dialogue (238c4, 249e3, 251c6). **b6–c1 οἱ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενοι:** those who "instituted" the words.

244c1–3 οὐ γὰρ ἂν τῆι καλλίστηι τέχνηι . . . μανικὴν ἐκάλεσαν "for they would not have connected precisely this word [i.e. *mania*] with the most noble art, by means of which the future is determined, and called it manic art." The generous characterization of prophecy, based on its intended efficacy and implicit throughout this paragraph, is essential for the argument that god-given *mania* is beneficial. The actual efficacy of prophecy is blithely ignored (cf. *Chrm.* 173c). The notion of an art of madness (μανικὴ τέχνη) is paradoxical since a τέχνη is precisely an activity that is carried out by rational means. This paradox parallels the paradox of *erōs* as the product of both god-given μανία and ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη (257a6, 227c3–4n., Introd. 5). **c3 καλοῦ ὄντος:** *sc.* μανίας. **c4–5 ἀπειροκάλως . . . μαντικὴν ἐκάλεσαν:** the insertion of the *tau* is vulgar (ἀπειροκάλως, as opposed to the word-makers' ability to recognize what is καλόν, c3) because it obscures the edifying connection between prophecy and madness. μάντις and related words may in fact be related etymologically to the root that gives rise to μανία, μαίνομαι, etc. (Chantraine 1968–80: 665), but Plato connected these words in ignorance of the historical–linguistic information that is utilized by modern etymological science. Euripides' Teiresias already utilized the verbal similarity to point out the connection between madness and prophecy without drawing an explicit etymology: τὸ μανιῶδες μαντικὴν πολλὴν ἔχει (*Bacch.* 299). **c5–6 τήν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων . . . τῶν ἄλλων σημείων** "the inquiry into the future made by the sober-minded, who conduct [their inquiry] through birds and other signs"; possessive genitive (τῶν ἐμφρόνων) and objective genitive (τοῦ μέλλοντος) depend on the same noun (ζήτησιν) (*AGPS* 47.9.6). Any occurrence could serve as a sign of divine intention, but bird flight (along with dreams and the entrails of victims) was one of the chief domains believed to be used by the gods to reveal their intentions cryptically. Interpreting divine signs is the work of sober-minded diviners because like a *technē* it is a deliberate, ratiocinative process that operates according to established principles (Burkert 2005). **c6–7 ἅτ' ἐκ διανοίας ποριζομένων**

ἀνθρωπίνηι οἰήσει νοῦν τε καὶ ἱστορίαν "inasmuch as they intellectually provide understanding and information for human thinking." **c7 οἰονοϊστικήν:** Plato's invention from <u>οἰ</u>ήσει <u>νοῦ</u>ν (cf. uncontracted νόον) τε καὶ <u>ἱστο</u>ρίαν.

244d1 τῶι ω σεμνύνοντες: a dig (like ἀπειροκάλως, 244c4): lengthening the vowel from ο to ω may indeed have created an emotive effect (Hermog. *Id.* 247 Rabe), but from Plato's perspective it is a laughable way to lend the word greater dignity, especially since it obscures the true and informative sense of the word. **d2 τελεώτερον καὶ ἐντιμότερον μαντικὴ οἰωνιστικῆς:** the superiority of inspired prophecy over rationalistic divination is evident from the preeminence of Delphi, Dodona, and Sibylla (244b1, 3). **d2–3 τό τε ὄνομα τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔργον τ' ἔργου:** τε . . . τε ("both . . . and") emphasizes the close connection between word and thing (244b6–d5n.). **d3 κάλλιον:** predicate of μανίαν. **d6–e5 Ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσων γε . . . τῶν παρόντων κακῶν εὑρομένη** "next point: for the worst illnesses and troubles, which indeed somehow [were] in some of the families due to ancient wraths, the madness, when it arose [in those families] and prophesied to the proper persons, discovered a cure by taking refuge in prayers and service to the gods. Thus it [i.e. the madness] hit upon purifications and initiatory rites and brought the person who had a share of the madness out of danger for the present and future time, since it discovered for the person who was truly mad and possessed a release from his current evils." As the second example of divine beneficial madness, telestic madness (244e2, 265b3) discloses purificatory rites that cure a person who is a member of a legendary family plagued by an ancient curse and whose illness is itself a form of the very madness that brings relief (244e3n.). This situation has parallels in common Greek beliefs and practices (244e2n.; Parker 1983: 198–234), but poetic details (244d6–7, e3) and the striking personification of the healing madness that structures the entire passage also suggest the imaginary archaic world of tragic poetry, though no particular drama is called to mind. **d6 ἅ:** the neuter refers to νόσων and πόνων as a group. **d6–7 παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνιμάτων:** the preposition between adjective and noun is poetic (*AGPS* 68.4.2); cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 934 παλαιῶν Ἄρεος ἐκ μηνιμάτων. **d7 τῶν γενῶν:** tragic plots often focused on divine anger and the multi-generational tribulations of particular families, such as the houses of Atreus and Labdacus.

244e1–2 καταφυγοῦσα πρὸς θεῶν εὐχάς τε καὶ λατρείας: the metaphor in the participle – "taking refuge in," meaning "having recourse to" – maintains the focus on the gods as the source of salvation. θεῶν is objective genitive, "prayers and service to the gods." **e2 καθαρμῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν:** these purifying rites might consist of particular sacrifices conducted in a particular order, cleansing by lustral water, the use of torches and sulfurous smoke, and homoeopathic scourings by vegetal and animal matter (Parker 1983: 224–34; 243a2–4n.). **e3 τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἔχοντα:** lit. "the person who has [something] of itself [i.e. the madness]." The verb, normally transitive, here takes a partitive genitive, a construction that

"implies an ellipse that may be represented by . . . τι" (*AGPS* 47.15.4); cf. *Grg.* 514a πράξοντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, *Rep.* 6.485b δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας (*AGPS* 47.15.3). The masculine participle used as a substantive with a dependent genitive is poetic (*AGPS* 47.10.1). The reflexive pronoun, referring to ἡ μανία, the subject of ἐποίησε, shows that the madness which afflicts the suffering person (τῶι ὀρθῶς μανέντι τε καὶ κατασχομένωι, e4) is the same as the divine healing madness. **e4 κατασχομένωι:** aorist middle with passive sense (LSJ s.v. A.II.10).

245a1 ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχή τε καὶ μανία: Plato modifies the traditional linkage between divine inspiration and poetry's authority (Hes. *Theog.* 1–35) by emphasizing madness as the key to the poet's success (Ford 2002: 167–9). Plato is well aware of poetry's ability to captivate and he often concedes divine inspiration (*Ion* 533d–534e, *Rep.* 10.607c–d), but he consistently rejects poetry's claim of authority regardless of its origins (*Ap.* 22a–c; Ferrari 1989). The absence of such a rejection here hardly signals a change of heart. There is evident irony (as with the previous two forms of beneficial divine madness) in allowing poetry its traditional due before it is eclipsed by S.'s divinely inspired, philosophically informed erotic rhetoric. **a1–2 ἁπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχήν:** i.e. young, because a young soul is most impressionable; cf. *Rep.* 2.377a–b, *Laws* 2.664b–c in regard to poetry's ability to shape young souls. ἄβατον, lit. "untrodden," here means "pristine." **a2 ἐκβακχεύουσα:** bacchic stimulation of the poet's soul emphasizes even more his lack of rationality. **a2–3 κατά τε ὠιδὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν** "with songs and with the other kind of poetry," i.e. poetry not set to music (278c2–3n.). **a3–4 μυρία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους παιδεύει:** the notion that poetry was a proper source of moral instruction became fashionable in the fifth century (*Prt.* 338e–339a; Ford 2002: 197–208) and was categorically rejected by Plato (*Rep.* 2–3, 10). **a4–5 ὃς δ' ἂν ἄνευ μανίας . . . ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος:** the disparagement of poetic *technē* in favor of poetic inspiration precisely parallels the case of technical divination vs. inspired prophecy (244c5–6n.). When S. shifts his focus away from divine madness and towards *technē* in the second, dialectical, part of the dialogue, he cites Sophocles and Euripides as exemplary experts in poetic *technē* (268c5n.). The distinction between poetic inspiration and *technē* helped shape the way poets in the Hellenistic period understood their task (Fantuzzi and Hunter 2004: 1–17). **ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται:** the image suggests that composing inspired poetry is akin to being granted admission into a locked and privileged domain. **a5 ἀτελής:** both "uninitiated," i.e. excluded from the privileged company of the Muses and their inspired poets, and "unsuccessful," i.e. at poetry. **a6–7 ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἡ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἠφανίσθη:** beyond the basic contrast between good poetry and bad, the hyperbaton highlights the contrast of madness and sobriety, as 244d3–5. The verb is gnomic aorist (232c1n.).

245b2–c4 ὥστε τοῦτό γε . . . ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως ἥδε: as S. is about to move into the body of his speech, he not only reminds us of the difference between Lysias' position on *erōs* and his own, but he draws a contrast between the bombastic quality of Lysias' speech (θορυβείτω δεδιττόμενος) and the substantive demonstration that he is about to present (ἀποδεικτέον, ἡ δὲ δὴ ἀπόδειξις, ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως). **b2 ὥστε** here introduces a main clause and is virtually equivalent to οὖν (*AGPS* 65.2.1). **b3 τοῦ κεκινημένου:** metaphorical ("the one who is disturbed," i.e. by *erōs*), but the verb anticipates the emphasis on the soul's movement in the upcoming proof (245c5–246a2). **b4–6 τόδε πρὸς ἐκείνωι . . . ἐκ θεῶν ἐπιπέμπεται:** merely asserting the Lysianic position on love (ἐκείνωι = πρὸ τοῦ κεκινημένου τὸν σώφρονα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι φίλον), with however much bluster (θορυβείτω δεδιττόμενος, b3), proves nothing, but a successful defense of Lysias' position (φερέσθω τὰ νικητήρια) would require an argument (τόδε . . . δείξας) establishing that divine *erōs* is not beneficial. **b5 τῶι ἐρῶντι καὶ τῶι ἐρωμένωι:** S. anticipates a crucial theme of his speech by including the *erastēs* along with the *erōmenos* as a beneficiary of divine *erōs* even though it is only the welfare of the latter that is officially under consideration. The benefit that accrues to the *erōmenos* does so only when both *erastēs* and *erōmenos* benefit and are animated by divine *erōs* (256a6–b7).

245c1 ἡ τοιαύτη μανία: i.e. madness that "comes from the gods" (245b1, cf. 244a6). **c2 δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή:** those interested in rhetorical display vs. those interested in the truth. The contrast reflects the different values held by Lysias and his audience and by S. and his preferred audience (227b6–7, 228a2, 243c1–d6; cf. *Ap.* 17a–18a). **c2–4 ψυχῆς φύσεως πέρι . . . τἀληθὲς νοῆσαι** "to understand the truth about the nature of the soul, human and divine, observing what it experiences as well as what it does." The conjunction of human and divine anticipates S.'s emphasis throughout the palinode on the human soul's transcendent striving and imitation of the divine. The focus on the soul's active and passive capacities anticipates S.'s dialectical account of the soul (270d1–7). **c4 ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως ἥδε:** this formal introductory statement prepares for the formal style in the next passage (245c5–246a2). The ἀπόδειξις (demonstration) spoken of here and throughout this paragraph (245b2–c4n.) refers not just to the immediately following passage but to the entire speech with its myth about the soul. The next passage is just the beginning, or first part, of the ἀπόδειξις.

245c5–246a2 Prior to narrating the experiences of the soul in heaven before and after its embodied life on earth, S. naturally seeks to establish that the soul lives on its own apart from the body. The argument for the immortality of soul accomplishes this task with a grandeur that sets the tone for the drama of transcendence in the rest of the speech. The argument depends on the evident connection between movement and life, presented as a permanent one: τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον (245c5). Only what is self-moving is always moving (245c5–d1); as the beginning of all that comes into existence in the universe, what is

self-moving neither comes into existence nor ceases to exist but always exists (245d1–e2); the self-moving is soul; therefore, since the self-moving is always moving and the always moving always exists, the soul always exists (245e3–246a2). The argument is highly condensed, which jeopardizes its coherence; for analysis cf. Bett 1986, Blyth 1997: 194–8. The idea that soul is immortal because it is always moving was proposed by Alcmaeon of Croton (5th c., DK 24 A12 = Arist. *De an.* 405a29–b1). The reliance on movement to prove the soul's immortal existence (also *Laws* 10.894b–896c), as opposed to other possible proofs (explored in the *Phaedo*), is appropriate because the coming myth focuses on the movement of souls towards Being and because both divine *erōs* and psychagogic rhetoric entail moving human souls in a particular direction.

Plato casts the argument in a form that recalls the gnomic, oracular qualities of fifth-century Ionian philosophical prose. Denniston 1952: 1–5 aptly compares Anaxagoras DK 59 B12, the first part of which runs as follows:

> τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει, νοῦς δέ ἐστιν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέμεικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλά τεῳι ἐμέμεικτο ἄλλωι, μετεῖχεν ἂν ἁπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμεικτό τεῳι· . . . καὶ ἂν ἐκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμειγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως ὡς καὶ μόνον ἐόντα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον, καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον· καὶ ὅσα γε ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω, πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ. καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὥστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν.

> The other things have a share of everything but *nous* is unlimited and self-ruling and has been mixed with no thing, but is alone itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but had been mixed with anything else, then it would partake of all things, if it had been mixed with anything; . . . and the things mixed together with it would thwart it, so that it would control none of the things in the way that it in fact does, being alone by itself. For it is the finest of all things and the purest, and indeed it maintains all discernment about everything and has the greatest strength. And *nous* has control over all things that have soul, both the larger and the smaller. And *nous* controlled the whole revolution, so that it started to revolve in the beginning. (trans. Curd)

The fundamental element νοῦς is treated with a majestic confidence similar to the treatment of ψυχή in the *Phaedrus* passage. Like Anaxagoras, Plato avoids emotional coloring, omits the article with key terms (ψυχή, ἀρχή), repeats basic terms (κινέω, γίγνομαι), and makes use of wordplay and sound play (245c5–7, 246a1–2). Cf. Thesleff 1966: 90–4 on the style of this genre.

245c5 Ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος: the conclusion of the argument, placed first for clarity, emphasis, and grandeur. ψυχὴ πᾶσα = "all soul," not "every soul,"

because the argument treats soul as a single undifferentiated entity that possesses certain properties (self-movement, immortality). But there is an ambiguity that remains unresolved between the immortal "all soul" of the proof and the immortal soul that individual human beings possess and that forms the subject of the myth (246c1n.). **τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον:** this point, the major premise of the entire argument, is axiomatic. The reading ἀεικίνητον (medieval MSS; cf. *quod semper movetur* in Cicero's translation, *Rep.* 6.27, *Tusc.* 1.53) is superior to αὐτοκίνητον (*P.Oxy.* 1017.20.5–6, 2nd–3rd c. CE, with [ἀει]κίνητον recorded in the margin). αὐτοκίνητον probably arose from and would make redundant S.'s immediately following argument that only what is self-moving never ceases moving (245c5–d1) (Decleva Caizzi 1970). **c5–7 τὸ δ' ἄλλο κινοῦν . . . παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς:** highly stylized: the antithetical statement about movement is followed by anaphora on παῦλαν, the absence of movement. **c7 ἅτε οὐκ ἀπολεῖπον ἑαυτό:** lit. "inasmuch as it does not abandon itself"; i.e. inasmuch as it remains what it is, viz. an entity that moves itself.

245d1 ἀρχὴ κινήσεως: ἀρχή should be translated throughout this passage as "the beginning" because there is a specific beginning at issue, viz. the one and only beginning of motion in the universe. By omitting the article Plato treats this entity like a proper name, which lends grandeur, as with βασιλεύς for the Persian king or with salient natural phenomena; e.g. *Grg.* 451c περὶ τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φορὰν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης (*AGPS* 50.2.12, 18). **d2 μηδ' ἐξ ἑνός** = ἐκ μηδενός. **d2–3 εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του ἀρχὴ γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο:** *sc.* πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον (d1–2) as the subject of the main clause: "for if the beginning came into existence from something, [everything that comes into existence] would not come into existence from the beginning" (which *per hypothesim* is impossible). Cf. the similar point at 245d5 εἴπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῖ τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι. If ἀρχή is understood as the subject of the main clause, the resulting sentence – "if the beginning came into existence from something, [the beginning] would not come into existence from the beginning" – makes no sense. The commonly accepted emendation οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἀρχὴ γίγνοιτο (based on a reference to this passage in Iamblichus, *In Nicomachi Arithmeticam introductionem* 11) is unsatisfactory because it would require that γίγνοιτο be taken as equivalent to εἴη ("the beginning would no longer be a beginning"), but throughout this passage γίγνομαι has the meaning "come into existence." **d3–4 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγένητόν . . . ἀνάγκη εἶναι:** the subject of ἐστιν is ἀρχή, which is the antecedent of αὐτό.

245e1–2 ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν . . . κινηθέντα γενήσεται: *sc.* ἀνάγκη, οὐρανός = universe (cf. *Ti.* 28b), γένεσις = τὰ γιγνόμενα (cf. *Ti.* 29e): "otherwise the entire universe and all that has come into existence [must] collapse and come to a halt and never again have an occasion whereby they will be moved and come into existence." **e3–4 ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον τοῦτον αὐτόν τις λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται** "a person will not hesitate to speak of the essence and account of soul as precisely this," viz. self-moving. τοῦτον αὐτόν is attracted from neuter to the

gender of λόγον. **e5** ὧι δὲ ἔνδοθεν αὐτῶι ἐξ αὑτοῦ: *sc.* τὸ κινεῖσθαι. **e6** ταύτης: i.e. self-movement. **e6–246a1** εἰ δ' ἔστι τοῦτο . . . ἢ ψυχήν "and if that is the case, that that which moves itself is none other than soul, . . ."

246a1–2 ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγένητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη: the conclusion, marked with assonance on α, recalls the opening (245c5).

246a3–e3 The image of the soul as winged chariot with charioteer and team of one good horse and one bad one.

246a3 τῆς ἰδέας αὐτῆς: "the ἰδέα [of the soul] is the form in which the nature (φύσις) of the soul manifests itself; so the words are practically synonymous" (Verdenius 1955: 277; cf. 245c2–3). **a4–5** οἷον μέν ἐστι . . . ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος "[to say] what sort of thing [the soul] is requires an utterly completely divine and lengthy explanation, but [to say] what it resembles [requires] a human and briefer one." The genitives are predicative, expressing characteristics of the subject; e.g. *Grg.* 507b σώφρονος ἀνδρός ἐστιν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν (*AGPS* 47.6.8). The infinitive εἶναι is due to the influence of λεκτέον. S. suggests that the divine, lengthy account which he forgoes is inappropriate in the present context for being too rigorous, as in the *Republic* S. forgoes a "longer and fuller" account of the three parts of the soul (4.435d) and also substitutes the image of the sun in place of the account of the good that is not possible at the moment (6.506d–e). **a6** συμφύτωι: lit. "grown together"; the word stresses the unity of the soul in spite of the conflict that becomes apparent in the account of *erōs* (250e1–252c3). ὑποπτέρου goes with both ζεύγους and ἡνιόχου, the entire soul being winged (251b7). The winged soul anticipates the connection with Eros, the winged god (252b6–c1n.). ζεύγους: Plato follows a venerable tradition in using the chariot – for the Greeks the most powerful engine of movement (Crouwel 1992) – for literary purposes (*Il.* 5.364–9, Anacreon *PMG* 360 in regard to *erōs*, Parmenides DK 28 B1.1–10; Romilly 1982, Slaveva-Griffin 2003: 231–9).

246b1–4 καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν . . . ἡ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἡνιόχησις: by specifying that for non-divine souls (τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, a7–b1) the team of horses (ζεύγους, a6) consists strictly of a pair (συνωρίδος), S. immediately establishes the problem treated in the myth: one driver (ὁ ἄρχων) unavoidably (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) struggling to guide the mixed (μέμεικται) team of one good horse and one bad one. The chariot image is compatible with the tripartite soul of the *Republic*: charioteer equivalent to reason, good horse equivalent to the spirited part of the soul (253d6–7n.), bad horse equivalent to the appetitive part of the soul. But far from serving as an analytical account of the soul, the chariot image is designed to meet the needs of the palinode, viz. to put the psychological experience of *erōs* into narrative form (253c7–254e9). ἡνιοχεῖ governs the genitive συνωρίδος as with verbs of ruling (*AGPS* 47.20.0). ἡ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἡνιόχησις = "the driving in our case" (279a4–5n.). **b4** πῇ δὴ οὖν θνητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ζῶιον ἐκλήθη: the question arises because it was just proved that all soul is immortal. The subject is ζῶιον

("a living creature," i.e. one endowed with a soul), the predicate is θνητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον. **b6** **Ψυχὴ πᾶσα παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου** "all soul [245c5n.] has charge of all that is soulless" because soul, the self-mover, imparts movement to the rest of the (soulless) universe (245c7–d1, d6–e2).

246c1 **ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλοις εἴδεσι γιγνομένη** "taking different forms at different times." This clause makes the transition, and helps to cover the ambiguity (245c5n.), between "all soul" of the proof and the individual soul that is likened to the winged chariot in the myth that is about to unfold. **c1–d2** **τελέα μὲν οὖν . . . ταῦτα συμπεφυκότα:** this long sentence is based on coordinate main clauses (τελέα μὲν [*sc.* ψυχή] . . . μετεωροπορεῖ τε καὶ . . . διοικεῖ, ἡ δὲ . . . φέρεται), on which depends a temporal clause (ἕως ἂν . . . ἀντιλάβηται) followed by a locative clause (οὗ . . .) that contains a string of participles and loosely connected finite verbs (ἐκλήθη . . . θνητόν τ' ἔσχεν . . . , ἀλλὰ πλάττομεν). Details are treated in the following notes. **c1** **τελέα:** soul is "perfect" insofar as it has its wings intact and no admixture of body. **c3** **φέρεται ἕως ἂν στερεοῦ τινος ἀντιλάβηται:** i.e. falling to the earth, which is the "something solid." **c3–6** **οὗ κατοικισθεῖσα . . . θνητόν τ' ἔσχεν ἐπωνυμίαν:** the subject shifts from ψυχή to τὸ ξύμπαν, with which ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα παγέν are in apposition: "where [soul], having settled and taken on earthly body that itself seems to move itself because of soul's power, the whole thing together, soul and body fixed [to it], is called a living creature and has mortal as its name." **c6–7** **ἀθάνατον δὲ οὐδ' ἐξ ἑνὸς λόγου λελογισμένου:** *sc.* ἔσχεν ἐπωνυμίαν from the previous clause; ἀθάνατον is accusative: "but immortal it [i.e. the combined entity of soul and body] has as its name on the basis of no reasoned argument." **c7–d2** **ἀλλὰ πλάττομεν . . . ταῦτα συμπεφυκότα** "rather we fashion god, without having seen or sufficiently apprehended it, as a kind of immortal living creature that has both soul and body, and [we fashion] these things [i.e. soul and body] as naturally joined for all time." Thus S. accounts for the traditional anthropomorphic gods, who are given a central role in this mythic discourse but who are also assimilated to the idea of beneficent divinity that is basic and idiosyncratic to Plato (246e1n.).

246d3–4 **δι' ἣν ψυχῆς ἀπορρεῖ** "through which [cause] they [i.e. the wings] fall away from the soul." **d6–e1** **κεκοινώνηκε δέ πῃ μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θείου** "and [the wing], in a sense, partakes of the divine most of the things associated with the body." Although the wings are part of the soul, they can be considered in relation to the body since mortal beings are conglomerations of soul and body (246c2–6). On περί with the accusative in attributive position, cf. 279a4–5n.

246e1 **τὸ δὲ θεῖον καλόν, σοφόν, ἀγαθόν, καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι τοιοῦτον:** it was a fundamental principle for Plato that what is divine is necessarily good (242e3, 274a2–3, *Rep.* 2.379a–c, *Ti.* 29e–30a). Divine goodness entails no particular concern for

human welfare or individual human beings, but is the impersonal consequence of the just and orderly nature of the divine cosmos, which allows human beings to thrive insofar as we adapt ourselves to it (Verdenius 1954, Carone 2005). **e1–3 τούτοις δὴ τρέφεταί . . . διόλλυται:** because the wings that lift ensouled creatures to the lofty divine realm are strengthened by the virtues and destroyed by the vices, the acquisition of the virtues or vices will be the key development in the life of a human soul (250a3–4).

246e4–247c3 The heavenly procession of divine and human souls. Order and grace among the gods contrast with the struggle and turmoil of human souls.

246e4–5 Ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν . . . καὶ ἐπιμελούμενος: grand style, abruptly following mundane descriptive style (246a3–e3), grabs the attention as the myth proper begins. **e5–247a4 τῶι δ' ἕπεται στρατιὰ . . . ἣν ἕκαστος ἐτάχθη:** the "host" is composed of eleven contingents, each headed by one of the twelve gods except Hestia. Zeus stands at the head of both the entire host and his own contingent (250b5, 252c4). Twelve main gods were canonical (Long 1987), Hestia among them (Heitsch 1993b: 174–8). Hestia stays at home because there, at the hearth, is her proper place (*Hom. Hymn Aphrodite* 30), just as the other leading gods assume their proper places (κατὰ τάξιν ἣν ἕκαστος ἐτάχθη). Hestia was also associated with the earth (Soph. *TrGF* 615, Eur. *TrGF* 944, Anaxagoras DK 59 A20b), which would prevent her ascent to the top of heaven. Pythagorean influence was formerly supposed in order to explain the mention of Hestia, but the supposition is mistaken (Burkert 1972: 317). The θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων who make up the host include the innumerable local gods and lesser divinities who inhabit all corners of the Greek world. The presence of human souls is not indicated until 247a6.

247a2–4 τῶν δὲ ἄλλων . . . ἣν ἕκαστος ἐτάχθη "all the other gods in the number of the twelve, having been stationed (τεταγμένοι) [as] chiefs (ἄρχοντες), lead (ἡγοῦνται) at the station to which each was stationed." **a4 μὲν οὖν:** picked up by δὲ δή (247a7). **a5–6 πράττων ἕκαστος αὐτῶν τὸ αὑτοῦ:** this expression recalls the principle of justice in the ideal polis of the *Republic* (4.433a–434d). **a6 ἕπεται δὲ ὁ ἀεὶ ἐθέλων τε καὶ δυνάμενος:** i.e. the human souls in the procession, opposed to the θεῶν γένος εὐδαιμόνων (247a5); cf. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα μόγις (247b2–3). **a6–7 φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται:** only in Plato's world do the gods not envy human achievement (246e1n.). **a7 πρὸς δαῖτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην:** the gods' banquet, as at the end of *Iliad* 1, further suggests the ease with which they carry on their affairs, here the ascent. The feast consists simply of the view of true Being, the soul's proper nourishment (247d1–2, 3, e2, 248b5–c2). **a7–b1 ἄκραν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἁψῖδα:** heaven is imagined as the inside space of a sphere or perhaps the top half of a sphere (247c1–3n.). The top of the heavenly "vault" (ἁψῖδα), which supports heaven from the inside and below (ὑπ-), is at the highest point of the inside of the heavenly sphere.

247b3 βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς κάκης ἵππος μετέχων: the wicked horse "weighs down" the chariot to which it belongs because vice (τῆς κάκης) prevents the soul's ascent (246e1–3n.). **b4 ὧι μὴ καλῶς ἧι τεθραμμένος τῶν ἡνιόχων** "for whichever charioteer has [a wicked horse] that is not well trained." Omission of ἄν with the subjunctive in a general relative clause is poetic (*AGPS* 54.15.1). **b5 αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατοι καλούμεναι:** *sc.* ψυχαί, the souls of the gods (246b4–5). αἱ μέν is answered by αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί (248a1).

247c1–3 ἡνίκ' ἂν πρὸς ἄκρωι . . . τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ: having proceeded in the interior of the heavenly sphere (247a4) up to the topmost point on the inside (247b1), the divine souls take a position on the outer surface (lit. "on the back") of the sphere at the same topmost point. Looking outward from that point, which lies at the top of the axis around which the heavenly sphere revolves, they can see what lies beyond the heavenly sphere. **c1 ἔστησαν:** gnomic aorist for typical actions in the narrative (also 247e4–5, 248a2–5, 254b4–e5) (*AGPS* 53.10.2).

247c4–e4 The divine view of the super-heavenly realm.

247c4–6 Τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον τόπον . . . περὶ ἀληθείας λέγοντα: S. warns that the topics he is about to broach, true Being and the Forms (which could be treated more rigorously in a dialectical setting), can hardly receive apt treatment (κατ' ἀξίαν) in the poetic, hymnic genre in which he is speaking. Unlike the image of the soul as winged chariot that substitutes for a full account of the soul (246a4–5), here S. offers not an image but simply an abbreviated account. But S. does not fail both to maintain the hymnic character of the speech and to summarize effectively the nature of true Being and the Forms (265b6–c3). **c4 τῆιδε:** here on earth. **c6 ἀληθείας:** the pun with τό γε ἀληθές ("the truth") does not translate directly: ἀληθείας is not "truth" (epistemological sense), but "the true nature of things" (metaphysical sense; also 247d3 τἀληθῆ, 248b6 ἀληθείας, 248c4 τῶν ἀληθῶν, 249b5 ἀλήθειαν). **c6–8 ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός . . . θεατὴ νῶι** "the colorless, shapeless, intangible Being that truly is, perceptible only to the soul's pilot, intelligence." Forms, which never change, lack attributes of physical existence, but there is a sense in which they can be seen (250b4–c4). **c8 περὶ ἣν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης γένος:** lit. "about which is the class of true knowledge" = "which is the object of the class of true knowledge."

247d1–2 ἅτ' οὖν θεοῦ διάνοια . . . τρεφομένη = ἡ οὖν θεοῦ διάνοια, ἅτε . . . τρεφομένη, κτλ. **d2 καὶ ἁπάσης ψυχῆς ὅση ἂν μέλληι τὸ προσῆκον δέξασθαι** "and [the mind] of every soul that is going to receive what is fitting." **d3–4 ἰδοῦσα διὰ χρόνου . . . καὶ εὐπαθεῖ:** the vision of true Being provides delight in addition to nourishment, as is fitting in a feast (247a7). This delight is a crucial aspect of philosophical *erōs* (266b4–7). τἀληθῆ = "true reality" (247c6n.). **d4 ἕως ἂν κύκλωι ἡ περιφορὰ εἰς ταὐτὸν περιενέγκηι:** a single complete revolution of the heavenly sphere (247c1–3n.); the duration is unspecified. **d5–6 καθορᾶι μὲν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην . . . καθορᾶι δὲ**

ἐπιστήμην: Plato uses the intensifying pronoun αὐτός with an abstract noun to refer in a technical sense to the pertinent Form (des Places 1962); hence "justice itself" means the Form of justice, as e.g. *Rep.* 7.517e αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην. The usage with δικαιοσύνην here extends to the two other nouns. The anaphora with καθορᾶι and the mention of three of the most important Forms suggest the complete understanding that is appropriate for the gods. Beauty, conspicuous by its absence, awaits special consideration (250b4). **d6–e1** οὐδ' ἥ ἐστίν . . . ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν "nor, surely, [the knowledge] that is different in different circumstances, being [knowledge] of things that we on earth call real, but the knowledge that is real in the circumstance of what is truly Being." The predicate ὄντων is attracted to the case of its subject ὧν, which is a compression of τούτων ἅ.

247e3–4 πρὸς τὴν φάτνην . . . νέκταρ ἐπότισεν: a reminiscence of Homer adds to the feel of myth: *Il.* 5.368–9 (≈ 13.34–5) ἔνθ' ἵππους ἔστησε ποδήνεμος ὠκέα Ἶρις | λύσασ' ἐξ ὀχέων, παρὰ δ' ἀμβρόσιον βάλεν εἶδαρ. In Homer ambrosia is food for gods as well as divine horses; nectar is drunk by gods.

248a1–c2 The struggle of human souls to see true Being.

248a1 αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί: human souls (cf. 247b5 αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατοι), who follow, insofar as they can, one or another of the divine contingents that constitute the procession up towards the top of heaven (246e5–247a6). **a1–2** ἡ μὲν ἄριστα θεῶι ἑπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη: the first category of human souls, those who keep up with the divine leader of their contingent (ἄριστα θεῶι ἑπομένη) and succeed in glimpsing the super-heavenly realm in spite of the difficulty (μόγις καθορῶσα τὰ ὄντα, 248a3–4). These human souls are "most like a god" (ἄριστα θεῶι also with εἰκασμένη) in the strength of their wings and the charioteers' ability to control both horses (247b3–4, 248b2–3), which according to the allegory means that the souls are well ordered and virtuous. Later S. stresses a different sense in which human beings become like the god whose contingent they attended during the procession of souls (252c4–253c2, esp. 253a4n.). **a3** συμπεριηνέχθη τὴν περιφοράν "it is carried round in the revolution" (247c1–3n.); cognate accusative modifying the passive verb (*AGPS* 46.5.1), which is gnomic aorist (247c1n.). **a4–5** ἡ δὲ τοτὲ μὲν . . . τὰ δ' οὔ: the second category of human souls, those who because of the jostling (βιαζομένων δὲ τῶν ἵππων) attain only a partial view of the super-heavenly realm (τὰ μὲν εἶδεν, τὰ δ' οὔ). Transitive ἦρεν is parallel to intransitive ἔδυ (τοτὲ μὲν ἦρεν, τοτὲ δ' ἔδυ). With ἦρεν *sc.* εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἡνιόχου κεφαλήν (248a2). The simple verb repeats the sense of the compound ὑπερῆρεν (248a2), but more forcefully, which is a poetic usage (*AGPS* 68.46.20). **a5–b5** αἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλαι . . . τροφῆι δοξαστῆι χρῶνται: the third category of human souls, those who attain no glimpse of the super-heavenly realm in spite of their desire to see it and their strenuous efforts. The next incarnation of these souls will not be in human form because

they had no glimpse of the super-heavenly realm (249b5–6n.). **a6** ἕπονται "try to follow" (273d7n. on the present tense). ὑποβρύχιαι: i.e. on the lower, interior side of the membrane of the heavenly sphere through which the souls must emerge to see the super-heavenly realm (247c1–3n.). **a6–b2** πατοῦσαι ἀλλήλας . . . ἱδρὼς ἔσχατος γίγνεται: contrast the order and grace of the divine procession (246e4–247c3).

248b1 ἐπιβάλλουσαι "shoving"; intransitive (*AGPS* 52.2.7). **b2–3** κακίαι ἡνιόχων: the charioteers' inability to manage their teams. **b4** πολὺν ἔχουσαι πόνον: pathetic: "in spite of their great toil." ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας "uninitiated in the spectacle of Being"; a brief anticipation of the full-blown comparison to mystery cult initiation (249c6–d1, 250b4–c5n.). **b5** τροφῆι δοξαστῆι "the food of opinion," which is based on the world of appearance (this earthly world) and is opposed to knowledge. The latter, based on the Forms and true Being, constitutes the soul's proper nourishment (247d1–4, next note). **b5–c2** οὗ δὴ ἕνεχ' . . . τούτωι τρέφεται "the reason why there is great eagerness to see where the plain of truth lies is that the proper pasturage for the best part of the soul comes from the meadow there, and the natural power of the wing, which makes the soul lighter, is nourished by it." The inborn appetite for knowledge that belongs to the "best part of the soul" (reason, 247d1–2) is part of the soul's natural erotic disposition that will be exploited by the skilled rhetorician (271c9–272b4). The locutions τὸ ἀληθείας πεδίον and τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος draw on a vocabulary of cosmological mythological discourse used by Plato elsewhere in accounts of the afterlife (*Rep.* 10.621a τὸ τῆς λήθης πεδίον, 10.614e εἰς τὸν λειμῶνα, *Grg.* 524a ἐν τῶι λειμῶνι).

248c3–249d3 The law of Adrastea, the incarnation and reincarnation of souls, and how human beings recollect the Forms which they saw in their original, prenatal glimpse of true Being. Plato's doctrine of metempsychosis and the soul's quest for purity joins a tradition that goes back through Empedocles (Inwood 2001: 55–68) to the Orphics (Casadio 1991) and Pythagoreans (Burkert 1972: 120–65, Huffman 2009), but his borrowing is selective.

248c3 Θεσμός τε Ἀδραστείας: the law of Adrastea ("she from whom one cannot run away") is unavoidable. Identified with Ἀνάγκη in an orphic theogony (DK 1 B13; West 1983: 194–6), Adrastea was also a name of Nemesis, the divine enforcer ([Eur.] *Rhes.* 342, Antimachus frag. 131 Matthews). She was enshrined in the pithy saying προσκυνεῖν Ἀδράστειαν, "submit to the inevitable" (*Rep.* 5.451a, [Aesch.] *PV* 936, [Dem.] 25.37). **c4** τῶν ἀληθῶν "the true nature of things" (247c6n.). μέχρι τε τῆς ἑτέρας περιόδου: the duration is unspecified. On the nature of the revolution, cf. 247c1–3n. **c4–5** ἀπήμονα . . . ἀβλαβῆ: this soul remains in the heavenly realm and is not born into a corporeal form. The accusative–infinitive construction follows the law of Adrastea. **c6** τινι συντυχίαι: in the chaos among human souls struggling to keep up with the gods

(248a5–b3). **λήθης:** this "forgetfulness," i.e. of the Forms and true Being, begins as soon as the soul fails to attain sight of the super-heavenly realm in its latest attempt to do so. It can be remedied by the process of recollection (249c1–3) that ultimately returns the soul to the heavenly procession. In describing ignorance of truth as λήθη Plato exploits a common Greek conception that understood λήθη in opposition to ἀλήθεια and regarded both in relation to the condition of being seen (λήθη as concealment vs. ἀ-λήθεια as un-concealment) (248b6) (Heitsch 1962). **κακίας:** the "deficiency" which afflicts this soul refers both to the charioteer's inability to manage his team and to the defects of character that damage the wings, encumber the soul, and send it downward (246e2–3, 247b3–4, 248b2–3, 250a3–4).

248d1 ταύτην μὴ φυτεῦσαι εἰς μηδεμίαν θήρειον φύσιν "not to implant this [soul] into any animal creature." **d2 τῆι πρώτηι γενέσει:** the soul can be born as an animal after its first life as a human being (249b3–5). **d2–e3 τὴν μὲν πλεῖστα ἰδοῦσαν . . . ἐνάτηι τυραννικός:** the hierarchy of human lives illustrates that the more a soul has seen of the super-heavenly realm, i.e. the more it understands of the Forms and true Being, the better and more virtuous its life on earth. The hierarchy also anticipates the typology of souls that underlies the use of style in proper rhetorical practice (271b1–272b4). **d2–3 τὴν μὲν πλεῖστα ἰδοῦσαν . . . καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ:** supply φυτεῦσαι (from d1) to govern the feminine accusative (*sc.* ψυχήν); supply τῶν ἀληθῶν (from c4) with πλεῖστα. γονὴν ἀνδρός = "the engendering of a man" (objective genitive). Lover of wisdom, lover of beauty, follower of the Muses, and follower of Eros are all aspects of the philosophical life (278d4–6, *Phd.* 61a, *Rep.* 3.403c, 8.548b). Such a life is the best one for an individual and includes as well the ability to transform other individuals and whole communities permanently for the good. "Follower of the Muses" does not include poets per se, who come sixth (248e1), since they are not necessarily philosophical (278b6–d6). Stesichorus would be an exception because of his philosophical status (243a6). On Plato's philosophical Muses, cf. 258e5–259d6n., 268e1–2n. **d4–5 τὴν δὲ δευτέραν . . . ἢ χρηματιστικοῦ:** supply γονὴν ἀνδρὸς γενησομένου with εἰς in d4, 5. Lawful king and military leader benefit the community. The political man, estate holder, and businessman achieve practical benefits on a lesser scale. **d5–6 τετάρτην εἰς φιλοπόνου . . . ἐσομένου:** supply γονὴν ἀνδρὸς with εἰς . . . ἐσομένου. The lives in the fourth rank contribute towards physical well-being, yet τινα is disparaging: this healer is more an empirical physician than a scientific one. On the difference between the two types of physician, cf. *Laws* 4.720a–e, 9.857c–e. **d6–e2 πέμπτην μαντικὸν βίον . . . τις ἄλλος ἁρμόσει:** supply βίος with ποιητικός and τις ἄλλος. Prophet, ritual expert, and poet are not high on the list because, despite the beneficial divine inspiration that is the source of their activities (244b1–245a7), they are mere vehicles for such inspiration and as individuals they make no distinctive contribution (*Meno* 99c–d). This view of inspiration leads S. to regard his

eloquence as inspired for the sake of self-deprecation (262d2–5, d4–5n.). Painter and sculptor are primary among others "concerned with imitation."

248e2–3 ἑβδόμηι δημιουργικὸς . . . τυραννικός: *sc.* βίος. The lives of craftsman and farmer are menial but honest. The lives of sophist and demagogue are dishonest and destructive (*Grg.* 461b–466a, 515b–521a). The life of a tyrant is the worst and most destructive of all (*Rep.* 9.571a–578c). **e4–249b5 Ἐν δὴ τούτοις ἅπασιν . . . πάλιν εἰς ἄνθρωπον:** once born into human form souls cannot regain wings and rejoin the heavenly procession for at least ten thousand years. Each life followed by its postmortem punishment or reward lasts one thousand years, at which time the soul is reincarnated and chooses the form of its next life. The philosopher is an exception: he can regain his wings, and thus rejoin the heavenly procession, after three thousand years if he leads three philosophical lives in succession (256b1–5n.). **e4–5 ἀμείνονος μοίρας . . . χείρονος:** after death, as elaborated in 249a4–b2. **e5–6 τὸ αὐτὸ ὅθεν ἥκει:** the top part of the heavenly sphere where the procession upward to the super-heavenly realm takes place.

249a1–2 τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαντος ἀδόλως ἢ παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας: two respects in which the philosopher's soul merits the speedier return to heaven. First, ἀδόλως, "honestly," is a reminder, ever apt in Plato's world, of the confusion between the true philosopher, who subordinates all concerns to the pursuit of knowledge, and the sham one who uses intellectual expertise to advance personal ends; cf. *Rep.* 10.619e ὑγιῶς φιλοσοφοῖ, *Sph.* 253e τῶι καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι. Plato represents this confusion as afflicting S. in the *Apology* (18b–20c) and the establishment of the just city in the *Republic* (6.490a–500c). Second, the virtuous nature of the erotic pursuits of the philosopher (256a6–b7) is diametrically opposed to the self-serving pursuit of sex undertaken by the conventional *erastēs* of Lysias' speech and S.'s first speech. **a4 ἀπέρχονται:** i.e. away from this world and back to the heavenly sphere. **a5–b2 κρίσεως ἔτυχον . . . ἐβίωσαν βίου:** in myths elsewhere Plato gives an extended treatment of postmortem judgment, punishment under the earth, and reward in heaven (*Rep.* 10.614c–616b, *Grg.* 523b–524a). **a6–b1 εἰς τοὐρανοῦ τινα τόπον ὑπὸ τῆς Δίκης κουφισθεῖσαι** "lifted up by Justice into some region of heaven"; i.e. not the upper region of heaven where the procession towards the super-heavenly realm takes place (for which they must await the renewal of their wings), but a lower part of heaven (τῆς ὑπουρανίου πορείας, 256d6) where they await their next reincarnation.

249b1–2 διάγουσιν ἀξίως οὗ ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει ἐβίωσαν βίου "they lead a life worthy of the one they lived in human form." **b2–3 ἐπὶ κλήρωσίν . . . θέληι ἑκάστη:** in the myth of Er the souls about to be reborn select lots for the order in which they will choose their new lives (*Rep.* 10.617d–620d). **b5–6 οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε μήποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα:** ἀλήθειαν = "true reality"

(247c6n.); "this shape" = human shape. The fact that all human souls have seen true reality (to some extent) explains the restriction on birth into human form (248d1–2, 249b4–5). This fact (repeated for emphasis, 249e4–250a1) also complements the hierarchy of human lives that is determined by the differences in the souls' vision of true reality (248d2–e3n.). The art of discourse that is set forth later in the dialogue is designed to respond both to the differences among human souls (as reflected in the hierarchy) and to the capacity for instruction that is common to all human beings by virtue of their common primordial vision of true Being, however brief that vision may have been (271d1–6). **b6–c1 δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον . . . λογισμῶι συναιρούμενον:** a vexed passage, often emended (Hoffmann and Rashed 2008), but best left as received. The object of συνιέναι is λεγόμενον (neuter acc. sing. pass.), used substantively without the article, "a thing said." For this usage cf. 271e3–4 παραγιγνόμενον ("a nearby person"), *Lys.* 213c ὅταν ἢ μὴ φιλοῦν τις φιλῆι ἢ καὶ μισοῦν φιλῆι, *Meno* 82c; further examples at Kühner and Gerth 1898: 1.608–9. κατ' εἶδος modifies λεγόμενον, ἰόν agrees with λεγόμενον, συναιρούμενον agrees with ἕν. First, a literal translation: "a human being must understand what is said with respect to form, as it [i.e. what is said with respect to form] goes from many perceptions to a unity brought together through reasoning." "What is said with respect to form" is a discourse conducted on a higher, more abstract level than concrete instances or individual perceptions, as is evident in the use of "form" (εἶδος, ἰδέα) in the account of dialectical reasoning later in the dialogue (265d1–266b2). The way in which reason is here said to perceive unity within multiplicity (ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῶι συναιρούμενον) anticipates collection in particular, the synoptic movement of dialectic (265d4–5). Hence a more comprehensible translation: "a human being must understand a discourse conducted on an abstract level as that discourse proceeds from many perceptions to a unity brought together through reasoning." This is a highly condensed statement of the underlying process of reasoning by means of which a human being in this world acquires knowledge. It follows the preceding statement about the human soul's prenatal vision of true Being (249b5–6) because for Plato a human being must recall that vision if he or she is to acquire knowledge during this earthly life (next note).

249c1–2 τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἅ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή: to account for the ability of human beings to learn complex, high-level truths and especially to progress to the knowledge of Forms Plato proposed the theory that learning of this kind is based on recollection (ἀνάμνησις) of the original, prenatal, vision of the Forms (*Meno* 81c–85d, *Phd.* 72e–77a); cf. Scott 1995: 3–85, Kahn 2006 on this theory and its difficulties. In the *Phaedrus* the theory is neither explained nor justified by argument; rather, it is dramatized in the soul's prenatal journey upward to glimpse the super-heavenly realm of the Forms. Following this reference to the theory in terms that suggest its applicability to human beings generally (249b5–c1), S. is concerned just with the philosopher's earthly

experience of beauty and *erōs* as the spur to his recollection of the Form of beauty and to his engagement in erotic philosophical pursuits. **c3** ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν "which we on earth say are real" (cf. 247d6–7). **c4** μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια: i.e. in three thousand years as opposed to the minimum ten thousand that holds for ordinary human souls (248e5–249a4). The following sentences (249c4–d3) illustrate the exceptional position of the philosopher vis-à-vis the rest of humanity. διάνοια refers to the whole soul (256b1, c5). **c4–5** πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις . . . θεῖός ἐστιν "for to the extent that he can [the philosopher] is through memory always in close proximity to those things whose close proximity to a god makes him a god." "Those things" (ἐκείνοις) are the Forms and true Being. **c5–6** τοῖς δὲ δὴ τοιούτοις ἀνὴρ ὑπομνήμασιν ὀρθῶς χρώμενος: "such reminders" (τοῖς τοιούτοις ὑπομνήμασιν) are not the Forms (ἐκείνοις, c4) but things in this world that spur recollection of the Forms, as e.g. the sight of the beloved spurs recollection of the Form of beauty. By "using such reminders correctly" (ὀρθῶς χρώμενος) a person makes the transition from perception to recollected Form, as anticipated in 249c1 ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῶι συναιρούμενον. Cf. *Phd.* 73c–75e for an account of this process. Cf. 276d2–3n. on "reminders" in S.'s argument on writing. **c6–d1** τελέους ἀεὶ τελετὰς τελούμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται "being continually initiated into perfect mystery rites, he alone becomes truly perfect/initiated"; cf. 250b4–c5n. on the ritual terminology. The philosopher's perfect and continual initiation, which is the process of recollection, is by implication superior to initiation in the Eleusinian cult, which is open to everyone and occurs but once; cf. 250b6–c1n. The point is hammered home by the four-fold play on the root τελ-.

249d1–2 ἐξιστάμενος δὲ . . . πρὸς τῶι θείωι γιγνόμενος: the philosopher's orientation towards the divine, visible in his conduct in the world, is inseparable from his pursuit of knowledge; cf. 273e3–274a3. **d3** ἐνθουσιάζων: an understanding of how the soul comes to be divinely possessed, and that it is the philosopher in particular whose soul is thus possessed, is the point that S. has been driving towards since he began the account of the soul at 245c5. After specifying this divine madness as *erōs* (249d4–e3), he will be in a position to undertake the main task of the speech: to show what is so good about *erōs* (249e4–257a1).

249d4–250d7 The recollection of beauty and the arousal of *erōs* in the soul.

249d4 τῆς τετάρτης μανίας: following prophecy, ritual healing, poetry (244b1–245a7). **d4–e1** ἥν, ὅταν . . . μανικῶς διακείμενος: vigorous anacoluthon betrays S.'s excitement as he nears the depiction of *erōs*: the relative pronoun ἥν (*sc.* μανίαν) is left hanging; in the ὅταν clause πτερῶται never receives a balancing finite verb following τε καί; participles pile up. **d5** τὸ τῆιδέ τις ὁρῶν κάλλος, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος: "earthly (τῆιδε) beauty" will turn out to be physical human beauty seen face-to-face (251a2–4); "true [beauty]" is beauty itself, the Form of beauty. Though previously S. spoke generally of earthly

perceptions as reminders of the Forms and true Being, now he silently introduces beauty as the paradigm case. But there was a hint: the lover of beauty and the follower of Eros were placed in the top-ranked life along with the philosopher (248d3, 249a2). **d6 ἀναπτερούμενος προθυμούμενος ἀναπτέσθαι:** the first participle is explained by the second one, which takes a complementary infinitive. Only when the philosopher has succeeded in remembering the Form of beauty is his attention drawn upward (cf. 254b5–6). When the philosopher begins to be attracted to the young man who embodies "earthly beauty," the philosopher is focused on him (251a2–252a7). **d7–e1 αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακείμενος** "he is accused of being mad"; cf. 249d2–3.

249e1–3 ὡς ἄρα αὕτη . . . ἐραστὴς καλεῖται: following the anacoluthon (249d4–e1), the clauses introduced by ὡς ἄρα and καὶ ὅτι resume the train of thought regarding the fourth kind of madness that was abandoned at ἧν (249d4). **e1–2 ἀρίστη τε καὶ ἐξ ἀρίστων** "best and from the best stock"; i.e. absolutely best (274a1–3n.). **e2 τῶι τε ἔχοντι καὶ τῶι κοινωνοῦντι αὐτῆς:** *erastēs* and *erōmenos* respectively. By mentioning the latter, whose share in *erōs* is discussed towards the end of the speech (255a1–257a1), S. keeps in view the imagined young man who is his auditor (243e4–6). **e3 ταύτης μετέχων τῆς μανίας ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν ἐραστὴς καλεῖται:** since ταύτης τῆς μανίας is ἀρίστη (249e1), ἐραστής is formed from ἐρῶν and ἀρίστη (244b6–d5n.). τῶν καλῶν is evidently masculine because of the context. **e4 καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται:** referring to 249b5–6.

250a1–2 ἐκ τῶνδε ἐκεῖνα: from earthly things, Forms (ἐκεῖνα = τὰ ὄντα, 249e4–250a1). **a2 ὅσαι βραχέως εἶδον τότε τἀκεῖ:** before these souls were born into human form (248a4–5). **a2–4 αἳ δεῦρο πεσοῦσαι . . . ἱερῶν ἔχειν:** ἱερῶν, referring to Forms, maintains the metaphor of religious awe (248b4, 249c6–d1) that is about to reach its climax (250b4–c5). This forgetting of the Forms due to injustice occurs after the souls are born into human form (δεῦρο πεσοῦσαι), though even before birth vice impairs the soul's ability to stay aloft (246c3) and to remember what it saw of the super-heavenly realm (248c6n.). In his myths, including this one (248c4–249b5, 256a6–e2), Plato emphasizes individual responsibility for the essential quality of one's life, whereby the myths complement the ethical argument of the dialogues (Dalfen 2002). Attributing injustice vaguely to "bad luck" (ἐδυστύχησαν) and the influence of "certain associations" (τινων ὁμιλιῶν) is exceptional for Plato, but the *Republic* (6.490e–492e) contains an account of how good persons are corrupted by circumstances. **a5 τι τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμοίωμα:** "a likeness of the things there" is a particular thing on earth that, by virtue of a property it possesses, participates in the Form whose name it bears as a predicate (cf. 250e2 with note). For example, a city that participates in the Form of justice and is properly called a just city would be a likeness of the Form of justice. To speak of participation of this kind elsewhere, Plato uses the word μετέχειν (e.g. *Phd.* 101c) or μεταλαμβάνειν (e.g. *Phd.* 102b). On the complex relation

between Forms and particulars, which Plato omits in the *Phaedrus* but considers in the *Philebus* and other dialogues, cf. Silverman 2002. **a6** ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέθ' αὑτῶν γίγνονται "they are astounded and no longer in control of themselves." The possessive genitive (here reflexive) as predicate indicates "a relationship of complete subordination and domination" (*AGPS* 47.6.4, 6). What is disruptive is seeing the earthly thing *as* a likeness of the Form, i.e. sensing the higher reality, which is the beginning of recollection. This disruptive experience anticipates the philosopher's overwhelmingly disruptive experience of seeing a young man who, as a likeness of beauty, triggers recollection of that Form (251a2–252a7). **a7** διὰ τὸ μὴ ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεσθαι "because their ability to discern [the underlying Form] is insufficient."

250b1–4 Δικαιοσύνης μὲν οὖν . . . τὸ τοῦ εἰκασθέντος γένος "there is no radiance of [the Forms of] justice, moderation, and the other things that are valuable to souls [i.e. the other moral virtues] in their earthly likenesses, but through feeble organs with difficulty few indeed, when they approach the images of them, see the source [i.e. the Form] of the thing imaged." εἰκών and εἰκασθέν are here equivalent to ὁμοίωμα (250a5n.). Plato's basic metaphor of speaking about the Forms in terms of perception is intensified to prepare for the extreme case of beauty. "Radiance" (φέγγος) is the capacity of a Form to exhibit its own nature, either indirectly through an earthly likeness or directly when it is seen in the super-heavenly realm. In the case of justice, moderation, and the other virtues, that capacity is not as great as it is with beauty. "Feeble organs" supports the metaphor of perception in φέγγος and θεῶνται without referring to a particular organ of perception, but "feeble" sets up the contrast with the vividness of beauty (250d2–7). **b4–c5** κάλλος δὲ τότ' . . . ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι: the unsurpassed radiance of the Form of beauty – perceived not through a likeness on earth but directly in the super-heavenly realm – is not described but demonstrated by the bliss that is evident in S.'s reminiscence of it. S.'s reminiscence comes from his original encounter with Being before his soul was born into its material state (τότ', 250b4). One of Plato's sublime passages (250c1–2n.), this blissful reminiscence advances the rhetorical goal of the speech by stirring the auditor's own desire to attain that wondrous moment (Yunis 2005). The Eleusinian mystery cult provided ordinary Greeks with privileged access to a hidden world of eternity and involved them in a dramatic ritual that culminated in ecstatic spiritual salvation. Plato uses the terminology associated with the cult (anticipated 248b4, 249c6–d1) to create a complex metaphor for several facets of S.'s reminiscence at once. Beauty's radiance and S.'s glimpse of it are likened to the ἐποπτεία (ἐποπτεύοντες, 250c3), the Eleusinian cult's highest grade of initiation, in which the light of sacred torches (αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ, 250c4) breaks upon the night to put the cult's hidden, sacred objects suddenly in view (ὄψιν τε καὶ θέαν, 250b5, φάσματα, c3). The purification rendered by the rite (ὠργιάζομεν, 250c1) corresponds to the pure state of the soul devoid of the body (250c1–5). The

ecstasy of the rite and the blessedness of spiritual salvation (μακαρίαν, 250b5, μακαριωτάτην, c1) convey the bliss that is itself the means of extolling beauty's radiance. On the Eleusinian mysteries, cf. Burkert 1983: 248–97, Parker 2005: 342–60; on the terminology used in the cult, cf. Clinton 2003; on Plato's use of such terminology in the *Phaedrus* and elsewhere, cf. Riedweg 1987: 1–69. The originality of Plato's account may be appreciated by comparison with Isocrates' prosaic encomium of beauty in the *Helen* (10.54–8). **b4–5 εὐδαίμονι χορῶι:** this is the divine chorus (247a6–7), whose orderly movements lead to a clear view of the super-heavenly realm (246e4–247c3), in contrast to the jostling of human souls that frustrates the attempt to see it (248a1–b5). **b5 ἑπόμενοι μετὰ μὲν Διὸς ἡμεῖς:** S.'s presence in Zeus's contingent instills the pursuit of wisdom in S. and his erotic pursuits (252e1–253a7). The first-person plural refers to S. and others of like philosophical nature; as they shared the original vision, they are capable, if they find each other, of sharing the recollection. **b6–c1 ἣν θέμις λέγειν μακαριωτάτην:** while borrowing the epithet of blessedness from the Eleusinian cult, this phrase eliminates any possible misunderstanding of Plato's extended metaphor: it is the philosophical initiation, not that of Eleusis, that "it is right to deem most blessed" (cf. 249c6–d1).

250c1–2 ἀπαθεῖς κακῶν ὅσα ἡμᾶς ἐν ὑστέρωι χρόνωι ὑπέμενεν: the evils "that await us in a later time" belong to earthly existence. Recalling the pathos of the human situation in the midst of S.'s transcendent vision, this phrase imparts sublimity. On the sublime in Plato, in particular the way he emulates Homer, cf. [Longinus], *Subl.* 13. **c2–3 ὁλόκληρα δὲ καὶ ἁπλᾶ καὶ ἀτρεμῆ καὶ εὐδαίμονα:** of the four epithets, the first three (perfect, simple, unmoving) are appropriate only to the Forms, while the last does double duty for the Forms and the metaphor from Eleusinian cult. **c3 φάσματα μυούμενοί τε καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες:** S. alludes to the visual experiences of Eleusinian initiation in accord with the visual metaphor of apprehending the Forms and beauty's extraordinary radiance in particular. On φάσματα, cf. 250b4–c5n. μυεῖσθαι and ἐποπτεύειν are the proper terms for the two stages of Eleusinian initiation, the former being the basic initiation, the latter being the elite level attained by those who participated a second time a year later and indicating in its very name a privileged visual experience (Clinton 2003). **c4–5 ἀσήμαντοι τούτου ὃ νῦν δὴ σῶμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν:** building on the saying τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, "the body is for us a tomb [i.e. of the soul]" (*Grg.* 493a; cf. *Cra.* 400c, Huffman 1993: 402–6; from σῆμα as the marker of a tomb), Plato gives a double meaning to ἀσήμαντοι: as pure souls, we are "unmarked [i.e. not stained]/not entombed by that which we now carry around and call body." **c5 ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι:** the stark image brings the transcendent vision to an abrupt end. Contrast the complex, expansive image near the close of the *Republic* (10.611d–612a), where the soul, likened to the sea god Glaucus and conceived as separating from the material world, is pictured emerging from the sea and being stripped of the wild mass of

stones and shell-creatures (ὄστρεα) that were clinging to it and encumbering it. On adverbial τρόπον cf. 241c8n.

250d1–2 μετ' ἐκείνων τε ἔλαμπεν ὄν "it [i.e. beauty] shone when it was among those things [i.e. the other Forms]," seen directly in the super-heavenly realm (250b4–c5). **d2–7** δεῦρό τ' ἐλθόντες . . . καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον: the thought moves swiftly over three points (following notes) to prepare for the account of how the sight of a beautiful young man arouses desire in the soul (250e1–252c3). **d2–5** δεῦρό τ' ἐλθόντες . . . οὐχ ὁρᾶται: (1) in comparison with wisdom (φρόνησις) (as well as justice, moderation, etc., cf. next note), beauty is exceptional on earth (δεῦρο) too, i.e. when it is perceived through a likeness, in that it shines most vividly (στίλβον ἐναργέστατα) and the sense through which it is perceived, sight, is the keenest of the senses. **d5–6** δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν . . . ὅσα ἐραστά "for [wisdom] would arouse terrible desire if it furnished such a vivid image of itself that was visible to the eyes [lit. that went into sight], and [likewise] the other desirable things [i.e. the other Forms, such as justice and moderation, that are 'valuable to souls' (250b1)]." (2) It having been established that we have an innate desire for the Forms (247c4–248c2), it is the vividness of our perception of a Form that determines the intensity of our desire for it. εἴδωλον is here another word for an earthly likeness of a Form, as ὁμοίωμα, εἰκών, εἰκασθέν (250b2–4). On the idea of perception underlying εἰς ὄψιν ἰόν, cf. 251b2–7n. **d6–7** νῦν δὲ κάλλος . . . καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον: (3) to beauty is reserved the distinction that, being the most radiant, most vividly perceived Form (ἐκφανέστατον), it provokes desire in us to the greatest degree (ἐρασμιώτατον).

250e1–252c3 The maddening experience of *erôs* in the lover's soul and the regrowth of the soul's wings.

250e1 μὴ νεοτελής: one whose original vision of the super-heavenly realm (his "initiation," 250b4–c5n.) was long ago, perhaps several lifetimes ago (249a4–b6). διεφθαρμένος: 250a2–4n. ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε: from earth to the world of Forms. **e2** τὴν τῇδε ἐπωνυμίαν: beauty's "namesake here," i.e. an earthly thing that bears the predicate beautiful, is an earthly likeness of the Form of beauty (250a5n., *Phd.* 102b), which in this case is a beautiful young man and potential *erōmenos*. **e3–251a2** ἡδονῆι παραδοὺς τετράποδος νόμον . . . ἡδονὴν διώκων "surrendering (παραδούς, intrans.) to pleasure he tries to mount [his *erōmenos*] in the manner of a quadruped and beget offspring, and well acquainted with outrage he is not afraid and not ashamed to pursue his pleasure contrary to nature." The depraved *erastēs*, motivated by the hubristic, pleasure-seeking *erōs* condemned in S.'s first speech (238a1–3, b5–c4), is condemned for seeking anal intercourse with his *erōmenos*. "Mount in the manner of a quadruped" describes with derogatory connotations the posture in which the coupling takes place, the *erastēs* behind the *erōmenos* who is on all fours. νόμον is an adverbial accusative with dependent genitive (*AGPS* 46.3.5). For βαίνειν as transitive, referring especially

to animal copulation, cf. Arist. *Hist. an.* 546b7–9, Achaeus *TrGF* 28, Hdt. 1.192.3. παιδοσπορεῖν is a rare word (LSJ s.v.) and its literal meaning – sow, i.e. beget, children – is evident, but here it indicates not the *erastēs*' intention, clearly, but the penetration and ejaculation that belong to the begetting of children. Anal intercourse, even when the passive participant freely consented, was considered an act of ὕβρις (Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 7.1148b30, Dem. 22.58, Aeschin. 1.185, Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.30; Cohen 1995: 149–51, 155–61). As such it would demean and dishonor the young man, which is why S. condemns it so strongly. Plato describes anal intercourse between males as contrary to nature also at *Laws* 1.636c (παρὰ φύσιν), 8.836c (τὸ μὴ φύσει τοῦτο εἶναι); cf. also below δεινὰ καὶ παράνομα (254b1), and Cohen 1991: 188 for similar views expressed by other authors. In the face of widespread misunderstanding of Plato's condemnation of anal intercourse, this passage was correctly understood by Plut. *Amat.* 751d–e; Vlastos 1981: 25. For the debate on *physis* and sex in later Greek literature, cf. Goldhill 1995: 46–111.

251a3–4 θεοειδὲς πρόσωπον . . . σώματος ἰδέαν "he sees a godlike face that imitates beauty well or perhaps a body shape [that does so]." **a4–b2 πρῶτον μὲν ἔφριξε . . . καὶ θερμότης ἀήθης λαμβάνει:** reminiscence of Sappho's poem φαίνεταί μοι (frag. 31 Voigt), which, like S., describes the physical symptoms of *erōs* at the sight of the beloved (ἴδηι, a3; ἴδω, Sappho): the shudder (ἔφριξε), sweat (ἱδρώς), and heat (θερμότης) experienced by Plato's *erastēs* recall Sappho's trembling (τρόμος), sweat (ἴδρως), and slender fire (λέπτον πῦρ); S.'s ὑπῆλθεν recalls Sappho's ὑπαδεδρόμακεν. Without departing from his own framework for describing *erōs* Plato signals that his idea of *erōs* includes the experience described by Sappho, which would be familiar to readers and perhaps definitive for their idea of *erōs*; cf. Yatromanolakis 2007 on Sappho's reception in classical Athens. The reminiscence was anticipated at 235c3. **a4–5 τῶν τότε . . . δειμάτων:** "the former fears" that reemerge is the awe felt during the primordial vision of true beauty in the company of Zeus (250b4–c4). **a5–6 προσορῶν ὡς θεὸν . . . τοῖς παιδικοῖς:** the religious awe to which this *erōs* is likened suggests not only the power of this feeling but also its purity, which checks the *erastēs*' carnal impulse (also 252d6–8, 254b4–7). The absence of this awe in the depraved *erastēs* leads directly to his excessive desire for sex (250e2–3).

251b1 ἰδόντα δ' αὐτόν: ἰδόντα is the *erastēs*, object of λαμβάνει. αὐτόν is the *erōmenos*, object of ἰδόντα. **οἷον ἐκ τῆς φρίκης** "as [happens as] a result of the shuddering." **b2–d7 δεξάμενος γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους . . . τοῦ καλοῦ γέγηθεν:** in this description of the lover's regrowing wings at the sight of the beautiful beloved, talk of warming (ἐθερμάνθη, b3), melting (ἐτάκη, b4), swelling (ᾤδησε, b5), gushing (ἀνακηκίει, c1), chafing (ἀγανακτεῖ, c4), tingling (γαργαλίζεται, c4), and throbbing (πηδῶσα, d4) suggests mounting sexual tension, which leads to a crisis (255d6–256a5). **b2–7 δεξάμενος γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους . . . τὸ πάλαι πτερωτή** "having received through his eyes the stream of beauty [i.e. emanating from the *erōmenos*], by which the wing's natural power is watered, [the *erastēs*]

grows warm, and when he is warmed the places [on the soul] where the feathers sprout melt, [places] which long ago closed up from hardness and prevented sprouting, but when the nourishment flows in [to those places] the quill of the feather [in each of those places] swells and begins to grow from its root under the whole shape of the soul, for formerly it was entirely winged." To the basic metaphor of feathers and wings is added a botanical metaphor whereby the feathers are considered like dormant plants that begin to grow anew when they receive water and warmth. The stream of beauty that comes through the eyes is a borrowing from Empedocles' theory of perception, whereby we see things by virtue of effluences (ἀπόρροαί, *Meno* 76c) that come forth from things and go into pores in our eyes (Empedocles DK 31 A86.7, 87, B89, 109a). **b7 ἐν τούτωι** "in this state of things."

251c1–4 ὅπερ τὸ τῶν ὀδοντοφυούντων . . . φύουσα τὰ πτερά: in comparison with the sublime vision of beauty (250b4–c5) and the shattering, Sappho-like, encounter with a beautiful young man (251a4–b2), the simile of cutting teeth is homely but equally vivid. **c5–6 ἐκεῖθεν μέρη . . . δεχομένη:** on the effluent theory of perception, cf. 251b2–7n. On the proposed origin of ἵμερος, understand ἰέναι, μέρη, ῥοή on the basis of μέρη ἐπιόντα καὶ ῥέοντ' (244b6–d5n. on Platonic etymology). This etymology is amplified at 255c1–2.

251d2 χωρὶς γένηται: *sc.* τοῦ παιδός. The subject is still ἡ ψυχή. **d2–3 τὰ τῶν διεξόδων στόματα . . . τὴν βλάστην τοῦ πτεροῦ** "the orifices of the outlets, where the feather [in each case] is starting upward, having dried out [and thus] closed up, shut off the feather's shoot." **d4–7 ἡ δ' ἐντὸς μετὰ τοῦ ἱμέρου . . . τοῦ καλοῦ γέγηθεν** "but the shoot [*sc.* ἡ βλάστη], closed off inside along with desire, throbbing like pulsating blood vessels (τὰ σφύζοντα), in each case pricks at its own outlet so that in its entirety the soul, stung all over, is frenzied with pain, but when it recalls the beautiful young man it rejoices." πηδάω is used of the heart at *Smp.* 215e. In Plato's day, before arteries and veins were distinguished and the normal pulsating properties of arteries were recognized, σφύζω, "pulsate," was used of blood vessels whose pulsations were thought to be the result of inflammation (Hippoc. *Epid.* 2.5.16; von Staden 1989: 268). Hermias 185.13 glosses ἐγχρίει as κεντεῖ καὶ ἐμπίπτει ("pricks and attacks") and compares the stings and bites of insects. **d7 ἐκ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων μεμειγμένων** "as a result of the mixture of both feelings," viz. the torment of the beautiful young man's absence and the joy of recollecting his beauty. **d7–252a1 ἀδημονεῖ τε τῆι ἀτοπίαι . . . ἐν τῶι παρόντι καρποῦται:** the lover's madness seeks and finds its release and the lover takes his pleasure solely in beholding (ὄψεσθαι, ἰδοῦσα) the beautiful young man, nothing more. The subject is still ἡ ψυχή.

251e2 μεθ' ἡμέραν "by day" (*AGPS* 68.27.2). **θεῖ δὲ ποθοῦσα ὅπου ἄν** "desiring, it runs wherever . . . " **e3–4 ἐποχετευσαμένη ἵμερον ἔλυσε μὲν τὰ τότε συμπεφραγμένα** "it irrigates itself with desire and [thus] loosens the places that

were previously blocked up." The places in the soul that were previously blocked up are the outlets where the feathers that were parched as a result of the beloved's absence are now sprouting (251d1–3). The metaphor in ἐποχετευσαμένη is helped by the idea that desire (ἵμερος) consists of the beloved's beauty that flows (ῥέοντ') to the lover and waters (ἄρδηται) his soul (251c6–d1, also ἀπορροήν, ἄρδεται, 251b2–3).

252a1–2 ὅθεν δὴ ἑκοῦσα . . . περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖται: slight hyperbaton in the postponement of τοῦ καλοῦ, which goes with both ἀπολείπεται (passive) and περὶ πλείονος: "wherefore the soul is not willingly apart from the beautiful young man nor does it value anyone more than him." The lover of S.'s first speech also seeks to remain in the presence of the beloved (οὔθ' ἡμέρας οὔτε νυκτὸς ἑκὼν ἀπολείπεται, 240c6), but he does so for the sake of sex (240d1–e2). **a2–4 μητέρων τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν . . . παρ' οὐδὲν τίθεται:** in contrast to this lover, heedless of the loss of his own family, friends, and fortune, lovers in S.'s first speech seek to deprive their beloveds of their family, friends, and fortune (239e4–240a2). The poetic form λέλησται, in place of the normal prose form ἐπιλέλησται, maintains the elevated style of the speech. παρ' οὐδὲν τίθεται ("regards as nothing") is also poetic (Aesch. *Ag.* 229, Eur. *IT* 732). **a4–6 νομίμων δὲ καὶ . . . ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ πόθου:** the lover's newfound scorn for conventional values facilitates his adoption of (unconventional) philosophical ones (256e4–6, 265a11). τοῦ πόθου is the object of the lover's desire, the beautiful young man. **a6–7 πρὸς γὰρ τῶι σέβεσθαι . . . τῶν μεγίστων πόνων** "in addition to revering the one who has beauty, [the lover's soul] has found [him to be] the only physician of his greatest sufferings." On the lover's "reverence" for his beloved, cf. 251a5–6n.

252b1 πρὸς ὃν δὴ μοι ὁ λόγος: δή, "indeed," suggests that S.'s long, apparently digressive account of the soul's experience of *erōs* is precisely what the young auditor needs to hear (249e2n.). **b1–3 ἄνθρωποι μὲν ἔρωτα . . . εἰκότως διὰ νεότητα γελάσει:** the young man is implicitly advised not to laugh at the divine term for *erōs* because, like S.'s etymologies (244b6–d5n.), the divine terms for things reveal truths about those things that are obscured by the human terms. But when S. produces the divine term for *erōs*, the reader will indeed be inclined to laugh (252b6–c1n.). Indicating the different terms by which men and gods call things was a poetic trope associated particularly with Homer (*Cra.* 391d–392a), e.g. *Il.* 1.403–4 ὃν Βριάρεων καλέουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δέ τε πάντες | Αἰγαίων' (list of examples in West 1966: 387); and it structures the (supposedly) Homeric verses that S. is about to present (252b6–c1). **b3 λέγουσι** "recite" (LSJ s.v. III.13). **Ὁμηριδῶν:** the Homeridae, literally "descendants of Homer," were rhapsodes of privileged status and great skill. In the late sixth century they helped institute the rhapsodic contests of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* at the Panathenaia in Athens and performed and promoted epic poems ascribed to Homer elsewhere in Greece. They were not actually descended from Homer (if such a poet existed)

but were a professional guild connected to Chios (West 1999, Graziosi 2002: 208–28). S. mentions the Homeridae to buttress the Homeric status of the verses he is about to introduce. S. is ascribing authorship of the verses to Homer; the Homeridae merely perform them (λέγουσι, b3, ὑμνοῦσι, b5). **τῶν ἀποθέτων ἐπῶν:** lit. "the stored-away verses," i.e. "the secret verses." In relation to texts, books, or ideas, ἀπόθετος refers to items that are unknown to the public because they are held in reserve or secret (Labarbe 1949: 378–80); cf. Posidonius frag. 253.155 Kidd = Ath. 214e ([ψήφισμα] ἀπόθετον, "secret document"), Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 11.62.3 (ἀποθέτων βίβλων, "secret books"), Plut. *Crass.* 16.6 (ἀρὰς ἀποθέτους, "secret curses"), *Quaest. conv.* 728f (λόγος ἀπόθετος, "secret reason"). There is no evidence that secret Homeric verse existed as a recognized category in Plato's day; "the secret verses" is part of Plato's joke. Only because S.'s verses are "secret" and recited by only "some Homeridae" (τινες Ὁμηριδῶν) can S. present them as Homeric even though no one ever heard them before. West "paraphrases" τῶν ἀποθέτων ἐπῶν as "apocrypha" and assigns S.'s verses to a humorous poem entitled Ἐπικιχλίδες ('Gigglers', from κιχλίζω), whose existence and Homeric attribution are first attested after Plato (citations and evidence in West 2003: 224, 229, 254–7). The verses most likely achieved apocryphal status by their appearance here. **b4–5 τὸ ἕτερον . . . τι ἔμμετρον:** on what is outrageous and unmetrical, see 252b6–c1n. **b5 ὑμνοῦσι:** the verses belong (according to the conceit) to a hymn to Eros on the model of the canonical Homeric hymns to the various gods; cf. ὕμνει *Hom. Hymn Hermes* 1, ὑμνέων *Hom. Hymn Apollo* 178. **b6–c1 τὸν δ' ἤτοι θνητοὶ . . . πτεροφύτορ' ἀνάγκην:** Eros is the winged god, evident in both iconography (*LIMC* s.v. Eros) and poetry (Anacreon *PMG* 378, Eur. *Hipp.* 1270–5). What is "quite outrageous" (ὑβριστικὸν πάνυ, b4) in the second verse and likely to provoke laughter (b3) is the audacity of unmetrical, non-canonical, hitherto secret Homeric verses that contain the punning neologism Πτέρωτα ("Wingederos," from πτερόν and ἔρωτα) that just happens to confirm S.'s story about how *erōs* grows the soul's wings; cf. *Cra.* 426b, where S. refers to some of his etymologies as ὑβριστικὰ καὶ γελοῖα. The verses are transparently Plato's invention, as even Hermias 188.15 noticed; S. essentially admits as much in his immediately following words, τούτοις δὴ ἔξεστι μὲν πείθεσθαι, ἔξεστιν δὲ μή (c2). The second hexameter is "not especially metrical" (b4–5) insofar as δέ is not lengthened before πτ, whereas the second syllable of διά is. Other idiosyncrasies make evident Plato's satiric intent: the first hexameter breaks Hermann's bridge (barring word end after a trochee in the fourth foot, –⏑⁝⏑), a rare occurrence in Homer; jingling combinations jar: ἤτοι θνητοὶ . . . ἀθάνατοι, Ἔρωτα . . . Πτέρωτα . . . πτεροφύτορ'.

252c1 διὰ πτεροφύτορ' ἀνάγκην "because he [Eros/Pteros] compels the growth of wings." **c2–3 τούτοις δὴ ἔξεστι . . . τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὄν:** one need not believe the verses (= τούτοις) because their authority is less than unimpeachable (252b6–c1n.). But what the verses say about *erōs* should be accepted because

that is what S. himself has been saying since he began his account (at 250e1) of what the lover experiences in his soul.

252c4–253c6 Lovers seek a beloved of like character, as determined by the god to whose contingent they belonged in the prenatal heavenly procession (246e4–247a6, 250b5–6). Through *erōs* lovers educate their beloved in such a way that both approach the divine and become like their leading god to the extent possible.

252c4 ληφθείς: *sc.* ὑπ' ἔρωτος (LSJ s.v. λαμβάνω A.1.2.a). **ἐμβριθέστερον . . . φέρειν** "to bear with some steadfastness." This modicum of control in the face of *erōs* is attained by members of Zeus's contingent (S. among them, 250b5) because of their philosophical nature (252e1–253a7). **c5 πτερωνύμου:** Eros, because of his name Πτέρωτα (252c1). **c5–d1 ὅσοι δὲ Ἄρεώς . . . καὶ τὰ παιδικά:** Ares' followers are at the opposite extreme in *erōs*-management to Zeus's. Their murderous nature and readiness to "sacrifice" (καθιερεύειν) themselves along with the beloved, aroused at the mere perception of a slight (τι οἰηθῶσιν ἀδικεῖσθαι), reveal the god of war. καθιερεύειν maintains, now in a dark sense, the metaphor of religious awe that suggests the intensity of *erōs* (251a5–6, 252d6–8).

252d2 χορευτής: the heavenly procession was described as a divine chorus (247a7, 250b5). **d3–4 ἕως ἂν ἧι ἀδιάφθορος . . . βιοτεύηι:** a person retains the benefit of his soul's prenatal vision of true Being in the company of the gods insofar as the person avoids corrupting influences (250a2–4, e1–2); and that benefit remains effective in a person's first incarnation (248e4–249b6, 251a2–3). **d5–6 τόν τε οὖν ἔρωτα τῶν καλῶν πρὸς τρόπου ἐκλέγεται ἕκαστος** "each [lover] selects his love from the beautiful boys in accord with his character," the latter being determined by the god of his prenatal heavenly contingent. The genitive τῶν καλῶν lacks a preposition under the influence of ἐκ- in the compound verb (*AGPS* 47.23.0.B). **d6–8 ὡς θεὸν . . . τιμήσων τε καὶ ὀργιάσων: ἑαυτῶι** goes not with τεκταίνεταί τε καὶ κατακοσμεῖ, which would run counter to S.'s emphasis on the benefit that accrues to the beloved, but with ὡς θεὸν . . . ὄντα: "as if that very one (αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον) [i.e. the boy selected as his love] were a god in his eyes, [the lover] molds and adorns him like a divine statue (ἄγαλμα) so as to honor and celebrate him with orgiastic rites." The lover's divine regard for the beloved is no mere metaphor, but the boy is a vehicle for the lover's reminiscence of the original god (252e5–253a4). ὀργιάσων recalls the ecstatic nature of the soul's primordial vision of the Form of beauty (ὠργιάζομεν, 250c1; 250b4–c5n.) and reflects the intensity of the lover's feeling, but the metaphor of religious awe and the lover's *agalmatophilia* also suggest the sublimation of this *erōs* (251a5–6n.; Steiner 2001: 198–204).

252e1 δῖον: lit. "brilliant," but the play based on the juxtaposition with Διός adds the sense "Zeus-like," which is S.'s point in the following lines. An allusion to Dion (Δίων) of Syracuse, Plato's student and friend who involved him in

Syracusan affairs (*Epist.* 7; Nails 2002: 129–32), has been supposed (Nussbaum 1986: 228–32) but is unlikely. An allusion in this passage would advertise a pederastic relationship, or at least an erotic attachment, between Plato and Dion. But the only evidence for such a relationship or attachment is the erotic epigram commemorating Dion's death (in 354) that is attributed to Plato (Diog. Laert. 3.30 = *Anth. Pal.* 7.99) but is a post-Platonic forgery (*FGE* 125–7, 169–71). Further, for Plato to introduce an allusion to his private life would reek of melodrama and disrupt the elevated tone that is an essential aspect of S.'s message. ζητοῦσι "seek that" + accusative (τὸν ἐρώμενον) and infinitive (εἶναι). **e2** **φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ἡγεμονικός:** these traits, united in Zeus (246e4–5), reflect the natural conjunction of philosophical knowledge and ruling, exemplified by the philosopher-kings of the *Republic* (Sedley 2007). **e3** **πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὅπως τοιοῦτος ἔσται:** the propensity of the Zeus-like lover to do his utmost to turn his Zeus-like beloved into a philosopher and potential ruler (= τοιοῦτος) is to convey the ultimate benefit, which gives the young male auditor the best possible reason to choose such a lover. In contrast, the conventional lover of S.'s first speech keeps his beloved away from philosophy (239b1–5). **e4–253a7** **ἐὰν οὖν μὴ πρότερον ἐμβεβῶσι . . . ὁμοιότατον τῶι σφετέρωι θεῶι:** the subject of the verbs throughout is the lovers who belonged to Zeus's contingent (οἱ μὲν δὴ οὖν Διός, 252e1). Their endeavor to turn their beloved into a philosopher (252e3) is described not as an educational process but as a spontaneous effect of *erōs*: seeking the divine in the beloved, lovers are brought close to the divine themselves (252e4–253a4), and then they miraculously pour their exalted condition over onto the beloved (ἐπαντλοῦντες, 253a6), affecting him likewise. Explicit educational measures are mentioned in the parallel case of lovers from other divine contingents (253b4–5) and in the *Symposium* (209b–c). **e4** **τῶι ἐπιτηδεύματι:** "the practice" which the lovers embark upon is that of making the beloved a philosopher and potential ruler (252e3). **e4–253a2** **τότε ἐπιχειρήσαντες . . . πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν** "then, having taken up [the practice], they learn from any source they can and pursue [it] on their own, and hunting with their own means to discover the nature of their god they succeed on account of having been forced to gaze intently at the god." The lovers seek and then see their god in the beloved, who retains a trace of the god within him (252d2–8). What "forces" the lovers to gaze is *erōs*.

253a2–4 **ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτοῦ . . . καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα** "grasping him [i.e. the god of their contingent] in memory, becoming possessed, they adopt their customs and habits from him." On the participles without conjunction, see 228b3n. **a4** **θεοῦ ἀνθρώπωι μετασχεῖν:** to participate in the divine or to be like the divine (253a7) (to the extent possible) is to succeed (to the extent possible) in the pursuit of wisdom and the proper goal of human life (*Tht.* 176b; Sedley 1999). **τούτων:** i.e. the divine traits which lovers acquire from loving their beloved, namely, grasping their god in memory, becoming possessed by the god, and adopting the god's customs and habits (253a2–4). **a5** **ἔτι τε . . . κἄν:**

τε... καί coordinate main verbs (ἀγαπῶσι, ποιοῦσιν), ἄν... ἀρύτωσιν being subordinate to ποιοῦσιν. **a5–7 κἂν ἐκ Διὸς ἀρύτωσιν... ὁμοιότατον τῶι σφετέρωι θεῶι:** the object of ἀρύτωσιν and ἐπαντλοῦντες is supplied from τούτων (a4): "and if they draw [the divine traits] from Zeus, like the bacchant women they pour them onto the soul of the beloved and make him as much like their god as they can." The dense combination of metaphor (ἀρύτωσιν, ἐπαντλοῦντες) and simile (ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι) characterizes the way in which lovers acquire their divine traits and transmit them to the beloved as a miraculous process akin to the experiences of divinely possessed bacchant women. Possessed by Dionysus, bacchants miraculously draw milk and honey from rivers or wells: cf. *Ion* 534a: ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι ἀρύονται ἐκ τῶν ποταμῶν μέλι καὶ γάλα κατεχόμεναι; Aeschines Socraticus *SSR* 53: αἱ βάκχαι ἐπειδὰν ἔνθεοι γένωνται... μέλι καὶ γάλα ἀρύονται; Eur. *Bacch.* 142, 708–11. The miraculous communication of divine traits from lover to beloved is not unlike the way in which divine maenadic possession is communicated from woman to woman under Dionysus' influence (Eur. *Bacch.* 35–6, Apollod. 2.2.2).

253b1 βασιλικόν: in accord with Hera's status as Zeus's queen, but lacking the philosophical endowment of Zeus's followers (252e2). Lawful, but non-philosophical, king was second in the hierarchy of human lives (248d4). **b3–4 οὕτω κατὰ τὸν θεὸν ἰόντες ζητοῦσι τὸν σφέτερον παῖδα πεφυκέναι** "proceeding in the manner of their god they seek that their boy be of like nature." **b4–5 μιμούμενοι αὐτοί... καὶ ἰδέαν ἄγουσιν** "by imitating [their god] themselves and by exhorting and training their boy [lovers] lead him to the behavior and likeness of that god." These lovers undertake explicit educational measures in contrast to the spontaneous educational effect of *erōs* described in the case of lovers from Zeus's contingent (252c4–253a7n.). **b6 ἑκάστωι:** each lover. **b6–c1 οὐ φθόνωι... πρὸς τὰ παιδικά:** contrast the lover's envious behavior towards the beloved in Lysias' speech and S.'s first speech (232c3–d3, 238e3–239b3, 243c4–5).

253c1–2 πᾶσαν πάντως ὅτι μάλιστα: emphasizing the sincerity and strenuousness of the lovers' efforts to educate their beloved properly. **c3 τελετή:** "initiation" is a strong metaphor for the successful efforts of true lovers to educate their beloved: by means of those efforts both lovers and beloveds approach the divine. The metaphor recalls the prenatal vision of true Being in the company of the gods which S. imbued with initiatory terminology (250b4–c5n.) and which is itself the spur to the lover's erotically charged education of his beloved (252d2–8, esp. 252d8 ὀργιάσων). τελετή is present in the tradition as a correction in a secondary MS. τελευτή, the unanimous reading of the primary MSS, could only be construed with the genitive τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐρώντων dependent on it as well as on προθυμία, and that does not give acceptable sense. **c3–4 ἐάν γε διαπράξωνται ὃ προθυμοῦνται ᾗι λέγω** "if, that is, they accomplish what they seek in the manner I relate"; making clear that the lovers' efforts constitute an "initiation" only if they are successful. **c4–5 εὐδαιμονική... τῶι**

φιληθέντι γίγνεται "turns out to be productive of happiness . . . for the loved one"; emphasizing the benefit to the young man. **c5** ἐὰν αἱρεθῆι "if [the boy] is won over," i.e. by the lover in his courtship of the boy. For αἱρεῖν as the proper term for prevailing in a pederastic courtship, cf. *Smp.* 182e, *Lys.* 205e; for the passive ἁλίσκεσθαι, cf. *Smp.* 184a. **c5–6** ἁλίσκεται δὲ δὴ ὁ αἱρεθεὶς τοιῶιδε τρόπωι "the one who is won over is won over in the following way." The action of the aorist participle is coincident with the main verb (*AGPS* 53.6.8.B, 56.10.1.C).

253c7–254e9 S. resumes the chariot image to portray the violent conflict in the lover's soul between lust and restraint towards the beloved. The charioteer, supported by the good horse, and the bad horse engage in all-out, bloody struggle, the charioteer ultimately forcing the bad horse into submission. Rendered vividly and with concrete detail (Romilly 1982), the narrative brings the speech to the verge of climax.

253c7 ἐν ἀρχῆι τοῦδε τοῦ μύθου: referring to 246a5–b5.

253d1 ἱππομόρφω μὲν δύο τινὲ εἴδη, ἡνιοχικὸν δὲ εἶδος τρίτον: these accusatives (called accusative of content or internal object) describe the parts into which S. divided the soul (ψυχήν, c7), which is the direct or external object (*AGPS* 46.14.1). **d4** τοίνυν "well then"; starting the narrative (*GP* 573). τῆι καλλίονι στάσει: i.e. the right position of the two positions on the team. **d4–e4** τό τε εἶδος ὀρθὸς . . . μόγις ὑπείκων: the physical attributes in this list of oppositions reflect aesthetic qualities – straight vs. crooked, white coat vs. black coat, black eyes vs. blue eyes, long neck vs. short neck – and thus contrast, for example, with Xenophon's practical emphasis on the details of equine anatomy when he considers the attributes of horses to be used in actual riding (*Eq.* 1). The aesthetic qualities mentioned by S. have moral connotations and thus sharpen the opposition between obedient, helpful horse and disobedient, disruptive horse. The natural alignment of aesthetic and moral qualities is an ancient trope, evident in Homer's portrayals of Achilles and Thersites (*Il.* 2.212–19, 21.108, 24.630). The black horse's crooked frame (σκολιός) in particular resembles Thersites (*Il.* 2.217–18 τὼ δέ οἱ ὤμω | κυρτώ, ἐπὶ στῆθος συνοχωκότε), who, like the bad horse, challenges rightful authority and in the end is physically beaten and forced into submission (254e4–8, *Il.* 2.265–9). S.'s own appearance resembles that of the bad horse in certain respects (βραχυτράχηλος, σιμοπρόσωπος, περὶ ὦτα λάσιος; Belfiore 2006: 199–203), but he is a conspicuous exception (279b8n., *Smp.* 215a–222b). **d5** ἐπίγρυπος "with slightly hooked nose"; signifying a more regal bearing than the "snub-nosed" (σιμοπρόσωπος, 253e2) look of the bad horse (cf. *Rep.* 5.474d). **d6** τιμῆς ἐραστὴς μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς: this characteristic, which is the basis of the good horse's support for and obedience to the driver, makes the good horse the counterpart to the "spirited" part of the soul (τὸ θυμοειδές) in the *Republic*, which is also φιλότιμον (9.581b). In the

soul of the just person (and correspondingly in the just city) the spirited element is trained to be temperate and to respect the guidance of reason (*Rep.* 4.439e–441a). **d6–7** ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἑταῖρος "a friend of true reputation"; i.e. this horse loves honor but wants no more credit than he deserves, as opposed to the bad horse, ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος (253e2–3). **d7** ἄπληκτος: i.e. obedient without the application of force, which from the charioteer's perspective is the ideal form of obedience. κελεύσματι μόνον καὶ λόγωι ἡνιοχεῖται: this point and the corresponding one for the bad horse (μάστιγι μετὰ κέντρων μόγις ὑπείκων, 253e3–4) complete their respective accounts and are the crucial points for the narrative that follows.

253e1 πολὺς εἰκῆι συμπεφορημένος "a ponderous randomly assembled [creature]"; in contrast with διηρθρωμένος (253d5). For πολύς with the participle, cf. Dem. 18.136 πολλῶι ῥέοντι of a speaker "flowing massively," also 255c2; LSJ s.v. I.2.c. **e2** γλαυκόμματος "blue-eyed"; a sign of cowardice in [Arist.] *Physiognomonica* 812b3: οἷς δὲ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ γλαυκοὶ ἢ λευκοί, δειλοί. ὕφαιμος "bloodshot," referring to the horse's eyes. "Bloodshot eyelids" (βλέφαρα ὕφαιμα) are among the "signs of shamelessness" (ἀναιδοῦς σημεῖα) in [Arist.] *Phgn.* 807b29–30. ὕβρεως: the fundamental reason for the trouble caused by this horse (254c3, e3) and the opposite of the σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς of the good horse (253d6). **e3** κωφός "deaf," which only adds to the horse's imperviousness to verbal commands. μετὰ κέντρων = καὶ κέντροις (*AGPS* 68.26.1.I). **e5** τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα "the delight (ὄμμα) that inspires *erōs*," viz. the beautiful young man himself. ὄμμα, a poetic word, is used in a metaphorical sense that occurs in poetry ("eye" > "source of light" > "source of joy"); e.g. the news that Heracles is safe is an ἄελπτον ὄμμα for Deianeira (Soph. *Trach.* 203), Cithaeron is Ἀρτέμιδος ὄμμα (Eur. *Phoen.* 802) (Lloyd-Jones 1993). The striking poetic usage gives the narrative a strong start. **e5–254a1** πᾶσαν αἰσθήσει . . . κέντρων ὑποπλησθῆι "[the charioteer], having sent warmth through the whole soul by virtue of perceiving, is filled with tingling and goads of longing." This partly recapitulates S.'s earlier account of what happens when the lover sees the beloved: the sight spreads warmth through his soul (251b2–7) and the consequent regrowth of feathers tingles (251c1–4). Now it is specifically the charioteer who catches sight of the beloved, which excites desire in all three parts of the soul and, as the narrative is about to relate, causes them to react in different ways. The metaphorical "goads of longing" (πόθου κέντρων, similarly 251d5, e4–5) are juxtaposed with actual "goads" which the charioteer applies to the bad horse in attempting to restrain him (κέντρων ἡνιοχικῶν, 254a3, 253e3).

254a2 βιαζόμενος: passive. **a3–4** σκιρτῶν δὲ βίαι φέρεται "bolts and dashes violently ahead"; φέρεται is passive but the idiom translates better into an intransitive active verb in English. Cf. βίαι φέρουσιν (Soph. *El.* 725, Eur. *Hipp.* 1224) of horses taking a chariot out of control. **a4** πάντα πράγματα "all kinds of trouble" (*AGPS* 50.11.8.C). **a5–6** ἀναγκάζει ἰέναι . . . τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων

χάριτος "[the bad horse] forces [them, i.e. his yoke-fellow and the charioteer] to go towards the boy and to recall the joy of sex." μνείαν ποιεῖσθαι = ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι (the uncompounded form being rare in prose). Wishing to have his yoke-fellow and driver share his desire for sex, which would unite the entire soul in pursuit of sex, the bad horse tries to force them to recall the joy of sex simply by getting near the beloved. The memory of sexual pleasure which the bad horse intends is the base, corporeal opposite of the memory of the Form of beauty which in fact is aroused in the charioteer and motivates his fierce struggle against the bad horse when the soul comes near the boy (254b4–c3). Though it is grammatically possible to understand μνείαν ποιεῖσθαι as equivalent to ἀναμιμνήσκειν, the resulting translation – "[the bad horse] forces [them] to go towards the boy and remind [him, i.e. the boy] of the joy of sex," which is the sense one finds in most translations – is wrong because it does not fit the context. In the next sentence S. describes the (negative) reaction of the driver and the good horse (= τὼ δέ) to the prospect of sex, the narrative being focused strictly on the conflict within the lover's soul and not yet on the boy. Further, in pederastic relationships of the kind under discussion, when the *erōmenos* engages in sex with the *erastēs*, he does so as a favor to the *erastēs*, not for the sake of his own pleasure (231a1n., 231e1–2n., 240d3–e2n.). Finally, how could this young man, new to sex (255d2–256a4), be reminded of sexual pleasure?

254b1 δεινὰ καὶ παράνομα ἀναγκαζομένω: the moral objection contained in these words suggests anal intercourse in particular (250e3–251a2n.). On the accusatives, see 242a1–2n. **b2–3** ὁμολογήσαντε ποιήσειν τὸ κελευόμενον: tired of the bad horse's importuning, the charioteer and good horse consent to approach the boy, not to pursue sex with him. **b4** ἐγένοντο καὶ εἶδον: the switch to aorist indicative (until 254e5 ἔδωκεν) enlivens the narrative (247c1n.). **b5** ἀστράπτουσαν: the "flashing" of the boy's face (ὄψιν) suggests the unique power of sight to trigger recollection of the Form of beauty (250b1–4, d1–7). **b5–7** ἡ μνήμη . . . ἐν ἁγνῶι βάθρωι βεβῶσαν: the Form of beauty (= τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φύσιν) is recalled in its divine, pure setting (250b4–c5n.). Among the other Forms (250b1–4) *sōphrosynē* is mentioned because of its relevance to the events being narrated. **b7** ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἔδεισέ τε καὶ σεφθεῖσα ἀνέπεσεν ὑπτία: at the same moment that the beautiful beloved is seen and the Form of beauty is recalled, the charioteer experiences the awe and reverence inspired by this *erōs* (251a5–6n.) and recoils. This moment and its attendant impulses are the source of the charioteer's strength and perseverance in the following narrative (to 254e9). The feminine nominatives agree with ἡ μνήμη, but the charioteer is functionally the subject.

254c1–2 ἠναγκάσθη εἰς τοὐπίσω . . . καθίσαι τὼ ἵππω: a violent and powerful move. καθίσαι is better taken as transitive, making the charioteer's action more aggressive and parallel to the similar action described below, τὰ σκέλη τε καὶ τὰ ἰσχία πρὸς τὴν γῆν ἐρείσας (254e4–5). Hippolytus makes a similar

move – ἥρπασ' ἡνίας χεροῖν ἕλκει . . . ἱμᾶσιν εἰς τοὔπισθεν ἀρτήσας δέμας – but cannot control his horses (Eur. *Hipp.* 1220–2).

254d3 δεομένων εἰς αὖθις ὑπερβαλέσθαι "when they beg to postpone it until later." **d4** ἀμνημονεῖν προσποιουμένω ἀναμιμνήισκων "reminding them [i.e. the charioteer and good horse] when they pretend to forget." **d4–5** βιαζόμενος: middle. **d5–e1** ἕλκων . . . ἕλκει: what the bad horse achieved previously through importuning (254a4–b3) with just a suggestion of force (254a3–4) now becomes a test of sheer strength. ἕλκει repeats ἕλκων to stress this main action on the part of the bad horse among all the details crowded into this sentence. The posture described in ἐγκύψας καὶ ἐκτείνας τὴν κέρκον shows the horse's straining. Since κέρκος was also a colloquial term for penis (Ar. *Thesm.* 239), ἐκτείνας τὴν κέρκον also suggests the horse's erect phallus at the prospect of sex with the young man; cf. 256a1–2n. for a similar suggestion. Biting down on the bit (ἐνδακὼν τὸν χαλινόν) is an attempt to resist the charioteer's efforts to exert control, as also Hippolytus' mares: ἐνδακοῦσαι στόμια . . . γνάθοις (Eur. *Hipp.* 1223). **d5–6** ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους "for the same reasons," i.e. as before, viz. to have the charioteer and good horse recall sexual pleasure (254a5–6).

254e1–3 ἔτι μᾶλλον . . . παθών, . . . ἔτι μᾶλλον . . . σπάσας: the charioteer's resistance consists of the same actions as before (254b7–c3) except that they are carried out with even greater intensity (ἔτι μᾶλλον). **e2** ταὐτὸν πάθος: viz. ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἔδεισέ τε καὶ σεφθεῖσα ἀνέπεσεν ὑπτία (254b7); described as a πάθος because this first part of the charioteer's reaction is virtually an involuntary reflex as the lover approaches the beloved and sees him. ὥσπερ ἀπὸ ὕσπληγος ἀναπεσών: ὕσπληξ or ὕσπληγξ was obscure already in antiquity (Σ ad loc.; Hesychius, *Suda*, LSJ s.v.). Among the possible meanings the one most apt in this context is "turning-post," i.e. in a race course (cf. βαλβίς, one of Hesychius' glosses): the charioteer leans back (cf. ἀνέπεσεν ὑπτία, 254b7) and reins in the horses as if to avoid crashing into the turning-post in a race. At Soph. *El.* 743–8 a racing charioteer fails to rein in the horses at the post (called στήλη), crashes, and dies. **e3** ἐκ τῶν ὀδόντων βίαι ὀπίσω σπάσας τὸν χαλινόν: drawing the bit out of the horse's teeth and back into the soft part of its mouth reestablishes control. **e4** τήν τε κακηγόρον γλῶτταν: because of his earlier reproaches against the charioteer and good horse (254c6–d1). **e5** ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν: a Homeric phrase (ὀδύνῃσιν ἔδωκεν, *Il.* 5.397, *Od.* 17.567, at line-end), which gives a feel of conclusiveness to the charioteer's victory over the bad horse. **e7–8** φόβωι διόλλυται: i.e. the beast is tamed, physical pain (254e5) being the only language it understands.

255a1–257a1 Conclusion. Now able to approach the beloved with discretion, the lover stirs the beloved to *philia*, then to a reciprocal *erōs*, which leads to a conflict in the beloved's soul between lust and restraint similar to that experienced by the lover. The pair that abstain from sex and pursue philosophy achieve for

themselves the first of the three philosophical lives that is their short route back towards regrowing their wings and rejoining the heavenly procession. The pair that love honor and indulge in sex occasionally have made progress towards eventually regrowing their wings. For the beloved who would go with Lysias' non-lover life is bad, punishment follows after death, and progress towards regrowing wings is postponed indefinitely.

255a1–b2 Ἅτε οὖν πᾶσαν . . . εἰς ὁμιλίαν: the *erōmenos* is the subject of the subordinate clause (ἅτε . . . θεραπευόμενος . . . καὶ . . . ὢν . . . , ἐὰν . . . διαβεβλημένος ἦι . . . καὶ . . . ἀπωθῆι . . .). δέ ("then," *GP* 181) signals the start of the main clause (. . . ἥ τε ἡλικία καὶ τὸ χρεὼν ἤγαγεν . . .). **a1 πᾶσαν θεραπείαν ὡς ἰσόθεος θεραπευόμενος:** not merely figurative: the lover's divine regard for and devoted attendance on the beloved enable him to attain a godlike condition (252d6–8n., 253a5–7). **a2 τοῦτο:** i.e. ἔρωτα, from τοῦ ἐρῶντος. **a3 φύσει φίλος τῶι θεραπεύοντι** "naturally friendly to whoever attends on [him]"; generic article with the substantivized participle, as in the Athenian political expression ὁ βουλόμενος (*AGPS* 50.4.0). **ἐὰν ἄρα καί** "if then too." **a4 διαβεβλημένος** "misled." For this meaning of διαβάλλω, cf. Hdt. 8.110.1 Θεμιστοκλέης μὲν ταῦτα λέγων διέβαλλε, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἐπείθοντο; Chadwick 1996: 92. **a4–5 αἰσχρὸν ἐρῶντι πλησιάζειν:** 231e1n., e1–2n.

255b1 ἥ τε ἡλικία καὶ τὸ χρεών: the beloved's "age" (i.e. his youth) renders him naturally responsive to the lover's interest. The beloved's "need" is exactly for the friendship and education which the lover can offer him. **b2–3 οὐ γὰρ δήποτε . . . ἀγαθῶι εἶναι:** the diction of timelessness (εἵμαρται), the patterned phrasing, and the sentiment make this sound like a proverb, which S. uses to stress the natural attraction between lover and beloved. For proverbs of similar intent cf. Hom. *Od.* 17.218 αἰεί τοι τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον (quoted by S. at *Lys.* 214a), Eur. *TrGF* 296. **b3 προσεμένου:** 2 aorist middle participle of προσίημι, picking up προσέσθαι (b1); *sc.* τὸν ἐρῶντα. **b4–6 ἐγγύθεν ἡ εὔνοια . . . ἔνθεον φίλον:** the beloved undergoes an experience that astounds (ἐκπλήττει) complementary to that of the lover (ἐκπλήττονται, 250a6), but whereas the latter is astounded at the sight of the beloved's beauty, the former is astounded at the extent and sincerity of the lover's desire to help him (εὔνοια). By a coincidence rooted in nature, what begins in (divine) *erōs* leads to *philia* (and then to *erōs* again, 255c1–d5). **b6 πρὸς τὸν ἔνθεον φίλον** "in comparison with his divinely possessed friend"; on the lover's divine possession, cf. ἐνθουσιῶντες (253a3). **b6–7 χρονίζηι τοῦτο δρῶν:** the subject is the *erastēs*. τοῦτο = displaying his εὔνοια towards the beloved. **b7–c1 μετὰ τοῦ ἅπτεσθαι . . . ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ὁμιλίαις:** the incidental physical contact of sport and exercise undertaken in the nude stimulates *erōs* (cf. *Smp.* 217c), as would have been obvious to Plato's contemporaries. Athens' gymnasia were among the chief places where pederastic relationships were pursued and consummated (literary, epigraphic, iconographic evidence in Scanlon 2002: 199–273). Plato illustrates the

tension of the gymnasium's pederastic culture in the opening of *Lysis* (203a–207b) and *Charmides* (154a–c). Other occasions for non-sexual but erotically stimulating physical contact (ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ὁμιλίαις) would not have been rare in Athens' male society.

255c1–d5 τότ' ἤδη ἡ τοῦ ῥεύματος ἐκείνου... ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθεν: the lover's sight of the beautiful beloved, which caused the lover to fall in love (251a2–252c3), is not fully absorbed in the lover but in part spills over and is reflected back to the beloved. Seeing himself in the lover's gaze, though unaware that it is himself, the beloved receives an image of beauty into his soul, and then he too falls in love and his soul too begins to regrow its wings. **c1–2 ἡ τοῦ ῥεύματος... ὠνόμασε:** ὅν, referring to τοῦ ῥεύματος ἐκείνου, is attracted to the gender of ἵμερον. The origin of the word ἵμερος based on particles of beauty flowing to the lover was proposed at 251c5–6. Zeus has already been recast as the philosophical god (250b5, 252e1–253a7); now the traditional rape of Ganymede (*Hom. Hymn Aphrodite* 202–17) is recast as the model of divine *erōs*. Plato's seamless interweaving of traditional myth into his own, new myth is a more compelling revision of traditional myth than the tedious, rationalizing approach to the rape of Oreithyia proposed by Ph. and rejected by S. (229b4–230a6 with notes, 246c7–d2n.). Plato censures the traditional Zeus–Ganymede story at *Laws* 1.636c–d because it was used to justify the sexual practices that he finds abhorrent and that in the *Phaedrus* he attributes to the bad, pleasure-seeking *erōs* (250e3–251a2n.). **c2 πολλὴ φερομένη:** on πολύς with the participle, cf. 253e1n. **c3 ἀπομεστουμένου** "when he [i.e. the *erastēs*] is filled up to overflowing." **c5–6 τὸ τοῦ κάλλους ῥεῦμα πάλιν εἰς τὸν καλὸν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ἰόν:** the stream of beauty that goes back to the beloved via the lover's gaze originated in the beloved himself (251b2–3); but the beauty which thereby enters the beloved's soul arouses *erōs* in him just by virtue of being a likeness of the Form of beauty, not because of the particular origin or nature of that likeness. On the underlying theory of perception, cf. 251b2–7n. **c6 ᾗι πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἰέναι ἀφικόμενον καὶ ἀναπτερῶσαν** "where [i.e. εἰς τὸν καλόν] it [i.e. τὸ τοῦ κάλλους ῥεῦμα] naturally goes towards the soul, reaches it, and sets it aflutter." The metaphor in ἀναπτερῶσαν is standard (LSJ s.v. 1.2) but apt in view of the regrowth of wings in the soul of the beloved.

255d1–2 τὰς διόδους... ἔρωτος ἐνέπλησεν: the same process as that described in the soul of the lover (251b2–252a1); hence αὖ ("in turn"). **d2 ἐρᾶι μὲν οὖν, ὅτου δὲ ἀπορεῖ:** the subject is the *erōmenos*; with ὅτου (neuter) *sc.* ἐρᾶι. **d3 οὔθ' ὅτι πέπονθεν οἶδεν οὐδ' ἔχει φράσαι** "neither does he know nor yet can he tell what has happened to him" (*GP* 193 on οὔτε... οὐδέ). **d3–4 ἀπ' ἄλλου ὀφθαλμίας ἀπολελαυκώς:** ophthalmia was known in the ancient world for being extremely contagious (Plut. *Mor.* 681d), so one could easily catch it without knowing how, which is the point of comparison with falling in love. Further, this ailment travels from eye to eye, as does the reflected vision of the

young man's beauty. (Porphyry, *Abst.* 1.28.2 says that ophthalmia was transmitted by looking at someone with the ailment, perhaps implied in this passage.) The irony in ἀπολελαυκώς – "having the enjoyment of ophthalmia" – expresses the young man's bewilderment at finding himself in distress suddenly and for no apparent reason. **d4 κατρόπτωι:** κάτροπτον, not κάτοπτρον, is the proper spelling of the word for "mirror" in Plato (West 2002). *Alc.* 132e–133b compares seeing oneself in a mirror to seeing oneself in the pupil of another. **d5 ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθεν:** ἑαυτόν with both verbs. **d7–e1 εἴδωλον ἔρωτος ἀντέρωτα ἔχων** "since his reciprocal *erōs* is a reflection of [the lover's] *erōs*"; the manner in which the reflection comes about was described in 255c3–6, d4–5.

255e1 καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ οἴεται οὐκ ἔρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαν εἶναι "but he calls it [i.e. ἀντέρωτα] and believes it to be not *erōs* but *philia*." *Philia* is a kind of love, but is much broader than sexual desire (255b4–6). Amidst his confusion about what he is feeling (255d2–5), the young man instinctively follows convention in thinking that his feelings for the *erastēs* are a matter of *philia* (*Smp.* 182c; Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.28, *Smp.* 8.16, *Hiero* 1.35; Dover 1989: 53). It was an innovation on Plato's part to view the *erōmenos* as capable of experiencing a reciprocal *erōs*, including feelings of sexual desire, though Plato restricts this possibility to interaction with a philosophical *erastēs* (Halperin 1986). **e2 ἐκείνωι:** the *erastēs*, dative dependent on παραπλησίως. **e2–3 ὁρᾶν, ἅπτεσθαι, φιλεῖν, συγκατακεῖσθαι:** the asyndeton with terms rising in degree of intimacy focuses attention on the rising sexual tension. φιλεῖν = "kiss." **e3 τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ταχύ** "quickly (ταχύ) afterwards (τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο)." **e5 ἔχει ὅτι λέγηι** "knows what to say." The subjunctive is used by analogy from the construction in which the deliberative subjunctive is retained in an indirect question, as οὐκ ἔχει ὅτι λέγηι "he does not know what to say"; cf. *Ion* 536b ἀπορεῖς ὅτι λέγηις . . . εὐπορεῖς ὅτι λέγηις (Goodwin 1912: 217, 411).

256a1–5 ὁ δὲ τῶν παιδικῶν . . . λόγου ἀντιτείνει: since the beloved too experiences *erōs*, conflict between lust (bad horse) and restraint (charioteer and good horse) arises in his soul too, although as his *erōs* is weaker (εἴδωλον ἔρωτος, 255d7, ἀσθενεστέρως, 255e2), so the conflict in his soul is more tentative than that which takes place in the lover's soul. The mixture of desire, confusion, physical intimacy, and willingness to offer sexual gratification recalls Alcibiades' account of his youthful experience with S. (*Smp.* 217e–219d). **a1–2 ὁ δὲ τῶν παιδικῶν . . . καὶ φιλεῖ** "but the boy's [licentious horse] (δέ) [responding to τοῦ μὲν ἐραστοῦ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἵππος, 255e4] on the one hand (μέν) has no idea what to say, on the other hand (δέ) swelling and confused embraces the lover and kisses him." ἔχει οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν is the opposite of ἔχει ὅτι λέγηι (255e5). σπαργῶν has sexual connotations; cf. σπαργᾶις θυμὸν ἅπαντα πόθοις, addressed to Priapus (Erucius, *Anth. Plan.* 242.4 = Gow–Page, *GP* 2285). **a2–3 ὡς σφόδρ' εὔνουν ἀσπαζόμενος:** referring to 255b3–6. **a4–5 ὁ δὲ ὁμόζυξ . . . ἀντιτείνει:** the beloved's good horse and charioteer step in to resist at the point where kissing and

non-sexual contact are about to lead to genital stimulation and gratification. μετ' αἰδοῦς καὶ λόγου = "in accord with shame and reason"; cf. παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας, 249a2. **a6–b1** Ἐὰν μὲν δὴ οὖν . . . τῆς διανοίας ἀγαγόντα "so then, if the better elements of the mind triumph by leading [the *erastēs* and *erōmenos*] towards an ordered way of life and philosophy." ἐὰν μέν looks forward to ἐὰν δέ (256b7).

256b1–5 μακάριον μὲν καὶ ὁμονοητικὸν . . . ἐν νενικήκασιν: coordinate main clauses (μακάριον μὲν . . . διάγουσιν/τελευτήσαντες δὲ . . . νενικήκασιν) structure the apodosis; the subjects are the philosophical *erastēs* and *erōmenos*: "on the one hand, blessed (μακάριον μέν) and harmonious is the earthly life they lead – in control of themselves and well-behaved, having enslaved (δουλωσάμενοι μέν) [the part] of the soul through which badness was arising [i.e. the bad horse] and freed (ἐλευθερώσαντες δέ) [the part] through which excellence [was arising] [i.e. the charioteer and good horse] – on the other hand, when they die (τελευτήσαντες δέ) and become winged and light they have triumphed in one of the three wrestling-throws that are truly Olympian." In the Olympic games (dedicated to Zeus) a wrestler won the match by throwing his opponent three times (*Anth. Pal.* 11.316), which became synonymous for victory generally (Aesch. *Ag.* 171 τριακτήρ, *Eum.* 589, Pl. *Rep.* 9.583b, *Euthd.* 277d). Hence, the suppression of the bad horse in both *erastēs* and *erōmenos* and their abstention from sex while under the pressure of *erōs* is portrayed as the first (252d3–4) of the three successive philosophical lives which these followers of the philosophical Zeus (252e1–253a7) must attain in the "truly Olympian" struggle to regain their wings and rejoin the heavenly procession (248e5–249a4). The chaste ἀρετή achieved in this victory is opposed to the ἀρετή of sexual conquest pursued by the *erastēs* of Lysias' speech and S.'s first speech (232d4). **b5–7** οὔ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν . . . πορίσαι ἀνθρώπωι: the stately diction – centered on antithetical chiasmus (σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη/θεία μανία) combined with anaphora (οὔτε . . . οὔτε) – announces the conclusive point: S.'s purpose was to show that divinely inspired *erōs* brings unsurpassed benefit (244a5–6, 245b6–c1). Mental soundness (σωφροσύνη) was the plea of Lysias' non-lover (236a2n., 244a4). Placed in the chiasmus with the adjective "human," it allows S. to reaffirm that the soul's transcendent journey to contemplate the Forms in the pure, heavenly realm constitutes a far greater benefit than any worldly good, even one attained through rational considerations. The latter point is reiterated and a layer of contempt is added in the formal conclusion following in a moment (256e3–257a1).

256c1 φιλοτίμωι: love of honor (characteristic of the good horse, 253d6) raises a person above the materialism and hedonism of the masses, though it remains well below the philosopher's pursuit of knowledge and the welfare of his soul (*Rep.* 8.547c–550b, 9.581a–e, *Smp.* 208c–d). Plato viewed love of honor as a distinctive mark of the contemporary wealthy class, as in the case of his brother

Glaucon (*Rep.* 2.368a, 5.474d–e, 8.548d), and this class provided the chief and most visible participants in Athens' pederastic culture (Hubbard 1998). Hence the inferior but still beneficial type of erotic relationship described here (256b7–e2) applies particularly to members of this class, who formed a major part of Plato's contemporary audience. **c1–4 τάχ' ἄν . . . εἰλέτην τε καὶ διεπράξαντο:** following the present general condition (ἐὰν . . . χρήσωνται) and further conditions specified in the participles (λαβόντε, συναγαγόντε), ἄν with the aorist indicative suggests iterated or intermittent action (*AGPS* 53.10.3); the active εἰλέτην is vivid: [in these conditions] "it may be that [from time to time] they seize and consummate the choice which the masses consider most blessed." τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μακαριστὴν αἵρεσιν is a euphemism for sex, but derogatory in its reference to the hedonistic masses. Since the sex act that Plato condones in the case of the honor-loving *erastēs* and *erōmenos* can hardly be anal intercourse (250e3–251a2n.), it is likely to be intercrural intercourse, which was felt to avoid demeaning the younger participant (Dover 1989: 98–109, Lear and Cantarella 2008: 106–38). The combination of dual and plural is unremarkable (*AGPS* 63.3.0). **c5 οὐ πάσηι δεδογμένα τῆι διανοίαι:** sex is sought only by the bad horse in each of them, the charioteer and good horse being opposed but not able to resist when they are taken off guard. **c6–d3 φίλω μὲν οὖν . . . ἐν δὲ τῆι τελευτῆι:** lasting friendship during life on earth (μέν, c6–d3), progress towards regaining wings after death (δέ, d3–e2). **c6–d1 φίλω μὲν οὖν . . . ἔξω γενομένω διάγουσι** "also these two [i.e. honor-loving *erastēs* and *erōmenos*] lead their lives as friends of each other, though less so than those [i.e. philosophical *erastēs* and *erōmenos*], both during their *erōs* and when they have gone beyond it." The lasting friendship sought and attained by the honor-loving *erastēs* and *erōmenos* distinguishes them from the purely sexual encounter sought by the *erastēs* of Lysias' speech and S.'s first speech.

256d3–4 ὡρμηκότες δὲ πτεροῦσθαι "but starting to become winged." **d5–e2 εἰς γὰρ σκότον . . . ὅταν γένωνται, γενέσθαι** "for it is established for those who have once started on the journey in lower heaven [i.e. as their reward] that they not thereafter go to the darkness and the underworld journey [i.e. for punishment], but that they happily lead their [postmortem] life in the light journeying together and become winged together, whenever they do, thanks to *erōs*." This passage reflects what happens to souls when they are judged at the end of their earthly life: they are either punished and sent to the underworld or rewarded in a lower region of heaven (249a6–b1n.), in both cases awaiting their next reincarnation at the end of their thousand-year cycle (249a4–b2). Contrasts in diction – σκότον/φανόν, τὴν ὑπὸ γῆς πορείαν/τῆς ὑπουρανίου πορείας – highlight the postmortem benefit that accrues to the honor-loving *erastēs* and *erōmenos*. The last clause (ὁμοπτέρους . . . γενέσθαι) expands the idea expressed in ὡρμηκότες δὲ πτεροῦσθαι (256d3–4), holding forth the expectation that eventually the honor-loving *erastēs* and *erōmenos* will become winged and

rejoin the heavenly procession, though not via the shortcut reserved for the philosophical *erastēs* and *erōmenos* (248e5–249a4, 256b4–5).

256e3 **ὦ παῖ:** the formal conclusion to the argument of the speech is appropriately addressed to the imagined auditor (243e7), but thus also to Ph., who agreed to stand in for the boy (243e6n.). **e3–4** **ἡ παρ' ἐραστοῦ φιλία:** referring to 255b4–6. **e4** **ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος οἰκειότης** "but the relationship that originates with the non-lover." **e4–6** **σωφροσύνηι θνητῆι . . . τῆι φίληι ψυχῆι ἐντεκοῦσα** "mixed with worldly prudence, dispensing meager, worldly things, having produced in his friend's soul a lack of freedom which the masses praise as a mark of excellence." S. refers with disdain to the conventional goods which Lysias' non-lover claimed to provide (231a4–6, 232b5–e1n.) based on his sanity (236a2n., 244a4, 256b6), and to Lysias' conventional, but perverse, view of sexual hedonism as freedom (cf. 256b2–3). The disdain applies particularly to Lysias' speech because S. ended his first speech, by design, before praising the non-lover (237a7–241d1n.). **e6–257a1** **ἐννέα χιλιάδας . . . ὑπὸ γῆς ἄνουν:** nine thousand years "wallowing senselessly around the earth and under the earth" represents nine successive thousand-year periods of incarnation (περὶ γῆν) and postmortem subterranean punishment (ὑπὸ γῆς) which the soul of an *erōmenos* who has joined with a non-lover will endure before he even has a chance to regrow his wings and rejoin the heavenly procession (248e4–249b5n.). Nine such periods must be counted following the first thousand-year period of incarnation and punishment (249a4–5), ten thousand years being the minimum (248e5–249a1). The contrast not only with the philosophical *erōmenos* (regrowth after three thousand-year periods, 256a6–b7) but even with the honor-loving *erōmenos* (progress towards eventual regrowth, 256c6–e2) is stark: for this young man life on earth and after death is unrelievedly bad and the prospect of his soul's regrowing wings and rejoining the heavenly procession is postponed indefinitely.

257a2–b6 As a postscript to the speech proper, S. prays to Eros for his own continued efficacy as an erotic expert and for Ph.'s conversion to philosophy.

257a2–3 **Αὕτη σοι . . . ἐκτέτειται παλινωιδία:** S. took Stesichorus' *Palinode* as his model because his purpose was to make amends for offending Eros in his first speech (242b7–243d4), as ἐκτέτειται (perfect passive of ἐκτίνω) recalls. The complex superlative emphasizes the scrupulousness of S.'s piety. The invocation makes the hymnic character of the speech, recalled by S. later (265c2), explicit. **a3–4** **"τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν" . . . εἰρῆσθαι:** when Ph. praised the style of Lysias' speech (234c6–d1), S. gave ironic approval in terms that suggested the pointlessness of display for its own sake (234e5–6n.). Here S. recalls verbatim Ph.'s manner of referring to Lysias' style in order to contrast his own functional use of style: it was necessary to deliver the palinode "in somewhat poetic language on account of Ph."; that is, S. used such language in order to make the

speech compelling to Ph. (228a5n.). S.'s purpose therein, viz. to convert Ph. to philosophy, is revealed momentarily (257b4–6); and he anticipates his general claim that style in rhetoric is properly determined by what compels the intended auditor, and thus is strictly functional (271b2–4n.). In addition to the mythical framework (μυθικόν τινα ὕμνον, 265c1–2), the chariot image (246a3–6), and the dramatic conflict between the charioteer and the bad horse, the palinode is permeated with poetic style: see notes at 244d6–7, e3, 247b4, c4–6, 248a4–5, 251a4–b2, 252a2–4, b1–3, 253e5. Mras 1915: 104–16, Dover 1997: 103–6 survey poetic diction and usage in the speech. **a5–6 τὴν ἐρωτικήν μοι τέχνην . . . δι' ὀργήν:** while maintaining the piety that motivates the speech as a whole and belongs to his persona, S. dispenses with irony and explicitly claims the erotic expertise that is demonstrated in the speech itself and gives the speech its authority. Cf. 227c3–4n. on S.'s erotic expertise.

257b1 δίδου τ' ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν παρὰ τοῖς καλοῖς τίμιον εἶναι: this part of S.'s prayer – that he become even more prized in the eyes of beautiful boys – is to be understood as attaching importance to his erotic expertise to the extent that, in common with the theme of the speech, he advances the interests of those who are affected by it. **b2 ἀπηνές** "harsh" (Dover 1968b: 216 ad Ar. *Nub.* 974). **b2–3 τὸν τοῦ λόγου πατέρα:** Lysias is "the father of the discussion" in the sense that he started it; S. no longer holds Ph. responsible (244a1n.). Cf. 275e3n. on the father metaphor. **b3 τῶν τοιούτων λόγων:** i.e. speeches that blaspheme the god and endanger young men. **b3–4 ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν δέ . . . τρέψον:** 243d5–e1n. on S.'s interest in Lysias. But the main purpose in praying for Lysias to turn to philosophy is to set the stage for Ph., "his lover," to do so (257b4–5). Polemarchus' turn to philosophy, evident in the *Republic* (1.327b–328b, 331e–336a, 5.449b), demonstrates that such a turn is genuinely possible. **b4–6 ἵνα καὶ ὁ ἐραστὴς . . . τὸν βίον ποιῆται** "in order that also this lover of his [viz. Ph.] not waver any longer as he does now, but orient his life completely towards Eros with philosophical discourse." Having drawn for the first time an explicit distinction between Lysianic discourse and philosophic discourse (257b1–6), S. uses the prayer to put his priorities for Ph. into the open, viz. that Ph. realize his potential for an erotic, philosophical life of the first rank (248d2–3, 259b4n.). S. characterized such a life earlier as παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας (249a2). On Ph. as Lysias' *erastēs*, cf. 236b5n. ἁπλῶς answers ἐπαμφοτερίζηι.

257b7–259e1: THIRD INTERLUDE

The transition from the speeches on *erōs* to the dialectical inquiry into discourse takes place in two stages. In response to Ph.'s effort to excuse Lysias from further competition, which involves the subject of speechwriting, S. reveals the need to address the question of what constitutes good and bad discourse (257b7–258e4).

To prepare Ph. to undertake a dialectical inquiry into that question, S. tells an allegory about the cicadas, who are chirping above them (258e5–259d6).

257b7–c1 Συνεύχομαί σοι . . . ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι: by joining S.'s prayer, Ph. has moved considerably from his initial enthusiasm for Lysianic rhetoric, but the condition expressed in the subordinate clause – "if it is better for us" – indicates the need for fuller consideration, which the following inquiry provides. ἡμῖν refers to Ph. and Lysias, S. having prayed for both of them to turn to philosophy.

257c1 πάλαι θαυμάσας ἔχω "I have long marveled at [your speech] and still do." Whereas the adverb is regularly construed with the present indicative (cf. *Cri.* 43b πάλαι θαυμάζω), here the periphrastic form (aorist participle with present indicative ἔχω) explicitly distributes the action (*AGPS* 56.3.6). **c2** ταπεινός "humbled." Since ταπεινός was a critical term for low or banal style (Alcid. *Soph.* 19, Arist. *Rh.* 3.1404b1–4), Plato may also be suggesting a more trenchant view of Lysias' style than the fulsome, ironic praise offered by S. earlier (234e5–6n.). **c3** ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ ἐθελήσῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄλλον ἀντιπαρατεῖναι "if indeed [Lysias] really should wish to put forward another [speech] in opposition to it." Ph. is no longer eager to have Lysias continue the competition (cf. 243d5–e1). **c4** θαυμάσιε: pointed and picks up θαυμάσας (257c1). τοῦτ' αὐτό: "this very thing," for which one of the politicians reproached Lysias, is the writing of speeches, implied in c3. **c5** λογογράφον: i.e. forensic speechwriter, one who, in return for a fee, wrote speeches for litigants to deliver in court on their own behalf; cf. Lavency 1964, Wolff 1968 on this practice. Since speechwriters were unaccountable to the *dēmos* and could be suspected of using their compositional skills to manipulate the legal process for profit, Athenian politicians could exploit a popular prejudice against them by using the term λογογράφος as a reproach against opponents (Aeschin. 3.173, Dem. 19.250; more examples and discussion at Yunis 1996: 174–5). The episode to which Ph. refers is more likely a convenient fabrication than an actual attack on Lysias. Though Lysias was indeed a speechwriter, as a metic (resident alien) in Athens and thus not able to participate in politics directly he was not susceptible to attacks that were effective against politicians. A late report that Lysias was the intended beneficiary of a citizenship grant following the restoration of democracy in 403 might, if it were true, provide a context for the political attack mentioned by Ph.; but the report was invented for biographical literary purposes ([Plut.] x *orat.* 835f–836a; Todd 2007: 6). Further, as S.'s response implies (c7–d1), it is implausible that an attack on Lysias for being a forensic speechwriter would affect his willingness to compose an epideictic discourse of the kind at issue in the dialogue; it clearly did not prevent him (in Plato's representation) from writing the first speech. Rather, Ph. seizes on the popular prejudice against speechwriters as an excuse to spare Lysias any further competition with the obviously superior S. He does not even contemplate the possibility that Lysias, whose skill lies in writing speeches (228a2), might extemporize a response. **c5–6** τάχ' οὖν ἂν ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας ἐπίσχοι

ἡμῖν ἂν τοῦ γράφειν "perhaps then we can see that he might refrain from writing for the sake of his reputation." ἡμῖν is ethical dative, expressing the person from whose point of view the statement holds (*AGPS* 48.6.5). The second ἂν repeats the first (232c2–3n.). **c7** **νεανία:** pointed and suggests teasing (Introd. note 11). τὸ δόγμα: viz. Ph.'s belief that Lysias will refrain from writing just because a politician reproached him for being a speechwriter.

257d1–2 **ἴσως δὲ καὶ... λέγειν ἃ ἔλεγεν** "but perhaps you really think that the man who was attacking him said what he said by way of reproach." S. goes straight to the question whether there is any merit in reproaching someone just for being a speechwriter. The possibility of further epideictic competition is ignored and forgotten. **d4** **οἱ μέγιστον δυνάμενοι... ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν:** Ph. refers archly to Athens' leading politicians. **d4–6** **αἰσχύνονται λόγους... μὴ σοφισταὶ καλῶνται:** Athenian politicians did not normally engage in forensic speechwriting or publish texts (καταλείπειν, "leave them behind") until Demosthenes changed the practice in the mid fourth century (Yunis 1996: 175, 241–7). σοφισταί refers not to a specific group of sophists (Protagoras, Gorgias, *et al.*) but to a broader group of intellectuals (229c5–d1n.), who, like speechwriters, were often held in suspicion by the *dēmos*. Written texts were associated with this group because they were among the first to produce written texts that came to the attention of the broader public (Alcid. *Soph.* 1; Thomas 2003). **d7–8** **"Γλυκὺς ἀγκών,"... ἐκλήθη:** the proverb "sweet bend," originating, as S. says, from a big (and therefore difficult) bend in the Nile, means that words should be understood in the sense opposite to their literal meaning. So S. is telling Ph. that he has made the mistake of taking the politicians at their word. Bothered by the explanation of the proverb which looks like a gloss, editors have deleted the clause ὅτι... ἐκλήθη (De Vries 1969: 184–7), but S.'s didactic tone towards Ph. suits this passage. The clause is present in *P. Ant.* 77 (2nd–3rd c. CE) as well as the three primary medieval MSS.

257e1–258d10 In a passage of intensifying ridicule S. makes the paradoxical claim that politicians are eager to write speeches and leave compositions behind and defends it by pointing out that politicians compete to have their proposals adopted by the *dēmos* and publicly inscribed. The confusion evident in the politicians' self-contradictory reproach of speechwriting makes clear the need to consider what constitutes good and bad speaking and writing in general without regard for genre or occasion (258d7–10). This passage not only creates a bridge to the following inquiry, but also makes clear that deliberative rhetoric turned into epideictic display by craven politicians in the democratic assembly is a travesty that parallels Lysias' epideictic deliberative speech addressed to a young man. This parallel between forms of discourse that are ostensibly quite different illustrates the appropriateness of examining all forms of persuasive discourse in one inquiry (261a7–b3, d10–e4). Cf. Yunis 1996: 181–93 on the argument and derisive humor in this passage.

257e1–2 οἱ μέγιστον φρονοῦντες . . . καταλείψεως συγγραμμάτων: the claim that "the proudest politicians love most of all speechwriting and leaving written compositions behind" is a paradox, as Ph.'s puzzlement (257e5), likely to be shared by the reader, implies. S.'s argument in defense of the paradox hinges on the terms λογογραφία and σύγγραμμα. With regard to λογογραφία S. shifts from the conventional sense "forensic speechwriting," as used by Ph. (257c5), to a literal sense "composing speeches," i.e. of any kind (257e1, 258b4, c1–2, 264b7). He is helped by Ph.'s attempt to conflate forensic and epideictic speechwriting (257c5n.), by Ph.'s locution λόγους γράφειν (257d5) with the ambiguity of λόγος referring to discourse of any kind and γράφειν referring to inscribing as well as writing, and by the fact that λογογράφος could mean simply "prose-writer" in contrast to a poet (Thuc. 1.21.1, Arist. *Rh.* 2.1388b21, 3.1413b13). The term σύγγραμμα commonly referred to any prose document that was composed in writing and used, published, or circulated in written form, as both actual forensic speeches of the kind written by Lysias and the epideictic speech attributed to him in the dialogue; thus Ph.'s usage in 257d5. But S. expands σύγγραμμα (and cognates) here and below (258a1, a6, a8, b1, b5, c4) to include politicians' speeches delivered before the assembly even though the proposals contained in those speeches may not have been written up until they were approved by the *dēmos* and made ready for inscription. In the Platonic corpus it is not unusual for S. "to understand words and phrases contrary to all convention if they seem to him ambiguous or if his own interpretation leads him to a new significance" (Classen 1959: 178), as happens again with ψυχαγωγία (261a7), φιλόσοφος (278d5); further examples at Classen 1959: 99–164. **e1 μάλιστα ἐρῶσι:** the intensity of the desire anticipates the abjectness of the politicians' pursuit of popular favor (258b3–5). **e2 οἵ γε καί** "because it is they who." **e3 τοὺς ἐπαινέτας** "his admirers," ironic for a politician's supporters (258a6–7n.). **e3–4 προσπαραγράφουσι πρώτους οἳ ἂν ἑκασταχοῦ ἐπαινῶσιν αὐτούς** "they write in as an addition at the beginning whoever admires them on any occasion."

258a4–5 "Ἔδοξέ," πού φησιν . . . "ὃς καὶ ὃς εἶπεν": at the beginning (πρώτους, 257e4, πρῶτος, 258a1) of inscribed Athenian decrees stood the formula of enactment: "resolved by the council," "resolved by the people," or "resolved by the council and the people" (Henry 1977). Having approved the politician's proposal, the people constitute his "admirers" (257e4, 258a2). The people's formal approval of the politician's proposal (ἔδοξε τῶι δήμωι) precisely mirrors the persuasive goal of sophistic rhetoric, viz. τὰ δόξαντ' ἂν πλήθει (260a2), τὸ τῶι πλήθει δοκοῦν (273b1–2). The name of the proposing politician, recorded in the form "so-and-so said" (ὃς καὶ ὃς εἶπεν), immediately followed the formula of enactment in the inscription. **a5–6 τὸν αὑτὸν δὴ λέγων μάλα σεμνῶς καὶ ἐγκωμιάζων ὁ συγγραφεύς** "the writer naturally mentioning his own self with great solemnity and praise." The irony, beginning with the reflexive pronoun used with the article (τὸν αὑτόν) and δή, is blatant. **a6–7 ἐπιδεικνύμενος**

τοῖς ἐπαινέταις τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σοφίαν: more irony. The politician, properly an adviser (σύμβουλος), is reduced to epideictic performer (ἐπιδεικνύμενος). The σοφία he displays is less "his [political] wisdom" than "his [epideictic] skill." The political audience, properly autonomous listeners deciding their own interests, are reduced to admirers. Thucydides' Cleon (3.38.4–7) vividly describes the degradation of the Athenian assembly into epideictic competition. **a7 πάνυ μακρόν:** another dig. **a8–b1 ἦ σοι ἄλλο τι φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ λόγος συγγεγραμμένος;** this amounts to asking Ph. whether he accepts S.'s expansion of the term σύγγραμμα (257e1–2n.) as legitimate.

258b3 ἐὰν μὲν οὗτος ἐμμένηι: *sc.* ὁ λόγος: "if this speech [i.e. the politician's proposal] should stand," i.e. be approved by the assembly so as to become an official decree. **b3–4 γεγηθὼς ἀπέρχεται ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου ὁ ποιητής:** the poet (= politician) departs the theater (= assembly) rejoicing for having won the dramatic (= political) competition. Democratic political rhetoric and democratic poetic competition are equally forms of flattery (*Grg.* 501e–502e, *Rep.* 6.492b–493d). On ποιητής cf. 234e5n. **b4–5 ἐὰν δὲ ἐξαλειφθῆι . . . καὶ οἱ ἑταῖροι:** if the politician's proposal (subject of ἐξαλειφθῆι, parallel to ἐμμένηι) fails to pass in the assembly, as a written document it is literally erased (cf. Andoc. 1.76 ἐξαλεῖψαι τὰ ψηφίσματα) and the politician (subject of γένηται) thereby loses his chance to have his speech written/inscribed. πενθεῖ is mocking, like γεγηθώς (b3). οἱ ἑταῖροι is the term for political associates. **b10–c4 ὅταν ἱκανὸς γένηται ῥήτωρ . . . αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα;** "when he [the aspiring political συγγραφεύς] becomes a good enough politician or king so as to acquire the power of Lycurgus or Solon or Darius and become an immortal speechwriter in his city, does he not consider himself equal to the gods while he is still alive and do not later generations have the same opinion of him as they gaze on his writings?" The delusion of the aspiring political συγγραφεύς is comically excessive. Whereas the quasi-divine fame of the legendary statesmen rests on real political achievements and they were not ones to have flattered the *dēmos* in competition with opponents, the aspiring συγγραφεύς is nothing more than an ill-tempered, self-seeking epideictic speechwriter whose celestial aspirations and immortal fame rest not on the content of his discourse and the public benefits of his policies but solely on the durability of the medium on which his flattering speech is inscribed. βασιλεύς anticipates Darius, but also indicates the extent of the politician's ambition, as seen e.g. in Alcibiades or Callicles. The "later generations" who exalt the successful politician merely because of his inscribed decrees (αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα) are equally foolish, like Plato's contemporary Athenians who exalt the great Athenian politicians of the preceding generations (*Grg.* 502d–503c). The Spartan Lycurgus, the Athenian Solon, and the Persian Darius form a natural group as representatives of the fundamental types of constitution (oligarchy, democracy, monarchy; *Laws* 3) and traditional great powers (*Laws* 3.695c–d, *Epist.* 7.332a–b on Darius; *Smp.* 209d–e on Lycurgus and Solon).

258c6 τῶν τοιούτων: politicians (257c4). **c6–7** ὅστις καὶ ὁπωστιοῦν δύσνους Λυσίαι "whoever is hostile to Lysias to any extent whatsoever." **c8–9** Οὔκουν εἰκός γε ... ὀνειδίζοι: of course politicians did make such reproaches (257c5n.), which exposes their confusion about what they were doing. Such exposure is the invariable outcome of S.'s investigations into the practices of democratic politicians (*Ap.* 21b–22a, 24c–27e).

258d1–5 οὐκ αἰσχρὸν αὐτό γε ... αἰσχρῶς τε καὶ κακῶς: from Ph.'s claim that a politician criticized Lysias for being a speechwriter (257c3–5) S. retains the interest in criticism; but there being nothing to criticize in the mere act of writing speeches, he directs critical judgment towards the way in which speeches are written: since speeches can be written well or badly, they can be evaluated as such. Further, there being nothing disgraceful just in writing speeches, evaluation of the production of speeches will naturally include the two means of producing them, orally (λέγειν) and in writing (γράφειν). Socratic discourse will thus be included alongside Lysianic discourse in the following inquiry. **d7** Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος τοῦ καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν; "what then is the nature of writing [speeches] in an admirable way and in a way that is not [admirable]?" The question is further specified in the next sentence. Composing discourse καλῶς is exemplified by S.'s palinode (καλλίστη, 257a2), soon to be taken as a model of rhetorical art (262c8–d2n.). **d7–10** δεόμεθά τι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ... ἄνευ μέτρου ὡς ἰδιώτης; S.'s request to pursue the investigation marks the transition to the second half of the dialogue. Lysias warrants scrutiny because he is (obviously) a producer of discourse (243d5–e1n.), but he warrants no special scrutiny: the inquiry is to be a general one, applying to all writers of speeches at any time (καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις πώποτέ τι γέγραφεν ἢ γράψει), without regard for the status of the speech as public or private (εἴτε πολιτικὸν σύγγραμμα εἴτε ἰδιωτικόν) or its form in verse or prose (ἐν μέτρωι ὡς ποιητὴς ἢ ἄνευ μέτρου ὡς ἰδιώτης). Public/private and verse/prose are basic and exhaustive dichotomies. Orally produced speeches are also to be included along with written ones (258d4, 259e3). ἰδιωτικόν (d9), in opposition to the specialized domain πολιτικόν (d9), here means non-political, hence private. ἰδιώτης (d10), in opposition to the specialized ποιητής who writes in verse (d10), here means non-poet, hence prose-writer. The comprehensiveness of the inquiry is stressed again at its conclusion (277d1–e1, 278c1–d6).

258e1 Ἐρωτᾶις εἰ δεόμεθα; τίνος μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα: repeating the question and μὲν οὖν express lively agreement (*GP* 478). **e2–3** οὐ γάρ που ἐκείνων γε ὧν προλυπηθῆναι δεῖ ἢ μηδὲ ἡσθῆναι: ὧν is attracted from ἅς to the case of its antecedent ἐκείνων: "for surely [one would] not [live for the sake of] those [pleasures] with respect to which one must experience pain beforehand or else not even have pleasure." The notion that physical pleasures result from the cessation of pain is raised elsewhere by Plato (*Phd.* 60b, *Rep.* 9.583c–d). **e4** δικαίως ἀνδραποδώδεις κέκληνται: Ph.'s satisfaction in the superior quality of his pleasures mocks him gently and prompts S. to reply with the cicada story. Yet

Ph.'s instinctive desire for pleasure in discourse rather than for physical pleasure makes him a suitable candidate for philosophical endeavors (228a4n., 259b4n., 276d1–7).

258e5–259d6 S.'s mention of the cicadas overhead recalls the beautiful spot that fostered S.'s first rhetorical outburst (230b2–c4) as well as his speeches on *erōs*. Now, however, as S. and Ph. are about to commence their dialectical inquiry, the combination of the cicadas' chirping and the heat threatens to derail it right at the start. To Ph. – and to readers who, like him, are intrigued more by rhetorical performances than by dialectical inquiries – the cicada story functions as both a warning and a stimulus (Görgemanns 1993: 142–4). The cicadas' chirping was traditionally portrayed as singing (Hom. *Il.* 3.152, Hes. *Op.* 583), which enabled cicadas to be associated with poetry and the Muses (Davies and Kathirithamby 1986: 117–18). Plato makes the cicadas' chirping into a combination of singing and conversing (ᾄδοντες καὶ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμενοι, 259a1–2), the latter activity representing the dialectical inquiry that S. is about to launch (259a3, 6). Yet like the Sirens' song (259b1), the cicadas' chirping is captivating while constituting an obstacle to be overcome. The base reaction, typical of sheep (259a5), is to succumb to the physical inducement and be charmed into sleep, which is the effect that dialectical inquiry is liable to have on Ph. and readers with similar tastes. The nobler reaction is to resist the physical inducement to sleep, recognize the Muses as the inspiration of the cicadas' chirping, and emulate the cicadas' service to the Muses by pursuing the very activities which the Muses sponsor. The most eminent Muses, whose utterances are most beautiful, are the Muses of philosophy (259d2–5, anticipated 248d3). Thus in this isolated spot under the watchful eye of the cicadas, S. and Ph. have the privilege and obligation of pursuing philosophy as a way of honoring the goddesses, and thereby reaping pleasure too, in the tireless manner of the cicadas (259c4). The cicadas are both a reminder of philosophy's status as a divine, pleasurable pursuit and a spur to engage in that pursuit.

258e5 Σχολή: S.'s assurance of leisure is a sure sign that the proposed examination is important to him (227b8–10, 229e3–230a6). **e5–259a1 ὡς ἐν τῷι πνίγει** "as [happens] in the heat."

259a1–2 ᾄδοντες καὶ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμενοι: the cicadas' "singing" represents the first, rhetorical–performative, part of the dialogue (230c2, 238d2, 241e1–2, 265c1–4); their "discussing with each other" represents the upcoming, dialectical, part (διαλεκτική, 276e5). **a2 καθορᾶν καὶ ἡμᾶς:** in the isolated rural setting the pressures of human society that ordinarily necessitate philosophy (*Rep.* 2.369c–376c) are absent, but even here, where undisturbed, sheep-like sleep is available, the gods (through their agents, the cicadas) are watching and provide an incentive to philosophy, as S. goes on to explain. **a4–5 δικαίως ἂν καταγελῷιεν, ἡγούμενοι ἀνδράποδ' ἄττα:** the words in which Ph. revealed his complacent

superiority (δικαίως ἀνδραποδώδεις, 258e4) are turned around by S. to exhort him to greater effort and a higher standard.

259b1 παραπλέοντάς σφας ὥσπερ Σειρῆνας ἀκηλήτους "[if they see us] sail past them, as if they were Sirens, without falling under their spell." Odysseus allowed himself to fall under the Sirens' spell while managing to avoid death by a ruse (*Od.* 12.153–200). S. and Ph. are to resist the spell of the cicadas' sleep-inducing song by sheer determination, though S. holds out the hope of pleasure and a reward if they are successful. **b4** φιλόμουσον: to encourage Ph. in the task ahead, S. suggests that Ph. is himself a lover of the Muses, which is consistent with Ph.'s own aspirations (228a4, 258e4n.). S. described the highest human life in the hierarchy of lives of the palinode thus (248d2–3): ἀνδρὸς γενησομένου φιλοσόφου ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μουσικοῦ τινος καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ. Ph.'s designation as "lover of the Muses" puts him at this level (μουσικοῦ τινος) and thus suggests that he has the potential to become a philosopher (φιλοσόφου) and erotic expert (ἐρωτικοῦ); cf. 257b4–6, Introd. 2, 3. **b5–6** ποτ' ἦσαν οὗτοι ἄνθρωποι τῶν πρὶν Μούσας γεγονέναι "once upon a time these [cicadas] were men who belonged to the generations before the Muses were born."

259c1 ἐξεπλάγησαν ὑφ' ἡδονῆς: unlike Ph. (258e1–4), the proto-cicada men do not intellectualize pleasure but experience it purely, and this way of experiencing pleasure (of a divine kind) is exemplary for S. (251a2–c4). **c1–2** ἠμέλησαν σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν: on the cicadas' abstinence as a model for S. and Ph., cf. 227b6–7n. **c2–6** ἐξ ὧν τὸ τεττίγων γένος . . . τιμᾶι τῶν ἐνθάδε: λαβόν is nominative in agreement with τὸ γένος and has as its object γέρας τοῦτο, which is then explained in the accusative–infinitive construction that follows: "from those men the race of cicadas is afterwards born [historical present] and they accepted this gift from the Muses: that once born they have no need of nourishment but straightaway sing without food or drink until they die, and then they go to the Muses and report to them who among men here honors which of them." **c4** ἄσιτόν τε καὶ ἄποτον: Aristotle reports that cicadas lack a mouth and ingest only dew (*Hist. an.* 532b10–17). **c6** Τερψιχόραι: Plato borrows from Hesiod the names of the Muses (*Theog.* 77–9) and the idea of connecting their names with the activities they supervise (*Theog.* 63–74), though Plato adapts to his purposes what those activities are. Terpsichore's dances recall the dance-like procession of souls upward within the vault of heaven (247a7, 250b5).

259d1 τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς: the erotic activities that occupy those who are reported to Erato must, in this context, go beyond the traditional erotic activities such as those described by erotic poets (235c3) to include the divine *erōs* of the palinode (248d3). **d2–3** τῆι δὲ πρεσβυτάτηι Καλλιόπηι καὶ τῆι μετ' αὐτὴν Οὐρανίαι: as "the most eminent of all [the Muses], she who accompanies kings" (Hes. *Theog.* 79–80), here "the eldest," Calliope is properly the chief philosophical Muse. Her name ("beautiful voice") allows Plato to treat her as the Muse of discourse

(περὶ . . . λόγους . . . θείους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους, 259d4–5), which in its most beautiful and pleasurable form is philosophy. Urania, placed by Hesiod next to last before Calliope (*Theog.* 78), is the second philosophical Muse because heaven is both a subject of philosophical discourse (περί τε οὐρανόν, 259d4) and the place of the procession of souls upward towards the Forms. **d3–4 τὴν ἐκείνων μουσικήν:** *sc.* τέχνην: "the art that belongs to these Muses," viz. philosophy (as *Phd.* 61a, *Rep.* 8.548b). **d4–5 περί τε οὐρανὸν καὶ λόγους οὖσαι θείους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους** "are concerned with heaven and discourses about gods and men." This subject matter and these discourses pertain to philosophy generally, but the palinode inevitably springs to mind. The three categories (heaven, gods, men) recall Hesiod's enumeration of the Muses' songs as concerning Uranus, Zeus, and men (*Theog.* 44–52). **d5 ἱᾶσιν καλλίστην φωνήν:** a final reminiscence of Hesiod: the Muses ἐπήρατον ὄσσαν ἱεῖσαι (*Theog.* 67, cf. also 43, 65). The "most beautiful voice" signifies the form in which the philosophical subject matter is cast.

259e1 Λεκτέον γὰρ οὖν: prepared by the cicada story, Ph. is now ready to be initiated under S.'s. guidance into dialectical philosophy. He has the advantage that the inquiry concerns a subject that is dear to him.

259e2–274b6: WHAT CONSTITUTES GOOD AND BAD DISCOURSE: THE ART OF RHETORIC

Having decided to examine the question what constitutes good and bad discourse without regard for the form or occasion of the discourse (258d4–10), S. and Ph. agree that they will investigate good discourse in the sense of discourse that persuades (259e2–261a6). Hence their attempt to consider what the art of rhetoric consists in (261a7–e4). S. argues that rhetorical art requires dialectic and psychology. Dialectic is needed to construct effective rhetorical arguments. Because the auditor's receptive properties are determined by the nature of his or her soul, psychology is needed to discover the form in which the discourse should be cast in order to make it most effective in persuading the auditor. S. also shows how the sophists' attempts to discover and teach rhetorical art have been woefully inadequate.

The argument proceeds through the following stages:

(1) 259e2–261a6: preparing the ground: S. undertakes to demonstrate that the skilled speaker, i.e. one who persuades by art, must have knowledge of the subject matter of his discourse
(2) 261a7–e4: definition: rhetoric is a kind of *psychagōgia* and is applicable to discourse in all its forms
(3) 261e5–262c3: demonstration: the skilled speaker has knowledge of his subject matter

(4) 262c4–266d4: examination of Lysias' and S.'s speeches for the presence or absence of rhetorical art
  (4a) 262d7–264e6: Lysias' speech lacks an argument, comparison to Midas epigram
  (4b) 264e6–266c1: S.'s speeches are based on dialectic, consisting of collection and division
(5) 266d5–269d1: criticism of sophistic *technē rhētorikē*
  (5a) 266d5–267d9: the sophists' rhetoric books
  (5b) 268a1–269d1: the sophists' notion of *technē*
(6) 269d2–272b6: psychology
  (6a) 269d2–271c4: the skilled speaker needs to understand the nature of the soul
  (6b) 271c9–272b4: the skilled speaker's psychological training
(7) 272b7–274b6: conclusion of the account of the art of rhetoric: no short cut
  (7a) 272d2–273e3: Tisias' probability arguments rejected
  (7b) 273e3–274a5: the proper use of rhetoric.

The manner in which S. leads Ph. through the stages of this inquiry and persuades him to accept the conclusions they reach is itself a *tour de force* of *psychagōgia* and as impressive as the palinode. Details are presented in the notes.

259e2–261a6 From the start S. focuses on the relation of the skilled speaker to the subject matter of his discourse, asserting that a speaker must have knowledge of his subject matter. In response Ph. reports a view he has heard: a speaker must have knowledge not of the subject matter but of the audience's beliefs about the subject matter, since knowledge of the latter kind is the key to persuasion (259e5–260a4). S. easily demonstrates that if a speaker is to benefit his audience, he must have knowledge of his subject matter (260b1–d2). But in response to Ph.'s interest in persuasion, S. undertakes to demonstrate that if a speaker is to persuade his audience (i.e. by art), he must also have knowledge of his subject matter (260d3–261a6). This undertaking puts S. squarely in opposition to sophistic rhetoric and determines the course of the rest of the inquiry.

259e2–3 Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ νῦν προυθέμεθα . . . σκεπτέον: S. restates the question under consideration (cf. 258d7–10) just before he begins the attempt to answer it. ἔχει is impersonal with καλῶς. τὸν λόγον (= "a speech," generic article) is object of λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν. **e5 τοῖς . . . ῥηθησομένοις:** neuter. **e6 τοῦ λέγοντος:** when S. or Ph. mentions "the speaker" (ὁ λέγων, ὁ ῥήτωρ), he means a skilled speaker (τεχνικός, ῥητορικός), one who produces good discourse by art (τέχνῃ). **ὧν . . . πέρι** = περὶ τούτων ἅ. **e7–260a3 οὐκ εἶναι ἀνάγκην . . . ἀλλ' ὅσα δόξει** "[I have heard] that it is necessary for the would-be speaker to learn not the actually just things but whatever things seem [just] to the masses who will be giving judgment, and not the actually good or noble things but whatever will seem [good or noble to the masses]." τὰ δόξαντ'

ἄν = ταῦτα ἃ δόξειε ἄν (*AGPS* 54.6.6.D on participles in indirect speech with ἄν). Just, good, and noble things constitute the subject matter of the discourse in the city's judicial, deliberative, and epideictic institutions. What the "masses" (τὸ πλῆθος) believe about these things is pertinent because in Athenian democracy they constitute the decision-making audiences. The emphasis on the beliefs of the masses and persuasion (260a3) suggests that the view which Ph. "has heard" (258e7) is a typical sophistic view of discourse (260c7–d1n., 272d2–273c4), which is appropriate given his characterization as a devotee of sophistic and rhetorical circles (227a4–5n., 242a6–b5, 266d5–6, 272c3–4, 273a7).

260a5–6 "Οὔ τοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος" . . . ὃ ἂν εἴπωσι σοφοί: a quotation, then adaptation of Nestor's comment οὔ τοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος ἔσσεται, ὅττι κεν εἴπω (*Il.* 2.361), with which he introduces his plan to distinguish good soldiers from bad. σοφοί is polite and the following recommendation to examine their view is sincere, but σοφοί is also ironic: S. goes on to demolish the view that is attributed to them (266c2–5), and he is ultimately unwilling to use the term σοφός for any human being (278d4–5), let alone for the sophists who hold the view summarized by Ph. **a6 μή τι λέγωσι** "whether there may not be something in what they say" (*AGPS* 51.16.13 on the idiom with τι).

260b5 Οὔπω γε: i.e. S. has not yet completed the case that reveals the absurdity of a speaker who lacks knowledge of his subject matter. **b5–6 συντιθεὶς λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ τοῦ ὄνου:** lit. "composing a praise speech regarding the ass," as if this politician's speech was a rhetorical παίγνιον perversely delivered in a deliberative assembly. The parallel with Lysias' erotic παίγνιον and its deliberative framework is evident (257e1–258d10n.). ἔπαινον is used attributively of λόγον, as *Smp.* 177d λόγον εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἔρωτος. **b7–260c1 ἀποπολεμεῖν τε χρήσιμον** "and [that the creature] is useful to fight from," as if from horseback; cf. *Prt.* 350a ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων πολεμεῖν.

260c4–5 οὐ κρεῖττον γελοῖον καὶ φίλον ἢ δεινόν τε καὶ ἐχθρὸν εἶναι; the comment operates on two levels. First, S.'s example may indeed be ridiculous, as Ph. just said (260c3), but S. presented it with the friendly purpose of advancing their inquiry, and clearly, as Ph. agrees (260c6), that is better than a clever example that (in addition to demonstrating S.'s cleverness) might be advanced by S. with the hostile purpose of tricking his interlocutor and thwarting his progress in the inquiry. Second, a public speaker so ridiculous as to confuse horses and asses but harboring good intentions is better, in the sense of less harmful to the audience, than a speaker who cleverly exploits the audience's ignorance for hostile purposes, as S. makes clear in his next utterance. **c7–d1 Ὅταν οὖν ὁ ῥητορικὸς . . . ὧν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν;** S. generalizes from his horse-and-ass example and reformulates Ph.'s position (259e7–260a4) in order to demonstrate the harm inflicted by speakers who lack knowledge of their subject matter yet possess knowledge of the audience's beliefs about the subject matter and use that knowledge to persuade the audience. The sophistic lineage of this view of discourse, already

suggested by Ph. (259e7–260a3n.), is made conspicuous in two ways. First, the terms ὁ ῥητορικός ("one skilled in rhetoric"; cf. Ammann 1953: 176–7) and τὴν ῥητορικήν (260d1n.) suggest the formal training in persuasive speaking that is associated with sophists in this dialogue (266d2–267d9, 273b4–c4) and elsewhere in Plato (*Grg.* 449a–453a, *Prt.* 310d–319a). Second, S.'s utterance amounts to a summary of the argument against sophistic rhetoric put forward in the *Gorgias* regarding the persuasion that arises from manipulating the beliefs of the ignorant masses (*Grg.* 454e–459c) and the harm that is inflicted by politicians who use such rhetoric (*Grg.* 463c–465e, 502d–520b). Underlying both the argument in the *Gorgias* and S.'s point here is the model of discourse as a form of advising: according to this model good discourse supplies the knowledge which the recipient of the discourse needs for his welfare but otherwise lacks. **c8 ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν:** i.e. like the speaker, ignorant of good and bad. **ὄνου σκιᾶς:** "an ass's shadow" was proverbial for something worthless (Ar. *Vesp.* 191, *PCG* 199; *Corpus paroemiographorum graecorum* 1.169 Leutsch–Schneidewin). The utter worthlessness conveyed by the expression heightens the contrast with the real damage done by this speaker. **c10–d1 ποῖόν τινα οἴει μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπὸν ὧν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν;** "what kind of fruit do you think the art of rhetoric reaps after that from the seeds it sowed?" The idea "you reap what you sow" was proverbial: Hes. frag. 286 Merkelbach–West, Gorg. DK 82 B16.

260d1 τὴν ῥητορικήν: *sc.* τέχνην. Plato employs the term ῥητορική in the *Phaedrus* to refer to both the sophistic teachings about persuasion that S. rejects (here, 269b3, 269c6) and the true art of discourse that S. proposes and defends (261a7, 263b3, b6, 266d4, 269b6, b7, c2, e2, 270b1, 271a5). Context makes the reference clear. In the *Gorgias* Plato used the term ῥητορική to refer to the sophists' techniques of persuasive speaking at the same time as he undermined the claim that their rhetoric attains the status of a true *technē* (*Grg.* 448d–465e); and he used the term "true rhetoric" (ἡ ἀληθινὴ ῥητορική) for an ideal, but as yet unrealized, political discourse that would benefit its recipients (*Grg.* 517a, cf. 462e, 504d). Cf. next note, 261b7–c1n. on related terms. **d4 τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην** "the art of discourse," used in the *Phaedrus* as a synonym for ἡ ῥητορικὴ τέχνη (260d1n.) in reference to both sophistic *technē* (here, 262c1, 266c2, d6, 267d7) and the true Platonic *technē* (270a6, 272b4, 273d7, 274b4). Cf. also τέχνη τοῦ λέγειν (262d5). **d4–8 τί ποτ', ὦ θαυμάσιοι, ληρεῖτε . . . ἔσται πείθειν τέχνῃ:** personified, sophistic rhetoric denies that it requires a speaker to be ignorant of his subject matter (and thus likely to harm his audience, as S. showed), but affirms that even a speaker who has knowledge of his subject matter (and thus is in a position to benefit his audience) needs rhetoric if he is to persuade his audience. This position too is familiar from the *Gorgias* (456a–b), where Gorgias recalls the aid he renders his brother, a physician, who despite his medical expertise cannot persuade his patients to undergo the beneficial, but painful, medical treatment he prescribes. Gorgias claims that he can persuade

them to undergo the treatment even though he knows nothing about medicine. The need for persuasive ability over and above an expert's knowledge of his subject matter is a basic requirement for Plato's conception of philosophy too if philosophy is to have any effect in the world, where it is forced to communicate with the ignorant masses if it is to bring them any benefit (Yunis 2007a, 2007b). The lively polemical manner in which sophistic rhetoric speaks in its own behalf – τί ποτ', ὦ θαυμάσιοι, ληρεῖτε, εἴ τι ἐμὴ συμβουλή, τόδε δ' οὖν μέγα λέγω – palpably conveys the tension of the Platonic challenge to sophistic rhetoric. **d6 ἀλλ', εἴ τι ἐμὴ συμβουλή, κτησάμενον ἐκεῖνο οὕτως ἐμὲ λαμβάνειν** "but, if my advice counts for anything [lit. is anything], [I urge] that a person [*sc.* τινα from οὐδένα, d5] first acquire that (ἐκεῖνο) [i.e. τἀληθές] and [only] in that condition (οὕτως) [i.e. in possession of the truth] seize hold of me [i.e. rhetoric]." **d7 τόδε δ' οὖν μέγα λέγω:** lit. "in any case I say this [i.e. the following point] boastfully"; i.e. I make this my boast. μέγα is adverbial in the phrase μέγα λέγειν ("to boast," e.g. *Phd.* 95b, *Laws* 2.653a) as it is in the phrase μέγα φρονεῖν ("to be presumptuous") (*AGPS* 46.5.6). For δ' οὖν, "in any case," cf. *GP* 461–2. οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον "not a whit more." **d8 πείθειν τέχνῃ:** how "to persuade by means of art" becomes the point of the investigation.

260e2 Φημί, ἐὰν οἵ γε ἐπιόντες αὐτῇ λόγοι μαρτυρῶσιν εἶναι τέχνῃ "yes, if, that is, the arguments that are advancing upon it [i.e. upon the sophistic art of discourse, 260d4] testify that [in fact] it is an art." τέχνῃ, the predicate, is attracted from the accusative to the case of αὐτῇ (*AGPS* 55.2.5). ἐπιόντες implies hostile intent (LSJ s.v. I.1.b), so even before S. reveals the force of these arguments in the next sentence, he sheds doubt on the possibility that these arguments will support the sophistic art of discourse in its claim to be an art. The personified λόγοι respond to the personified art of discourse in S.'s preceding utterance. **e3 ὥσπερ** "as it were," softening the harshness of the extended personification. διαμαρτυρομένων "protesting vigorously." **e4 ψεύδεται καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἀλλ' ἄτεχνος τριβή:** the subject is ἡ τῶν λόγων τέχνη (= αὐτῇ, e2). The second part of this utterance is a striking reminiscence of *Grg.* 463b οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή and thus of the entire argument in the *Gorgias* that sophistic rhetoric is not a τέχνη but a τριβή (*Grg.* 462b–465e). The τριβή ("practice") to which S. refers is a knack for flattery, the appetites to which flattery caters being irrational and thus not susceptible to manipulation by art. The reminiscence not only confirms that S. has been alluding to the argument against sophistic rhetoric put forward in the *Gorgias* (260c7–d1n., 260d4–8n.), but also alerts the reader to the manner in which the argument that S. is about to bring forward departs from the *Gorgias*. In the earlier dialogue Plato demonstrated that sophistic rhetoric fails to benefit its auditors and in fact harms them. Here he demonstrates that sophistic rhetoric fails to persuade its auditors, and he will also demonstrate what a true *technē* of persuasion consists in. **e5 φησὶν ὁ Λάκων:** "the Laconian" is not a particular Spartan but a generic representative of the

Spartans. He is an appropriately witty source of support for S.'s philosophical view of rhetoric insofar as a playful inversion of traditional Laconian reticence makes Laconians into a repository of unassailable wisdom. This Laconian type is given comic treatment at *Prt.* 342a–343b and belongs to the tradition of Spartan wisdom represented by Plutarch's collection of ἀποφθέγματα Λακωνικά, which incorporated the present passage (*Mor.* 233b). **ἔτυμος:** a poetic word (243a7, LSJ s.v.), which lends the Laconian's wisdom the sanction of tradition. **ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἧφθαι** "without a grasp of truth." ἧφθαι is perfect middle infinitive of ἅπτω. **e6 οὔτε μή... γένηται:** 227d4–5n. on οὐ μή with the subjunctive.

261a3 καλλίπαιδά τε Φαῖδρον "Ph., who has beautiful children," in reference to Ph. as begetter of discourses, his "children" (242a6–b5; cf. *Smp.* 177d Ph. as πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου). In tragedy, its original context, καλλίπαις means "having beautiful children" (Aesch. *Ag.* 762 [*pace* Fraenkel 1950: 349 ad loc.], Eur. *HF* 839, *TrGF* Adespota 178) except for a unique case where it means "beautiful daughter" (Eur. *Or.* 964). Prose authors after Plato use the term in the sense "having beautiful children," following Plato's lead in the present passage; cf. Plut. *Quaest. Plat.* 1000f–1001a in specific reference to this passage, Aristid. *Or.* 17.20 with a reference to rhetorical production. S. appropriately recalls Ph.'s talent for engendering discourses as Ph. helps him launch the dialectical investigation (261a1–2, 257b7–c1), just as he recalled that aspect of Ph.'s character before the palinode (242a6–b5) and also had Ph.'s help (243e4–6). The jingle παιδ-/Φαιδ- teases and signals the same gentle mocking of Ph.'s actual contribution as that displayed throughout the earlier scene (242a6, e1–2). Yet, as Hermias (223.18) notes, καλλίπαιδα also suggests the sense καλὸς παῖς, "beautiful boy." That suggestion recalls the fact that Ph. is like the young man addressed in the speeches (παῖ καλέ, 243e7) insofar as he too is propelled by S. towards philosophy and faces a critical choice (257b4–6). **a4–5 ἐὰν μὴ ἱκανῶς φιλοσοφήσῃ, οὐδὲ ἱκανός ποτε λέγειν ἔσται περὶ οὐδενός:** in his coming argument on rhetorical art S. will show that the knowledge available only to a philosopher is a prerequisite for good discourse in two respects: dialectic provides knowledge of the subject matter of a speech, which is essential for constructing rhetorical arguments (261e5–266d3); psychology provides knowledge of the types of souls that a speaker addresses, which is essential for casting arguments in persuasive form (269d2–272b6). Philosophy, understood as the pursuit of wisdom, is also essential for enabling a discourse-composer to make proper use of both oral and written forms of discourse (278c4–d6). Using his insight into Ph.'s desire to become an expert speaker, S. recommends philosophy not as valuable in itself or for how it benefits the soul, but for its instrumental value in producing expertise in discourse. S. addresses Ph. in the third person, as when he previously revealed his insight into Ph.'s desire (228a5–c4), as if he is inviting Ph. to take a look at himself. The play ἱκανῶς/ἱκανός makes S.'s advice pointed. **a6 Ἐρωτᾶτε:** the plural

is addressed to the "worthy creatures" (261a3), that is, the arguments that Ph. wants to hear.

261a7–e4 S. puts forward a definition of rhetoric that involves two novel claims: rhetoric is a kind of *psychagōgia* (261a7), and rhetoric deals with any topic in any setting (261a8–b2). The former claim is taken up later (269d2–272b6). To justify the latter claim S. notices that skilled speakers in private as well as public forums have the ability to convince their audiences of both a thing and its opposite (ἀντιλογική) (261c5–d8). S. infers that the art that deals with all discourse is the art that enables a speaker to make a case that (virtually) anything resembles (virtually) anything else (261d10–e4).

261a7–b2 Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον . . . περὶ φαῦλα γιγνόμενον; "then must not the art of rhetoric, as a whole, be a kind of leading of the soul through speeches, not only in lawcourts and all other meetings of the *dēmos* but also in private ones, [it being] the same [art] in regard to small issues and great ones and a thing deserving of no more respect, at least in its proper use, when it concerns serious issues than when it concerns trivial ones?" **a7 τὸ μὲν ὅλον:** adverbial accusative. Rhetoric "as a whole" concerns the production of discourse in all forms (257e1–2n., 258d7–10n., 261a8–b1n.). The implied δέ – rhetoric in a particular sense – is ignored until the account of rhetoric as a whole is complete and S. considers the propriety of written discourse in particular (274b7; Heitsch 1993a: 131). ψυχαγωγία is no mere synonym or metaphor for persuasion (πειθώ) but refers in a literal sense to the particular kind of persuasion that Plato is interested in. The original sense of ψυχαγωγία (and cognates) was "raising (dead) souls," i.e. by ritual or magic (*Laws* 10.909b, Aesch. *Pers.* 687, *TrGF* 273a in reference to ψυχαγωγοί, Soph. *TrGF* 327a, Ar. *Av.* 1555 in comic reference to S.), whence arose the metaphorical sense "beguilement" (*Laws* 10.909b, *Ti.* 71a, Isoc. 2.49, 9.10, Xen. *Mem.* 3.10.6, Lycurg. *Leoc.* 33, Arist. *Poet.* 1450a33). Plato exploits the literal meaning of the term while discarding any connotation of religious ritual or magic. The art of "leading the soul through speeches" means the ability to use discourse to influence human beings ("souls") to go in one direction rather than another, that is, to make certain choices and pursue certain ends (271c9–272b4). Defining rhetoric by its influence on the soul's movement recalls the palinode and makes rhetoric, like *erōs*, into a potentially life-changing force. The indefinite article τις cushions the unexpected, literal sense of ψυχαγωγία. Cf. 257e1–2n. on Plato's use of unconventional literal meanings. **a8–b1 οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστηρίοις . . . καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις:** private discourse is a crucial addition to the judicial and political domains of rhetoric that were the norm for the sophists (261b3–6, 272d6–7, *Grg.* 452e): it makes rhetoric a force for addressing individuals (271e3–272a1n.), as the palinode addressed both the young male auditor and Ph. Most conspicuous among the meetings of the *dēmos* is the assembly (δημηγορίας, 261b6), though also included in this category are the theater and the state funeral oration. A similar threefold categorization

of discourse (judicial, demegoric, private) occurs at *Sph.* 222c–d, [Arist.] *Rh. Al.* 1421b12–14.

261b1–2 ἡ αὐτὴ σμικρῶν . . . περὶ φαῦλα γιγνόμενον: the claim that (true) rhetoric deals equally with all subjects that human beings discuss (from "small" to "great," "serious" to "trivial"; cf. 261e1 περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα) is based on the idea that no discourse is neutral in its effect on the soul and therefore a person is affected for good or ill by any discourse that he or she encounters (241d2–243e6n., *Prt.* 314a–b; Burnyeat 1999: 217–22, 236–63). This claim opposes the sophists' tendency to understand rhetoric as an art based on manipulating beliefs of the masses and useful for wielding power in the mass institutions of the polis (*Grg.* 451d–452e, *Prt.* 318e–319a), a tendency that was taken up and advanced by Isocrates (J. Poulakos 2004). The polarity serious/trivial (σπουδαῖα/φαῦλα) also looks forward to S.'s account of oral and written discourse (278c6–d2), suggesting that rhetoric is properly employed in both media. τό γε ὀρθόν is adverbial accusative. **b2–6 ἦ πῶς σὺ ταῦτ' ἀκήκοας; . . . ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα:** query and response make clear that Plato is innovating when S. extends rhetoric beyond the city's mass institutions to include all discourse. **b5–6 περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεται . . . καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας** "there is speaking and writing by means of art in regard to court cases and speaking [by means of art] also in regard to speeches in the assembly." The dative τέχνηι is the same as in πείθειν τέχνηι (260d8). In the assembly, which required extempore speaking, there was less scope for written preparation. Ph. ignores epideictic, a subject with which he is obviously familiar. **b7–c1 Ἀλλ' ἦ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ὀδυσσέως τέχνας . . . τῶν δὲ Παλαμήδους ἀνήκοος γέγονας;** written *technai* are written accounts of a *technē*; S. surveys and critiques this genre below (266d5–267d9). ἀκούω + accusative of a book = "read," from the habit of reading aloud (Schenkeveld 1992); ἀνήκοος γέγονα + genitive of a book = "have not read." The "arts of Nestor and Odysseus on speeches," which S. supposes Ph. has read, would pertain to the judicial and demegoric rhetoric that Ph. is familiar with (261b4–6). "The arts of Palamedes," which S. supposes Ph. has not read, would pertain to the extension of rhetoric to private discourse, which Ph. has no knowledge of (261b6). This scheme is confirmed when S. introduces his representative of private rhetoric as "the Eleatic Palamedes" (261d6). Of course, Nestor and Odysseus wrote no rhetorical *technai* in their free time at Troy or at any other time. S. turns them and Palamedes into authors of rhetorical *technai* as a mock grandiose way of referring to the giants of the discipline while postponing specifics until later in the conversation (266d5–267d9). These figures are aptly chosen: Nestor and Odysseus were recognized in the fifth and fourth centuries as Homer's most accomplished speakers (Ar. *Nub.* 1057, Antisthenes *AS* B 19.10, Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.15); Palamedes was Odysseus' rhetorically skilled opponent (Gorg. *Pal.*).

261c2 ἔγωγε τῶν Νέστορος: *sc.* ἀνήκοος γέγονα. **c2–3 εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν . . . Ὀδυσσέα** "unless you are representing Gorgias as a sort of Nestor

or perhaps Thrasymachus or Theodorus as Odysseus." Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and Theodorus are accorded individual notice in S.'s survey of sophistic arts of rhetoric (266e6, 267a5, c7). We do not have the evidence to assign any further meaning (if there is any) to the identifications which Ph. makes. Yet Ph. has understood S.'s indirect way of referring to sophistic rhetorical theory, as S. confirms (261c4). **c5 οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσι μέντοι;** "do they not argue opposing sides of a case?" (261d10–e2n. on ἀντιλογική, 229b4–5n. on μέντοι). **c9–d1 ὁ τέχνηι τοῦτο δρῶν ... ὅταν δὲ βούληται, ἄδικον:** S. focused in 261c4–7 on the two opposing speakers in any legal case who generate arguments about right and wrong that are (necessarily) opposed to each other. Now S. focuses on a single person who, by virtue of his command of rhetoric (τέχνηι), can take either of the two positions in a legal case and convincingly argue for or against it, and can also convincingly argue the opposite position to the same audience (i.e. a panel of judges) at another time. Such a person was a forensic speechwriter like Lysias (257c5n.). The dative τέχνηι, "by means of art," is the same as that used in πείθειν τέχνηι (260d8) and λέγεταί τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνηι (261b5); the same dative is understood in 261d3 and used explicitly in 261d6.

261d3–4 Καὶ ἐν δημηγορίαι ... δ' αὖ τἀναντία; *sc.* ὁ τέχνηι τοῦτο δρῶν ποιήσει. "The polis" is the assembly of citizens. The person who has the skill to convince the assembly at one time that something is good and at another time that it is bad is the skilled ῥήτωρ, "politician," such as Pericles. **d6 Τὸν οὖν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην:** Zeno of Elea, the presocratic philosopher who supported the monist position of Parmenides of Elea – that all reality is a single, stable, undifferentiated entity – by precisely the arguments which S. attributes to "the Eleatic Palamedes." οὖν introduces a new point (*GP* 426). **τέχνηι:** with λέγοντα (261c9–d1n.). **d7–8 τὰ αὐτὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλά, μένοντά τε αὖ καὶ φερόμενα:** not that Zeno argued merely that the same things were like and unlike, one and many, resting and in motion. Rather, as can be inferred from Plato's fuller characterization of Zeno's arguments at *Prm.* 127e–128a, he constructed a *reductio ad absurdum*, arguing that if there is a plurality of things or if things move, then it follows (in several further steps) that things are both like and unlike or one and many or resting and in motion. The self-contradictory conclusion makes it necessary to reject the premise, which strengthens the case for Parmenidean monism (Vlastos 1975: 150–5). **d10–e2 Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον περὶ δικαστήριά ... αὕτη ἂν εἴη** "so the art of arguing opposing sides of a case (ἀντιλογική) not only concerns lawcourts and speeches in the assembly, but, it seems, a single art concerning all things that are said, if it exists, would be this [art]." Arguing opposing sides of a case was a central achievement of sophistic teaching and practice, highly influential in Greek culture, and brought to formal perfection by Thucydides (Kraus 2006a, Yunis 1998). For Plato *antilogikē* reflects the availability of multiple perspectives without the absolute regulating

perspective of the Forms. Plato distinguishes *antilogikē* from both eristic, which is mere contentiousness, associated with sophists and unequivocally harmful, and dialectic, which has antilogical features but is guided by the Forms (Kerferd 1981: 63–7, Nehamas 1990). ῥητορική can be characterized as ἀντιλογική with respect to rhetoric's ability to generate discourse in any context (next note); that is a separate matter from rhetoric's use of dialectic as the source of persuasive arguments. S.'s two speeches are both antilogical and based in dialectic (265a4–5, 265c5–266c1).

261e1 περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα: by rejecting the strictly political–legal scope of rhetoric that was the sole concern in the *Gorgias* and moving towards a universal art of discourse (261b1–2n.), Plato is removing from consideration in the *Phaedrus* the problem that was identified in the *Gorgias*, namely, the inevitable futility of the expert's discourse in a competitive democratic setting. The account of rhetoric to be offered in the *Phaedrus* will focus on the form and content of the speaker's discourse and the receptive properties of the intended audience. These are factors that in Plato's view can be systematically examined and that provide a systematic basis for artistic choices. The rhetorical art proposed in the *Phaedrus* has nothing to say about the manner in which the success of the discourse may be affected by contingent features of the setting in which the discourse is delivered or received, such as competing speakers, the wild impulses of mass audiences, or the effect of the discourse on audiences other than those intended by the speaker or author. Such features lie outside the art (272a3–4n.). **e2–3 ἧι τις οἷός τ' ἔσται πᾶν παντὶ ὁμοιοῦν τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ οἷς δυνατόν:** with τῶν δυνατῶν *sc.* ὁμοιοῦσθαί τινι, with οἷς δυνατόν *sc.* ὁμοιοῦσθαί τι: "[this art] by means of which a person will be able to liken everything to everything of the things that are able [to be likened to something] and to which things it is possible [for something to be likened]." To liken X to Y is, in this context, not only to claim that X is like Y but also to make a case that X is like Y. That is evident from the way in which S. presents his examples: the legal and political speakers and Zeno make their audiences believe that what they claim is the case: ποιήσει φανῆναι . . . τοῖς αὐτοῖς (261c9–d1); [ποιήσει] τῆι πόλει δοκεῖν (261d3); λέγοντα . . . ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι (261d6–7). Hence, rhetoric is an art that demonstrates propositions by means of likenesses. The very plasticity of the concept of "likeness" means that a case can be made that (virtually) anything is like (virtually) anything else (cf. *Prt.* 331d). The practical limitations on rhetorical demonstration are expressed in the phrase τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ οἷς δυνατόν and discussed further at 263a3–c5. But the restriction of rhetorical demonstration to "likenesses" (ὁμοιότητες) assures that rhetoric only establishes convictions in the minds of auditors and does not establish anything about true reality. **e3–4 καὶ ἄλλου ὁμοιοῦντος καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένου εἰς φῶς ἄγειν** "and [a person will be able] to expose when another person likens [something to something] while keeping hidden [what he is doing, i.e. his use of the art]." Because rhetorical

demonstration involves a hidden use of art (261e5–262c3), exposure is a means of resisting an opposing speaker's attempt to persuade by means of art.

261e5–262c3 S. makes good on his claim that if a speaker is to persuade his audience by art, he must have knowledge of the subject matter of his speech (260d3–261a5). Persuasion by means of art involves deception (ἀπάτη, 261e6). Starting from the listener's opinion on some subject, the speaker likens one thing to another and that thing to another (and so on), moving the listener along by small, virtually imperceptible steps until, without realizing how it has happened, the listener ends up holding the opinion which the speaker wants him to hold. The kind of argument that systematically produces this effect is one based on knowledge of the subject matter. Only such knowledge provides a knowledge of the various likenesses out of which such arguments are constructed.

Some have been surprised that S. speaks of the rhetorical art that he defends and considers the true rhetorical art as deception, but he is merely being frank and informative. Persuasion of this kind is called deception because it takes place without the auditor's conscious assent, and thus is a means for the speaker to impose his will on the auditor. It is immaterial from the perspective of the art whether the auditor is persuaded to hold true or false beliefs; artistic persuasion can be employed in either case. Elsewhere S. argues in a different way to a similar conclusion (*Hp. mi.* 365d–369b): the ability to lie requires knowledge of what one lies about and the skilled liar is the same as the person who has the ability to speak the truth.

Deception of the kind presented in this passage is in itself morally neutral; moral evaluation pertains to its use (Murray 1988). The good man uses deception of this kind only for good purposes (273e3–274a3). Beneficial uses can be seen, for instance, in S.'s ironic manipulation of Ph. leading up to the palinode (Introd. 2), in the slippery manner in which S. himself sometimes argues for the sake of acquiring his interlocutors' agreement (262a2–3n.; Gadamer 1991: 57–8), and in the rhetorical devices employed in Plato's own political program, such as the educational myths and noble lie of the *Republic* (2.376c–3.402c, 3.414b–4.15d). The power of deceptive rhetoric is evident by contrast with S.'s horse-and-ass example (260b1–c3), where the ignorant speaker persuades his ignorant audience to accept something which, by virtue of their existing beliefs, they are already inclined to accept from the start. Plato's deceptive, psychagogic art entails the potentially transformative power of ridding an audience of beliefs which they currently hold and replacing them with entirely new ones.

261e5 τὸ τοιοῦτον: lit. "that kind of thing," i.e. a statement of that kind. **e6 Τῇιδε δοκῶ ζητοῦσιν φανεῖσθαι** "I think [it, i.e. the statement about the art that enables one to liken everything to everything] will be clear [to us] if we investigate in the following way." **ἀπάτη:** this deception is a feature specifically of artistic rhetorical argument, hence it differs from the deception described by Gorgias,

which is akin to magic and is an intrinsic feature of discourse generally (*Helen* 8, 10, DK 82 B23).

262a2 Ἀλλά γε δή "moreover": ἀλλά γε = "but still," δή stresses the importance of the coming point. ἀλλά γε, i.e. without intervening words, is extremely rare in classical Greek (*GP* 23); another instance occurs at *Rep.* 1.331b. **a2–3** κατὰ σμικρὸν . . . κατὰ μέγα "you will reach the opposite [position] undetected if you cross over in small steps rather than in big ones." The "opposite [position]" is the conviction which is the opposite of that held by the listener at the outset and to which the speaker wants to bring the listener. The "small steps" are the steps of the argument through which the listener is led from his initial position to the (opposite) one he ends up accepting. Adimantus complains of a similar experience at S.'s hands (*Rep.* 6.487b): "[People who listen to S.] suppose that because they are inexperienced in question and answer they are led astray by the argument a little bit at each question and when the little bits are put together at the end of the argument a huge mistake and a contradiction of their original position are evident." **a5–6** ἀπατήσειν μὲν ἄλλον, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴ ἀπατήσεσθαι: deceiving another means using the art to persuade the other; not being deceived oneself means resisting another speaker's attempt to persuade by means of art (261e3–4n.). ἀπατήσεσθαι is middle in form, passive in meaning (*AGPS* 52.6.1). **a6** τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνομοιότητα: lit. "the likeness and unlikeness of the things that exist," i.e. the respects in which the things that exist (both in the earthly world and the Forms) are and are not like other things that exist. Knowledge of these respects is supplied by dialectic (265d4–266b2). **a9–b1** τὴν τοῦ ἀγνοουμένου . . . διαγιγνώσκειν: lit. "to discern in other things the likeness, whether small or large, of the unknown thing"; τοῦ ἀγνοουμένου is objective genitive. Hence, "to discern whether other things are like the unknown thing, and if so, to what extent."

262b3–4 Οὐκοῦν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ ὄντα . . . εἰσερρύη "now clearly people who hold beliefs contrary to reality and are [in that sense] deceived slip into this condition through certain likenesses." τὸ πάθος τοῦτο = τὸ παρὰ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν καὶ ἀπατᾶσθαι. οὐκοῦν introduces a new point, in this case a minor premise (*GP* 434). **b6–8** Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως . . . ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων; "therefore, is there any way that one who does not know what each of the actual things [that form the subject matter of his speech] is will be skilled at moving [a listener] over by small steps through likenesses, leading [him] on each occasion away from what is the case to the opposite [position], or [skilled] at avoiding this situation himself?"

262c1–2 Λόγων ἄρα τέχνην . . . παρέξεται: S. concludes the argument broached at 260d3–261a5, viz. that persuasion by means of art requires the speaker to have knowledge of the subject matter of his discourse. The beliefs (δόξας) are those of the ignorant masses (260a2–3, c9–10). τεθηρευκὼς suggests

empirical, non-systematic pursuit (*Rep.* 7.531a, *Phlb.* 56a; Classen 1960: 56–7). γελοίαν τινά... καὶ ἄτεχνον recalls ἄτεχνος τριβή (260e4).

262c4–266d4 S. undertakes to discover the presence or absence of rhetorical art (262c4–5) in the three speeches delivered in the first half of the dialogue. Concerned strictly with art, S. is now entirely indifferent to the blasphemous portrayal of *erōs* in Lysias' speech and his own first speech that disturbed him and provoked the appearance of his *daimonion* just a short time ago. Lysias' speech is shown to have no coherent argument at all (262d7–264e6). S. puts aside the striking formal aspects of the palinode (265b6–c3), treats his two speeches as exactly on a par, and claims that his speeches surpassed Lysias' speech because of the clarity and force of their arguments (264e6–265c6). S.'s speeches defined the matter to be decided and presented an account of the qualities of the matter based on the definition. S. ascribes these rhetorical virtues to the two analytical procedures called collection and division that together constitute dialectical reasoning (265d1–266b2), and he adds a personal comment that reveals his passion for dialectic (266b4–c1). From an artistic point of view it is entirely appropriate that S.'s two speeches were opposed to each other (263c9–d1, 265a4–5). That both of S.'s speeches were not only coherent but highly effective, even though they were opposed to each other, is a result of dialectic and a mark of the skill with which S. executed his rhetorical task in each case.

262c4 ἐν οἷς = ἐν τούτοις ἅ, i.e. S.'s two speeches. **c5 τι ὧν φαμεν ἀτέχνων τε καὶ ἐντέχνων εἶναι** "any of the features that we say constitute a lack of art or the presence of art." ἀτέχνων τε καὶ ἐντέχνων agree with ὧν, which is a compression of τούτων ἅ (same construction at 247d6–7). **c6–7 ὡς νῦν γε ψιλῶς . . . ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα:** the reader will likely share Ph.'s desire for examples following the highly condensed, abstract argument of 261e5–262c3. **c8 κατὰ τύχην γέ τινα:** ironic, anticipating S.'s ironic deflection of artistic responsibility (262d2–5). **c8–d2 ἐρρηθήτην τὼ λόγω . . . παράγοι τοὺς ἀκούοντας** "two speeches were delivered that offer an example of how one who knows the truth [about the subject matter of his speech] can sway his listeners while playing in speeches." The "two speeches" are S.'s two speeches: they are both examples of speeches composed by "one who knows the truth" (about *erōs*), namely S. himself, the erotic expert (227c3–4n., 257a6); they also both have the effect of "swaying the listeners," in the first case against (bad) *erōs*, in the second case in favor of (good) *erōs*. Lysias' speech is not an example of a speech composed by one who knows the truth about his subject matter; and his speech has no effect on listeners other than, perhaps, arousing admiration for his skill at epideictic (230e6–234c5n.). Further, Lysias' speech was not inspired by the local gods or the cicadas (262d2–5).

262d1–2 προσπαίζων ἐν λόγοις: this phrase is the first explicit suggestion in the dialogue that, as useful as rhetoric might be when conducted according to *technē*, it is nevertheless not an entirely serious pursuit, at least not in comparison with

dialectic (277e6–278a1n.). S. amplifies below: 265c1–2, c8–d2, 276b1–d7. **d2** παράγοι "sway," which recalls ψυχαγωγία (261a7). "Mislead" would be an incorrect translation, but not because of pejorative connotations; S. just clearly labelled rhetorical argument a kind of deception (261e6). Here S. is interested not in whether a speaker persuades his listeners of truths or falsehoods, but in how a speaker who has knowledge of some matter uses that knowledge to persuade his listeners to adopt some view of the matter. Whereas S. asserts that both of his speeches exemplify the rhetorical effect under scrutiny (262c8–d2n.), only his first speech misled the imagined young auditor. **d2–3 τοὺς ἐντοπίους θεούς:** the nymphs, Achelous, Pan (230b6–7, 263d6–7). **d3–4 ἴσως δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφῆται . . . τοῦτο τὸ γέρας:** the perfect optative with ἂν looks to the future, here with regard to an event that is completed (*AGPS* 54.3.6): "perhaps too it would be the Muses' prophets, the singers overhead [i.e. the cicadas, 259a1], who have inspired us with this gift." This gift of the cicadas is rhetorical expertise (263d6–7n.). Earlier S. mentioned a different gift (γέρας) of the cicadas, viz. to be reported to the Muses for honoring them by conducting philosophical conversation (259b1, c3–d6). But the gift of rhetorical expertise really comes from the Muses themselves (278b6–c1), the cicadas functioning here just as intermediaries. **d4–5 οὐ γάρ που ἔγωγε τέχνης τινὸς τοῦ λέγειν μέτοχος:** S. revives his ironic denial of responsibility for the artistry of his speeches (235c6–7, 238c5–d6, 241e3–4, 263d6–7), as Ph. recognizes in his reply (ἔστω ὡς λέγεις, d6). S.'s ironic stance matches the traditional stance of poets towards the Muses (245a1n.).

262e1–4 Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν . . . μεταμέλει = 230e6–231a2.

263a3–4 τῶν τοιούτων: the reference is initially unclear, as Ph.'s response confirms (a5); but S. clarifies in a moment (a6) that he is talking about words (i.e. nouns, ὀνόματα). **a4** ὁμονοητικῶς . . . στασιωτικῶς "of one mind . . . at odds." **a6** ὄνομα . . . σιδήρου ἢ ἀργύρου "the noun 'iron' or 'silver'"; for this genitive, cf. *Cra.* 398d τὸ τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄνομα, *AGPS* 47.7.6.B. **a7 διενοήθημεν:** gnomic aorist (232c1n.). **a9 δικαίου ἢ ἀγαθοῦ:** *sc.* τις ὄνομα εἴπηι.

263b3 εὐαπατητότεροι "[we are] more easily deceived," i.e. by a rhetorical argument so as to change our opinion on some matter (261e5–262c3). **b5** πλανώμεθα "we are uncertain" (LSJ s.v. II.5). **b7–8 ταῦτα ὁδῶι διηιρῆσθαι . . . ἐν ὧι μή** "to have divided these things [i.e. nouns] methodically and to have grasped some mark of each of the two classes [of nouns], [viz. that] in which the masses are necessarily uncertain and [that] in which they are [necessarily] not [uncertain]." ὁδῶι, lit. "by means of a way," becomes a metaphor in Plato for a methodical way of doing something (*Rep.* 4.435a, 7.533b) and is still felt as a live metaphor (269d6–7n.). The masses, who form the audience of sophistic rhetoric (259e7–260a4), are not the exclusive audience of the true rhetoric that utilizes the twofold classification of nouns (261a7–e4). Rather,

it is the masses' certainty or uncertainty in the understanding of nouns that constitutes the linguistic feature which the expert speaker exploits in constructing his argument, regardless of the particular audience he is addressing. The talk of methodical division, word classification, and necessity anticipates the stringency of the true rhetorical *technē* and contrasts with the sense of inspired discourse that permeated the palinode, that was just repeated by S. (262d2–5), and that he is about to repeat again (263d2–3).

263c1–2 **Καλὸν γοῦν ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶδος εἴη κατανενοηκὼς ὁ τοῦτο λαβών** "at any rate, S., he will have understood a wonderful class [of nouns, i.e. the class of disputable nouns, those that offer scope for rhetorical argument], if he grasps that [i.e. the distinction between the two classes of nouns]." **c3–5** **Ἔπειτά γε . . . τυγχάνει τοῦ γένους:** *sc.* ἑαυτόν with λανθάνειν: "secondly, I think, [it is necessary that the person who is going to pursue the art of rhetoric] not come upon each thing unawares but clearly perceive to which class whatever he is going to talk about belongs." **c7–8** **Τί οὖν τὸν ἔρωτα; πότερον φῶμεν εἶναι τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων ἢ τῶν μή;** "then what about *erōs*? should we say it belongs to the disputable terms or to those which are not disputable?" For the energetic manner of interrogation, cf. *Sph.* 266c τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἆρ' οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν ποιεῖν; (*AGPS* 64.5.3.E). **c9–10** **οἴει ἄν σοι συγχωρῆσαι εἰπεῖν ἃ νῦν δὴ εἶπες περὶ αὐτοῦ:** *sc.* ἐμέ as subject of συγχωρῆσαι: "do you believe that [I] would have allowed you to say what you just said about it . . . ?" Cf. tacit ἡμᾶς as subject of the infinitive at 266c1–2. τὸν ἔρωτα cannot be supplied (from c7) as the subject because it would also have to be personified, which is a heavy load for a tacit subject. **c10–d1** **ὡς βλάβη τέ ἐστι . . . τῶν ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνει:** S.'s two speeches, which argue opposing sides of a case (265a4–5). For τυγχάνει without supplementary participle of εἶναι, see 230a3–6n.

263d2–3 **τὸ ἐνθουσιαστικόν:** S. explained his divine possession at 241e3–4, 262d2–5. **d3** **οὐ πάνυ μέμνημαι:** S.'s forgetfulness about his speeches calls attention to the fact that, unlike Lysias' written *epideixis*, his speeches were composed extempore in response to the needs of the particular listener before him and as oral productions are no longer available. **d3–4** **ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου** "at the beginning of my speech." S. defined bad *erōs* at the beginning of his first speech (237b7–238c4). He defined good *erōs* at the beginning of his second speech, though it was a lengthy task (243e7–249e3). **d6–7** **τεχνικωτέρας Νύμφας τὰς Ἀχελῴου καὶ Πᾶνα τὸν Ἑρμοῦ:** S.'s speeches were the result of inspiration but that does not leave the speeches' artistry unaccounted for: the gods who inspired S. possess rhetorical expertise. The situation is parallel to that of inspired poets. On the nymphs, Achelous, and Pan cf. 230b6–7n., b7n., 238d1n., 279b8n. Pan is associated with *logos* through his father Hermes (*Cra.* 408d; Sedley 2003: 95–6). **d7–e2** **ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω . . . διεπεράνατο;** "maybe I'm wrong but did Lysias too force us at the beginning of his speech on *erōs* to take *erōs* as a particular real

thing that he chose himself, and did he then organize the entire rest of the speech in relation to that [i.e. the particular view of *erōs* that he forced on us] until he reached the end?" Forcing listeners to take a particular view of the subject matter at the beginning of the speech is accomplished by defining the subject matter. The definition then determines the course of the argument that moves the listeners from the initial point to the view which the speaker wants the listeners to hold at the conclusion (cf. 237c5–d3). τῶν ὄντων refers (as 262a6, b8) to the real things (both in the earthly world and the Forms) that an expert speaker must have knowledge of in order to construct a rhetorical argument.

263e6–264a4 Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν . . . τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται = 230e6–231a3.

264a5–7 οὐδὲ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς . . . διανεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον "tries to swim across the speech not even from the beginning but from the end, on his back in the wrong direction." The metaphorical task – swimming across a body of water to reach the other side (cf. *Prm.* 137a διανεῦσαι τοσοῦτον πέλαγος λόγων, *Rep.* 4.441c) – is depicted as being performed in an impossible backward way, indicating the futility of the manner in which Lysias' non-lover tries to persuade the young man to grant him sexual favors. ἐξ ὑπτίας = "on his back," as *Rep.* 7.529c ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων. ὑπτίας is a feminine form without an ellipsis (*AGPS* 43.3.9). **a7** ἄρχεται ἀφ' ὧν πεπαυμένος: *sc.* τοῦ λόγου. What Lysias put at the beginning that should come at the end is the claim that the young man has heard how he will benefit from bestowing his favors on the suitor. That is precisely the point which the speech should demonstrate but never does (231a4–6n.). **a8** φίλη κεφαλή: vocative, borrowed from Homer (*Il.* 8.281), and endearing, as is evident when S. speaks thus to Callicles (*Grg.* 513c), Ion (*Ion* 531d), and Dionysodorus (*Euthd.* 293e). Cf. 234d6n. on the synecdoche.

264b3 τὰ τοῦ λόγου: on what "the parts of the speech" are, see 264c3–6n. **b4–5** φαίνεται τὸ δεύτερον εἰρημένον . . . τῶν ῥηθέντων; "does it seem [to you] that the second thing said has to be put second because of some necessity [for it to be second], or any other thing that was said [has to be put where it is because of some necessity]?" The "necessity" at issue, which stands in opposition to χύδην (b3), "randomly," is specified in a moment by λογογραφικήν (b7). **b5** μηδὲν εἰδότι: on S.'s denial of expertise, cf. 235c6–7n., 262d4–5n. **b6** οὐκ ἀγεννῶς τὸ ἐπιὸν εἰρῆσθαι τῶι γράφοντι "that the writer boldly said whatever occurred to him," and thus delivered his points in a random order. This feature of Lysias' speech is conspicuous by Plato's design (231a7n.). Plato uses οὐκ ἀγεννῶς (lit. "not ignobly") for ironic approbation of directness (*Grg.* 492d, *Rep.* 7.529a). **b6–8** σὺ δ' ἔχεις τινὰ ἀνάγκην λογογραφικὴν . . . ἔθηκεν; "do you know of some necessity arising from the composition of the speech that he [Lysias] relied upon when he put his points one after the other in this order?" The "necessity arising from the composition of the speech" (ἀνάγκη λογογραφική)

implies that speeches which are the product of art have purpose and design, an obvious point, perhaps, but one that was not understood by the sophists (268a1–269d1) and that belongs in this fundamental account of what rhetorical art consists in. Logographic necessity also imparts a compelling quality to the speeches that possess it (271b2–4n.). Given that logographic necessity belongs to rhetoric as a universal art of discourse (261a7–b2, d10–e4), it applies not just to forensic or Lysianic speechwriting but to discourse-composition in the comprehensive sense proposed by S. (257e1–2n.). Carried to its logical conclusion, logographic necessity eliminates chance from artistic discourse and determines the form and content of a discourse down to the smallest detail, as is evident in the *Phaedrus* itself (Introd. 2, Lebeck 1972). Poets were long aware of this principle but prose-writers learned it only gradually. Plato is the first to articulate it.

264c1 τὰ ἐκείνου: Lysias' practices in writing his speeches. **c3 Ἀλλὰ τόδε . . . σε φάναι ἄν:** i.e. if you, Ph., had insight into Lysias' practices and recognized how they fall short of rhetorical art. **c3–6 δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῷον . . . τῶι ὅλωι γεγραμμένα** "every speech must be composed like a living creature by having a kind of body (σῶμά τι) of its very own (αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ), so that it is neither headless nor footless but has middle parts and extremities that are written so as to fit each other and the whole." The statement starts as simile (ὥσπερ ζῷον), moves cautiously towards metaphor (σῶμά τι), then becomes metaphor outright (ὥστε . . . γεγραμμένα). The comparison asserts that as a complex, purposeful entity like the body of a living creature, a speech should possess all and only the parts it needs in order to achieve its purpose (whatever that purpose may be) and the parts should function together to advance that purpose. As becomes apparent during the following analysis of Lysias' and S.'s speeches, the parts that must be properly disposed are not formal elements such as introduction, narrative, and conclusion, which S. disparages (266d7–e4, 267d2–4), but the steps of the argument that move the listener from his initial position to the position which the speaker ultimately wants him to hold. A structure of this kind, employing logographic necessity (264b7) in the disposition of its parts, is a matter of design, as it is in any other *technē* (*Grg.* 503e–504a) and in nature (cf. *Ti. passim*, e.g. 69c–76e on design in human physiology). S. considers more closely the relation between the design of a complex entity and the function of its parts when he compares rhetorical *technē* to established *technai* (268a1–269c4). γεγραμμένα suits the critique of Lysias' written speech in particular, but in accord with S.'s usage throughout this section S.'s point extends to written and spoken discourse (258d1–10, 264b6–8n.). **c8 τοῦ ἑταίρου σου:** Lysias, as 278e4. **c9–d1 ὃ Μίδαι τῶι Φρυγί . . . ἐπιγεγράφθαι:** i.e. the epigraph that was inscribed on Midas' tomb. The vagueness of φασίν τινες may indicate that the epigram circulated in Plato's day without any indication of authorship or origin (264d4–7n.).

264d2 τί πεπονθός; lit. "what has it suffered?"; i.e. "what's wrong with it?" **d4–7** χαλκῆ παρθένος εἰμί... ὅτι τῇδε τέθαπται: dactylic hexameters. Neither the authorship nor the provenance nor the occasion of this grave epigram in Greek for a Phrygian king of the late eighth–early seventh century can be ascertained. The problem is complicated by the frequency, variation (including two additional lines), and contamination in its transmission. Plato is the earliest source. We cannot exclude the possibility that Plato composed the epigram for this spot in the dialogue, but S.'s point has greater impact if the epigram was already widely known. Among later sources the most important are Diog. Laert. 1.89–90 and [Hdt.] *Vita Homeri* 11, who ascribe it to Cleobulus of Lindus and Homer respectively. For a full account of the transmission and the linguistic, poetic, and historical issues, and a good argument that places the original epigram in or near seventh-century Cyme, a Greek city on the Asia Minor coast with which Midas had ties, see Markwald 1986: 34–83. The device of an object speaking in the first person to a viewer/reader is common in archaic and early classical verse epigraphs (Häusle 1979). **d4** χαλκῆ παρθένος εἰμί, Μίδα δ' ἐπὶ σήματι κεῖμαι: the "bronze maiden" could have been a sphinx, siren, or nymph. The grave marker (σῆμα) on which the female figure was erected could have been a stone mound, pillar, or column. Μίδα is a Doric genitive (= Attic Μίδου). **d6** αὐτοῦ τῇδε "right here."

264e1 οὐδὲν διαφέρει αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ ὕστατόν τι λέγεσθαι: i.e. it makes no difference that *any line* in the epigram is said first or last. The lines, all of which are end-stopped, can stand in any order and the meaning of the epigram as a whole is unchanged. The Midas epigram does not make an argument but merely makes the statement "here lies Midas" in a poetically elaborate way, the poetic elaboration being for Plato's present purposes mere fluff in regard to that statement. The comparison with the epigram reveals that Lysias' speech lacks a compelling argument, as S. asserted earlier (235a1–7). No wonder, then, that the elements of Lysias' speech could be delivered in any order and it would not make the speaker's appeal to his listener more effective. Of course, Lysias' speech was never intended to persuade an actual young man (230e6–234c5n.). **e3** τὸν λόγον ἡμῶν: Lysias' speech, which is Ph.'s too because he supported it enthusiastically. **e5–6** μιμεῖσθαι αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν μὴ πάνυ τι "so long as one tries to imitate them not in any way at all." **e6** τοὺς ἑτέρους λόγους: S.'s two speeches.

265a4 Ἐναντίω που ἤστην: what is revealing about the rhetorical artistry of S.'s two speeches (264e6–265a2) is their antilogical character, i.e. the way in which the speeches advocate opposite positions while each is effective in its own terms. What gives the speeches this characteristic (as S. goes on now to demonstrate) is his use of dialectical reasoning to supply material for the arguments of both speeches. **a6–7** ἀνδρικῶς... μανικῶς: Ph.'s "manfully" acknowledges the effectiveness of S.'s speeches, while S.'s "madly" deflects the compliment with a

reference to his claim that he delivered the speeches while inspired. **a8** αὐτὸ τοῦτο: i.e. that the speeches were delivered "madly." μανίαν . . . τινα "a kind of madness." **a11** τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένην "and the [madness] that comes into being through a change of customary norms caused by the gods." The palinode made clear how divine *erōs* leads lover and beloved to abandon the conventional values and practices of Athens' elite in favor of philosophical values and practices (243e7–257b6n.).

265b2–c3 Τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν . . . καλῶν παίδων ἔφορον: coordinate main verbs: ἐφήσαμέν τε . . . καὶ . . . προσεπαίσαμεν. διελόμενοι is subordinate to ἐφήσαμεν, and θέντες is subordinate to διελόμενοι. ἀπεικάζοντες is subordinate to προσεπαίσαμεν, and ἐφαπτόμενοι, παραφερόμενοι, κεράσαντες are subordinate to ἀπεικάζοντες. Aside from the partitive τῆς δὲ θείας, the genitives in the first half of the sentence are all possessive and predicative. προσεπαίσαμεν has two accusatives: ὕμνον is accusative of content (253d1n.), Ἔρωτα is direct object (*AGPS* 46.11.0). "After we distinguished four parts of divine [madness] as belonging to four gods, having set down prophetic inspiration as Apollo's, initiatory [inspiration] as Dionysus', poetic [inspiration] furthermore as the Muses', and a fourth [inspiration] as Aphrodite's and Eros', we said that erotic madness is best and when we somehow depicted the experience of *erōs*, perhaps touching on truth in some sense, perhaps also being swept away in another direction, yet having mixed a speech that was not entirely unpersuasive, with a kind of mythical hymn we celebrated moderately and auspiciously your master and mine, Eros, watcher over beautiful boys." **b2–4** μαντικὴν μὲν . . . ποιητικήν: when S. introduced the first three kinds of divine madness in the palinode he mentioned the Muses in connection with poetry (245a1) but not Apollo or Dionysus. But S. mentioned Delphi as his first example of prophetic madness (244b1); and S.'s second type of divine madness stressed the purifying aspect of initiatory madness (244d6–e5), which is easily connected with Dionysus as one of the chief gods of mystery cult (Versnel 1990: 131–55). **b5** οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ: on the expression, cf. 227c4n. **b6–c1** ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς τινος ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε παραφερόμενοι: the palinode's depiction of erotic experience is truthful in regard to both the benefit of divine *erōs* to lover and beloved and the struggle that is involved in attaining that benefit. The elements of the palinode that stem from S.'s "being swept away in another direction" concern the mythical, hymnic form (μυθικόν τινα ὕμνον) in which the truthful elements were presented (243e7–257b6n., 257a2–3n.). The forcefulness of παραφερόμενοι suggests the inspired manner in which S. embraced the rhetorical task. S.'s tone is cautious (ἴσως, ἀληθοῦς τινος, τάχα δ' ἄν) in keeping with his restrained acknowledgment of rhetorical skill (265d1n.).

265c1 κεράσαντες: i.e. mixing together the truth and the mythical, poetic form so as to produce a persuasive speech. **c2** προσεπαίσαμεν: because the verb has the god as direct object, it has the sense "celebrate." But since the same verb is used

in the immediate vicinity with its root sense of playing as opposed to being serious (262d1, 265c8), that meaning is present too: the rhetorical celebration of Eros carried out in the palinode is simultaneously a form of play (265c8–d2n.). **c2–3** **τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σὸν δεσπότην:** S. cajoles Ph. towards shared philosophical values, as at 257b4–6; contrast Ph.'s naïve assumption about their shared values at the start (227a4–5n.). **c4** **οὐκ ἀηδῶς:** *sc.* εἶχε impersonal. **c5–6** **ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψέγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐπαινεῖν ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος μεταβῆναι:** how S.'s "discourse" (ὁ λόγος) – comprising both his speeches – was able to go from censure of *erōs* to praise of it reflects the antilogical character of the two speeches taken together (265a4). Praise and blame are tasks for rhetoric, but dialectic supplies the arguments (266a3–b2). **c8–d2** **Ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται . . . οὐκ ἄχαρι** "to my mind the rest [of S.'s discourse, c6] was simply playful play, but these two forms of some kind having come up by chance, it [would be] not unwelcome if one could grasp their power by means of art." The first μέν has no responding δέ, emphasizing the speaker's expression of his own opinion (μέν *solitarium*, *GP* 380–2). The μέν/δέ contrast that structures the rest of the utterance is expressed without grammatical parallelism: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα is the subject of its clause, τούτων δέ introduces a genitive absolute. The combination of plural and dual in the genitive absolute is unremarkable (*AGPS* 63.3.1). The "two forms of some kind" are the forms of thinking that together constitute dialectical reasoning, viz. collection and division; "their power" is the power to speak and to think (266b5n.). By isolating the dialectical aspect (τούτων δέ) of his speeches from everything else in them (τὰ μὲν ἄλλα) and emphatically labeling the latter as play (next note) while seeking to investigate the former, S. leaves the clear implication that dialectic is uniquely serious. Rhetoric can be pious (265c2n.) and it can be useful, as in the palinode's address to a young man facing a choice of suitors or to Ph. facing a choice of forms of discourse. But rhetoric, like written composition, is not the medium for the serious task that belongs to dialectic, which is the pursuit of knowledge of reality in partnership with a kindred soul and which enables an ascent to the Forms (276b1–277a4). **c8** **παιδιᾶι πεπαῖσθαι:** the repetition of the verbal idea in the dative noun lends emphasis (etymological figure; *AGPS* 48.15.16).

265d1 **ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων:** S. used collection and division to define *erōs* at the beginning of both speeches (237d4–238c4, 244a4–245c4); and he alluded to collection in his brief statement of abstract reasoning in the palinode (249b6–c1n.). ἐκ τύχης is consistent with his ironic refusal to take credit for his speeches. **d2** **τέχνηι:** in contrast with ἐκ τύχης. This dative is the same as that used by S. when he defined rhetorical *technē* (261c9–d1n.).

265d4–266b2 This account of collection and division (named at 266b4–5) is directed specifically to their use in S.'s speeches. Collection (συναγωγή) is the process of bringing together related phenomena under a single general form, enabling the speaker to define his subject clearly (265d4–8). A clear definition,

formulated by the speaker with his persuasive goal in mind, is the first step in breaking down the auditor's resistance to the speaker's proposition and preparing him to accept it (263d7–e2n.). Division (διαίρεσις) is the process of dividing the general form into sub-classes according to natural criteria. The speaker is thereby enabled to say pertinent things about his subject, in particular, things that make the subject look good or bad according to the speaker's needs (265e1–266b2). Collection and division as the constituent procedures of dialectical reasoning are explained elsewhere by Plato (*Sph.* 253b–254b, *Plt.* 262a–263b, *Phlb.* 16b–17a), though nothing in the *Phaedrus* resembles the large-scale dialectical examinations carried out in the *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and *Philebus* (Dixsaut 2001).

A rhetorical argument is not the direct or raw presentation, as it were, of a dialectical argument; and rhetorical argument does not derive its persuasiveness from the logical force of a dialectical argument. Rather, dialectic merely provides the material for rhetorical argument which the speaker then casts in a form that suits the particular audience being addressed. Although the material which dialectical knowledge provides a speaker for rhetorical purposes is based in objective reality, the speaker's dialectically acquired, rhetorically useful knowledge does not insure that his discourses will be true, just, or expedient. The truth, justice, or utility of a discourse is a contingent matter not connected to rhetorical art and is determined by extra-rhetorical factors. For instance, S.'s first speech is, on his own account, effective because of its basis in dialectic, but the topic and purpose of the speech, which were determined by the encounter with Ph. and the competition with Lysias, were perverse and had to be corrected by the palinode. Rather, the dialectically acquired knowledge of Platonic rhetorical art is useful for *psychagōgia*. That is, the artistic speaker's discourse may be true or false, just or unjust, useful or harmful, but in any case it addresses the auditor's sensibilities with a pertinent argument that has the effect of moving him or her in the direction of the speaker's choosing; and it does so without flattering.

A terminological note: the word εἶδος is used to refer, first, to the "two forms of some kind" that turn out to be collection and division (265d1, 9); second, to the sub-classes (265e1, 273e1, 277b7; cf. *Plt.* 263a–b) that are produced by dividing a general form (called ἰδέα at 265d4, 273e1); third, to the general "form" of madness (266a1, 3) which is divided into sub-classes in each of S.'s speeches.

265d4 Εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῆι διεσπαρμένα: infinitival noun clause without the article; *sc.* τινα with συνορῶντα ἄγειν: "that a person perceives all together the things scattered in many places and gathers them into one form." This "one form" is the general form in which related phenomena are collected before the form is divided into sub-classes. S. stressed the synoptic element of collection in his earlier statement about learning and recollection, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῶι συναιρούμενον (249b6–c1 with note). τε has no responding καί because Ph. intervenes (d9). **d5** ὁριζόμενος . . . ποιῆι: *sc.* τις. ἀεί "on each occasion." διδάσκειν: this verb is used, and not

πείθειν, because S. is describing dialectical reasoning. Whereas rhetoric leads to persuasion in the sense of *psychagōgia*, dialectic leads to instruction or learning in the sense of the auditor's gaining a clear and stable understanding of things (265d7n., 278a2–6). **d6 ὃ ἔστιν ὁρισθέν** "what [*erōs*] is when it is defined"; ὁρισθέν agrees with its predicate ὅ. It is not simply what *erōs* is but how it was defined that made each of S.'s speeches effective. **d7 τὸ γοῦν σαφὲς καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτῶι ὁμολογούμενον:** these qualities, attained through dialectic, add persuasiveness to the definitions used in rhetoric (237c6–d1n., 238b5–6, 263d8–e2) and make dialectic the appropriate medium for learning (275c6, 277d7, 278a4). **d8 ὁ λόγος** "our discourse," referring to S.'s two speeches together, as 265c6. Both speeches had clear, coherent definitions of *erōs* and both instructed the listener about *erōs*.

265e1–3 Τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἴδη δύνασθαι . . . κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπωι χρώμενον: another infinitival noun clause, this time with the article and coordinate main infinitives (δύνασθαι . . . καὶ . . . ἐπιχειρεῖν); *sc.* τινα as subject of the infinitives and χρώμενον: "that one is able in the opposite direction [i.e. opposite to collecting] to cut up [the general form] into its sub-classes at joints where it is natural [to cut it up], and tries not to shatter any part [of the general form] by performing in the manner of an incompetent butcher." The butchery metaphor of διατέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα is made explicit by the simile of the incompetent butcher. **e3–266b2 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄρτι τὼ λόγω . . . ὡς μεγίστων αἴτιον ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν** "but just as a short time ago my two speeches conceived of the mad portion of the mind as a single general form, and just as from one body nature produces double parts that have the same names, [the ones] called left and the ones called right, so too, as my two speeches viewed the condition of madness as a single form that naturally exists in us [human beings], the first speech, cutting the part on the left, did not leave off cutting it further until it discovered among the parts [that were cut] a so-called left *erōs* and quite rightly heaped abuse on it, and the second speech, having first brought us towards the parts of madness on the right, and then having discovered and put forward an *erōs* that has the same name as the first one but yet is divine, praised it as the cause of our greatest goods." **e3 ὥσπερ . . . τὸ μὲν ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας:** answered by ὥσπερ δὲ σώματος ἐξ ἑνὸς (266a1).

266a2 σκαιά, τὰ δὲ δεξιά: τὰ μέν is omitted with σκαιά (*GP* 165). **a2–3 τὸ τῆς παρανοίας . . . τὼ λόγω:** in this phrase S. restates what he just said in τὼ λόγω . . . ἐλαβέτην before he delivers the main point of the rest of the sentence using the structure ὁ μὲν (λόγος)/ὁ δὲ (λόγος) (a3–b2). **a3–5 τὸ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τεμνόμενος . . . σκαιόν τινα ἔρωτα:** this refers to the first part of S.'s first speech (237d4–238c4). Starting with this use of ἀριστερά, left and right have the traditional metaphorical sense of bad and good (Lloyd 1962). S. did not speak of left *erōs* and right *erōs* in the actual speeches. There is no difference in sense between τεμνόμενος and τέμνων. **a5 ἐλοιδόρησεν μάλ' ἐν δίκηι:** the rest of

S.'s first speech (238d7–241d1). **a5–b1** εἰς τὰ ἐν δεξιᾶι τῆς μανίας . . . καὶ προτεινάμενος: the first half of the palinode (243e7–249d3).

266b1–2 ἐπήινεσεν ὡς μεγίστων αἴτιον ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν: the second half of the palinode (249d4–257a1). **b4–5** Τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε . . . τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν: "these divisions and collections" are the two movements of dialectical reasoning (265d4–266b2n.). S. is virtually proclaiming that he is a philosopher, a lover of wisdom or knowledge (278d5–6). ἐραστής conveys in addition the passion and transcendent achievement of the philosophical ἐραστής of the palinode, the connection between philosophical *erōs* and dialectic being elaborated below (276e4–277a4). S. calls himself an ἐραστής of dialectic at *Phlb.* 16b. **b5** ἵνα οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν: not mere speaking and thinking, for which dialectic is hardly necessary, but purposeful speaking and thinking as exemplified by S., viz. speaking and thinking as a matter of τέχνη, whether ῥητορική or διαλεκτική. At *Tht.* 189e–190a S. describes an individual's internal thinking and judgment as a matter of dialectic. **b6** δυνατὸν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθ' ὁρᾶν: πεφυκόθ' is neuter acc. pl. agreeing with both ἓν and πολλά: "able to look to one and towards many as natural entities." Perception of a unity amid multiplicity is collection; perception of multiplicity within a unity is division, it being necessary in both cases to perceive the way things are in nature. The different prepositions with ὁρᾶν are variation. πεφυκός (MSS) cannot be construed in a way that yields sense. **b7** τοῦτον διώκω "κατόπισθε μετ' ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο" "I pursue him 'from behind following [his] footsteps like a god's [footsteps]'"; i.e. as if he were a god. The partial dactylic hexameter verse (⏑⏑–⏑⏑–⏑⏑–⏑⏑––) is reminiscent of Homer (*Od.* 2.406, *Il.* 22.157) but not found in our texts of Homer. Pursuing a practitioner of collection and division like a god recalls the lover's pursuit of his beloved like a god (251a5–6, 252d5–8). S. is also anticipating the priority of dialectic, conducted with a partner face to face, over written discourse (276a1–277a4). **b8** θεὸς οἶδε: on the gods as bestowers of names, cf. 252b1–3n.

266c1 μέχρι τοῦδε "up to now." διαλεκτικούς: "dialecticians" are experts in the art of dialectic (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη), which includes both dialectical reasoning as defined here (collection and division) and the skill of conducting philosophically fruitful dialogue, as exemplified by S. (268a1–269d1n.) and described below (276e5n.). **c1–2** τὰ δὲ νῦν παρὰ σοῦ τε καὶ Λυσίου μαθόντας εἰπὲ τί χρὴ καλεῖν: μαθόντας agrees with an implied ἡμᾶς, subject of καλεῖν: "but as things stand now say what we should call [them, viz. those who practice collection and division] if we take a lesson from you and Lysias." The request is a ploy, allowing S. to move the inquiry to its next stage. Relying on Ph.'s familiarity with sophistic rhetoric (259e7–260a3n.), S. politely suggests that Ph. (and Lysias) will naturally have a view of how people who practice collection and division should be called because those things properly belong to rhetoric. S. knows of course that dialectic forms no part of sophistic rhetoric and is entirely new to Ph., as the sequel confirms. Grammatically it would be possible to take μαθόντας as object of καλεῖν,

but it makes no sense to speak of people who have learned from Ph. except in the informal sense it would have if it refers to S. and Ph. themselves. **c2–3** ἢ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν . . . οἱ ἄλλοι χρώμενοι: ἡ λόγων τέχνη is in apposition to ἐκεῖνο: "or is this [the ability to practice collection and division] that, [namely,] the art of discourse which Thrasymachus and the others used . . . " On Thrasymachus cf. 267c5–7n. **c4** ἄλλους τε ποιοῦσιν: *sc.* σοφοὺς λέγειν. τε follows μέν (*GP* 376). **c4–5** οἳ ἂν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεῦσιν ἐθέλωσιν: the ironic tone reveals S.'s view of the sophists' claim that they can make their (paying) students skilled speakers; cf. *Ap.* 19e–20c for the same irony and the same point. **c6** μὲν δή: adversative to the preceding μέν (*GP* 393). **c7** τοῦτο μὲν τὸ εἶδος: "this mode" consists of collection and division taken together; cf. 265d1 τούτων . . . εἰδοῖν.

266d1 τὸ δὲ ῥητορικὸν δοκεῖ μοι διαφεύγειν ἔθ' ἡμᾶς: *sc.* εἶδος. Ph. has failed to understand, as S. confirms (d2–3), that "the dialectical mode" (τὸ διαλεκτικὸν εἶδος) is "the rhetorical mode" (τὸ ῥητορικὸν εἶδος) insofar as rhetoric is to be practiced as a *technē*. **d2** καλὸν πού τι ἂν εἴη: ironic. τούτων: collections and divisions. **d4** τί μέντοι καὶ ἔστι τὸ λειπόμενον τῆς ῥητορικῆς "what, then, really *is* the rest of the art of rhetoric," i.e. in addition to dialectic. S. answers this question himself – psychology (269d2–272b6) – only after he has rejected the material in the sophists' rhetoric books (266d5–269d1). On καί following the interrogative pronoun cf. *GP* 313.

266d5–267d9 In response to Ph.'s statement that books on rhetoric contain a great deal of material apart from dialectic, S. surveys this material with a sharp irony that patently reveals his negative view of the sophists' "wonderful techniques" (παγκάλων τεχνημάτων, 269a6). The techniques concern the parts of a speech, types of arguments and styles, and emotional appeals. Not unlike his knowledge of rationalistic mythological interpretation (229b4–230a6), S.'s surprisingly extensive knowledge of the sophists' books reveals an ability to engage his interlocutor in the most opportune manner. Plato thereby also shows that his critique of sophistic rhetoric is based not on ignorance but on close familiarity.

All the sophistic books discussed by S. have been lost; this is the earliest glimpse of such material that we possess. These written *technai* are more likely to have been compilations of illustrative passages, arguments, and styles, accompanied by descriptive titles or rubrics, than handbooks that put forward precepts in the manner of a late fourth-century text like the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (Cole 1991a: 81–94). The sophists named by S. are most of the major ones of the fifth century and figure prominently elsewhere in Plato. Gorgias, Hippias, and Protagoras are the title characters of Platonic dialogues, Thrasymachus plays a major role in *Republic* 1, Polus a major role in the *Gorgias* (461b–481b), and Prodicus a brief but memorable role in the *Protagoras* (337a–c, 339e–341e). Plato's interest lies not in summarizing these predecessors neutrally, but in evaluating them, which accounts for both S.'s irony and his critique of the notion of *technē* implicit in

the sophists' written *technai.* For a review of the rhetorical contributions of the sophists whom S. cites and the rhetorical terms and techniques that he mocks, see Heitsch 1993a: 152–6.

266d5–6 τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς περὶ λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοις: "the books written on the art of speeches" are the same as the written *technai* mentioned elsewhere (261b7–8, 269c5–6, 271c1). **d7–e1 προοίμιον μὲν οἶμαι . . . τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης;** it being obvious where in the speech the introduction should go, S.'s comment on that point is mocking, which S. augments by the jingle προοίμιον μὲν οἶμαι πρῶτον and by referring to such insights ironically as κομψά, "refinements" (227c6n.). In Plato's day the προοίμιον had received considerable theoretical attention, which Plato himself used for his theory of the legal προοίμιον ("preamble," *Laws* 4.722b–723d; Yunis 1996: 223–6, 288).

266e3 διήγησίν τινα: the indefinite article is dismissive: "narrative or some such." μαρτυρίας τ' ἐπ' αὐτῆι "and testimonies [i.e. from witnesses] in addition to that [i.e. narrative]." **e4 τεκμήρια:** arguments based on signs, i.e. that one thing is the sign of another thing; cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.16. **εἰκότα:** arguments based on what is probable. S. examines such arguments below (272d2–273c4). **e4–267a2 πίστωσιν οἶμαι καὶ ἐπιπίστωσιν . . . κατηγορίαι τε καὶ ἀπολογίαι:** the terminology of Theodorus of Byzantium – "confirmation and super-confirmation," "refutation and super-re-refutation" – betrays a fastidious preoccupation with superficial distinctions, which Aristotle criticized in him too (*Rh.* 3.1414b13–18). πίστωσις is to be distinguished from πίστις, Aristotle's general term for rhetorical proof (*Rh.* 1.2). S.'s grandiose periphrasis τόν γε βέλτιστον λογοδαίδαλον Βυζάντιον ἄνδρα is conspicuously ironic; λογοδαίδαλον, "cunning speech-maker," suggests the irony that attaches to κομψά (266e1). ὡς ποιητέον depends on οἶμαι . . . λέγειν τόν . . . ἄνδρα (266e4–5). Testimonia regarding Theodorus are collected in *AS* B 12.

267a2 Εὔηνον: testimonia in *AS* B 20. Euenus also wrote verse (West, *IE*[2] 2.63–7), hence his verse mnemonics (a4). Though none of Euenus' surviving verses concerns παραψόγους, one six-line elegy is rhetorical, offering advice on ἀντιλέγειν (Euenus 1 West = Athenaeus 367e). **a3–4 ὑποδήλωσιν . . . παρεπαίνους . . . παραψόγους** "insinuation," "indirect praises," "indirect censures." **a5 Τεισίαν:** from Syracuse; testimonia in *AS* B 2, jointly with the testimonia concerning Corax, with whom Tisias is often grouped in the ancient sources. Cole 1991b untangles the confused doxography on Tisias and Corax. S. gives Tisias particular attention below (273a7–274a5). **Γοργίαν:** from Leontini, near Syracuse. Testimonia regarding written *technai* by Gorgias are collected in *AS* B 7; other fragments and testimonia in DK 82. The *Helen* and *Palamedes* were possibly regarded as written *technai* (Cole 1991a: 81). Gorgias makes extensive use of probability arguments in both speeches (Kraus 2006b: 138–9). **a5–6 πρὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον** "saw

that probabilities are to be honored more than truths." This is a criticism not of the sophists' indifference to truth per se, but of the weakness of their rhetorical arguments based on the probable (272d2–274a5). For the sophists probabilities reflect the beliefs of the masses (273b1–2, cf. 259e7–260a4), which are indeed indifferent to truth, whereas S. showed that knowledge of the subject matter (i.e. truth) is needed to construct effective arguments for *psychagōgia* (261e5–262c3, 264e6–266b2). **a6–b3** τά τε αὖ σμικρὰ μεγάλα . . . περὶ πάντων ἀνηῦρον: in the clause καινά... καινῶς *sc.* λέγουσι from ῥώμην λόγου. The points that S. ascribes to Tisias and Gorgias are rhetorical commonplaces (cf. Isoc. 4.8). Plato has Gorgias (*Grg.* 449b–c) and Protagoras (*Prt.* 335b) claim the ability to speak concisely or at length on any topic. However, ἄπειρα is mocking (as μακρὸν... σύγγραμμα, 258a7–8). The sophists lack an account of the rationale for casting a message in one form rather than another (272a4–5n.).

267b3–5 μόνος αὐτὸς ηὑρηκέναι . . . μετρίων "he said that he alone had discovered what speeches are needed, and that there is need of neither long ones nor short ones but moderate ones." Prodicus' rhetorical insight is not reported from a written *technē* but was communicated to S. personally. Prodicus' testimonia and fragments are collected in *AS* B 8, DK 84. τέχνην (MSS) is likely an intruded marginal gloss. **b6** Σοφώτατα: Ph. remarks the vapidity of Prodicus' insight with irony befitting S. This outburst anticipates the overtly condescending attitude on the part of Ph. that S. seeks to correct forthwith (268a1–269d1n.). Prodicus' insight is vapid because in itself it has no practical use. **b7** αὐτῶι: Prodicus. Hippias of Elis (*AS* B 11, DK 86) recommends Prodicean moderation in discourse at *Prt.* 338b.

267c1–3 Τὰ δὲ Πώλου πῶς φράσωμεν . . . πρὸς ποίησιν εὐεπείας; "and what should we say about Polus' museums of speeches – such as 'doublet-expression' and 'maxim-expression' and 'image-expression' – and [the museums] of Licymnian words which he [i.e. Licymnius] bestowed on him [i.e. Polus] as a gift for the creation of fine language?" As Hermias (239.6–7) implies, μουσεῖα λόγων is not the title of Polus' book, but Plato's mockery of Polus' flights of εἰκονολογία and εὐέπεια. The metaphor of pleasant sound in μουσεῖα is alive in Euripides' ἀηδόνων μουσεῖον (*TrGF* 88; cf. *Hel.* 174, 1108) and Aristophanes' parody χελιδόνων μουσεῖα (*Ran.* 93). In the spirit of Aristophanes, Plato's metaphor plays on the discordancy of Polus' word formations. By way of contrast, Plato truly invokes the Muses' sweet sound when speaking of Calliope, the philosophical Muse (259d2–5), and when speaking of the place under the plane tree as τὸ Νυμφῶν μουσεῖον (278b6–c1). ὡς introduces the accusatives διπλασιολογίαν, γνωμολογίαν, εἰκονολογίαν, possibly Polus' coinages, which stand in apposition to μουσεῖα. On this use of ὡς cf. *AGPS* 69.63.2. ὀνομάτων τε Λικυμνίων depends on μουσεῖα. Hermias (239.12–14) reports that Licymnius divided words into various classes. Polus' testimonia are collected in *AS* B 14, Licymnius' in *AS* B 16. Licymnius also wrote dithyrambs (*PMG* 768–73). Aristotle joins

Licymnius to his criticism of Theodorus regarding excessive terminology (266e4–267a2n.). **c4** **Πρωταγόρεια** picks up Λικυμνίων (c2), i.e. neuter adjectives based on the sophists' names. **c5** **Ὀρθοέπειά γέ τις, ὦ παῖ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλά:** the indefinite article is dismissive (as 266e3), as is καλά, thus including Protagoras within S.'s disdain for sophistic rhetorical *technai*. ὀρθοέπεια is not the title of a book by Protagoras (though it may have been for Democritus, Diog. Laert. 9.48), but plays off the εὐέπεια that Polus pursues (c3). "Correct language" includes grammatical gender, proper Greek usage, mastery of types of sentences (statement, question, answer, etc.) as well as "correctness of words" (ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων) (*AS* B 3.5–13; Kerferd 1981: 68–9). Protagoras' fragments and testimonia are collected in *AS* B 3, DK 80. παῖ teases, as νεανία, 257c7; cf. Introd. note 11. **c5–7** **τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόων . . . τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος** "further, the might of the Chalcedonian [i.e. Thrasymachus of Chalcedon] seems to me to have mastered by art piteously wailing speeches that are dragged to old age and poverty." Mock grandeur: the opening phrase τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἑλκομένων λόγων mimics rotund oratory with its lack of hiatus and cretic–choriambic rhythm (–⏑– –⏑⏑– ⏑⏑–– –⏑⏑– –⏑⏑– ⏑–); the diction – οἰκτρογόων, ἑλκομένων (metaphorical for "applied"), κεκρατηκέναι – is pompous; the concluding periphrasis for Thrasymachus is pseudo-Homeric, cf. σθένος Ἰδομενῆος, σθένος Ἠετίωνος (*Il.* 13.248, 23.827). The pathetic speeches mocked by S. are likely those contained in a book of Thrasymachus which Aristotle knew under the title Ἔλεοι (*Rh.* 3.1404a15). Thrasymachus' fragments and testimonia are collected in *AS* B 9, DK 85.

267d1 **ὠργισμένοις:** referring to πολλούς, dative with ἐπάιδων. **d2** **ὁθενδή** "whencesoever"; i.e. from whatever source slanders (διαβολάς) may arise. **d2–3** **τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων:** having started the discussion of sophistic rhetoric with the introduction (προοίμιον, 266d7), S. ends the discussion with the conclusion. τέλος is nominative. **d3–4** **ᾧι τινες μὲν ἐπάνοδον, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο τίθενται ὄνομα:** Aristotle uses both ἐπάνοδος ("recapitulation") and ἐπίλογος (*Rh.* 3.1414b1–5). **d5–6** **Τὸ ἐν κεφαλαίωι ἕκαστα . . . περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων;** slight hyperbaton: the object of λέγεις is the articular infinitive phrase τὸ . . . ὑπομνῆσαι . . . περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων.

268a1–269d1 To explain what is wrong with the techniques found in the sophists' rhetorical treatises, S. compares other *technai* and takes a dramatic approach designed to appeal specifically to Ph. Citing individuals whom S. knows Ph. will acknowledge as experts, S. asks Ph. to imagine how these experts would respond to claims of expertise in their own *technē* based merely on proficiency with assorted techniques that produce given responses. Such techniques are "preliminary to the *technē*" (πρὸ τῆς τέχνης, 269b7) but do not constitute the *technē*. Expertise in the *technē* entails understanding both the goal of the *technē* and how the goal can be realized in particular circumstances, which is a different and far more complicated task than applying particular techniques to produce

given responses. The manner in which S. conducts this imagined dialogue reveals the usefulness of patience and gentleness in dialectical situations; and it demonstrates the liveliness and efficacy of oral, face-to-face instruction in contrast to the deadness and pomposity of the sophists' books. In S.'s hands Ph. displays remarkable docility. The gentle, instructive approach that S. both recommends to and uses upon his interlocutor contrasts with the sharp irony he just directed at the authors of the sophistic *technai* (266d7–267d9), who, of course, are absent and not S.'s concern.

268a1–2 ταῦτα δὲ ὑπ' αὐγὰς μᾶλλον ἴδωμεν, τίνα καί ποτ' ἔχει τὴν τῆς τέχνης δύναμιν "let's look at these things [i.e. the sophistic rhetorical techniques mentioned since 266d7] under a brighter light [and see] what ever (ποτ') is the artistic power that they really (καί) have." **a4** Ἔχει γάρ "yes, that is so" (*GP* 73–4 on γάρ of assent). S. agrees with Ph.'s statement that sophistic rhetorical techniques can be effective in mass assemblies (ἔν γε δὴ πλήθους συνόδοις); the horse-and-ass example (260b1–d2) is itself proof of that. But S. rejects the sophistic view that rhetoric is concerned just with manipulating the beliefs of the masses and effective only in mass assemblies (261a7–e4 with notes). **a4–5** φαίνεται διεστηκὸς αὐτῶν τὸ ἤτριον: lit. "their warp seems to be separated"; i.e. there seem to be "some holes in the fabric" (Hackforth 1952), which would appear when held up to the light (268a1). αὐτῶν = ταῦτα (268a1), the sophistic rhetorical techniques. **a7–8** τῶι ἑταίρωι σου Ἐρυξιμάχωι ἢ τῶι πατρὶ αὐτοῦ Ἀκουμενῶι: physicians, Ph.'s friends, and chosen by S. because he knows that Ph. views them as experts (227a4–5n.).

268b1 προσφέρειν: used particularly of medical treatment (270b5; LSJ s.v. A.1.3.b). **b2** ἐμεῖν ποιεῖν . . . κάτω διαχωρεῖν "to induce vomiting or diarrhea." **b3–4** ἄλλον ποιεῖν: *sc.* ἰατρικόν. **b6–7** οὕστινας δεῖ καὶ ὁπότε ἕκαστα τούτων ποιεῖν καὶ μέχρι ὁπόσου: ποιεῖν has two accusatives: "to whom and when he should do each of these things and to what extent." **b8** ταῦτα = τούτων (268b4), viz. the treatments mentioned in 268b1–3.

268c1 αὐτόν: i.e. on his own; S. expands the point at 269c3–4. **c2–3** ἐκ βιβλίου ποθὲν ἀκούσας "having read [something] in a book somewhere"; on ἀκούω = "read," cf. 261b7–c1n. On medical texts in the classical period and their use by medical charlatans, cf. Dean-Jones 2003. **c3** περιτυχὼν φαρμακίοις: the participle stresses the lack of method; the diminutive expresses contempt. **c5** Σοφοκλεῖ . . . καὶ Εὐριπίδηι: cited by S. as authorities because in Ph.'s eyes these two are unassailable masters of their craft and thus serve the same purpose as Eryximachus and Acumenus. S.'s discussion of tragedy alongside and in the same terms as the discussions of medicine, harmonics, and rhetoric implies that there exists a τέχνη τραγική. Much of Plato's work would lead one to view that notion as highly questionable in Plato's eyes, especially insofar as Sophocles and Euripides are taken as experts (Ferrari 1989). Here the tacit assumption

of a τέχνη τραγική is incidental and undertaken just to advance the discussion with Ph.; it helps demonstrate principles that are assuredly valid from the other *technai*. Whether or not a τέχνη τραγική actually exists or could exist, what it would consist in, and whether or not Sophocles and Euripides are true experts in that *technē*, are questions that are not considered and not material. Nevertheless, one may detect here the same friendly, didactically useful irony that views traditional, Muse-inspired poetry as a preliminary model for philosophical divine madness (245a1n.) and that portrays Pericles as an exponent of Platonic rhetorical art (269a5n., 269e4–270a6n.). **c6–d1 περὶ σμικροῦ πράγματος . . . φοβερὰς καὶ ἀπειλητικάς:** composing long and short speeches and speeches that evoke emotions recalls sophistic rhetorical techniques (267a6–b3, c5–d1).

268d4–5 τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῶι ὅλωι συνισταμένην: the participle συνισταμένην stresses the verbal sense of τὴν τούτων σύστασιν and is modified by πρέπουσαν: "the composition of these things [i.e. the techniques of tragic poetry mentioned in 268c5–d1] that are composed fittingly with each other and the whole." Ph. is recycling in regard to tragedy what S. said in regard to rhetoric (264c3–6). **d7 μουσικὸς ἐντυχὼν ἀνδρὶ οἰομένωι ἁρμονικῶι εἶναι:** μουσικός in the sense "cultured" contrasts with ἀγροίκως; cf. Ar. *Eq.* 191–3 ἡ δημαγωγία γὰρ οὐ πρὸς μουσικοῦ | ἔτ' ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς οὐδὲ χρηστοῦ τοὺς τρόπους, | ἀλλ' εἰς ἀμαθῆ καὶ βδελυρόν. μουσικός is also an "expert in μουσική," the art of music, which includes "harmonics" (τὰ ἁρμονικά, 268e5, also called ἁρμονία, "attunement," 268e3, 4). Harmonics in particular is the expertise of the ἁρμονικός (*Smp.* 187a–b; Barker 2007: 88–90). Greek harmonics concerns the musical modes or attunements that were the musical structures underlying melody (Barker 2007: 6–12). S. activates in addition Plato's particular sense of μουσικός below (268e1–2n.). ὅτι δή "just because." **d8 ὀξυτάτην καὶ βαρυτάτην χορδὴν ποιεῖν:** lit. "to make a string most piercing and deepest"; i.e. to produce the highest and lowest notes on a string. Hermias (242.3–4) says that this is done by tightening and loosening the string. On the terminology and technique for tuning and producing notes on stringed instruments, cf. West 1992: 61–70.

268e1 "ὦ μοχθηρέ, μελαγχολᾶις" "you jerk, you're insane," with the bluntness of comic abuse: on μοχθηρέ cf. Olson 2002: 123 ad Ar. *Ach.* 165; on μελαγχολᾶις cf. Dunbar 1995: 139 ad Ar. *Av.* 14. S. is characterizing Ph.'s harsh view of the experts' likely reaction to a technically adept pretender: εἴποιεν ἄν . . . ὅτι μαίνεται ἄνθρωπος (268c2), οὗτοι ἄν . . . καταγελῶιεν (268d3). **e1–2 ἅτε μουσικὸς ὢν πρᾳότερον:** precisely because of his expertise the musical expert addresses the technically adept pretender in a gentle manner and does not reproach him for ignorance but instructs him where his error lies. Thus the expert in the art of music – μουσικός – is revealed as a follower of the Muses – μουσικός – in Plato's particular sense, i.e. a person devoted to philosophical pursuits and therefore a model of both understanding and conduct (248d3, 259b4–d6,

278b5–d6, *Rep.* 9.591d). Thus also S. urges Ph. towards the cooperative virtue that enhances learning and advances the dialectical inquiry, just as he urged Ph. towards the same virtue before he delivered the palinode (243c2–3n.). Plato's characterization of the gentle expert applies above all to S. in his dealings with Ph. throughout the dialogue. **e2 ὦ ἄριστε:** the form of address contrasts starkly with ὦ μοχθηρέ (e1) and sets the tone for the whole utterance (e2–5), which is friendly but direct. **ταῦτ':** how to produce the highest and lowest notes on a string (268d7–8). **e3–4 οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἁρμονίας ἐπαΐειν τὸν τὴν σὴν ἕξιν ἔχοντα** "however, nothing prevents a person in your condition [i.e. one who possesses the merely technical skill of producing high and low notes on a string] from understanding not even a bit of [the art of] attunement." μήν answers μέν (e2) (*GP* 335). **e4–5 τὰ γὰρ πρὸ ἁρμονίας ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἐπίστασαι ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἁρμονικά** "you know what must be learned before attunement but not the elements of attunement [= harmonics]." The techniques used in the art are distinct from and must be learned before the art, which is the knowledge of how and when to use those techniques. An expert in the art necessarily possesses the technical skills used in the art, but one who possesses the technical skills is not necessarily an expert in the art.

269a1 τόν σφισιν ἐπιδεικνύμενον "the one who was showing off to them [i.e. to Sophocles and Euripides]," referring to 268c5–d2. With this accusative *sc.* ἐπίστασθαι from 268e5 ἐπίστασαι. **a5 Τί δὲ τὸν μελίγηρυν Ἄδραστον οἰόμεθα ἢ καὶ Περικλέα:** *sc.* ἂν εἰπεῖν. S. introduces Adrastus and Pericles with the expectation that Ph. will accept them as experts in rhetoric, parallel to Eryximachus and Acumenus in medicine and Sophocles and Euripides in tragedy. Pericles' usefulness for this purpose is obvious, and S. extends this usage beyond the present paragraph (269b5–6n.) to his next point regarding the expert *rhētōr*'s knowledge of the soul (269e4–270a6). Because S. uses Pericles for purely didactic purposes, nothing that he says here affects the substantial criticism of Pericles as democratic *rhētōr* in the *Gorgias* (502d–519d; Yunis 1996: 136–53). Adrastus is a mythological figure – king of Argos and leader of the Seven against Thebes; in Euripides' *Suppliant women* he pleads with Theseus to secure the burial of the Argive dead – so he is the exception among the experts named in this passage, all the rest of whom are historical figures of the fifth century. Some have suspected a veiled reference to another leading fifth-century orator, but no figure suits and our information regarding fifth-century politicians is plentiful. The eloquence of Adrastus was evidently established in legend: the poetic coloring of the epithet μελίγηρυν ("honey-voiced") suggests an original context in poetry (Davies 1980), and a close parallel is to be found in a verse of the seventh-century Spartan poet Tyrtaeus – γλῶσσαν δ' Ἀδρήστου μειλιχόγηρυν, "gentle-voiced tongue of Adrastus" (12.8 West). That is a sufficient basis for S. to cite the mythical Adrastus as one of his gentle experts. After this mention S. drops him and relies solely on Pericles as his exemplar of rhetorical expertise. The earlier reference to the mythical

figures Nestor, Odysseus, and Palamedes as writers of rhetorical *technai* serves a different purpose and functions in a different manner (261b7–c1n.). **a6–b1** ὧν νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς διῆιμεν τῶν παγκάλων τεχνημάτων . . . ἔφαμεν εἶναι σκεπτέα: "the wonderful techniques" were discussed in 266d7–267d6. S. issued the call to examine them in 268a1–2.

269b1–4 πότερον . . . ἂν αὐτούς . . . εἰπεῖν . . . ἢ . . . κἂν . . . ἐπιπλῆξαι: accusative–infinitive following οἰόμεθα (269a5). **b1** ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ: only Ph. spoke roughly (268c2–4, d3) but S. includes himself to soften the blow. **b2–3** ῥῆμά τι εἰπεῖν . . . ὡς ῥητορικὴν τέχνην "[whether they would] utter a boorish statement of some kind against those who have written these things [i.e. the techniques in the books] and teach [them] as rhetorical art." ἀπαίδευτον contrasts with μουσικός, "cultured" (268d7n.). **b4** κἂν νῶιν ἐπιπλῆξαι "they would actually chide the two of us." **b5–6** τινες μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι . . . τί ποτ' ἔστιν ῥητορική "some people [i.e. the sophists of 266d5–267d9] out of ignorance in dialectic turned out to be unable to define what rhetoric really is." On διαλέγεσθαι in the sense "define by means of dialectic," cf. *Grg.* 453b, 457c, *Rep.* 7.532a. Whereas S. introduced dialectic for its usefulness to the rhetorician in composing speeches (265c8–266b2), now he adds that dialectic is useful to the rhetorician for defining, and thus understanding, his own art. S. illustrates the latter usage below (270b3, d1–7). S. made no mention of dialectic when he defined rhetoric himself (261a7–e4), but his definition – especially the core idea ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων (261a7–8) – entails precisely the complex, structured speeches that are designed to persuade (264c3–6) but are beyond the capability of the sophistic rhetoricians who produce given effects by linguistic devices. Pericles of course knew nothing about dialectic in Plato's sense of the term. S.'s device of putting words in Pericles' mouth patently turns him into a mouthpiece for the argument on rhetoric that S. wishes to make (269a5n.). **b7–c1** τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης . . . ὠιήθησαν ηὑρηκέναι: similar diction was used to make the same point in regard to harmonics at 268e4–5.

269c1–4 ταῦτα δὴ διδάσκοντες ἄλλους . . . πορίζεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις "teaching others precisely these things [i.e. the techniques that produce given responses], they suppose that rhetoric has been taught by them completely, and that the matter of uttering all these things persuasively and composing the whole – being no trouble – their pupils themselves must provide in their speeches on their own." συνίστασθαι is middle. **c7–d1** τὴν τοῦ τῶι ὄντι ῥητορικοῦ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ τέχνην "the art of the truly expert and persuasive speaker."

269d2–272b6 Returning to his definition of rhetoric as *psychagōgia*, "a leading of the soul," through speeches (261a7, 271c9), S. reveals the second novel feature of the true art of rhetoric. In addition to the invention of arguments by means of dialectic, rhetoric requires knowledge of the nature of the object in which it aims to implant persuasion, namely, the soul (270b3–7). The art consists in knowing,

and recognizing in the world, the types of human souls and bringing to bear on these souls precisely those forms of speech that have the effect of persuading them in given circumstances, which is a systematic enterprise of massive proportions (271c9–272b4). To enable Ph. to appreciate both the systematic study of the soul and its intrinsic importance for rhetoric, ideas that are utterly foreign to him, S. leads Ph. in a line of reasoning that uses the concept of "nature" (φύσις) in an increasingly more specific sense; and he continues to exploit Ph.'s proclivity for recognized experts. First, S. connects Pericles' rhetorical expertise with his exposure to Anaxagoras' theory of nature (269e4–270a6). Then, analogizing rhetoric and medicine, S. sees medicine's interest in the body and rhetoric's interest in the soul as equally a concern with the nature of their objects, which provokes from Ph. an approbatory mention of Hippocrates (270b1–c4). Finally, S. offers a dense, abstract set of parameters for a proper account of the nature of any object, such that the object's natural capacities for active and passive interactions with other entities would be fully described (270c8–e5). Only then does S. present Ph. with his rhetorical psychology as the logical consequence of rhetoric's disciplinary interest in the soul as the locus of persuasion (271c9–272b4). Plato has S. invoke Pericles and Anaxagoras and accept the parallel with Hippocrates not because these predecessors actually anticipated Plato's rhetorical psychology, but because they serve as touchstones for the idea that understanding any object requires understanding its underlying nature. That idea helps S. move Ph. towards accepting the connection between rhetoric and psychology. Thus S. employs on Ph. the deceptive, gradually shifting, psychagogic form of argument described above (261e6–262c2) (Heitsch 1994).

269d2 Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὥστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι "with regard to the ability [to acquire the art of the truly expert and persuasive speaker, 269c7–d1] so as to become an accomplished competitor." "Accomplished competitor" prepares for Pericles, the most accomplished *rhētōr* (269e1–2). Yet the real-world competition of deliberative rhetoric belongs as much to private encounters (e.g. *erastai* competing for an *erōmenos* or S.'s competition with Lysias for Ph.'s allegiance to philosophy or sophistic rhetoric) as it does to the traditional forums of public decision-making (261a7–b2). Epideictic competition, abhorrent to S. (242b7–d2, 257d8–258c4, 277e6–278a1n.), is not at issue. **d3–6 εἰ μέν σοι ὑπάρχει . . . ταύτηι ἀτελὴς ἔσει:** the three essential characteristics of the accomplished *rhētōr* – natural talent, knowledge, practice – were conventional (*Prt.* 323c–324c, from Protagoras' speech; Isoc. 13.14–18, 15.187–92; Alcid. *Soph.* 3–5) and are tacitly accepted by Ph. **d6–7 ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη . . . φαίνεσθαι ἡ μέθοδος** "but with regard to as much of it [i.e. becoming an accomplished *rhētōr*] as is *technē*, the way there (ἡ μέθοδος) seems to me to appear [to be] not where Lysias and Thrasymachus go." δέ responds to τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι (d2). τέχνη refers specifically to ἐπιστήμην (d5); S. proceeds to focus on the knowledge that is necessary for rhetoric and how it is acquired. The literal sense of μέθοδος is brought

out by the locative use of ἧι and πορεύεται; cf. also 263b6 τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνην ῥητορικὴν μετιέναι, 270e1 where a bad μέθοδος is likened to τυφλοῦ πορείαι.

269e1–2 Κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄριστε, . . . εἰς τὴν ῥητορικὴν γενέσθαι: Pericles' status as "the most accomplished of all men with regard to rhetoric" is stated in a manner that reflects general agreement and not S.'s personal opinion, which is not germane. S. continues to use Pericles as the putative rhetorical expert for the sake of instructing Ph. (269a5n., b5–6n.). The vocative addressed to Ph. is the same as that which S.'s gentle expert uses when he instructs the technically adept pretender (268e2).

269e4–270a6 S. claims that Pericles acquired the knowledge of nature that is necessary for rhetorical art from Anaxagoras' theory of nature, yet both the overall tone and specific terms used by S. are unmistakably ironic. Elsewhere Plato makes substantial criticism of both these predecessors (269a5n. on Pericles, 270a4–5n. on Anaxagoras), yet the irony is not mainly intended to satirize or otherwise disparage Anaxagoras or Pericles. Rather, the irony serves S.'s immediate didactic purpose. It enables S. to put forward a provocative, historically striking example of psychologically based rhetorical art – and thus to introduce to Ph. the idea that knowledge of the nature of the soul is an essential part of the knowledge that belongs to rhetoric – while simultaneously precluding serious consideration of the example. When Ph. asks S. to explain his point about Pericles and Anaxagoras (270a7), S. leaves Pericles and Anaxagoras behind, shifts to the medical analogy, and proceeds from there towards his goal, which is the account of rhetorical psychology (271c9–272b4). Anaxagoras is well suited for the role S. gives him. He was a contemporary of Pericles, spent time in Athens, wrote περὶ φύσεως, and emphasized νοῦς (cf. 245c5–246a2n.), which is close enough to ψυχή for S.'s purpose. While it is evident that Pericles did not develop Platonic rhetorical art from exposure to Anaxagoras (or anyone else), it is entirely possible that Pericles and Anaxagoras did interact, though we do not have the evidence to know whether they actually did and if they did to what purpose. The anecdotal tradition linking Pericles and Anaxagoras, which reaches its acme in Plutarch's *Life of Pericles* (4.6–6.5, 8.1–4, 32), goes back to fourth-century sources, chiefly this passage (also *Alc.* 118c), and in its details is clearly fabricated (Stadter 1991, Podlecki 1998: 23–31).

269e4 προσδέονται: προσ- means that the knowledge of nature required by great arts is knowledge "in addition to" the (obviously necessary) knowledge of their own materials, such as rhetoric's knowledge of discourse and medicine's knowledge of drugs. It is the additional knowledge that turns these practices into full-fledged *technai*. **e4–270a1 ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως πέρι** "chatter and high-flown speculation about nature" ("high-flown speculation" from Hackforth 1952), which is an ironic way of saying "discussion of and inquiry into nature"; on the purpose of the irony cf. 269e4–270a6n. μετεωρολογία refers to inquiry into the natural phenomena of the sky (τὰ μετέωρα) (*Ti.* 91d,

Arist. *Mete.* 338a26). Such inquiry having become suspect in the popular mind, μετεωρολογία was used pejoratively in reference to scientists, sophists, and the historical S. (Ar. *Nub.* 228, 360, Pl. *Ap.* 18b, *Plt.* 299b). ἀδολεσχία was a ready term to speak disparagingly of intellectual pursuits, including the verbal-based inquiries pursued by S. (Ar. *Nub.* 1480, *PCG* 506, Pl. *Prm.* 135d). To demonstrate his disdain for such criticism, Plato blithely adopts ἀδολεσχία and μετεωρολογία to refer without prejudice to natural science (here, *Cra.* 401b) or to philosophy itself (*Rep.* 6.488e–489c, *Tht.* 195b–c). περὶ φύσεως was the standard way to refer to the subject matter of the cosmological works of the presocratic philosophers (*Phd.* 96a; Schmalzriedt 1970).

270a1–2 τὸ γὰρ ὑψηλόνουν τοῦτο καὶ πάντηι τελεσιουργὸν ἔοικεν ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν εἰσιέναι "for that high-mindedness and overall effectiveness [i.e. which belong to great *technai*] seem somehow to come [to them] from this source." ὑψηλόνουν prepares for Anaxagoras, the exponent of νοῦς. **a3 εὐφυής:** one of the three essential characteristics (269d3–6n.). **a3–4 προσπεσὼν γὰρ οἶμαι τοιούτωι ὄντι Ἀναξαγόραι:** προσπεσών makes Pericles' encounter with Anaxagoras sound like a matter of chance. τοιούτωι refers to the qualities of high-mindedness and effectiveness (270a1–2). **a4–5 μετεωρολογίας ἐμπλησθεὶς καὶ ἐπὶ φύσιν νοῦ τε καὶ ἀνοίας ἀφικόμενος:** the irony begun in 269e4 is extended by the crudeness of ἐμπλησθείς and the play νοῦ τε καὶ ἀνοίας, "mind and lack of mind"; ἄνοια is not to be taken seriously as reflecting a facet of Anaxagoras' theory of νοῦς. S.'s serious point is contained in the word φύσιν, intended to move Ph. towards considering the underlying nature of the soul. On Anaxagoras' theory of νοῦς, cf. DK 59 B11–14, Curd 2007: 192–205; on Plato's criticism of the theory, cf. *Phd.* 97b–99c. **a5 τὸν πολὺν λόγον** "that long account of his" (*AGPS* 50.4.12 on the demonstrative force of the article).

270b1 Ὁ αὐτός που τρόπος τέχνης ἰατρικῆς ὅσπερ καὶ ῥητορικῆς: lit. "there is, I suppose, the same situation of medical art which is also [the situation] of rhetorical [art]"; i.e. "the situation of medical art is the same, I suppose, as that of rhetorical [art] too." **b3–4 δεῖ διελέσθαι φύσιν, σώματος μὲν ἐν τῆι ἑτέραι, ψυχῆς δὲ ἐν τῆι ἑτέραι** "it is necessary to distinguish nature, [that] of the body in the one case and [that] of the soul in the other case." διελέσθαι suggests the dialectical division (διαίρεσις) of the concept nature into two sub-classes. **b4–5 μὴ τριβῆι μόνον καὶ ἐμπειρίαι ἀλλὰ τέχνηι:** S. interjects this reminder of the distinction introduced in the *Gorgias* between a mere knack (τριβή) or routine (ἐμπειρία) and a true *technē* (260e4n.) as he introduces an analogy that recalls but differs from the central analogy of the *Gorgias*. In the *Gorgias* (464b–465d) S. analogized medicine and justice as true *technai*, the former concerned with the body, the latter with the soul, while empirical, sophistic, non-artistic rhetoric was cast as the destructive impostor of justice and thereby analogous to cuisine, the destructive impostor of medicine. In this passage S. takes care to emphasize that the rhetoric which he is analogizing to medicine and which is concerned with the soul is true

rhetorical art and not the empirical impostor. **b5–6 τῶι μὲν . . . τῆι δέ:** *sc.* σώματι, ψυχῆι. **b6–7 τῆι δὲ λόγους . . . ἀρετὴν παραδώσειν** "and [if you intend, by applying (*sc.* προσφέρων)] discourse and lawful practices to the soul, to transmit [to it] whatever persuasion and excellence you wish." "Persuasion" (πειθώ) is meant in the sense of a view of things that one is persuaded to hold. This passage presents psychagogic rhetoric in a more expansive and edifying light than hitherto. "Lawful practices" have not been mentioned as belonging to rhetoric's arsenal in addition to discourse. Transmitting "excellence" has not been mentioned as a task of rhetoric in addition to persuasion. However, both were anticipated in the palinode: S.'s strictures on sexual conduct can be seen as the rhetorical application of lawful practices, and the palinode as a whole can be seen as transmitting excellence to its auditors. Since, like medicine, rhetoric is a powerful and thus potentially dangerous as well as beneficial tool (261e5–262c3n.), S. is anticipating the problem of the proper use of rhetoric (273e3–274a5). Gorgias extolled the power of discourse by means of a parallel with medicine (*Hel.* 14).

270c1–2 Ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν . . . ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως; "do you think it is possible to understand the nature of soul in a manner worth mentioning without the nature of the whole?" οὖν broaches a new point (*GP* 426); yet the meaning of the phrase "the nature of the whole" is unclear and only becomes clear in what follows. In response to Ph.'s intervention on this point (270c3–4), S. explains that "the nature of the whole" means viewing whatever object is under scrutiny, in this case the soul, with respect to a complete description of its active and passive interactions with other objects (270c8–e5; Jouanna 1977: 15–23). Cf. *Smp.* 205b–c where τὸ ὅλον is used to refer to complex entities (*erōs*, poetry) conceived as wholes. Since τὸ ὅλον can also mean "the universe" (*Lys.* 214b, *Phlb.* 28d), S.'s phrase has been taken to mean "the nature of the universe" in reference to presocratic theories of nature such as that of Anaxagoras (Mansfeld 1980). But that interpretation would have S. looking back to 269e4–270a6 instead of forward to 270c8–e5, which runs counter to the way the passage unfolds and does not advance Ph. (or us) towards the knowledge of the soul that is required for good discourse. Thus ἀξίως λόγου indicates not only an understanding of the nature of soul that is "worth mentioning," i.e. one that is minimally acceptable, but also one that is "worthy of discourse." **c3 Ἱπποκράτει γε τῶι τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν:** Asclepiad is here a familial as well as a professional designation. It specifies the physician and author of medical treatises contemporary with S. and descended from the Asclepiad line that settled in Cos. On Hippocrates and the heterogeneous corpus that bears his name, cf. Lloyd 1991, Jouanna 1999. **c4 οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος:** *sc.* κατανοῆσαι δυνατόν ἐστι. **ἄνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης:** "this method" refers to "the nature of the whole" (270c2). By associating "this method" with Hippocrates Ph. wishes to demonstrate that he understands S.'s argument. He does this even though, quite apart from the question of his understanding of Hippocrates, he is clearly not in a position to understand what S.

means by "the nature of the whole." It is a complicated, thoroughly Platonic concept and S. has not explained it yet (270d1–7). Nevertheless, impressed with S.'s medical analogy, Ph. indulges his proclivity for recognized experts, especially those whose expertise is established through written texts, and ventures a claim that reflects no more than a vague recognition that the famous physician and author took a scientific approach, of some kind, to the study of the body. No wonder S.'s response is lukewarm (270c5–6). Ph.'s claim about Hippocrates is the earliest extant reference to Hippocrates' work. In the (mistaken) belief that Plato intends Ph.'s claim as a valid and informative insight into Hippocrates' work, scholars have tried to identify particular works in the Hippocratic corpus to which Plato is alluding. The great variety of Hippocratic works that have been suggested to fit the bill reflects the utter vagueness of Ph.'s claim (Jouanna 1977: 23–8, Lloyd 1991: 196–203). **c5–6 Καλῶς γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε . . . εἰ συμφωνεῖ:** the first sentence is mere politeness (as 227b2), the second expresses S.'s real interest, in which authority belongs not to recognized experts such as Hippocrates but only to a coherent, compelling account. S.'s own use of recognized experts (268a1–269d1, 269e4–270a6), unlike Ph.'s, is strategic and supported by argument. With συμφωνεῖ *sc.* τῶι Ἱπποκράτει ὁ λόγος. **c8 Τὸ τοίνυν περὶ φύσεως:** an instance of S.'s "deceptive" argument (269d2–272b6n.): repeating the phrase περὶ φύσεως aids the transition from presocratic cosmological theory (270a1) to S.'s own theory of what an account of the nature of anything (περὶ ὁτουοῦν φύσεως, 270d1) must consist in if the thing is to be the subject of a *technē*.

270d1–7 ἆρ' οὐχ ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι . . . ἢ τῶι τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ; "then is it not necessary to think about the nature of anything whatsoever in the following manner: first, [whether] the thing about which we shall wish to be experts ourselves or to be able to make another person [expert] is simple or has many forms; second, if it is simple, [it is necessary] to consider its capacity, what [capacity] it naturally has for acting on what or what [capacity it naturally has] for being acted on by what, or if it has many forms, to enumerate them and observe for each [form] that which [we observe] for the single [i.e. uniform] thing, [namely,] by virtue of what [form] it naturally does what or by virtue of what [form] [it naturally] suffers what at the hands of what?" With ἑκάστου (d6) *sc.* εἴδους, with the interrogative τῶι (d6 twice) *sc.* εἴδει. αὐτό (d6) refers back to ὁτουοῦν (d1). πολυειδές (d2) and πλείω εἴδη ἔχηι (d5) mean not that the entity has many parts, but that it has many forms, i.e. that the entity exists as different types and each type has its own set of interactions; S. spoke of hubris as πολυειδές in this sense (238a3). The soul is πολυειδές in this sense too. Although the palinode's image of the soul involves several parts (charioteer, good horse, bad horse, chariot, wings), the palinode's interest lies in describing how souls are affected by their prenatal, heavenly experiences and thereby turned into different types (248d2–e3, 252c4–253c2). The types of human soul are about to be emphasized again in the rhetorical psychology (271b1–4, 271c9–272b4). The sense of this dense

passage arises from dialectic: entities are divided into two comprehensive sub-categories (uniform, multiform) and each sub-category is examined with respect to the further sub-categories of active and passive interaction with other objects (Hermias 245.15; Jouanna 1977).

270e1 τυφλοῦ πορείαι: on this image and the sense of μέθοδος, cf. 269d6–7n. **e2 ὁτιοῦν:** as ὁτουοῦν, 270d1. **e3 ἂν τῶι τις τέχνηι λόγους διδῶι** "if a person imparts discourse to another person with art." S. is referring not to using the art of rhetoric on someone, but to teaching the art of rhetoric to someone. This is evident from S.'s phrasing below (τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῶι, 271a4–5) and from the context, in which knowing the art and teaching the art are two aspects of the same expertise (270d2–3, 271a4–7). **e3–4 τὴν οὐσίαν δείξει ἀκριβῶς τῆς φύσεως τούτου:** to show "the essence of the nature of the thing," i.e. the essential nature of the thing that is the subject of the art, is equivalent to understanding the thing with regard to "the nature of the whole" (270c2) in the manner just described (270d1–7). Precision (ἀκριβῶς) arises from the expert's concern with the nature of the thing in this particular sense and depends on dialectic (269b5–6n.). **e4 προσοίσει:** the subject is the person who receives instruction in the art (τωι, e3) and is going to use it (αὐτῶι, 271a1). On the sense of προσοίσει, cf. προσφέρων (270b5).

271a1–2 τοῦτο . . . τούτωι: the soul. **a4 σπουδῆι:** i.e. actually accomplishing the job of teaching rhetoric, which Thrasymachus does not do (271c1–2n.). **a4–5 τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῶι** "imparts the art of rhetoric," i.e. by teaching it. δίδωμι (also 270e3) is used in the sense of παραδίδωμι at *Prt.* 319c: οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι. **a5–7 πάσηι ἀκριβείαι γράψει . . . κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολυειδές** "shall write with complete precision and make evident whether the soul [lit. cause one to see the soul, whether it] is by nature single and uniform or multiform like bodily shape." S. restates 270d2, this time with reference to the soul. Thus "multiform" refers to the soul not as an entity with many parts but as one that exists as different types (270d1–7n., *Rep.* 10.612a); and the reference to bodily shape concerns the many types of bodily shape, not the many parts that make up a body. S. mentions writing because of Thrasymachus, the writer of a rhetorical *technē*. S. clarifies in a moment that the relevant knowledge of the nature of the soul can be expressed in writing or orally, but either way that knowledge is necessary for rhetorical art (271b6–c4, 272b1–2). **a9 ὅτωι τί ποιεῖν ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν** "[he will make evident] by virtue of what [form the soul] naturally does what or suffers [what] at the hands of what." S. restates 270d4–7, this time with reference to the soul.

271b1 γένη "kinds," equivalent to εἴδη. **b1–2 τὰ τούτων παθήματα** "the ways in which the types of soul are affected." τούτων = τῶν ψυχῆς γένων, since the interaction under scrutiny concerns only how speeches affect souls. **b2**

τὰς αἰτίας "the causes [of the ways in which the types of soul are affected by the types of speeches]." Understanding the causal link between persuasive speeches and persuaded souls (also 271b3, d5) distinguishes rhetorical art from the rote learning or imitation typical of sophistic rhetoric and enables the expert speaker to exercise judgment in devising persuasive discourse in response to particular situations (272a3–6). **b2–4** προσαρμόττων ἕκαστον ἑκάστωι . . . ἡ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ "joining each [type of speech] to each [type of soul] and explaining what kind of soul is necessarily persuaded and what kind is not persuaded by what kinds of speeches for what reason." This is a new point, expanded below (271c9–272b4), where a clearer idea of what is meant by "types of speeches" is given. By making persuasion contingent on matching particular forms of speech to a person's soul, Plato creates the basis for the rhetorical expert's use of style and the rhetorical practice of expressing particular content in different forms with a view to effectiveness. Form in rhetoric is properly not a matter of display, which S. criticized in Lysias (234e5–6, 235a5–7) and the sophists (266d7–269c7), but is strictly functional with regard to persuading particular auditors. S. anticipated this point when he explained that the palinode was cast in poetic form for the sake of its effect on Ph. (257a2–4, 265b6–c3). The claim that certain types of souls are necessarily (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) persuaded by certain types of speeches recalls "logographic necessity" (264b6–8n.), puts this *technē* on a par with the most scientific *technai* (such as medicine and harmonics, 268a1–269d1), and removes the possibility of a shortcut to rhetorical art (272a6–273e3). **b5** Κάλλιστα γοῦν ἄν, ὡς ἔοικ', ἔχοι οὕτως "it would be quite wonderful, it seems, in that way (οὕτως)," i.e. in accord with S.'s account of necessarily persuasive speeches and persuaded souls. **b6–7** Οὔτοι μὲν οὖν . . . οὔτε τοῦτο: οὔτοι μὲν οὖν is a forceful corrective (*GP* 479); the phrasing aims at exhaustiveness (ἐνδεικνύμενον ἢ λεγόμενον, λεχθήσεται ἢ γραφήσεται, οὔτε . . . οὔτε); ἄλλως responds to οὕτως (b5): "in fact, my friend, in no other way will there ever be spoken or written discourse in accord with art, whether put forward for display (ἐνδεικνύμενον) or spoken [i.e. extempore], not any other [discourse] and not this [discourse, i.e. the discourse that we are conducting right now]." For the meaning of ἐνδεικνύμενον cf. S.'s comment on Protagoras' initial display to the gathered company (*Prt.* 317c): "[Protagoras] wanted to make a display before Prodicus and Hippias and show off (ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι)." Lysias' speech is an example of discourse put forward for display. S.'s first speech was both put forward for display and spoken extempore. S.'s second speech was delivered extempore in response to an immediate deliberative need.

271c1 οἱ νῦν γράφοντες, ὧν σὺ ἀκήκοας, τέχνας λόγων: 261b7–c1n. on written *technai* and ἀκούω = "read." **c1–2** πανοῦργοί εἰσιν καὶ ἀποκρύπτονται, εἰδότες ψυχῆς πέρι παγκάλως: the irony, especially παγκάλως, is so thick that S. intends Ph. to notice it. S. implies that the sophistic authors say nothing about the soul in their written *technai* because they know nothing about it. **c2–4**

πρὶν ἂν οὖν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον . . . τέχνηι γράφειν "until they speak and write [their *technai* on speeches] in this way, let us not be persuaded by them that they write [their *technai* on speeches] in accord with *technē*." "This way" refers to οὕτως (271b5), the nexus of persuasive speeches and persuaded souls that S. requires for rhetorical *technē* (271b1–4). Since Ph. asks for clarification (c5), that gives S. the opportunity to expand on what he means. **c6–7** Αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ ῥήματα . . . λέγειν ἐθέλω "to give the actual words [of a proper *technē* on speeches] is not easy, but I wish to say how one must write [a proper *technē* on speeches] if one is going to be expert in the *technē* to the extent possible." καθ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται anticipates the enormity of the task (273e3–274a3).

271c9–272b4 S. presents an outline of what psychological training for rhetorical art would consist in. This training and no other would enable a person to become skilled at *psychagōgia*. S. indicates the topics that must be covered while skipping detailed treatment (271c6). The training, which includes both theory and practice, goes beyond the inculcation of rules to enable the student to react flexibly and with his own judgment in response to the demands of particular auditors and situations in the real world (272a2–6). The training enables the student to recognize what type of soul any particular human being possesses, and on that basis to create a speech that will persuade that person in a face-to-face encounter to hold a particular view (271e3–272a2). S.'s treatment of Ph. throughout the dialogue exemplifies the skill outlined here (Introd. 2).

271c9 ψυχαγωγία: as a preface, as it were, to the account of what a proper training in rhetoric consists in, this key term (261a7n.) reminds us what rhetoric is supposed to accomplish.

271d1 ψυχή: one would expect ψυχήν, but here the subject of the following subordinate clause precedes the subordinating conjunction while retaining the case it would have as the subject of the subordinate clause; cf. *Lach.* 199e εὑρήκαμεν ἀνδρεία ὅτι ἔστιν. The effect gives prominence to the main idea of the sentence (*AGPS* 61.6.1). **d2** τόσα καὶ τόσα: the number of types of soul, anticipated in the palinode (248d2–e3, 252c4–253c2), may be large and here is left indefinite, but it is a finite number. **d2–3** ὅθεν οἱ μὲν τοιοίδε, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε γίγνονται "which is why some people are of such-and-such a kind and others are of such-and-such a kind." The nature of the soul determines the character of the person. **d3** τούτων δὲ δὴ οὕτω διηιρημένων "the forms of soul [= τούτων] having been distinguished in this way." The verb suggests that the distinctions are achieved through dialectic (270b3–4n.). **d4** τοιόνδε ἕκαστον "each [form of speech] being of such-and-such a kind"; in apposition to τόσα καὶ τόσα . . . εἴδη. **d5** διὰ τήνδε τὴν αἰτίαν "for such-and-such a reason"; on the demonstrative pronoun (and τάδε in the next clause) used like τοιοίδε, cf. Chadwick 1996: 208–9. On the importance of the student's knowing why particular people are persuaded by particular speeches, cf. 271b2n. ἐς

τὰ τοιάδε εὐπειθεῖς "easy to persuade into [holding] positions of such-and-such a kind." **d6–e3** δεῖ δὴ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς . . . ὧν τότε ἤκουε λόγων συνών "it is necessary that he [i.e. the student, τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι (271c9–d1)] understand these things sufficiently, and then, observing them as they are in action and as they take place, that he be able to attend to his perception [of them] keenly, or else [it is necessary] that he derive no advantage as yet from the statements which he heard then when he was with [his teacher]." This passage describes the student's transition from theory to practice. His theoretical training is conveyed to him by a teacher face to face (συνών, e3), not by books. The "statements" (λόγων, e2) which the student heard from his teacher are the lessons on persuasive speeches and persuaded souls (d1–6; i.e. "these things," ταῦτα, d6). The idiom οὐδὲν πλέον αὐτῶι ἐστι, "it does him no good" (cf. *Smp.* 222d, *Rep.* 1.341a; *AGPS* 48.3.7), is used here with a genitive, as Isoc. 15.28 ὧν οὐδέν μοι πλέον γέγονε, "none of those things has done me any good."

271e3–272b2 ὅταν δὲ εἰπεῖν τε ἱκανῶς ἔχηι . . . ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ "when he [i.e. the student] is sufficiently able to say what kind of person is persuaded by what kind of speeches and he is able to recognize a nearby person and demonstrate to himself that it is that person and that nature, which he was taught about then [i.e. by his teacher], now actually before him [i.e. the student], to which [i.e. nature] it is necessary to apply these speeches in this way in order to bring about persuasion of these things, then at that point (δ' ἤδη), when he [i.e. the student] has all these things and in addition has grasped the right times for when one should speak and when one should hold back and also for concise expression, pathetic expression, vehemence, and all the kinds of speeches he would learn, when he knows the right and wrong times for these things, the art has been attained [by him] well and completely but not before; but if a person falls short in any of these things in speaking, teaching, or writing and yet claims that he speaks in accord with art, whoever disbelieves [him] prevails [over him]." δέ (272a3) signals the start of the main clause (*GP* 183). The dative participles ἔχοντι (272a3), προσλαβόντι (272a3), διαγνόντι (272a5–6), referring to the student, supply the agent with the perfect passive main verb ἐστὶν . . . ἀπειργασμένη (272a6). **e3–272a1** παραγιγνόμενόν τε δυνατὸς ἦι . . . νῦν ἔργωι παροῦσά οἱ: the persuasive situation in which the student is trained to operate is revealed as a face-to-face encounter (διαισθανόμενος, παροῦσά οἱ) with a single person (παραγιγνόμενον, οὗτος). Yet the person is treated not as a unique individual but as the embodiment of a type, or "nature" (φύσις), for that is how persuasion is realized. Used with the reflexive pronoun, ἐνδείκνυσθαι lacks the negative connotations that were present with the same verb at 271b6. On the participle παραγιγνόμενον used substantively without the article, "a nearby person," see 249b6–c1n.

272a3–4 καιροὺς τοῦ πότε λεκτέον καὶ ἐπισχετέον: the neuter article turns the following interrogative clause (*sc.* ἐστί) into a substantive dependent on καιρούς

(*AGPS* 50.6.10); cf. 273c1 τῶι "πῶς δ' ἂν ἐγὼ τοιόσδε τοιῶιδε ἐπεχείρησα;" Knowing when to speak and when not to, which like the other features of discourse is determined by the nature of the recipient of the discourse in regard to the objective of the discourse, is later shown also to distinguish oral dialectical discourse from written discourse (275d3–e5). S. provided an example of strategic silence when he ended his first speech halfway through (237a7–241d1n.). Likewise, S.'s refusal to address Athenian democratic assemblies, except when it was unavoidable, is not indifference to politics but a strategic rhetorical decision (*Ap.* 31c–32a, *Grg.* 521c–522e). Plato's notion of καιρός, which is the opportune use of rhetoric and rhetoric's technical devices in particular (next note), has a background in the notion of timeliness in both early Greek moral thinking and Hippocratic medical treatment (Trédé 1992: 81–188). The sophistic background is meager (Noël 1998). Isocrates stressed the problem of choice in composition as a matter of καιρός (4.9, 10.11, 13.16; Trédé 1992: 260–82), but he offered no basis for how the choices that are determined by καιρός are to be made; the same is true for Alcidamas (*Soph.* 22–3). For Plato that task is accomplished with reference to *psychagōgia*. **a4–5 βραχυλογίας τε αὖ . . . ὅσα ἂν εἴδη μάθηι λόγων:** both the types of speeches that are named here and the others that the student would learn (from his rhetoric teacher) are technical devices that produce given responses in auditors; thus they belong to the same category as those which earned S.'s irony when he reviewed the sophists' written *technai* (266d7–267d4). The sophists taught them, wrongly, as constituting the art of rhetoric itself when they are actually preliminary to the art (269a5–c4). These verbal techniques find their proper place within the art when their use, like that of all stylistic elements (271b2–4n.), is determined by the occasion, the recipient, and the speaker's persuasive goal; hence τούτων τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν διαγνόντι (a5–6). **a6–b2 καλῶς τε καὶ τελέως . . . ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ:** S. insists that only mastery of the complete set of artistic practices attains the status of art because he portrays the difference between his rhetoric and that of the sophists in terms of what constitutes a complete account of the art (269b5–c4, 273a1–2). The sophists leave out what is most essential as well as most difficult, viz. *psychagōgia* and the artistic utilization of all resources (dialectical, psychological, linguistic) specifically to that end. Only the art in its complete form accomplishes *psychagōgia*. ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος recalls μὴ πειθώμεθα (271c3). The metaphor in κρατεῖ evokes the competitiveness between the sophistic and philosophical claimants to the art of discourse (260d4–8).

272b1 λέγων ἢ διδάσκων ἢ γράφων: the differences between speaking and writing will be made clear in due course, but both forms of discourse are capable of being used artistically, as S. anticipated at the beginning of the inquiry (258d7–10, 259e2–3) and reiterates at the end (278c1–d6). Teaching the art is distinct from using the art in speech or writing, but the ability to teach the art belongs to any expert practitioner. **b3 ὁ συγγραφεύς:** the hypothetical writer of the

exemplary rhetorical treatise that S. has been describing (271c6–7). **b3–4 δοκεῖ οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀποδεκτέον λεγομένης λόγων τέχνης;** *sc.* εἶναι with ἀποδεκτέον: "does it seem [to you] that one must accept [it] if the art of discourse is described in this way or in some other way?" The locution οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως goes back to 271b5–6. **b5–6 οὐ σμικρόν γε φαίνεται ἔργον:** responding to the sophists' misconception about rhetoric's psychagogic task – οὐδὲν ἔργον ὄν (269c3) – Ph. makes an obvious but crucial point about the size of the task and moves the inquiry to the next stage.

272b7–274b6 To eliminate any doubt that rhetorical art could possibly be acquired in a shorter, easier way, S. recapitulates his argument against sophistic rhetoric, focusing this time on the probability arguments based on audience expectations and ascribed to Tisias (272d2–273e3). The enormous effort that is necessary to learn the art of psychagogic rhetoric prompts from S. a comment on the proper use of rhetoric (273e3–274a3), which completes both the account of rhetorical art and the first, general, part of the inquiry into good and bad discourse.

272b7–c3 τούτου τοι ἕνεκα χρὴ . . . ἐξὸν ὀλίγην τε καὶ λείαν: to search for a shorter, easier route to the true λόγων τέχνη (= αὐτήν, c2) is reasonable, but highly doubtful from the start (cf. 260a5–6n.): not only was S. painstaking in laying out the full extent of the art, but here S. alludes to Hesiod's allegory of the short, easy path to vice (λείη μὲν ὁδός) and the long, difficult path to virtue (μακρὸς δὲ . . . οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν καὶ τρηχύς) (*Op.* 287–92, quoted at *Rep.* 2.364d). Thus ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταστρέφοντα ("twisting [the arguments] upside down") is ironic, suggesting the exercise will be vain (Heitsch 1991).

272c2 πολλὴν ἀπίῃ καὶ τραχεῖαν: cognate accusative with the verb of motion: "go off on a long and rough [road]." The subject τις is supplied from μεταστρέφοντα ἐπισκοπεῖν (c1). **c5 ἔχοιμ' ἄν:** *sc.* λέγειν. **c6 τῶν περὶ ταῦτά τινων** "from some of the people concerned with these things," i.e. with rhetorical training. **c9 τὸ τοῦ λύκου εἰπεῖν:** i.e. to play devil's advocate, apparently from a fable attributed to Aesop (Plut. *Conv. sept. sap.* 156a): "A wolf saw shepherds eating a sheep in their tent. Approaching nearby, he said: 'how great would be your outcry if I were doing that!'"

272d2–3 οὐδὲν οὕτω ταῦτα δεῖν σεμνύνειν οὐδ' ἀνάγειν ἄνω μακρὰν περιβαλλομένους "there is no need to make these matters into such a big deal or to take a long roundabout route and exalt them heavenwards." S. can be said (by sophistic opponents) to take a long roundabout route and to exalt rhetorical training heavenwards by requiring dialectic and psychology, to which the sophistic opponents allude in the following sentence (d4–6). The tone is caustic, as 260d3–8. For the meaning of περιβαλλομένους (middle intransitive), cf. Hdt. 6.44.2 τὸν Ἄθων περιέβαλλον, Th. 8.95.1 περιβαλοῦσαι Σούνιον (active transitive) of ships sailing round a point, *Smp.* 222c κύκλωι περιβαλλόμενος (middle intransitive) of

Alcibiades speaking in a roundabout way. **d3–4 ὃ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου:** referring to 259e7–260a4, 260d3–8. **d4–6 ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν . . . ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι** "that it is in no way necessary for the intending rhetorical expert to partake of truth in regard to just or good actions or even [in regard to] men, whether they are such [i.e. just or good] by nature or nurture." Grammatically one would expect δεῖν (following φασί, d2), but S. turns this clause into a subordinate clause following εἴπομεν, a minor anacoluthon that mimics natural speech (Dodds 1959: 203 ad *Grg.* 453a for examples). Knowing the truth about just or good actions is consistent with S.'s requirement that the trained speaker possess dialectically acquired knowledge of the subject matter of his speeches. Whether men are just or good is the question decided by courts (ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, d6–7), but φύσει ὄντων ἢ τροφῆι is a complex addition. In itself φύσει alludes to S.'s rhetorical psychology based on the nature (φύσις) of the soul (272a1), whereby people are of a certain kind because their souls are of a certain kind (271d2–3). However, the further addition ἢ τροφῆι creates a pair of terms that alludes to the antithesis of νόμος and φύσις in sophistic accounts of human nature; cf. Kerferd 1981: 111–30 on the sophistic antithesis.

272e1 τὸ εἰκός: having already referred to "the probable" disparagingly in relation to sophistic theory (229e2, 267a6), S. now launches a full critique of the sophistic theory of persuasion based on τὸ εἰκός. On probability arguments in early rhetorical theory and practice, cf. Kraus 2006b. **e1–4 οὐδὲ γὰρ αὖ τὰ πραχθέντα . . . χαίρειν τῶι ἀληθεῖ** "for [they say] that in addition (αὖ), sometimes, if events are not probable, one must say not at all what happened but what is probable, in accusation and defense, and that in every circumstance in which one speaks it is necessary to pursue, of course, the probable after one has bid a fond farewell to the truth." λέγοντα (e4) agrees with the tacit accusative subject of λέγειν (e2) and is retained in the accusative (instead of the dative) as the subject of the impersonal verbal adjective διωκτέον (*AGPS* 56.18.3). In the phrase πολλὰ εἰπόντα χαίρειν, the infinitive is imperatival, lit. "[after] one has said 'farewell' very much" (*AGPS* 55.3.13). δή, in a prominent position, indicates S.'s skeptical view of τὸ εἰκός (*GP* 229, 233).

273a1 τὴν ἅπασαν τέχνην: if creating εἰκός arguments constitutes the whole art of rhetoric, then the art is attained much more easily and quickly than S.'s account of it would imply (272b7–c3). On S.'s focus on the entirety of the art, cf. 272a6–b2n. **a4–5 ἐν τῶι πρόσθεν . . . ἐφηψάμεθα:** referring to 267a5–6. **a5 πάμμεγα:** earlier the personified sophistic art of discourse made its "boast" (μέγα λέγω) with regard to essentially the same point, viz. its ability to secure persuasion on the basis of the audience's beliefs (260d7–8). **a6 τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα:** viz. οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τεχνικοὶ προσποιούμενοι εἶναι (a3–4). **a7 τόν γε Τεισίαν αὐτὸν πεπάτηκας ἀκριβῶς** "you have carefully explored at least Tisias himself," i.e. among the sophists who have written about the probable as the means of persuasion. S. is referring to Ph.'s acquaintance

with Tisias' book on rhetoric (ἔγραψεν, 273b4), which S. included in his survey of sophistic rhetoric books (267a5n.). πατεῖν is used in the same sense at Ar. *Av.* 471, οὐδ' Αἴσωπον πεπάτηκας.

273b1–2 μή τι ἄλλο λέγει τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ τῶι πλήθει δοκοῦν "whether he says the probable is something other than what the masses think"; *AGPS* 54.8.12 on conjunctive μή introducing the indicative. This definition of εἰκός is similar to an expanded definition in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (1428a25–34) and is simpler than but similar to Aristotle's understanding of the term, which refers to the beliefs of the masses only indirectly (*Rh.* 1.1357a34–b1; Kraus 2006b: 146–7). Defining the probable in relation to the beliefs of the masses is precisely what makes the probable useful in sophistic rhetoric, which aims at mastery in the mass institutions of the polis (259e7–260a3n.). **b4 Τοῦτο δή, ὡς ἔοικε, σοφὸν εὑρὼν ἅμα καὶ τεχνικόν:** δή and ὡς ἔοικε indicate that σοφόν ("clever") and τεχνικόν ("artistic") are meant ironically, as 258a7 σοφίαν, 269a6 παγκάλων τεχνημάτων. This δή picks up τὸ δὴ εἰκός (272e4) and is repeated by S. (273b6, c2, 3, 7), indicating his view. **b5 ἐάν τις ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀνδρικὸς ἰσχυρὸν καὶ δειλὸν συγκόψας:** Aristotle uses this example to illustrate εἰκός arguments and attributes it to Corax (267a5n., *Rh.* 2.1402a17–20). **b6–7 δεῖ δὴ τἀληθὲς μηδέτερον λέγειν:** although the ostensible setting for these rhetorical arguments is a lawcourt, there is an element of epideictic display in the manner in which the speakers avoid the truth unless it is also probable and devise clever arguments in its place. The court's interest in knowing the truth in order to execute its judicial task is blithely ignored (cf. *Ap.* 17a–18a, *Laws* 11.937d–938c, Arist. *Rh.* 1.1354a11–31). Antiphon's *Tetralogies* use a judicial setting to make an epideictic display of rhetorical arguments. δή marks the apodosis as well as showing S.'s irony (273b4n.). **b8–c1 ἐκείνωι . . . τῶι "πῶς δ' ἂν ἐγὼ τοιόσδε τοιῶιδε ἐπεχείρησα;"** "that well-known [argument] 'how could someone like me [i.e. ἀσθενής] have laid hands on someone like him [i.e. ἰσχυρός]?'"

273c2–3 τάχ' ἂν ἔλεγχόν πηι παραδοίη τῶι ἀντιδίκωι: it is characteristic of probability arguments that each point made by one speaker generates a response by the other speaker, and so on, as seen in Antiphon's *First tetralogy*. **c4 τὰ τέχνηι λεγόμενα:** clearly ironic. **c6 Φεῦ:** the outburst shows that maintaining the respectful stance towards Tisias' art, with irony, is a burden, which S. now happily sheds. **δεινῶς . . . ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην:** the adverb goes with the participle. The art is so cleverly hidden that it seems to be no art at all. **c7–d1 ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δή ποτ' ὢν τυγχάνει καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος:** S. cleverly displays his lack of concern for precise knowledge of the lineage of mistaken sophistic doctrines, a matter that is insufficiently important to warrant his attention; cf. 229c5–230a7 for a similar impulse. The first part of this utterance – ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δή ποτ' ὢν τυγχάνει – reveals a measure of condescension, but also recalls the customary locution in prayers that piously identifies the god in an open-ended way, as e.g. Ζεύς, ὅστις πότ' ἐστιν (Aesch. *Ag.* 160); cf. Norden 1913:

144–6, Pulleyn 1997: 96–115 on this locution. S. then refers to the further custom in prayers of mentioning a place that is associated with the deity who is being invoked, as e.g. Apollo ὃς Χρύσην ἀμφιβέβηκας (*Il.* 1.37), Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί (279b8). At *Cra.* 400e S. recalls both these aspects of prayer-diction: "our custom in uttering prayers, [to say] whoever and from wherever they are pleased to be called (οἵτινές τε καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρουσιν ὀνομαζόμενοι)." Thus S. mockingly compares the author of the probability doctrine, whoever he may be and from wherever he is pleased to be called, to a god; cf. *Euthd.* 288a–b for another mocking instance of this locution. Hermias (251.8–9), followed by some modern scholars, sees an allusion to Corax, Tisias' supposed student, teacher, or associate (267a5n.), as if S. were signaling uncertainty about authorship. The failure to perceive S.'s irony leads to misunderstanding, since the irony indicates studied indifference to such questions.

273d3 πρὶν καὶ σὲ παρελθεῖν "before you even arrived [i.e. in the conversation]." **d4–6 ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο τὸ εἰκὸς . . . ἐπίσταται εὑρίσκειν:** S. recapitulates his argument at 261e6–262c3 but alters it slightly in order to answer Tisias' probability doctrine. As originally delivered, S.'s argument demonstrated that knowledge of likenesses (ὁμοιότητες) is required for artistic persuasion, but the argument did not consider εἰκός in particular. Here S. adds that the manner in which εἰκός arguments affect mass audiences (τοῦτο τὸ εἰκὸς τοῖς πολλοῖς . . . τυγχάνει ἐγγιγνόμενον) is also a matter of the expert's use of likenesses (δι' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς). The addition is justified: the argument on likenesses was S.'s response to Ph.'s contention that the masses are persuaded by speakers who manipulate their beliefs (259e7–260a4), and εἰκός arguments are simply attempts to anticipate what mass audiences believe (273b1–2). **d7 εἰ μὲν ἄλλο τι . . . λέγεις** "if you have anything else to say"; cf. *AGPS* 53.1.7 on the present tense expressing continuing action. **d8–e2 ἐὰν μή τις τῶν τε . . . ἕκαστον περιλαμβάνειν:** S. recapitulates the two key elements of his new rhetorical art: psychology (271a4–272b4) and dialectic, which is composed of division and collection (265c8–266c1). διαριθμήσηται recalls διαταξάμενος (271b1). εἴδη and ἰδέαι are used in their technical senses (265d4–266b2n.). μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ . . . καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον περιλαμβάνειν = "to comprehend each thing one at a time under one [general] form."

273e3 καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ: this qualification (repeated below, 273e6 εἰς δύναμιν) recalls S.'s characterization in the palinode of the human attempt to imitate divine virtue (253a4) and thus suggests the enormity of the task, which S. now considers.

273e3–274a5 This statement on the proper use of rhetoric forms a climax at the close of the inquiry into rhetorical art that began at 261a7. S. has avoided explicit treatment of the question of the proper use of rhetoric although it has been simmering just below the surface through the entire dialogue. This question was

clearly implied in the intervention of S.'s divine sign and his decision to deliver the palinode (242c7–d1n.), which provided the imagined auditor and Ph. with the counsel that actually serves their interests. The question was also implied in S.'s critique of self-serving democratic politicians (257e1–258d10), in the analogy with medicine (270b3–7), in S.'s horse-and-ass critique of sophistic rhetoric (260b1–d2), and in his initial comment upon hearing from Ph. what Lysias' composition was about (227c8–d2). S. also alluded to the argument on the harmful consequences of sophistic rhetoric that was presented in the *Gorgias* (260c7–d1n., d4–8n., e4n.). To say how rhetoric should be used, S. avoids an argument based on the auditor's best interests (as undertaken in the *Gorgias*), which is extraneous to the current investigation into what makes discourse persuasive (260d3–261a5; Yunis 2005: 103–9). In view of the full extent of true rhetorical art, which S. painstakingly emphasized (272a6–b2n.) and has just finished defending, the sheer difficulty of attaining it means that only the pursuit of a high and noble purpose could justify the effort. The orientation towards the divine that S. periodically discloses (e.g. 229e5–230a1, 242c5–d1, 279b8–c3) and made into the focus of the palinode is here put forward in a self-effacing manner as the only conceivable basis for undertaking so huge a task.

273e4 πραγματείας "trouble," "effort." **e5** διαπονεῖσθαι "to struggle with," "to work at." τὸν σώφρονα: the moderate person is for S. the proper measure of human ambition; cf. 279c1–3. **e5–6** τοῦ θεοῖς κεχαρισμένα . . . εἰς δύναμιν: *sc.* ἕνεκα with τοῦ δύνασθαι. θεοῖς also goes with κεχαρισμένως. The ability to speak and act among men (e4–5) was a traditional standard of achievement in the Greek (male) world; cf. *Prt.* 319a (Protagoras teaches one to be) δυνατώτατος . . . καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν, Thuc. 1.139.4 (of Pericles) λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος, Hom. *Il.* 9.443. Plato adapts the traditional view: pleasing the gods in these activities is turned into the proper measure of success, and pleasing the gods in one's discourse (κεχαρισμένα μὲν λέγειν) is but one aspect of the need to please the gods in one's behavior generally (κεχαρισμένως δὲ πράττειν τὸ πᾶν εἰς δύναμιν).

274a1–3 οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄρα, ὦ Τεισία . . . ἀγαθοῖς τε καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν: "fellow slaves" (ὁμοδούλοις) are fellow human beings; "masters who are good and from good stock" (δεσπόταις . . . ἐξ ἀγαθῶν) are the gods. Gods were commonly addressed as "master" (δεσπότης, δέσποινα) in prayers, but only Plato views the gods as invariably good and our unavoidable dependency on the divine (hence we are the gods' "slaves") as beneficial; cf. 246e1n., *Phd.* 62b "this seems to me [S.] to be true, that the gods are in charge of us and we human beings are one of their possessions." The expression "good and from good stock" means absolutely good; cf. 246a7, 249e1–2, *Grg.* 512d βελτίων καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων. To refer this advice to "those wiser than us" is a device for S. to ascribe his own moral stance to a higher authority, not a reference to any particular individuals or divinities, though the advice is consistent with the Delphic maxim γνῶθι σαυτόν (229e5n.). **a2**

ὅτι μὴ πάρεργον "except as a secondary consideration." Pleasing fellow human beings is indeed permitted so long as one pleases the gods; the palinode is a prime example (257a2–4). By contrast Tisian, sophistic rhetoric aims at pleasing human beings first and only. Lysias' speech too aims solely at pleasing his audience (227c8–d2n.). **a3** εἰ μακρὰ ἡ περίοδος: i.e. the circuitous path to attain the art; cf. 272d3 μακρὰν περιβαλλομένους. **a4** μεγάλων γὰρ ἕνεκα περιιτέον, οὐχ ὡς σὺ δοκεῖς "for the sake of great things [i.e. pleasing the gods (273e3–274a3)] it is necessary to take the [long] circuitous path [i.e. the path to psychagogic rhetoric that requires psychology and dialectic (273d6–e3)], not as you think [i.e. not by a shorter, easier route (272c1–2), which leads only to an empirical imitation of rhetorical art that lacks the ability to move human souls and succeeds only in pleasing them]." **a4–5** ἔσται μήν, ὡς ὁ λόγος . . . ἐξ ἐκείνων γιγνόμενα "nevertheless (μήν), as the account says, if one is willing [to undertake the long circuitous path to psychagogic rhetoric], these things too (ταῦτα) [i.e. pleasing human beings] will turn out to be most admirable as a result of those things (ἐκείνων) [i.e. pleasing the gods]." This sentence expands the idea expressed in the qualification ὅτι μὴ πάρεργον (274a2n.). **a6–7** εἴπερ οἷός τέ τις εἴη: given the enormity of the rhetorical training, Ph. wonders whether it is humanly possible. With S.'s encouragement Ph. does not pursue the question (274b1–3), which falls outside the inquiry.

274b2 τῳ: this indefinite person is the same as that implied in ἐπιχειροῦντι (b1). **b4–5** Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων πέρι ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω: S. closes the inquiry into what constitutes good and bad discourse in general, i.e. the inquiry that is concerned with the art of rhetoric "as a whole" (261a7), and that applies to discourse in all forms (258d4–10, 259e2–3, 261a7–e4).

274b7–278e3: UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS WRITTEN DISCOURSE IS APPROPRIATE OR INAPPROPRIATE

The inquiry just completed concerned the content and style of good discourse without regard for whether the discourse is produced and received in writing or speech. S. turns now to the question of writing because Ph.'s rejection of sophistic rhetoric and progress towards philosophy require an examination of this question. Ph.'s embrace of Lysianic rhetoric was simultaneously an embrace of written texts, evident not only in the use to which Ph. intended to put the papyrus in his possession (228a5–e4) but also in his interest in the technical treatises of sophists, physicians, and others (266d5–6, 270c3–4, 273a3–7). Ph.'s enthusiasm for written texts, which is typical of sophistic culture (228d7–e1n., 257d4–6n., 266d5–267d9n.), is as unreflective as the popular aversion to written texts which the politician aimed to exploit in his muddled reproach of Lysias (257c3–258d10). Both the enthusiasm and the aversion occurred at a time when writing was rapidly expanding into new domains for new purposes and the

consequences were just beginning to be considered (Yunis 2003; Eucken 1983: 121–40 on Alcidamas and Isocrates). Plato had a personal stake: on the one hand, his massive literary achievement indicates the intensity of his engagement with the new medium of artistic prose aimed at a reading public; on the other hand, the model philosopher at the center of his literary work relies strictly on oral, face-to-face communication for the advancement of his philosophical activity. In S.'s argument on writing Plato preserves both his philosophical priorities and his artistic tendencies.

S. makes no attempt to consider writing and orality comprehensively but focuses specifically on the transmission of knowledge or wisdom. In S.'s Egyptian story (274c5–275b2) Theuth, writing's inventor, connects writing not only with memory, which was a traditional view based on writing's fixity and durability, but also with wisdom. Thamus, speaking from superior understanding and possessing the final word, claims that writing hinders both memory and wisdom: memory is a purely internal process, so writing, an external entity, can do no more than remind one who already has knowledge; and in the absence of face-to-face oral teaching writing that aims to instruct promotes merely the appearance of wisdom, which is a dangerous outcome. S. adds that writing is useless "when one wants to learn" (βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, 275d6–7) because it does not respond to questions that arise in the mind of the reader, does not distinguish between whom it should and should not address (i.e. for the sake of instructing effectively), and does not explain or defend itself when, as is inevitable, it is criticized, attacked, or misunderstood (275c5–e5). Writing's inertness is an obstacle to the transmission of knowledge.

For S. knowledge or wisdom entails not the accumulation of information, which as far as S.'s argument goes may be appropriately stored in written form (*Ti.* 23a), but the ability on the part of an individual to give a clear and stable account of the nature of the things learned (275c6n., 277d6–7n.). An individual acquires that ability by developing it, i.e. by producing accounts, by having the accounts critiqued by an expert, and by refining the accounts until they become clear and stable. At each stage the expert responds to the specific qualities of the student's accounts that require improvement or refashioning, and the student produces new accounts that respond to the expert's criticisms. Instruction that issues in the student's ability to produce a clear and stable account is properly carried out by the art of dialectic (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη, cf. 276e5), which here refers not merely to the procedures of dialectical reasoning (265d4–266b2n.) but also to the exchanges between knowledgeable, responsive teacher and receptive, inquisitive pupil (276a1–8, 276e4–277a4). This is an idealized account of dialectic, viewed with regard to its τέλος. S. exalts dialectic, using metaphors of growth, reproduction, and immortality to describe the manner in which it is a potentially unending process that produces more and more knowledge-oriented discourse on the part of more and more experts and more and more students (276e5–277a3, 278a5–b2). To the extent that written discourse is interjected into

the aspects of instruction and learning that depend on face-to-face dialectical interaction, written discourse is harmful to this essential human activity and therefore inappropriate. Hence the *Phaedrus* does not constitute and does not contain a (written) *technē* of rhetoric. Hence also to treat writing as scripture (as the Neoplatonists did with Plato's writings) is destructive to the philosophical enterprise. See Wieland 1982, Gill 1992 on dialectic in this passage and dialectic's suitability for transmitting knowledge.

Whereas dialectic, as the medium for transmitting knowledge, is "serious business" (σπουδή), written discourse is "play" (παιδιά) (276b1–277a4, 277e5–278b3), which does not mean that written discourse is restricted in regard to its subject matter. Playful written discourse may be concerned with any topic, including such topics as the nature of the soul or the pursuit of wisdom that warrant serious treatment in the appropriate (dialectical) circumstances (246a4–5n., 278d8–9n.). Indeed, in the case of philosophical authorship, the author is able to treat the same topics in both dialectic and written discourse but he does so in each case in a manner that is appropriate to the ends that each kind of discourse can attain (278b5–e1). The playful status of written discourse means discarding the (impossible) burden of transmitting knowledge to readers via the written word and seeking instead objectives that are achievable within this medium, such as informing, influencing, and amusing. If the author fails to attain such objectives, it may not be pretty but no harm has been done. Not only is writing unsuitable for the transmission of knowledge because it is inherently non-dialectical, but rhetoric is also unsuitable for the transmission of knowledge because even though it may be oral and aimed at a specific audience it too is non-dialectical (277e6–278a1n.). Hence S.'s description of the palinode as play (265c8–d2n.), which does not disparage the palinode but indicates its proper function as a rhetorical composition that, like written discourse, aims to intrigue and influence Ph. (257a2–b6) without instructing him in the manner of dialectic.

In a series of self-deprecating self-allusions Plato makes evident that he views his own written discourse as play (276c3–e3 with notes, 278b5n.). Since he never speaks from the written page in his own voice, his basic stance as author and his characteristic means of playing in his written discourse are irony. Plato's irony is his ability to communicate with his readers in a manner that is distinct from but entirely dependent on what his characters say to each other. Since irony is never more than suggestive no matter how conspicuous or important it may be, Plato's meaning is never clear and stable (as dialectic aspires to be) and is always subject to interpretation. The whole enterprise depends on writer and reader sharing the conviction that the represented conversation is an artistic fiction – a game – managed by Plato for the reader (cf. *Plt.* 288c). For instance, writing about the seriousness of dialectic, he plays by using metaphors from writing to suggest the permanence of dialectic and the impermanence of written discourse (276a4, c6–8). The reader is informed and amused, but the reader cannot thereby be said to have acquired knowledge on the subject of dialectic.

When Ph. remarks the difference between "utterly beautiful" play and play that is "trivial" (παγκάλην ... παρὰ φαύλην παιδιάν, 276e1), it is clear to which kind of play Plato aspires and to which kind he would assign sophistic rivals. Like the gardens of Adonis to which S. compares playful written discourse (276b1–4n., 276d1), like the cicadas' chirping song, and in accord with S.'s principle of pleasing god in discourse as well as action (274b10–11), Plato's play is oriented towards the gods. His play aims at the sublime pleasures of the cicadas and the philosophical Muses rather than the appetitive pleasures of the symposium (276d1–7; cf. 227b6–7n., 259b5–d5, *Prt.* 347c–348a). Plato's παιδιά is placed at the service of the reader and is generous in contrast with the self-aggrandizing urbane games (παίγνια) of paradoxical epideictic artists such as Gorgias and Lysias (227c8–d2, 230e6–234c5n.).

274b7–8 Τὸ δ' εὐπρεπείας δὴ ... ὅπῃ ἀπρεπῶς, λοιπόν: with γιγνόμενον *sc.* τὸ γράφειν: "there remains the [question] concerning the propriety and impropriety of writing, how when [writing] takes place it is admirable and how it is improper." τὸ δέ not only responds to τὸ μέν (274b4) but also recalls the hanging μέν of τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη (261a7 with note), moving the inquiry from rhetoric as a whole to written discourse in particular. **b10–11** Οἶσθ' οὖν ὅπῃ μάλιστα θεῷ χαριεῖ λόγων πέρι πράττων ἢ λέγων; "then do you know how you will most please god in regard to discourse whether acting or speaking?" S. puts into practice his recommendation of a moment ago (273e4–274a3); πράττων ἢ λέγων in particular recalls the pair λέγειν/πράττειν to cover the basic modes of human behavior (273e5–6n.). πράττων ἢ λέγων is not redundant after λόγων πέρι: beyond uttering (λέγων) discourse, there is a myriad of senses in which one acts (πράττων) appropriately or inappropriately in regard to discourse, e.g. in listening, responding, obeying, rejecting, etc.

274c1 Ἀκοήν ... τῶν προτέρων, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν: these unspecified earlier people (τῶν προτέρων) had privileged access to the truth, like "those wiser than us" (274a1), like the primeval race of men who turned into cicadas (259b5–6), like the "ancient and wise" men and women who wrote on *erōs* (235b5–7), and like the ancients who knew Greek before it was corrupted by modern usage (244b6–d5). **c2–3** εἰ δὲ τοῦτο εὕροιμεν ... τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δοξασμάτων; S. justifies his telling of the story by implying that he and Ph. need it in order to discover the truth (τοῦτο), i.e. about the propriety of writing. The justification is ironic: not only does S. advance his own argument about the propriety of writing after he tells the story, but the story is patently his invention, as Ph. first suspects (ἅ φῄς ἀκηκοέναι, 274c4), then recognizes (275b3–4).

274c5–275b2 Plato combines two traditional literary motifs to create a story in which he pursues a question that is particularly his own. The first motif concerns inventors of *technai* who are praised for benefiting mankind (πρῶτον ... εὑρεῖν, 274c7–d1; cf. Kleingünther 1933 on πρῶτος εὑρετής), though Plato offers criticism

instead of praise. In most prior accounts Palamedes is the inventor of letters as well as numbers and the numerical sciences and games that S. ascribes to Theuth (274c7–d2); cf. Stesichorus *PMGF* 213, Soph. *TrGF* 479 (*Palamedes*), Eur. *TrGF* 578 (*Palamedes*), Gorg. *Pal.* 30, Alcid. *Odysseus* 22, Pl. *Rep.* 7.522d. Prometheus is the inventor of letters and numbers in [Aesch.] *PV* 459–61. The second motif is Egypt as the setting for wonders, extremes, and great antiquity; cf. Hom. *Il.* 9.381–4, *Od.* 4.227–32, Hdt. book 2, Eur. *Helen*, Isoc. 11 (*Busiris*, responding to Polycrates' *Busiris*), Pl. *Ti.* 21c–23c; Livingstone 2001: 73–85, Vasunia 2001. Plato's story addresses in exotic fashion the question that S. pursues with Ph.: what is writing good for?

274c5 τοίνυν: launching the narrative (253d4n.). **Ναύκρατιν:** the Greek emporium in the western Nile delta (Hdt. 2.178–9; Braun 1982). Egyptian Thoth (Θώθ), as he was generally called by the Greeks, had cult centers in the delta (Wilkinson 2003: 217). **c7 Θεύθ:** indeclinable, here accusative. Thoth was the god of writing, a crucial role in Egyptian culture, and was often represented in the form of his sacred bird (Wilkinson 2003: 215–17). Plato betrays no knowledge of the identification of Thoth and Hermes, which, though it possibly predates Plato (Hdt. 2.138.4), became widespread only from the late fourth century (Festugière 1950: 1.69–70). **c7–d2 πρῶτον ἀριθμόν . . . καὶ δὴ καὶ γράμματα:** on πρῶτον εὑρεῖν and these *technai*, see 274c5–275b2n. καὶ δὴ καὶ picks out γράμματα for special attention. S. ascribes the invention of γραμματικὴ τέχνη to Theuth at *Phlb.* 18b–d.

274d2–4 βασιλέως δ' αὖ τότε ὄντος . . . καὶ τὸν Θαμοῦν Ἄμμωνα: the relative clause contains an anacoluthon: "now at that time Thamus was king of all Egypt in the upper region's great city which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes and [they call] Thamus Ammon." Thamus, or Ammon, was Egyptian Amun, the chief god of the Egyptian pantheon and originally from Thebes in upper Egypt (Wilkinson 2003: 92–7). The Greeks identified Ammon with Zeus (Hdt. 2.42.5). **d6–7 διεξιόντος:** *sc.* τοῦ Θεύθ. **d7 ὅ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς δοκοῖ λέγειν:** *sc.* ὁ Θεὺθ τῶι Θαμῶι.

274e1 ἐπ' ἀμφότερα: i.e. in censure and praise. **e2–3 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς γράμμασιν ἦν:** lit. "when he was at letters," i.e. reached letters in the series of *technai* that he was introducing. **e4–5 μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον** "a drug for [enhancing] memory and wisdom." Like "drug" in English, a φάρμακον can be used for good or ill (Artelt 1937). The connection between writing and memory was part of the tradition on the invention of writing: [Aesch.] *PV* 460–1, Gorg. *Pal.* 30 (letters are μνήμης ὄργανον), Eur. *TrGF* 578 (letters are τὰ τῆς γε λήθης φάρμακ', "the drugs for [curing] forgetfulness"). Theuth's addition to Euripides' drug metaphor – that writing enhances wisdom too – is essential for Plato's critique of writing and was anticipated when S. used the drug metaphor earlier in the dialogue. S. connected Lysias' written speech – "the drug for [his]

going out [of the city]" – with the search for wisdom that governs his movements (230d3–e1). Plato is profoundly interested in the connection between memory and the acquisition of wisdom or knowledge (249b5–c3): a soul's departure from the heavenly procession in the palinode leads to "forgetfulness" (λήθη) of the Forms; and the value of *erōs* lies in its capacity for triggering recollection of the Form of beauty and thereby bringing the soul closer to understanding the Forms generally. Further, S. analogized drugs (φάρμακα) and speeches (λόγοι) as the means used by medical or rhetorical experts to heal bodies or influence souls (270b1–7). Thamus accepts Theuth's connection of memory and wisdom; he disputes the claim that writing enhances them both (λήθην μὲν . . . σοφίας δὲ . . . , 275a2–b2). **e5–275a1 ὦ τεχνικώτατε Θεύθ . . . τοῖς μέλλουσι χρῆσθαι:** further, S. implies that the question of the use of an art, and thus of its value, is more important than the question of how the products of an art are created and requires superior knowledge; the underlying argument is presented at *Rep.* 10.601c–602a, *Cra.* 390a–d, *Plt.* 304b–c. Hence τεχνικώτατε is not strictly complimentary.

275a2 τοὐναντίον εἶπες ἢ δύναται "you say the opposite of [what] they [i.e. letters] can do." **a2–3 τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθόντων λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει** "this thing [i.e. letters] will create forgetfulness in the souls of those who learn [it]." **a4–5 αὐτοὺς ὑφ' αὑτῶν ἀναμιμνῃσκομένους:** αὐτούς refers to τῶν μαθόντων (a3); the shift to the accusative avoids a piling up of genitives. ἀναμιμνῃσκομένους recalls ἀνάμνησις, learning as recollection of the Forms seen in the pure psychic state before birth (249c1–2n.). **a5–6 οὔκουν μνήμης ἀλλὰ ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον ηὗρες:** memory (μνήμη) differs from reminding (ὑπόμνησις) insofar as the latter is external (ἔξωθεν) to the soul and the former is a purely internal (ἔνδοθεν) process (a3–5). Plato stresses and favors the internal process of memory because for him it is the key to learning and is promoted by dialectic (249b6–c1n.). What one learns is not information, for which writing is indeed the proper medium (*Ti.* 23a), but truths, which count as learned only when one can give an account of them. Not only are written texts incapable of teaching knowledge (which is reserved for dialectic, 276e4–277a4), but they are also destructive to the enterprise of learning (275a6–b2). When people rely on written texts, they neglect memory and thus damage the ability to learn. Yet written texts are not entirely useless: for readers who have already learned the subject matter of the text, written texts have the capacity to remind them of what they previously learned (275c8–d1, 276d2–3n., 277b4n., 278a1–2). On φάρμακον cf. 274e4–5n. **a6 τοῖς μαθηταῖς** "your pupils," i.e. in the sense that they have adopted Theuth's method of learning through reading. **οὐκ ἀλήθειαν** "not the reality [of wisdom]." **a7 πολυήκοοι γάρ σοι γενόμενοι ἄνευ διδαχῆς:** the subject is οἱ μαθηταί; πολυήκοοι refers to reading (261b7–c1n. on ἀνήκοος γέγονα, 268c2–3); the pronoun is dative of interest, indicating Theuth's responsibility; διδαχῆς implies instruction from a knowledgeable teacher: "for [these

pupils], because of you having read much without instruction [i.e. firsthand from a teacher], [will seem . . .]."

275b1 ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος = ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. **b1–2** καὶ χαλεποὶ συνεῖναι, δοξόσοφοι γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν: readers harm not only their own capacity for learning, but are troublesome generally. Insofar as readers gain the reputation for being wise without being so (δοξόσοφοι), they are like sophists, among the most socially destructive of men (248e2–3), and would tend to win for themselves unwarranted, potentially dangerous authority in society. Sophists were among the greatest proponents of written texts (257d4–6n., 266d5–267d9). **b3–4** ῥαιδίως σὺ . . . ποιεῖς: Ph. recognizes that S. made the story up (274c2–3n.). The dismissive tone (ῥαιδίως, ὁποδαποὺς ἂν ἐθέλῃς) prompts S.'s reply. **b5–c2** Οἱ δέ γ', ὦ φίλε . . . εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει: from the beginning Ph. has demonstrated a tendency to esteem recognized authorities (227a4–5, 229c3n., 270c4n.), a tendency that S. exploited to advance the inquiry (268a1–269d1, 269e4–270a6), but which he confronts now. Reminding Ph. of an ancient simplicity that attended to discourse strictly for the sake of truth, S. urges Ph. to disregard the Egyptian story's provenance and consider instead whether the story contains a lesson for the question at hand. **b5–6** δρυὸς λόγους ἔφησαν μαντικοὺς πρώτους: at Zeus's oracle in Dodona, one of the oldest shrines in Greece, priestesses conveyed prophetic messages that originated in the sacred oak either from perching birds or rustling leaves (244b1, Hdt. 2.52–7; Dieterle 2007). **b6** τοῖς μὲν οὖν τότε: followed by σοὶ δέ (275c1). **b7–c1** δρυὸς καὶ πέτρας ἀκούειν ὑπ' εὐηθείας, εἰ μόνον ἀληθῆ λέγοιεν "[it sufficed] out of simplicity to listen to oak and rock, so long as they [i.e. oak and rock] would speak the truth." Oak and rock, two basic objects of the natural landscape, are not the elements of one particular proverb but form a pair that gives proverbial force to a variety of utterances (West 1966: 167–9 ad Hes. *Theog.* 35), as e.g. Penelope addressing unrecognized Odysseus (*Od.* 19.162–3): ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς μοι εἰπὲ τεὸν γένος, ὁππόθεν ἐσσί·|οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυός ἐσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης. (Plato alludes to these lines at *Ap.* 34d, *Rep.* 8.544d.) Here "oak and rock," which springs into S.'s head because he just mentioned Dodona's oak, means "anything whatsoever," even apparently mute natural objects; cf. Hermias 257.29 δρῦς ἢ πέτρα ἢ ὅ τι δήποτε. S. delivers his point in the conditional clause εἰ μόνον ἀληθῆ λέγοιεν and reiterates it in the rebuke directed at Ph. οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖς, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει (275c2). εὐήθεια ("simplicity") is used ironically (as σοφοῖς, b7) to indicate that the practices of these simple ancient people may contain a valuable lesson for sophisticated moderns like Ph.; cf. 275c7n.

275c4 ὁ Θηβαῖος: Thamus-Ammon (274d4). **c5** ὁ τέχνην οἰόμενος ἐν γράμμασι καταλιπεῖν: this author believes that his written composition constitutes a *technē* because in his view the composition transmits knowledge of the subject matter to the reader. S. challenges the notion, present in colloquial usage of the term τέχνη (261b7–c1n., 266d5–6n.), that it makes sense ever to speak of a

written document as a *technē*. **c6** ὁ παραδεχόμενος ὡς τι σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἐκ γραμμάτων ἐσόμενον: ὡς introduces in indirect speech the thinking of ὁ παραδεχόμενος, "in the belief that . . . " (*AGPS* 56.12.2.B). Because of the inherent limitations of written texts (275d3–e5), the expectation on the part of the reader-student (ὁ παραδεχόμενος) that he will derive from his reading "something clear and certain," i.e. something that amounts to knowledge, is misplaced. Clear and stable understanding is gained only through dialectical learning (265d7, 277d7, 278a4). This passage suggests that S.'s critique of writing is directed specifically at written *technai*, documents that we would call technical treatises or manuals. However, S. extends the argument below to include other kinds of written discourse as well as non-dialectical oral discourse (277d5–278a1, 278c1–4). **c7** εὐηθείας: now used without irony (275b7–c1n.), hence "foolishness." The word stings because those who use books for learning a *technē* pride themselves on their sophistication. **c8–d1** πλέον τι οἰόμενος . . . περὶ ὧν ἂν ᾖι τὰ γεγραμμένα "if he thinks that written discourse is something more than reminding one who already knows [the things] with which the written material may be concerned."

275d3–4 Δεινὸν γάρ που . . . ὅμοιον ζωγραφίαι: δεινόν is predicative, τοῦτο looks ahead: "for surely, Ph., this feature that writing has is strange and truly like painting." The analogy to painting is aided by the common root γραφ-. **d4** τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα: painting's "offspring" are painted human figures because the point at issue is the ability to speak in response to questions. Alcid. *Soph.* 27, arguing that written speeches are easier to produce and less effective than extempore speeches, compares written discourse to "bronze statues, stone monuments, and depictions of animals" (χαλκῶν ἀνδριάντων καὶ λιθίνων ἀγαλμάτων καὶ γεγραμμένων ζώιων) with respect to their inertness. **d5** σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾶι: the problem is not merely silence in the face of questions that arise in the mind of a viewer or reader. It is also the solemnity of the silence, which gives the false impression that the ability to respond and therefore to instruct is being held in reserve (cf. ὥς τι φρονοῦντας, d6). This solemnity contrasts with the unassuming sense of play (παιδιά) to be found in gardens of Adonis (276b3–4) and in written texts that are created and used properly (276d1–e3). ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι: *sc.* γεγραμμένοι from 275c8: "[written] discourse too is the same way." ταὐτόν is adverbial accusative; cf. *Smp.* 178e ταὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν ἐρώμενον ὁρῶμεν, *AGPS* 46.3.3 on substantivized neuter adjectives used predicatively. **d6** ἐὰν δέ τι ἔρηι τῶν λεγομένων "but if you ask about any of the things that were said." **d6–7** βουλόμενος μαθεῖν states clearly the condition under which written discourse is found wanting. **d7** σημαίνει: *sc.* ὁ γεγραμμένος λόγος.

275e1 κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ: the metaphor conveys the lack of control. παρὰ τοῖς ἐπαΐουσιν: for people who already understand the subject matter of a written text, the text poses no threat to their ability to learn and if the text is written properly (i.e. for play, not instruction) it can amuse as well as remind the reader of what he or she already understands. **e1–2** ὡς δ' αὕτως

παρ' οἷς οὐδὲν προσήκει: illustrated by Ph.'s enthusiasm for sophistic rhetorical manuals (266d5–6), which were exerting a bad influence on him until he ran into S. and was shown in what ways they are inadequate. Cf. *Epist.* 7.344c: "no serious man will ever come close to writing about serious truths for people in general [i.e. with the intent of instructing them in these truths] and [thereby] reduce them to envy and perplexity." **e2–3 οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς δεῖ τε καὶ μή** "[written discourse] does not know whom it should and should not address." By contrast, practitioners of both dialectic and true rhetoric do know whom they should and should not address (276a5–6, 272a3–4n.). For both dialectic and rhetoric the relevant criterion in the matter of who should and should not be addressed is whether the discourse can affect the recipient in the way intended by the speaker. **e3 πλημμελούμενος δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκηι λοιδορηθείς** "if [a written discourse] is mistreated and unfairly abused"; i.e. if what the text says is intentionally distorted or unfairly criticized by a reader. The implied context concerns scientific or philosophical debate (*Prt.* 347c–e, *Tht.* 164e) as well as political or legal debate (Alcid. *Soph.* 24–5). **τοῦ πατρός:** metaphorical for the author of the text. The father metaphor is used in different senses at 257b2–3, 261a3, 275a1–2. **e4–5 αὐτὸς γὰρ οὔτ' ἀμύνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατὸς αὑτῶι:** to "defend" or "help" a text would be to defend the positions put forward in the text with clarifications or further arguments, especially ones that respond to objections raised (cf. 276c7 λόγωι βοηθεῖν, 278c5 εἰς ἔλεγχον, *Phd.* 88e). Since a written text cannot do this for itself, it is up to the author of the text to do it on behalf of his text (278c5). But the author is normally not available.

276a1 ἄλλον ὁρῶμεν λόγον τούτου ἀδελφὸν γνήσιον: ἀδελφόν and γνήσιον are predicative: "do we see another discourse, brother of that one [i.e. written discourse], [but] legitimate [offspring of its father, the author]?" **τῶι:** interrogative. **a4 Ὃς μετ' ἐπιστήμης γράφεται ἐν τῆι τοῦ μανθάνοντος ψυχῆι** "[the discourse] that is written along with knowledge in the soul of a learner." The metaphor based on writing's durability is directed just at discourse that conveys knowledge to a student: only discourse of that kind, viz. dialectic, actually possesses the permanence that is popularly associated with writing (276e4–277a4). The recourse to a writing metaphor in the midst of a critique of writing is playful; cf. 276c6–7 for a similar juxtaposition. Plato's writing metaphor is an adaptation of writing as a metaphor for memory, which was common in fifth-century literature: e.g. Soph. *TrGF* 597 θοῦ δ' ἐν φρενὸς δέλτοισι τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους. Cf. Pind. *Ol.* 10.3, Aesch. *Supp.* 179, *Cho.* 450, *Eum.* 275, [Aesch.] *PV* 789, Soph. *Trach.* 683, *Phil.* 1325, Gorg. *Hel.* 17; Pfeiffer 1968: 26. Plato explains the aptness of the writing metaphor at *Phlb.* 38e–39a. **a5–6 ἐπιστήμων δὲ λέγειν τε καὶ σιγᾶν πρὸς οὓς δεῖ:** only certain individuals are capable of being instructed; those who are not have no business being addressed by this discourse because the endeavor would be fruitless (275e2–3n.). **a7–8 Τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον . . . ἂν

τι λέγοιτο δικαίως: Ph. grasps that S.'s preferred alternative to written discourse is not oral discourse generally, as S. makes clear later (277e6–278a1n.), but specifically oral discourse that issues from an expert (τοῦ εἰδότος). ἔμψυχον, "ensouled," was used in the palinode's formal proof of the soul's immortality based on self-movement (245e5–6). Here ἔμψυχον goes beyond ζῶντα to suggest discourse which is self-moving in the sense that the speaker's purpose and intelligence are present and actively guiding the discourse. Written discourse would rightly be called an "image" (εἴδωλον) of the expert's living, ensouled discourse insofar as the words of the written discourse are the same but the speaker's purpose and intelligence are no longer present. Plato uses terms found in Alcidamas though his point is more complex than that of his predecessor (*Soph.* 28): λόγος ὁ μὲν ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς διανοίας ἐν τῶι παραυτίκα λεγόμενος ἔμψυχός ἐστι καὶ ζῆι . . . , ὁ δὲ γεγραμμένος εἰκόνι λόγου τὴν φύσιν ὁμοίαν ἔχων ἁπάσης εὐεργεσίας ἄμοιρος καθέστηκεν.

276b1–4 ὧν σπερμάτων κήδοιτο . . . ἐν ἡμέραισιν ὀκτὼ γιγνομένους: σπουδῆι goes with ἀρῶν, which is a poetic and humorously exaggerated equivalent of σπείρων. ἂν goes with χαίροι: "would [a sensible farmer] plough with serious intent in summer seeds that he might care for and wish to become fruitful into gardens of Adonis and take pleasure in seeing [the gardens] grow beautiful in eight days?" Gardens of Adonis were pots planted with lettuce and fennel that sprouted thickly in a matter of days for ritual use in the Adonia, an annual festival in which women lamented the death of Adonis, Aphrodite's lover. On the festival and the ritual use of the gardens of Adonis, see Parker 2005: 283–8. Plato implies that the gardens of Adonis were planted in summer but other evidence points to the spring (Dillon 2003). "Eight days" is approximate, to match the "eighth month" when the grain is ripe (276b6–7). **b4 παιδιᾶς τε καὶ ἑορτῆς χάριν:** this form of play, exemplary for writing, is oriented towards the gods (276d4n.). Menander describes the Adonia as τῆς δ' ἑορτῆς παιδιὰν [πολλὴ]ν ἐχούσης (*Samia* 4.1–2). **b5 ὅτε καὶ ποιοῖ** "when he would even do it." The Adonia was celebrated by women, so it is incongruous for a farmer to be occupied with gardens of Adonis at all. **ἐφ' οἷς:** *sc.* σπέρμασι. **b5–7 ἂν . . . ἀγαπώιη ἂν . . . ὅσα ἔσπειρεν τέλος λαβόντα** "he would be content that what he sowed attained maturity." For this meaning of τέλος cf. *Laws* 8.834c referring to fully grown horses as τοῖς τέλος ἔχουσι. The first ἂν anticipates the second one (232c2–3n.).

276c3–4 Τὸν δὲ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντα: the plural ἐπιστήμας is distributive (*AGPS* 44.3.5, cf. 239c7n.), i.e. it indicates there are several branches of knowledge, specified by the genitives: "the person who has knowledge in the fields of what is just, what is beautiful, and what is good." By having S. specify the just, the beautiful, and the good as the fields in which this expert either writes for play (276c6–d7) or uses dialectic for the serious purpose of instruction (276e4–277a4), Plato moves beyond technical treatises (275c6n.) and

suggests that he is referring to his own discourse too. The suggestion is confirmed as this exchange develops (276d2–3n., d4–5n., e1–3n.). **c4** τὰ ἑαυτοῦ σπέρματα: i.e. his λόγοι. **c6–8** Οὐκ ἄρα σπουδῆι αὐτὰ ἐν ὕδατι . . . ἀδυνάτων δὲ ἱκανῶς τἀληθὲς διδάξαι "then he will not write them [i.e. his σπέρματα] in water with serious purpose, sowing [them] with ink through a reed [i.e. a pen] along with discourses that are unable to aid themselves in discussion and unable adequately to teach the truth." The phrase "write in water" is proverbial, meaning to waste effort (*Suda* s.v. εἰς ὕδωρ γράφειν), and is invoked with a sense of play preceding the metaphor for actual writing in μέλανι σπείρων διὰ καλάμου. μετὰ λόγων = καὶ λόγοις (253e3n.).

276d1 τοὺς μὲν ἐν γράμμασι κήπους: lit. "the gardens [that are constituted] by letters." On ἐν expressing means cf. *Laws* 2.660a τὰ ἔν τε ῥυθμοῖς σχήματα καὶ ἐν ἁρμονίαισιν μέλη, *AGPS* 68.12.6. **d2** παιδιᾶς χάριν σπερεῖ τε καὶ γράψει: Plato is saying as clearly as his literary medium permits that he writes his literary dialogues for the sake of play. On what that means, cf. 274b7–278e3n. **d2–3** ἑαυτῶι τε ὑπομνήματα . . . ἐὰν ἵκηται: the long-term use of written discourse has no parallel with the gardens of Adonis, which are thrown away after their ritual use. While characterizing the discourse practices that he is also implicitly ascribing to himself (276c3n., d4n., e1–3n.), Plato blunts the self-reference with self-deprecating humor. "The old age of forgetfulness" (τὸ λήθης γῆρας) is elevated style: the genitive construction stems from a Homeric model (e.g. *Il.* 3.309 θανάτοιο τέλος, 5.642 Ἰλίου . . . πόλιν) that is more common in poetry than prose (*AGPS* 47.7.6 for examples). ἵκηται is poetic, the usual prose form stemming from ἀφικνέομαι. Plato could be quoting verse otherwise lost. As with τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος (267c7, a similar Homeric construction) and S.'s Pindaric quotation (227b9), the poetic style produces mock grandeur. ὑπομνήματα has two senses: they are "reminders" in the sense distinguished from memory in the myth of Theuth (οὔκουν μνήμης ἀλλὰ ὑπομνήσεως, 275a5), which would include the "reminders" (ὑπομνήμασιν) that spur recollection of Forms (249c6); and they are "written notes" (as *Tht.* 143a), which would refer in a self-deprecating way to the dialogues as written documents. θησαυριζόμενος is grandiose in relation to ὑπομνήματα. Are we to imagine that Plato hoards his literary dialogues for his dotage, when he will read them over as an aid to recalling the deepest truths to which he devoted his life but which he will then but dimly remember? The idea pokes fun at Plato, as intended, but does not disrupt the possibility of written texts serving as reminders, i.e. not as a substitute for memory and learning but as an adjunct to them. **d3–4** καὶ παντὶ τῶι ταὐτὸν ἴχνος μετιόντι: also with θησαυριζόμενος. The expression is vague enough to include both students of philosophy and anyone who may be inclined to pursue philosophy. Perhaps Plato's written texts remind this group of what propelled them to philosophy in the first place. The hunting image recalls S.'s pursuit of a partner in dialectic (266b7) and the lover's pursuit of the divine in his beloved (252e5). **d4–5** ἡσθήσεταί τε

αὐτοὺς θεωρῶν φυομένους ἁπαλούς "and he will be pleased watching them [i.e. his literary gardens] grow delicately." "Delicately" in comparison with prolific dialectic (276e6–277a4). In view of the contrast with the sympotic pleasures of the next sentence (276d5–6), it is implied that the pleasure which the author takes in composing his literary gardens is that of the abstinent cicadas and thus stems from the philosophical Muses (259b5–d5). Hence this is another hint that Plato sees himself as a writer of the kind portrayed here. **d5–6** **συμποσίοις τε ἄρδοντες . . . τούτων ἀδελφά:** food, sex, and musical entertainment in addition to drink, and typical of the Morychian house where Lysias staged his *epideixis* (227b5n., b6–7n.). **d7** **οἷς λέγω παίζων διάξει** "will pass the time playing with the things [i.e. the forms of play] that I speak of."

276e1–3 **Παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην . . . πέρι μυθολογοῦντα:** anacoluthon: the person referred to in μυθολογοῦντα is the same as τοῦ δυναμένου, but μυθολογοῦντα is in the accusative as if παίζειν had a subject in the accusative: "you speak of an utterly beautiful form of play in contrast to a trivial one, S., [that] of a person who is able to play with discourse, that he tells stories about justice and other things you mention." Justice and the beautiful and the good were just mentioned by S. (276c3). To tell stories (μυθολογοῦντα) about these subjects suggests the palinode. In addition to the beautiful, S. spoke of justice in the palinode (247d5, 250b1) and the entire speech is directed at the good; and the palinode is clearly a playful composition (explicitly so characterized at 265c1–3, 8). To tell stories about justice while having knowledge of it (276c3–4) also suggests the *Republic*; cf. 6.501e ἡ πολιτεία ἣν μυθολογοῦμεν λόγωι, 2.376d. As the author of the *Republic* and the palinode, Plato is using Ph. to allude to himself as a writer whose writing aspires to "utterly beautiful play." **e5** **αὐτά:** justice and the other things S. mentioned (276e2). **τῆι διαλεκτικῆι τέχνηι:** the term διαλεκτική is rooted in the verb διαλέγεσθαι, "to converse" or "to discuss," so the face-to-face communicative aspect of dialectic is etymologically prominent (259a1–2n.). Dialectic is discourse by question and answer (*Cra.* 390c) and thus differs fundamentally from speechmaking (259a1–2n., *Grg.* 447c, 448e). At least from the *Republic* on, the art of dialectic is for Plato both a method of communication and a method of discovering truths (*Rep.* 7.532a–533e; Robinson 1953: 61–92, Stemmer 1992: 191–225). Earlier in the *Phaedrus* S. was concerned with dialectic's capacity for discovering truths (by means of the analytical procedures of collection and division) because rhetoric needs to discover the truth about its subject matter in order to construct persuasive arguments (265d4–266b2n.). Here S. is concerned with dialectic as a method of oral communication with a receptive learner, a view that S. also suggested earlier (266b4–c1). However, because it is not just any discourse but specifically "discourse along with knowledge" (μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους, 276e6) that is being communicated, the truth-discovering capacity of dialectic is functionally intertwined with its communicative capacity. **e5–6** **λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν** "having come upon a suitable soul"; for the sense

of the verb, cf. LSJ s.v. A.1.3. This soul, parallel to the farmer's suitable soil (τὸ προσῆκον, 276b6) into which he plants the seeds he wishes to bear fruit, is suitable in the sense that it has the capacity to learn. Like the rhetorician (271c9–272b4), the dialectician has the ability to recognize how souls are affected by discourse. The dialectician's prerogative in choosing his discourse partner is opposed to a writer's inability to choose his reader (275d7–e3). **e6–277a4** φυτεύηι τε καὶ σπείρηι . . . εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπωι δυνατὸν μάλιστα "[the dialectician] plants and sows along with knowledge discourse that is able to help itself and him who planted [it] and is not without fruit but has a seed – whence other [discourse], growing in other characters, is able to make this [seed] forever immortal – and makes the person in possession [of the seed] as happy as is possible for a human being."

277a1 βοηθεῖν: on the sense, cf. 275e4–5n. **a2** ἔχοντες σπέρμα: the discourse sown by the dialectician (276e6), which is parallel to the fruitful seed sown by the farmer (276b5–7), is said to have its own seed. **a2–3** ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἤθεσι φυόμενοι τοῦτ' ἀεὶ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἱκανοί: this clause is parenthetical between ἔχοντες σπέρμα and καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες. τοῦτο refers to σπέρμα. The seed of the dialectician's discourse is the source of a potentially unending process, i.e. when the discourse sown in one soul leads to further discourse sown in other souls down through the generations ad infinitum. ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἤθεσι suggests a dynamic quality to this dialectical discourse-production: as discourse is sown in souls of different types the discourse changes while the overall process endures. Thus it is the dialectical process, not one person or λόγος, that achieves immortality. The point is repeated at 278a6–b2. **a3–4** τὸν ἔχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπωι δυνατὸν μάλιστα: the extreme happiness of the person who possesses the seed of dialectical discourse, i.e. the person who participates in the unending procession of dialectic from soul to soul, means that the person has become virtuous as well as knowledgeable in the just, the beautiful, and the good (276c3). This happiness is the same as that enjoyed by the philosophical *erastēs* and *erōmenos* (256a6–b7). **a6** ἐκεῖνα: whether the politician who reproached Lysias for being a speechwriter was right or wrong (257c3–258d10). τούτων: the criteria for judging under what conditions written discourse is appropriate or inappropriate, which is the question that has occupied S. and Ph. since 274b7. **a8** Τὰ ποῖα: refers to ἐκεῖνα (a6). **a9** Ὧν δὴ πέρι: explained in the ὅπως clause. **a9–b2** ὅπως τὸ Λυσίου τε ὄνειδος . . . ἄνευ τέχνης γράφοιντο: to examine the politician's reproach of Lysias for being a speechwriter (257c3–5), S. and Ph. first inquired into artistic discourse in general, i.e. what makes discourse good or bad regardless of its form or occasion (258d4–10, 259e2–3). That inquiry, which, as S. says (277b3), was completed earlier (at 274b4–5), found that Lysias' discourse lacks all artistic merit. Having now reached agreement on the further question of the appropriate use of written discourse, S. is prepared to state how they should

judge Lysias' activity as writer. But the statement is postponed momentarily as S. supplies Ph. with a reminder about the first inquiry (277b5–c6).

277b4 ὑπόμνησόν με: in response to this request that S. remind Ph. about the dialectical inquiry into artistic discourse that he and S. recently completed, S. summarizes the conclusions reached in the inquiry while omitting the reasoning that led the participants to agree on those conclusions (277b5–c6). As S. reminds Ph., Plato is not only reminding the reader but also demonstrating what reminding, the proper task of written discourse (275a5–6n., 276d2–4), consists in. **b5–c6** Πρὶν ἄν τις τό τε ἀληθὲς . . . πᾶς μεμήνυκεν ἡμῖν λόγος: the sentence begins with a series of subordinate clauses (πρὶν ἄν τις . . . ἁπλοῦς δὲ ἁπλῆι) in which the elements of rhetorical training are enumerated in the same order as in the original inquiry. The main clause is expressed by means of the accusative δυνατόν (impersonal) and infinitive ἔσεσθαι, as if the whole thing followed from δεδηλῶσθαι (b3). **b5** λέγει ἢ γράφει: speaking or writing because the first stage of the inquiry, that being summarized here, concerned discourse in both forms (258d4–5, 259e2–3). **b6** κατ' αὐτό τε πᾶν ὁρίζεσθαι "to define in itself every thing [that he speaks or writes about]"; i.e. collection, which is the movement of dialectical reasoning that for rhetorical purposes does the work of defining (265d4–5). **b6–7** κατ' εἴδη μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν "to cut [the thing defined] at its sub-classes (εἴδη) until the uncuttable point"; i.e. division. On the technical sense of εἶδος cf. 265d4–266b2n. **b7–c1** περί τε ψυχῆς φύσεως διιδὼν κατὰ ταὐτά "and concerning the nature of the soul having scrutinized [it] in the same way," i.e. by using dialectical procedures (270b3–4n., 271d3n.).

277c1 τὸ προσαρμόττον ἑκάστηι φύσει εἶδος: i.e. the form of discourse that suits each kind of soul (271b1–4, 271d3–272b1). **c1–2** οὕτω τιθῆι καὶ διακοσμῆι τὸν λόγον: the doctrine of matching types of discourse to types of soul is the basis for stylizing discourse and using formal elements to make the transmission of a message effective (271b2–4n., 272a4–5n.). **c2–3** ποικίληι μὲν ποικίλους ψυχῆι καὶ παναρμονίους διδοὺς λόγους, ἁπλοῦς δὲ ἁπλῆι: ποικίλος ("multi-colored") and παναρμόνιος ("all-inclusive," lit. "having all musical modes") are lively metaphors for "complex"; cf. *Prt.* 334b ποικίλον τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπόν. But given the use of ποικίλον to refer also to the wild democratic nature in the *Republic* (8.557c, 561e) there is also the suggestion of the Typhonic nature that S. opposed to divine order earlier (230a3–5). Here psychic complexity is matched by rhetorical complexity: the dialectically adept rhetorical expert uses various modes of discourse to address complex souls, as in the *Phaedrus* itself (236b5–7, 265b5–c3, *Laws* 2.665c; Rowe 2009). The μέν clause unfolds gradually, the δέ clause completes the thought with punch, and the whole is phrased in lively, artificial word order: ABAB interlacing (ποικίληι μὲν ποικίλους ψυχῆι . . . λόγους), AABB *polyptoton* (same word, different cases: ποικίληι μὲν ποικίλους . . . ἁπλοῦς δὲ ἁπλῆι), ABBA *homoioptoton* (different words, same cases: ποικίληι μὲν ποικίλους . . . ἁπλοῦς δὲ ἁπλῆι). The rhymes on -ους

and -ηι are striking. The effect evokes the speaker's artistry in matching discourses and souls. **c3–4** **τέχνηι:** with μεταχειρισθῆναι. **c4–5** **οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ πεῖσαι:** instruction, itself a species of persuasion (*Grg.* 453d–454a), contributes to the psychagogic persuasion of Plato's rhetorical *technē* insofar as the clear definitions of things provided by dialectic are put to rhetorical purposes (263d7–e2n., 265d4–7).

277d1–2 **Τί δ' αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλὸν . . . ἂν ὄνειδος ἢ μή;** "what about whether it is admirable or shameful to utter and write speeches and by occurring in what way it [i.e. the uttering and writing of speeches] would rightly be said [to be] a disgrace or not?" These questions stem from the politician's (muddled) reproach of Lysias for being a speechwriter (257c3–258d10). **d3** **τὰ λεχθέντα ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν:** the inquiry into the propriety of written discourse (274b7–277a5). **d4** **Τὰ ποῖα;** Ph.'s question interrupts but does not affect the flow of S.'s statement. **d6** **νόμους τιθείς, σύγγραμμα πολιτικὸν γράφων:** parenthetical, explaining δημοσίαι: "making laws, [thereby] writing a political composition." "Making laws" is an instance of the larger category of "writing a political composition" (257e1–258c9, 278c3–4), which would also include the products of forensic speechwriters like Lysias. **d6–7** **καὶ μεγάλην τινὰ ἐν αὐτῶι βεβαιότητα ἡγούμενος καὶ σαφήνειαν:** the participle ἡγούμενος is anacoluthic under the influence of the preceding participles; grammatical precision would have required a finite form, e.g. ἡγεῖται, joined to ἔγραψεν ἢ γράψει (d5). αὐτῶι refers to σύγγραμμα. μεγάλην τινά is dismissive. The author's belief that his written composition contains "any great certainty and clarity" is false and gives rise to reproach because certainty and clarity are attributes of knowledge and are conveyed only through oral dialectical discourse (265d6–7, 275c6n.).

277e1 **εἴτε τίς φησιν εἴτε μή** "whether or not anyone says [that it is a reproach]." **e1–3** **τὸ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν . . . μὴ οὐκ ἐπονείδιστον εἶναι** "for to be ignorant while awake or dreaming [i.e. consciously or unconsciously] about what is just and unjust and bad and good does not in truth escape being a matter of reproach." ὕπαρ τε καὶ ὄναρ are accusatives of respect. Following a negative action verb (οὐκ ἐκφεύγει), μὴ οὐκ with the infinitive is a "sympathetic" negative, which is no negative at all (*AGPS* 67.12.7). The writer earns reproach not merely for being ignorant about just and unjust and bad and good but because in his written compositions on these subjects he pretends to knowledge that he lacks. **e3** **αὐτό:** i.e. the author's ignorance of just and unjust and bad and good. **e5–278b3** **Ὁ δέ γε ἐν μὲν τῶι γεγραμμένωι λόγωι . . . ἂν σέ τε καὶ ἐμὲ γενέσθαι:** having just described the misuse of written discourse (οὕτω μὲν ὄνειδος τῶι γράφοντι, 277d7–e1), S. now enumerates the views on written and oral discourse that he supports, attributing them to ὁ δέ . . . ἡγούμενος (277e5–6), so that the sentence is composed almost entirely of elaborations of its subject. ἡγούμενος governs: ἐν μὲν τῶι γεγραμμένωι λόγωι . . . εἰδότων ὑπόμνησιν γεγονέναι

(277e5–278a2) on the limitations of written and rhapsode-like oral discourse; ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδασκομένοις... καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς (278a2–4) on the instructive capacities of dialectical discourse; δεῖν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους... κατ' ἀξίαν ἐνέφυσαν (278a5–b2) on dialectical discourse as "legitimate offspring." S. adds a brief participial clause (τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους χαίρειν ἐῶν, 278b2) in agreement with ἡγούμενος, then completes the entire sentence with resumptive δέ and the main clause (οὗτος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ κινδυνεύει... γενέσθαι, 278b2–3). Amidst this summary of previously articulated positions the extension of the critique of written discourse to include rhapsode-like oral discourse is new (e6–278a1n.). **e5 περὶ ἑκάστου** "on any subject." **e6–278a1 οὐδένα πώποτε λόγον... πειθοῦς ἕνεκα ἐλέχθησαν** "no speech in verse or prose that is worth much serious attention has ever yet been written or even spoken as the [speeches] performed by rhapsodes are spoken for the sake of persuasion without [oral] examination and teaching." ἐλέχθησαν is gnomic aorist (232c1n.). Rhapsodes pursue persuasion insofar as they seek to convey an emotionally convincing performance (*Ion* 535e). S. is not identifying rhapsodic performance as the sole form of oral discourse that, like written discourse generally, is unworthy of serious attention. Rather, he is using the rhapsode, who has a memorized text, performs for the sake of effect, and is unable to engage in examination with an interlocutor (*Ion*), to exemplify with derision the qualities of non-serious, non-dialectical oral discourse generally, in verse or prose. Thus S. extends the category of non-serious discourse beyond written discourse to include oral discourse that eschews individual engagement and the dialectical pursuit of knowledge. At *Prt.* 329a S. compares books to popular orators (οἱ δημηγόροι) with respect to their common inability to respond to questions. An equally apt term for this class of discourse would be epideictic, not only in the formal sense represented by Lysias' erotic *epideixis* but also in the functional sense that for Plato includes popular poetry (*Grg.* 502b–d), democratic rhetoric (257e1–258c4), and sophistic discourse (*Rep.* 6.493a–c, *Prt.* 342a–348a). Though S.'s formal speeches earlier in the dialogue are fashioned specifically for their effect on Ph. and are incorporated by S. into the larger dialectical inquiry, in themselves they are rhetorical ("for the sake of persuasion") and non-dialectical ("without [oral] examination"); and his first speech verges on pure epideictic (236b1–4, 237a5n., 242c5–d1). Hence, apart from the dialectical conversation with Ph. in which S. presents them, they would not be worth serious attention. S. anticipated this implication when he spoke of the non-dialectical aspects of his speeches as a form of play (262d1–2, 265c2n., 265c8). Of course, S.'s speeches do not exist outside of their dialectical context, and it would not be possible to imagine them otherwise. **e8 ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαχῆς:** examination that consists in questioning and answering, and the transmission of knowledge that results therefrom, i.e. dialectic (276e5n.). ἀνάκρισις was also the technical term for an Athenian judicial procedure preliminary to trial that involved a magistrate's questioning the litigants (Harrison 1971: 94–105), but that sense is not in play here.

278a1–2 αὐτῶν τοὺς βελτίστους εἰδότων ὑπόμνησιν γεγονέναι "the best of them [i.e. the speeches that are not worthy of serious attention] are a reminder for those who know [the subject matter of the speech]." Reminders were distinguished from memory in the myth of Theuth (275a3–6). Used properly they serve philosophical purposes (249c5–d1, 276d2–3n.). **a2** διδασκομένοις: middle, *sc.* λόγοις. **a3** γραφομένοις ἐν ψυχῆι: cf. 276a4–6 for the metaphor, 276e4–277a4 for the import. **a3–4** περὶ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν: as 276c3–4. **a4** τό τε ἐναργὲς εἶναι καὶ τέλεον: "clarity" and "perfection" are attributes of knowledge, like certainty (βεβαιότης) and clarity (σαφήνεια) (277d7; cf. 265d7, 275c6). **a5–b2** δεῖν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους . . . κατ' ἀξίαν ἐνέφυσαν "such speeches must be said to be his own as if they were his legitimate sons, first of all, any [speech] in him that is in [him] when it is discovered [by him], then any offspring and brothers of that [speech] that have at once grown in other souls of other individuals in accord with their capacities." S. distinguishes two aspects of dialectical discourse, both suggested earlier: first, a person can use dialectic on his own ("in [him] when it is discovered [by him]"), as the dialectic of collection and division that enables S. "to speak and to think" (266b5n.); second, dialectic leads to further dialectical discourse in other persons, which S. introduced with the plant-and-seed metaphor at 276e4–277a4. The metaphor of dialectical discourse as legitimate offspring was introduced at 276a1.

278b2 τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους χαίρειν ἐῶν: true of S. but not of Plato. Plato may have used written compositions properly (cf. notes to 276c3–4, d2–3, d4–5, e1–3), but he did not forgo them as did S. **b4** Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε βούλομαί τε καὶ εὔχομαι ἃ λέγεις: this wholehearted endorsement of S.'s prayer, to be repeated in a moment (279c5), is a marked change from Ph.'s conditional response to S.'s prayer at the end of the palinode (257b7–c1) and signifies his decision to abandon sophistic rhetoric and pursue philosophy instead, as S. intended (257b4–6). **b5** Οὐκοῦν ἤδη πεπαίσθω μετρίως ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ λόγων "so we have now played on the theme of discourse in due measure"; a theatrical gesture to signal the end of the dialogue, reminiscent of Ar. *Thesm.* 1227 ἀλλὰ πέπαισται μετρίως ἡμῖν, which launches the anapaests that close the play. μετρίως recalls S.'s principle of composing a discourse so that its parts are πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῶι ὅλωι (264c5–6). The idea of play in πεπαίσθω, raised for the last time, emphasizes that for both the reader and the writer the *Phaedrus* aspires not to the seriousness reserved for face-to-face dialectic but to the playfulness that is appropriate for written discourse (274b7–278e3n.). Yet coming from S., πεπαίσθω is ironic. He and Ph. have indeed been engaged in dialectic, and for all the fun they have had, their concern with discourse has been deadly serious, as must be the case if S.'s prayer to Eros (257a2–b6) and the injunctions to Lysias and other composers of discourse in the next lines are to have any meaning. **b5–6** καὶ σύ τε: καί is adverbial with σύ, τε without subsequent καί is conjunctive for the sentence: "and so (τε) you also (καί)" (*AGPS* 69.32.11). **b6–c1** τὸ Νυμφῶν νᾶμά τε καὶ

μουσεῖον: at the close a reminder of the beauty of the spot beside the stream under the plane tree (230b2–c4), the pleasure of philosophical discourse under the guidance of the Muses (259b5–d5; cf. 267c1–3n.), and S.'s orientation towards the divine (273e3–274a5n.). The nymphs and the Muses were instrumental in facilitating S.'s eloquence (230b6, 238d1, 241e3–4, 262d3–5, 263d6–7).

278c1 ἠκούσαμεν λόγων, οἳ ἐπέστελλον: the *logoi* in question comprise all those uttered under the plane tree, both the formal *logoi* on *erōs* and the *logoi* produced by S. and Ph. in their dialectical examination of discourse. All these *logoi*, taken together, enjoin them to convey the message to Lysias and the others. **c1–4 Λυσίαι τε καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος . . . συγγράμματα ἔγραψεν:** S. distinguishes three classes of composers of written discourse with regard to external or occasional features of their discourse. The named representative of each class helps to identify the class (278e1): prose-writers, which is a larger category than professional logographers (257e1–2n.) and in addition to Lysias would include, e.g., Alcidamas, Isocrates, and Plato himself (278d5–6n.); poets; lawgivers and politicians. S.'s point, which is complete at 278e1, is not to establish criteria for classifying forms of discourse, but to demonstrate with particular examples that a philosophical approach to composing written discourse, based on a recognition of the requirements of the serious pursuit of wisdom through dialectic, is possible without regard for the external form or occasion of the written discourse. The original inquiry into good discourse also sought to describe good discourse without regard for particular genres or occasions (258d7–10, 261a8–b2, e1). **c2–3 ποίησιν ψιλὴν ἢ ἐν ὠιδῆι:** poetry (i.e. metrical discourse) without music (ψιλήν) and poetry set to music (ἐν ὠιδῆι); cf. 245a2–3, *Laws* 2.669d for the distinction. It belongs to the hypothesis under consideration that both kinds of poetry are composed in writing. **c3–4 ὅστις ἐν πολιτικοῖς λόγοις νόμους ὀνομάζων συγγράμματα ἔγραψεν** "anyone who wrote compositions in political discourse, calling [the compositions] laws." S. demonstrated that the written compositions of democratic politicians are a matter of civic legislation and compared Solon (257e1–258c4, 277d6). **c4–6 εἰ μὲν εἰδὼς ἧι τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχει . . . φαῦλα ἀποδεῖξαι:** the subject is any of the three just mentioned writers or other members of the classes they represent; ταῦτα refers to their written discourse. The participial clauses reflect the preceding argument on written vs. dialectical discourse and express the conditions of philosophical authorship (278d5): knowledge of the subject matter (276c3–4, 277b5–7); the ability to support one's written discourse with further arguments in live debate (275e4–5n.; ἰών is subordinate to ἔχων); and awareness of the inherent limitations of written discourse (277e5–278b3). The response to μέν comes at 278d8 οὐκοῦν αὖ (*GP* 376). **c5 εἰς ἔλεγχον ἰὼν περὶ ὧν ἔγραψε** "entering into an examination [of things] that he wrote about," i.e. the philosophical author defends in oral examination the account of the subject matter that he put in written form (275e3–5, 277e8). The written account thus concerns the same subject matter as the oral account, but whereas the written

account is capable only of providing amusement and reminding one who already knows, the oral account is capable of transmitting knowledge of the subject matter. **c6 λέγων αὐτὸς δυνατὸς τὰ γεγραμμένα φαῦλα ἀποδεῖξαι** "able in his own spoken discourse to make his writings seem trivial." For ἀποδεῖξαι meaning "make seem," cf. *Tht.* 166a γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξεν, LSJ s.v. II.2. φαῦλα makes clear that the author has no misplaced pride in his written compositions, yet the trivial status of his written compositions, in comparison with dialectic, does not mean that they are not artistic (261b1–2). **c6–d2 οὔ τι τῶνδε... ἐσπούδακεν ἐκείνων:** τῶνδε and ἐκείνων refer to the two kinds of *logoi* – written and spoken – discussed in the first part of the sentence: "such a person [i.e. one who meets the conditions expressed in the protasis] must not be referred to as if he had his name from these [written *logoi*], but [as if he had his name] from those [spoken *logoi*] that he is serious about." ἐσπούδακεν suggests dialectic; cf. 276e4–5 σπουδὴ... ὅταν τις τῆι διαλεκτικῆι τέχνηι χρώμενος.

278d4–6 Τὸ μὲν σοφόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε,... καὶ ἐμμελεστέρως ἔχοι: τὸ μέν forms an articular infinitive with καλεῖν; *sc.* καλεῖν with τὸ δέ. The distinction between divine perfection, which includes wisdom (246e1), and the human pursuit of wisdom is implicit in the palinode's contrast between the natural, effortless ascent of divine souls to the spectacle of Being and the difficult, at best partially successful, ascent of human souls (246e4–248c2). φιλόσοφος is used in Plato's particular sense based on its compound elements, viz. one who desires, and therefore seeks to acquire, only what he or she does not already possess, in this case, the perfect wisdom that belongs to the gods (*Lys.* 218a–b, *Smp.* 203c–204c); cf. 239b4n. for the conventional sense of φιλοσοφία, 257e1–2n. for Plato's use of unconventional meanings. φιλόσοφός is the appropriate term for the writer who meets the conditions laid out in 278c4–6 because it indicates his or her commitment to the kind of discourse that advances the pursuit of wisdom; in the face of that commitment the literary genre in which this writer writes is unimportant. S.'s sense of the impropriety of bestowing the term *sophos* on a human being contrasts with the self-promotion of politicians and sophists who lay claim to *sophia* overtly (258a7, 266c3–4). The distinction between *philosophos*, properly used of a human being who meets the specified conditions, and *sophos*, properly used of the gods, approximates S.'s distinction in the *Apology* between human wisdom and divine or superhuman wisdom (20d–23b). **d5 ἤ τοιοῦτόν τι:** only the thing itself matters, a fastidious concern for terminology being in bad taste (266e4–267a2n., *Tht.* 184c). Other terms that are apt for the philosopher: φιλομαθής (230d3), φιλόκαλος, μουσικός τις, ἐρωτικός (248d3), ἐραστὴς τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν (266b4–5), διαλεκτικός (266c1). **d5–6 μᾶλλόν τε ἂν αὐτῶι ἁρμόττοι καὶ ἐμμελεστέρως ἔχοι:** αὐτῶι refers to the person who creates written compositions in any of the three genres while maintaining a philosophical approach to his writings (278c4–d2). S. is making no judgment on whether Homer or Solon

(to say nothing of Lysias) or any other composer of written discourse qualifies as a philosophical author. He is merely making clear the conditions under which such authorship is possible. A dialectical philosopher may well undertake prose-writing, poetry, or law-writing if circumstances warrant: thus the philosophical legislator of the *Laws*, thus Stesichorus as a philosophical poet (243a6, 244a2), thus implicitly Plato himself as the author of his written dialogues (276c3–4n.). The philosopher's purpose in choosing to write prose, poetry, or laws, if and when he or she does so, is to use the psychagogic art of rhetoric to influence non-philosophers for their own benefit (Yunis 2009: 246–8). **d8–9 τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα τιμιώτερα . . . κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν** "the one who does not have more valuable things than the things he composed or wrote while turning [them] upside down over a period of time, pasting [them] together and taking [them] apart." The most conspicuous of the "more valuable things" which the non-philosophical writer lacks is precisely the dialectical form of discourse that instructs a partner and earns the philosophical writer his praiseworthy status. S.'s description of the non-philosophical writer's protracted, excessively fussy manner of composition – his most valuable possession – derides him and suggests both the sophists' "wonderful techniques" (269a6) and epideictic writings like those of Gorgias, Lysias (in the *Phaedrus*), and especially Isocrates, who took pride in his protracted manner of composition (4.11–14) and is about to be considered explicitly. ἄνω κάτω στρέφων suggests vain effort, as at 272b7–c1. στρέφων ἐν χρόνωι recalls S.'s ironic characterization of Lysias' prose-writing (228a1–2, 234e5–6n.); cf. Alcid. *Soph.* 4 for a similar critique of laborious composition. Like our expression "cut and paste," κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν refers to moving words and sentences around but is apt for papyrus, the sheets of which were glued together to make a roll (228b2n.); cf. Aspasia's creation of a funeral oration out of bits from Pericles (*Menex.* 236b): περιλείμματ' ἄττα ἐξ ἐκείνου συγκολλῶσα. The potency of Plato's own written prose suggests attention to detail; and later rhetorical tradition, which co-opted Plato into the canon of exemplary prose-writers, spoke of his artistic φιλοπονία and mythologized his incessant search for perfection in the opening sentence of the *Republic* (Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 25 = 2.133 Usener-Radermacher; Diog. Laert. 3.37). Yet what Plato mocks is not artistic φιλοπονία itself, but elevating it in a self-seeking manner over face-to-face, dialectical communication and philosophical pursuits (cf. S.'s similar point in regard to pleasing men and gods, 274a4–5n.). Joining this passage (as well as *Epist.* 7.341b–345a and the entire argument since 274b7) to a larger argument on Plato's so-called esoteric teachings, proponents of the Tübingen school of Platonic hermeneutics have argued that τιμιώτερα refers to Plato's esoteric teachings themselves and that in this passage Plato is declaring his refusal to commit these teachings to writing (Krämer 1959: 380–486, Szlezák 1985: 7–48; summary at Szlezák 1999: 51–4). This interpretation of τιμιώτερα is tendentious and untenable – chiefly because Plato differentiates between written and oral discourse not on the basis of content but on the basis of appropriate use – as has been made clear by Vlastos 1981: 394–8, Heitsch 1989, Kühn 2000.

Dalfen 1998 provides a comprehensive refutation of the esotericist approach to Plato.

278e1 ἐν δίκηι που ποιητὴν ἢ λόγων συγγραφέα ἢ νομογράφον προσερεῖς: the names themselves do not warrant reproach (278c1–4n.), but it is a matter of reproach for a writer to be classified merely with respect to his chosen literary genre since that indicates a lack of seriousness and philosophical pursuits (277e1–3). **e3 τῶι ἑταίρωι:** Lysias (237a9, 257c7, 264c8), who as a composer of discourse would benefit from being informed about the difference between writing prose as a philosopher and merely writing epideictic prose; cf. 243d5–e1n., 258d7–10.

278e4–279c6: CONCLUSION

The business of the dialogue is complete: S. has said what he wanted to say on *erōs* and discourse (278b5); Ph. has solemnly declared his intention to pursue philosophy (278b4, cf. 279c5); S. has clarified the message that Ph. is to take back to Lysias, his "beloved," in regard to his activity as a composer of discourse (278b5–e3). Ph. takes the opportunity to inquire regarding S.'s message for his "beloved," Isocrates, also a composer of discourse, which allows Plato to comment explicitly on his contemporary rival (278e4–279b3). Then, ready to depart the idyllic spot, addressing the gods who have inspired the conversation, S. prays for success in his quest for virtue and wisdom (279b8–c3). After Ph. joins the prayer, S. and Ph. acknowledge each other as friends and partners in the pursuit of wisdom and go (279c5–6).

278e4–279b3 On Isocrates. S.'s argument against the serious use of written texts and his derisive characterization of epideictic prose-writing are formulated for general applicability. Plato's use of Lysias, dead by 380 or soon thereafter, as the representative of Athens' rhetorical culture and S.'s rival for Ph.'s allegiance creates a distance between the argument in the dialogue and Plato's audience in the 360s or 350s when he likely wrote the dialogue (Introd. 7). Thus, even though Isocrates has intermittently been an implicit target (see notes at 235b2, 237d7–8, 239b4, 243a6, 261b1–2, 272a3–4, 278d8–9), Plato had reason to bring Isocrates into the dialogue explicitly, the only instance where Plato mentions Isocrates by name. Isocrates was the founder of a successful school of rhetoric and politics (Marrou 1956: 119–36), which rivaled the Academy as a school of higher education. He was the most prominent successor of the fifth-century sophists and the leading proponent of the written artistic rhetorical texts that were becoming ever more dominant in the fourth century (Livingstone 1998, Orth 2003). In addition, Isocrates laid claim to the word *philosophia*, to which of course Plato laid claim as well, as a token of his educational program (239b4n.). Plato uses irony to inform his readers, on the one hand, that he recognizes Isocrates as the chief representative of the contemporary rhetorical culture that

he opposes in this dialogue, and, on the other hand, that regardless of Isocrates' claim to *philosophia* he fails to attain the kind of philosophical discourse and written philosophical authorship that S. puts forward and defends. The artful manner in which Plato introduces Isocrates into the conversation maintains the dialogue's dramatic integrity (279a1–2n.) while allowing Plato to comment on his rival with specific reference to the argument on writing and philosophy in the dialogue (279a4–b3). Cf. Eucken 1983, Cooper 1985 on Isocrates vis-à-vis Plato. For the view that Plato's comments on Isocrates are not ironic, see Erbse 1971.

278e4–5 οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸν σὸν ἑταῖρον δεῖ παρελθεῖν "for certainly your companion too must not be overlooked." The second negative reinforces the first one (*AGPS* 67.11.2.G). **e7 τὸν καλόν:** the epithet suggests that S. is in love with – i.e. ardently admires – Isocrates in the way that S. has suggested Ph. is in love with Lysias (236b5n.), and that what makes Isocrates "beautiful" is his writing. S. accepts these suggestions so that Plato can make his point about Isocrates (279b2–3), but even within the fictional world of the dialogue they are not to be taken at face value. There is also no evidence that the historical S. was connected with Isocrates, hence Plato is not evoking an actual relationship between the two (Heitsch 1993a: 219–21). For καλός used with respect to intellectual endowment, cf. 279b8–c1 καλῶι... τἄνδοθεν and S.'s insistence that Theaetetus, known for being ugly, is καλός because he speaks well (*Tht.* 143e, 185e). **e7–8 τίνα αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι;** "what sort of person shall we say he is?," i.e. a philosophical writer or an epideictic writer like Lysias. On τίνα as predicate, cf. *Grg.* 449a εἰπὲ τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς, *AGPS* 61.8.0.

279a1–2 Νέος ἔτι, ὦ Φαῖδρε,... λέγειν ἐθέλω: S.'s prophecy is patently Plato's comment on Isocrates at the time he wrote the *Phaedrus*, when Isocrates, born in 436, would have been at least sixty-five and possibly into his eighties (Introd. 7). "Still young" suits the vague indications of dramatic date in the dialogue (Introd. 3); and it accommodates the conceit of a relationship with the older S. in which the whole passage is framed. But Plato is not concerned with chronology. Terms ascribing youth are notoriously vague and often indicate condescension on the part of the user: cf. Introd. note 11 on ὦ νεανία, Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.35 (νέος is applicable until the person is mature enough to serve on the Council, which is age thirty), Diog. Laert. 8.10 (Pythagoras divides the span of human life thus: παῖς εἴκοσι ἔτεα, νεηνίσκος εἴκοσι, νεηνίης εἴκοσι, γέρων εἴκοσι). The youth which S. ascribes to Isocrates enables Plato to shape S.'s "prophecy" of Isocrates around the idea of development from an immature stage to a mature one (279a8–b2n.). **a4–5 Δοκεῖ μοι ἀμείνων... ἤθει γεννικωτέρωι κεκρᾶσθαι** "in regard to his natural endowment [Isocrates] seems to me to be better than the level of the speeches associated with Lysias, and also to be blended with a nobler character." The comparative adjective followed by ἢ κατά signifies a different

order of magnitude between the comparanda (*AGPS* 68.25.2); cf. *Ti.* 40d περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἰπεῖν καὶ γνῶναι τὴν γένεσιν μεῖζον ἢ καθ᾽ἡμᾶς. περί with the accusative in the attributive position indicates a connection in a general way (*AGPS* 68.33.4); cf. 246b3–4 ἡ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἡνιόχησις. "The speeches associated with Lysias" must be paradoxical display pieces like the erotic speech in the dialogue as well as the logographic speeches that make up Lysias' corpus. The speeches for which S. praises Isocrates in the next sentence concern public matters and rhetorical and educational issues in general (next note), hence are the products of a nobler character. **a6–7** εἰ περὶ αὐτούς τε τοὺς λόγους . . . ἁψαμένων λόγων "[so it would not surprise as he grows older] if with regard to the very speeches that he works on now he should surpass those who have so far put their hand to discourse more than [he surpasses] children." To what speeches does S. refer when he pays Isocrates this compliment? Isocrates wrote two kinds of speeches that reflect discrete periods of his career, logographic speeches early on (speeches 16–21, in the years 403–393) and from about 390 onwards the series of public epideictic discourses on a variety of subjects for which he achieved renown (speeches 1–15). It was also around 390 or soon thereafter that Isocrates opened his school. By the mid 360s Isocrates had published ten such discourses that survive in whole or part, including *Against the sophists* (13, *c.* 390), *Panegyricus* (4, *c.* 380), *Helen* (10, *c.* 370). He added the *Antidosis* (15) in the mid 350s. S. has no reason to praise Isocrates' logographic productions, which are polished but not superior to those of Lysias in either technique or conception and which Isocrates himself later disavowed (15.36–41). S. must be referring to Isocrates' public written epideictic discourses, which would have been well known to Plato's contemporaries and in respect of which it can truly be said that Isocrates surpassed all others. In these speeches Isocrates builds up the sophistically based rhetorical culture that Plato contests. So when S. mentions speeches that Isocrates works on "now," he refers not to the dramatic date within the dialogue, at which time Isocrates had not yet begun to write publicly at all, but to the time when Plato wrote the *Phaedrus* and Isocrates was at his peak of professional accomplishment and fame. For S. to use νῦν to refer to Plato's day would disrupt the dramatic fiction, but no more so than the prophecy *ex eventu* itself, transparent as that device is. There is no reason why Plato should not pay Isocrates this compliment. Plato would be conceding, with irony, that Isocrates does well what he does without conceding that what he does is important, instructive, or beneficial; cf. S.'s ironic acknowledgment of Lysias as an accomplished professional writer (236d4–5). Plato's generosity is also ironic insofar as it sets up the rest of S.'s utterance, which combines ironic praise with implicit criticism. **a8–b2** ἔτι τε εἰ αὐτῶι . . . τῆι τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίαι "and further [it would not surprise] if these things [i.e. the speeches he works on now] should not suffice for him but some rather divine impulse should lead him to greater things. For, my friend, there is by nature a kind of philosophy in the man's mind." Double-edged: Isocrates' natural endowment suits him for philosophy,

like the souls at the top of the palinode's hierarchy of souls (248d2–3), which is high praise from Plato; but if Isocrates is to take up "greater things," which can only mean philosophy in Plato's sense, then he will give up his present occupation, i.e. the written epideictic speeches in which he excels and for which he is famed. The "rather divine impulse" that could possibly move Isocrates towards (Platonic) philosophy is left vague (τις . . . ὁρμὴ θειοτέρα), like the divine impulse that in the words of Plato's Parmenides actually affects S. (καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμὴ ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους, *Prm.* 135d). In the present context this impulse can only be divine *erōs*, for it is precisely divine *erōs* that moves souls towards philosophy. The movement towards "greater things" is expressed in psychagogic terms, as a force from outside that would lead (ἄγοι) him in the appropriate direction. The indefinite article τις attached to φιλοσοφία suggests that Isocrates occupies an ambiguous position between the (conventional) *philosophia* that he promotes (239b4n.) and the (true Platonic) *philosophia* that remains for him an as yet unrealized possibility; cf. the ambiguous position between rhetoric and philosophy occupied by Ph. earlier (ἐπαμφοτερίζῃ, 257b5). Since at the time of Plato's writing Isocrates was well advanced in years and entrenched in his career (279a1–2n.), a turn to philosophy on his part was unlikely in the extreme. The fact that he had not hitherto abandoned that career and advanced closer towards his natural potential is implicitly but clearly a reproach. Yet Plato retains the possibility that the "still young" Isocrates might give up his rhetorical practice and turn to philosophy, no matter how unlikely it was in fact that he should do so. It was important to retain that possibility. In the course of the dialogue we watch Ph. turn towards philosophy under S.'s tutelage, even though, apart from his appreciation for beauty, Ph.'s natural endowment might be considered to be less than fully philosophical. Though Lysias' natural endowment is said to be less than that of Isocrates, S. insists that Lysias be informed of what transpired under the plane tree so that he too might contemplate a turn from rhetoric to philosophy (278e3, 279b4; cf. 257b3–4). Earlier S. depicted Pericles as one who had the appropriate natural endowment for philosophical rhetoric and only needed a lucky encounter with Anaxagoras to fulfill his potential (270a2–6). By phrasing S.'s prophecy in terms of Isocrates' potential and leaving the matter open regardless of likelihood, Plato makes his point about his contemporary while maintaining decorum and demonstrating S.'s unstinting generosity, as befits the true μουσικός (268e1–2n.), towards all potential interlocutors, including sophistic pretenders.

279b2–3 ταῦτα δὴ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν . . . σὺ δ' ἐκεῖνα ὡς σοῖς Λυσίαι: S. and Ph. are to execute their responsibilities to their respective beloveds as befits philosophical *erastai*; cf. 236b5n., 278e7n. on the pederastic terminology. The nymphs and other divinities who oversaw the conversation (278b6–c1) give authority to the results of the conversation; hence παρὰ τῶνδε τῶν θεῶν. The deictic pronoun suggests reference to the votive offerings noticed earlier or possibly to the very

depiction of Achelous, nymphs, and Pan on the votive relief that was found in the vicinity (230b7n.). ἐκεῖνα refers to 278e3 ταῦτα, which refers to the message on philosophical authorship (278b5–e1). **b4–5 ἴωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πνῖγος ἠπιώτερον γέγονεν:** cf. 242a3–5 on the heat and leaving. S. reiterates Ph.'s ἴωμεν after he has laden it with meaning (279c6n.). **b6 εὐξαμένω πρέπει τοῖσδε πορεύεσθαι:** εὐξαμένω is attracted from the dative with πρέπει to the accusative with the infinitive (*AGPS* 55.2.7). The deictic pronoun refers to the gods (279b2–3n.). S.'s orientation towards the divine remains exemplary. **b8 Ὦ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί:** on the local gods and Pan, cf. 230b7n.; the Muses are included as well (278c1), represented by the cicadas overhead (262d3–5). The opening of this prayer at the end of the dialogue recalls the opening of S.'s prayer to Eros at the end of the palinode, ὦ φίλε Ἔρως (257a2). Pan and the nymphs caused S.'s nympholepsy (238d1n.) and were credited with the artistry that inspired S.'s speeches (262d3, 263d6–7). S. asks these gods not for the divine enthusiasm which is their province and which they bestowed on him earlier but for the philosophical virtues which he already strives to attain and which the moderate person (ὁ σώφρων) in particular embodies (279c2–3). Like the satyr Marsyas to whom Alcibiades likens S. (*Smp.* 215b–d) and like S. himself, Pan is ugly. The exterior ugliness suits the prayer for inner beauty. **b8–c1 δοίητέ μοι καλῶι γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν:** iambic rhythm (×–⏑–×–⏑–×–⏑–) but not an iambic trimeter because the line does not observe Porson's law (barring the rhythm – –⁝–⏑– at verse-end) and lacks a caesura after the first or third element of the second metron (×⁝–⏑– or ×–⏑⁝–). Iambic rhythm, which is closest to natural speech (Arist. *Rh.* 3.1408b33–4), suits the prayer's modest tone; cf. S.'s discomfort at uttering a hexameter, signifying epic verse, at the end of his first speech (241e1–2n.) as well as the unmetrical mock Homeric hexameters of the palinode (252b3–c1). δοίητε is optative of wish (*AGPS* 54.3.1), as νομίζοιμι, εἴη (c2). This last mention of beauty in the dialogue shifts the focus from the visible beauty that in the palinode arouses *erōs* (250b1–252a7) to the beauty that is a property of the soul (τἄνδοθεν). Implicit is the idea that inner beauty is a matter of virtue (wisdom, justice, piety, courage, moderation); cf. *Prt.* 309c–d, *Rep.* 4.444d–e.

279c1 ἔξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια: a person's exterior, physical attributes and circumstances have only secondary importance for his or her happiness (*Republic*). So S. prays not for any particular exterior circumstances but merely that the exterior circumstances (ἔξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω) be in harmony with (φίλια) his interior ones (τοῖς ἐντός), i.e. his soul, which is the primary concern. S.'s preference for interior resources over exterior ones recalls Ammon's preference for memory (μνήμη), an exclusively interior faculty (ἔνδοθεν), over reminding (ὑπόμνησις), an external event (ἔξωθεν) (275a2–6). **c1–2 πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν** "may I believe that the wise man is wealthy," which is a conviction that S. already holds (*Ap.* 29d–30b, *Rep.* 7.521a). This prayer, in place of the customary one for wealth (πλοῦτος) or prosperity (ὄλβος), is implicitly a

request to maintain the engagement with philosophy that provides S. with the basis for the conviction about the wise man that he already holds and wants to maintain. The figurative use of πλούσιον prepares for S.'s next request. **c2–3** τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτο ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων "and may I have as great a quantity of gold as none could bear and lead away but the moderate man." The optative δύναιτο functions like the optative in a subordinate conditional clause (*AGPS* 54.13.3). The prayer and thus the dialogue end with a riddle: how much gold can a moderate man bear and lead away? How much gold does S. pray for? It would be insipid for S. to pray for a moderate amount of gold, especially in his penultimate utterance of the dialogue. What would S. want with a moderate amount of gold? S.'s poverty, a result of his utter indifference to wealth, is a fundamental aspect of his character (227c8). μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν is a negative formulation of φέρειν τε καὶ ἄγειν, which is a common idiom for "plunder" (LSJ s.v. ἄγω A.I.3, φέρω A.VI.2); for the negative formulation, cf. *Laws* 10.884a τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μηδένα μηδὲν φέρειν μηδὲ ἄγειν. Thus S. prays to have no gold, for the moderate man will not plunder any gold at all. Yet the figurative use of πλούσιον in the preceding clause also lends a figurative sense to χρυσοῦ, which is brought out by the word order and can be construed thus: "but as for the quantity of gold [i.e. the gold that constitutes true wealth, viz. wisdom], may I have as much of it as . . . " (Gaiser 1989). S. previously used the word "golden" (χρυσοῦς) in a figurative sense, referring to Ph.'s good character (235e3n.). In the present case, taking μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν in a plain sense, S. prays to have as great a quantity of wisdom as the moderate man can acquire. How much wisdom is that? There is perhaps no strict upper limit to the wisdom which the moderate man in pursuit of wisdom can acquire except that it will be less than the perfect wisdom that belongs to the gods (278d4–6n.). Thus S. reaffirms his awareness of human and divine capacities, which he expressed in both the palinode (248a1–c2) and his comments to Ph. (273e3–274a3), this time appropriately in a prayer. Taking the moderate man as his model in the pursuit of wisdom, S. reaffirms his allegiance to the Delphic inscription (229e5) and his desire to see himself (*qua* human being) as "a gentler, simpler creature, whom nature has endowed with a divine, un-Typhonic portion" (230a4–5). Closing with a riddling comment that pertains to a central theme of the dialogue, as in the *Phaedo* (the cock to Asclepius) and the *Symposium* (one poet can write both comedy and tragedy), recalls and surpasses the witticisms that close Gorgianic–Lysianic display pieces (234c5n., 241d1n.). **c5** Καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτα συνεύχου· κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων: joining the prayer reiterates Ph.'s conversion to philosophy (278b4). Ph. quotes the well-known proverb not for the sake of sharing material goods but to join S. as a partner in the pursuit of wisdom, which is the one occupation that S. shares with his friends. καί answers μέν (279c4) (*GP* 374). **c6** Ἴωμεν: presumably back to the city, but the destination, left unstated, is unknown. By means of the first-person plural S. acknowledges Ph.'s use of the proverb about

friends and thus welcomes Ph. as his friend and partner in the pursuit of wisdom, which is their destination regardless of their physical movements. The verb of motion recalls the opening line of the dialogue and the dialogue's focus on the direction of the movement of the soul (227a1n.). The one-word utterance conveys finality even as it points to the future.

APPENDIX

SYNOPSIS OF THE *PHAEDRUS*

227a1–230e5: Prologue: along the Ilissus
  229c5–230a6: S. on rationalizing myth
  230b2–e1: S. on the beautiful spot under the plane tree
230e6–234c5: Lysias' speech on *erōs*
234c6–237a6: First interlude: S. to compete with Lysias
237a7–241d1: S.'s first speech on *erōs*
241d2–243e6: Second interlude: S.'s divine sign, Stesichorus' purifying palinode
243e7–257b6: S.'s second speech on *erōs*: the palinode
  243e7–245c4: introduction: traditional examples of beneficial divine madness
  245c5–257a1: *erōs* as beneficial divine madness
    245c5–249d3: the mythical setting
      245c5–246a2: formal proof of the immortality of the soul
      246a3–e3: the image of the soul as winged chariot
      246e4–247c3: the heavenly procession of divine and human souls
      247c4–e4: the divine view of the super-heavenly realm
      248a1–c2: the struggle of human souls to see true Being
      248c3–249d3: the law of Adrastea, the incarnation and reincarnation of souls, recollecting the Forms
    249d4–257a1: the heroic struggle and sublime victory of divine *erōs*
      249d4–250d7: the recollection of beauty and the arousal of *erōs* in the soul
      250e1–252c3: the lover's maddening experience of *erōs* in his soul
      252c4–253c6: the lover educates his beloved whereby both become like their leading god
      253c7–254e9: the conflict in the lover's soul when he approaches his beloved
      255a1–257a1: conclusion: the triumph and benefits of divine *erōs*
  257a2–b6: postscript: S. prays to Eros for himself, Lysias, and Ph.
257b7–259e1: Third interlude: from rhetorical speeches to dialectical inquiry
  257b7–258e4: what is good and bad speaking and writing?
  258e5–259d6: the cicadas as overseers of dialectical inquiry
259e2–274b6: Inquiry: what constitutes good and bad discourse: the art of rhetoric
  259e2–261a6: good discourse in the sense of discourse that persuades
  261a7–e4: definition: rhetoric is a kind of *psychagōgia*
  261e5–262c3: demonstration: the skilled speaker has knowledge of his subject matter
  262c4–266d4: examination of Lysias' and S.'s speeches for the presence or absence of rhetorical art

262d7–264e6: Lysias' speech lacks an argument, comparison to Midas epigram
264e6–266c1: S.'s speeches based on dialectic, consisting of collection and division
266d5–269d1: criticism of sophistic *technē rhētorikē*
266d5–267d9: the sophists' rhetoric books
268a1–269d1: the sophists' notion of *technē*
269d2–272b6: psychology
269d2–271c4: the skilled speaker needs to understand the nature of the soul
271c9–272b4: the skilled speaker's training in psychology
272b7–274b6: conclusion of the account of the art of rhetoric: no short cut
272d2–273e3: Tisias' probability arguments rejected
273e3–274a5: the proper use of rhetoric
274b7–278e3: Inquiry into the propriety of writing for the transmission of knowledge
274c5–275b2: myth of Theuth
275c5–278b4: playful written discourse vs. serious dialectic
278b5–e3: the conditions of philosophical writing
278e4–279c6: Conclusion
278e4–279b3: S. on Isocrates
279b8–c6: prayer and departure

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